Can Atheism Account For Rationality

[shunyadragon]

Of course they are, but they aren't laws, they are simply rules descriptive of the existing world.

The laws theories and hypothesis concerning the physical nature of our universe are descriptive base don our present knowledge, but ultimately there are laws or principles that are the foundation of our physical existence sometimes called the Laws of Nature. The principle assumption of Methodological Naturalism is that our physical existence is uniform and predictable based on the assumption that these Laws of Nature exist, and science is descriptive of the Nature of our physical existence.. Every time a theory or hypothesis is proposed and tested the assumption of uniformity of the Laws of Nature are tested.

[JimL]

I think, if you pay close attention, that most theistic people differentiate "mind" from "soul." Indeed, I asked my question about the "I" because I suspect you will find many who will term this "I" as arising from the soul. Ergo the soul has a mind, and a body (while living on this earth). So the question then becomes, does the mind arise from the soul - and the body is simply a tool for its corporeal expression, or does the mind arise from the body, and there is no such thing as a soul.

I'm cure Chrawnus will chime in if I have any of that wrong.

Yes, but, being that the mind and soul would be both one and the same thing, and the whole would be distinct from the material brain and body, the argument would amount to the same thing in either case, whether taken together or separately. There is no evidence of either, mind or soul, other than, as you pointed out previously, that of personal experience. Now that of course is my opinion, that there is no real evidence of either distnct souls, or distinct minds, seperate from the material brain and body, therefore in my opinion there is only one sound answer to your question, that being that the mind is synonomous with the brain, that what we think feel and experience is all in the brain, but that what we call that experience is, the mind.

[JimL]

The laws theories and hypothesis concerning the physical nature of our universe are descriptive base don our present knowledge, but ultimately there are laws or principles that are the foundation of our physical existence sometimes called the Laws of Nature. The principle assumption of Methodological Naturalism is that our physical existence is uniform and predictable based on the assumption that these Laws of Nature exist, and science is descriptive of the Nature of our physical existence.. Every time a theory or hypothesis is proposed and tested the assumption of uniformity of the Laws of Nature are tested.

Not seeing anything that I disagree with in that, shunya.

[JonathanL]

Because the statement I was responding to was your claim about them having a separate existence.

Well yes, separate as in "not the same thing", and not as in "one not depending on the other for it's existence" (I believe the mind and brain are separate in both senses, but I'm only arguing for the former in this thread).

Now the requirement is that the characteristic be "inherent?" The original comment was just about "no characteristics in common." And "where it can be found" would seem to me to be a fairly basic characteristic of a thing.

I'll admit I should have been clearer what I meant by a characteristic in my initial post, but let me assure you that I've always had "inherent characteristics" in mind in this discussion. So, "where it can be found" is not something I consider a basic characteristic of a thing, unless "where it can be found" is something that is an integral part of the nature what that thing is.

Again, "primarily" and "secondarily" are suddenly being added. I simply provided characteristics "mind" and "brain" have in common. I'm not even sure you can make that case for "primary" "secondary" without first assuming mind is primary and brain is secondary. If mind is given rise to by brain, the relationship would be exactly the opposite.

I don't agree it's suddenly at all. And I think it's pretty clear the way thoughts relate to the mind and the way they relate to the brain are completely different, so equating those two characteristics as being the same characteristic isn't something with which I'm willing to agree. As to whether thoughts are primarily associated with the mind and secondarily with the brain I'd assert that it at least appears like the relation between thoughts and the mind is far more "intimate" than the relation between thoughts and the brain. And absent compelling reasons to the contrary I think I'm justified in believing that "what it appears like is actually how it is", to put it in a slightly clumsy way.

Even if that were true, aren't the categories of characteristics themselves a characteristic shared by two things? Lobsters and men both have appendages is a "shared characteristic."

Well, I'm beginning to think I probably should have been more precise in my language.

I probably should have clarified that I meant inherent characteristics, by which I mean an attribute that is fundamental to the nature of the thing in question, and not an attribute that is dependent on it's relation to other things (unless how the thing relates to other things is a fundamental part of it's nature). But you are absolutely right that based on what I wrote in the initial post about common characteristics then lobster and men both having appendages would be a shared characteristic.

You are making an assumption here, again. If the brain gives rise to the mind (as I believe), calling it "non-sentient" is a bit of a stretch.

I don't think so at all. Even if I for some reason became an emergentist I don't see any compelling reason why anyone should believe the brain itself is sentient, instead of simply being the cause of a sentient mind. Even if one could precisely map every thought in the mind to a specific electro-chemical impulse in the brain I see no reason to think that the electro-chemical impulses that would give rise to the thoughts in the mind would themselves constitute sentience.

Chrawnus, this is somewhat akin to the other discussion I recently had about concepts and their existence. Although it takes a mind/brain to articulate/express/recognize something that deviates from the norm, if all the members of a species have vision and one member is born with a brain that does not have a proper vision center, that one individual will still deviate from the norm, even if there is no mind to express it or recognize it.

As for the concept of "error," I think I have to concede that point. Categorizations are actions of the mind. It is a value judgment. Without a sentient mind, value judgments don't exist.

Well, I would agree that if one person's brain has a vision center that isn't functioning properly or lacks a vision center altogether, then that individual and their brain would deviate from the norm. And their sensation of vision would also differ from other persons, or be lacking altogether. But the nature in which the brain and the mind would deviate from the norm would be quite different from each other. They would be still be similar, but not identical, or the same characteristics. But I will concede that based on my initial post where I didn't specify the type of characteristics I was thinking of then they probably would qualify as shared characteristics.

You are one of the rare individuals that would post any form of a concession here. I raise my (coffee-filled) glass to you.

Ever had an experience in a sensory deprivation tank? There is a complete lack of light or sound, and yet this persistent feeling of the "mind" being located in the "head" persists. I would love to have a chance to communicate with someone who lacks sight and hearing. I would be willing to bet they report the same thing. As for measuring, how do you know this to be true. An EEG is a physical measurement of the activity of the brain, which is electrochemical in nature. We literally radiate electromagnetic energy as we think that can be measured. Who is to say that what we experience as "mind" is not simply this electromagnetic energy. It meets many of the criteria we would expect: it's not a "thing," it's a "force." It occupies space - and is distinct from the thing that produces it. Perhaps, any being capable of producing a significantly complex electromagnetic field experiences that as "mind."

I'm not saying this is the fact - but I'm proposing a possibility that cannot, AFAICT, be excluded. It fits the scenario quite well. It comes into being as "mind" comes into being. It disappears as mind disappears. It is produced by the electrochemical activity of the brain. It is centered in the head. How can we blithely dismiss it as a possiblity?

I have not experienced being in sensory deprivation tank, no. But it seems to me like even if you completely deprived your hearing and vision from stimuli you would still have the feeling of the mind being located in the head based on memories of previous visual and aural stimuli, combined with the sensation of touch (as it seems to me like the sensation of touch, or rather, the mind's map of the body is also integral to our "feeling" of where the mind is located). I'm willing to bet that if you completely removed each and every single stimuli from all of the senses then your feeling of the mind being located in the head would also disappear, for the simple reason that you would have lost the sensation of even having a head in the first place. And I'm having a hard time seeing how you could "feel" like the mind is located in the head if you can't even feel your head, or any other part of your body for that matter, any more.

As for the brains electrochemical activity actually being the mind, well, I'm skeptical of that, to put it mildly. For one, one integral aspect of the mind and thoughts that electro-chemical activity seem to lack completely is intentionality. A mind can be focused on a specific subject, and thoughts are always about something, but I have a hard time seeing how electro-chemical activity can be either focused on anything (unless you equivocate between to different meanings of "focused"), or about something.

OK, perhaps "not viable" was too strong. "Not real" or "not actual" would have been better. When I look at the body of evidence, that mind is a function of brain seems to me (by far) the more plausible proposition. Psychologically (and historically), there are strong inducements to believe otherwise. But when you begin to peal apart the "why do we believe in an immortal mind/soul?" I find most of them end up devolving to "wishful thinking." But then again, I found the same to be true about the notion of gods. For me, it's all part of the same picture.

For me on the other hand, the experience has been the complete opposite. The more I read and consider the arguments for or against, the stronger the reasons to believe in the existence of God and an immortal soul seem to become, and just like you (except my experience has been about the arguments/reasons for not believing) I end up feeling like the arguments for the other side are simply "wishful thinking".

[Tassman]

Well Jim, I think we have two choices, an intelligible, rational universe, where consciousness develops is either the handi-work of a conscious rational Being or the result of the non-directed, non-conscious, non-rational forces of nature.

[JonathanL]

I'll be responding to multiple posts at once since I do not feel like posting several posts in a row. So here goes:

There is no evidence of a mind distinct from the brain, we have only evidence of the physical brain and what the experience produced by one feels like. Just because it feels like you are something other than your physical self, is not evidence that you are. In other words, what you feel is not incontrovertable evidence of what is, it isn't even a valid argument in itself.

Absent compelling reasons to think otherwise then "what you feel" is absolutely reason enough to be justified in believing in something, at least in some cases. But in this case it seems like you misunderstood the argument. It's not the fact that I "feel" like I'm not the same thing as my physical body that makes me believe I'm not the same thing as my physical body, rather it's the very existence of any sort of feeling, sensation or thought, and the very characteristics of these phenomena (intangibility being one of them, and intentionality, at least when it comes to thoughts, another) that makes me believe that the mind is distinct from the brain.

I see no reason to believe that anything in the brain and it's electro-chemical activity can be directly identified with any aspect of the mind, simply because the fundamental aspects of either differ so much from each other. For example, if someone had a complete reading of my electrochemical activity while watching a vase (just to take a random example), pointed to a specific part of it and said "this is the electro-chemical activity associated with your sensation of seeing a vase", my reaction would probably be, "That's interesting". But if they instead said "This electro-chemical activity is your sensation of seeing a vase" I would probably roll my eyes (or atleast experience the feeling one does when they want to roll their eyes, but choose not to in order to not appear disrespectful) and consider the person who uttered the statement as someone who has probably either not considered these things very thoroughly, or if they have, at least not rigorously.

That goes back to my reply to Chrawnus, i.e. that what it feels like is not evidence of what it is. I think that perhaps part of the reason one may feel that way, i.e that they are something other than their material body, is because it's what their brain was taught to feel.

If you're correct that the brain is the mind and we feel that we are other than our material body, then the one "teaching the brain to feel like there is a mind distinct from the brain" is the brain itself. The reason I believe that the mind and the brain is distinct is not because other people have taught me to associate my thoughts and sensations with a mind distinct from the brain, but because these thoughts and sensations by their very nature is unlike any aspect of the brain and it's activity. So if my belief about the mind and the brain being distinct is wrong it would only be because my brain is trying it's very hardest to convince me of this supposed falsehood and the fact that there doesn't seem to be any good reasons or evidence in favor of the supposed truth that the brain and the mind are identical.

I'll have to refer back to what I wrote to JimL in this very post that I'm writing right now. It's not an "experience" of the mind being separate from the brain that leads me to believe that the mind is separate from the brain, rather it's the very fact that we even have experiences (regardless of the type) in the first place, and the very non-physical nature of these experiences (even when you experience something physical the experience itself is something intangible) that leads me to believe that the mind is something that is itself not physical, even if it were true that it arose from and/or depended on the brain for it's existence.


Again, "subjective feelings" is not the argument. Or at least not in the way you seem to think. Even if every sensation and experience you had were some sort of delusion you would still be justified in believing your mind is distinct from your brain, because it's not the content of the delusion that's important for the argument, but the difference in attributes between the sensation and experiences that is deluding you in to believing what you're sensing and experiencing is real and the attributes with the neurological activity in the brain associated with these sensations and experiences.

Not being able to answer every single problem or dilemma associated with a theory or belief does not mean that there is an "incoherency" in that theory or belief, or, at the very least, the incoherency is not reason enough to abandon belief in it. If you really believed that you would not believe in a large swath of modern scientific theories that are currently plagued with unanswered dilemmas and issues, but which are still held to despite these dilemmas and issues because they're still the best theories we currently have.

[JonathanL]

I think, if you pay close attention, that most theistic people differentiate "mind" from "soul." Indeed, I asked my question about the "I" because I suspect you will find many who will term this "I" as arising from the soul. Ergo the soul has a mind, and a body (while living on this earth). So the question then becomes, does the mind arise from the soul - and the body is simply a tool for its corporeal expression, or does the mind arise from the body, and there is no such thing as a soul.

I'm cure Chrawnus will chime in if I have any of that wrong.

My personal belief about whether there is a difference between the soul and the mind (that is, if there's some sort of soul made up of a non-physical substance where the mind is located) or if they're essentially the same thing (i.e if the mind consists of that non-physical substance) is not really settled at this moment. Either belief seem plausible to me, and I have yet to come across any argument that has conclusive settled the question for me.

[Tassman]

I'll have to refer back to what I wrote to JimL in this very post that I'm writing right now. It's not an "experience" of the mind being separate from the brain that leads me to believe that the mind is separate from the brain, rather it's the very fact that we even have experiences (regardless of the type) in the first place, and the very non-physical nature of these experiences (even when you experience something physical the experience itself is something intangible) that leads me to believe that the mind is something that is itself not physical, even if it were true that it arose from and/or depended on the brain for it's existence.

Again, "subjective feelings" is not the argument. Or at least not in the way you seem to think. Even if every sensation and experience you had were some sort of delusion you would still be justified in believing your mind is distinct from your brain, because it's not the content of the delusion that's important for the argument, but the difference in attributes between the sensation and experiences that is deluding you in to believing what you're sensing and experiencing is real and the attributes with the neurological activity in the brain associated with these sensations and experiences.

One can understand that you believe your mind to be distinct from your brain, because it feels as though it is. But this is not to say that your feelings are necessarily accurate or reliable. This may well be a standard characteristic of relatively high intelligence common to all sentient creatures.

Not being able to answer every single problem or dilemma associated with a theory or belief does not mean that there is an "incoherency" in that theory or belief, or, at the very least, the incoherency is not reason enough to abandon belief in it.

The problem is that you are unable to answer any

If you really believed that you would not believe in a large swath of modern scientific theories that are currently plagued with unanswered dilemmas and issues, but which are still held to despite these dilemmas and issues because they're still the best theories we currently have.

[JonathanL]

believe your mind to be distinct from your brain, because it feels as though it is. But this is not to say that your feelings are necessarily accurate or reliable. This may well be a standard characteristic of relatively high intelligence common to all sentient creatures.

Again, this has nothing to do with "feeling" like your mind is distinct from your brain, and everything to do with the fact that the attributes that define the mind and it's contents (sensations, feelings, thoughts etc.) are wholly different from the attributes that define the physical brain and it's associated electro-chemical activity. The mind cannot be identical to the brain, or reduced down to the brain for the simple reason that simple logic dictates that if two things differ by even a single attribute they cannot be the same thing, and the mind and the brain differ with regards to several attributes, of which I've already mentioned two (intangibility vs physical/material and intentionality vs "non-intentionality".

The problem is that you are unable to answer any

The question about how the mind connects to the body is not the so big a problem so as to constitute a defeater for the belief that there exists an immaterial entity called the mind that is distinct from the body. Even if the question never gets a satisfactory answer it's still entirely justified to hold to the belief that the mind is it's own separate existence.

Of course it's grounded in existing knowledge, it's grounded in the existing knowledge that two things which do not share exactly the same attributes cannot be identical, but must be distinct from each other. What's not grounded in existing knowledge is the belief that the mind is identical to the brain, or brain activity.

[seer]

It is not a false dichotomy, you have simply chosen option two: the non-directed, non-conscious, non-rational forces of nature. And BTW Tass, the vast majority of creatures on earth survive fine without consciousness or self-awareness...

[Zara]

Again, this has nothing to do with "feeling" like your mind is distinct from your brain, and everything to do with the fact that the attributes that define the mind and it's contents (sensations, feelings, thoughts etc.) are wholly different from the attributes that define the physical brain and it's associated electro-chemical activity. The mind cannot be identical to the brain, or reduced down to the brain for the simple reason that simple logic dictates that if two things differ by even a single attribute they cannot be the same thing, and the mind and the brain differ with regards to several attributes, of which I've already mentioned two (intangibility vs physical/material and intentionality vs "non-intentionality".

These people may be beyond help. No really, sometimes one can become so entrenched in ones principles that one would have to deny the reality of ones own experience to remain consistent. The problem for them, is that in effect they condemn themselves to a form of conceptual hell, where they can't explore those 'subjective unverifiable feelings', even while the world's rich literature of people light years more intelligent in three different senses is there for all to see, for fear of them being mere illusions and not real. It would be tragic if it wasn't so sad.

I don't know what you're trying to achieve by arguing with them; while I find what you have to say interesting - they simply cannot comprehend it as meaningful. Its not their fault, I blame the philosophers of science, a handful of actual philosophers that push hard-core materialism as a way of "combating" religion, and universities that are not policing that part of conceptual space adequately.

[JonathanL]

These people may be beyond help. No really, sometimes one can become so entrenched in ones principles that one would have to deny the reality of ones own experience to remain consistent. The problem for them, is that in effect they condemn themselves to a form of conceptual hell, where they can't explore those 'subjective unverifiable feelings', even while the world's rich literature of people light years more intelligent in three different senses is there for all to see, for fear of them being mere illusions and not real. It would be tragic if it wasn't so sad.

I don't know what you're trying to achieve by arguing with them; while I find what you have to say interesting - they simply cannot comprehend it as meaningful. Its not their fault, I blame the philosophers of science, a handful of actual philosophers that push hard-core materialism as a way of "combating" religion, and universities that are not policing that part of conceptual space adequately.

Trust me, I'm not doing this for their sake.

[little_monkey]

Are the laws of logic absolute or not?

Which part of "they are a creation of the human mind, and as such they have limited applicability" don't you understand? If they are limited there are certainly not absolute. Do you have a reading problem?

If not then the law of non-contradiction does not necessarily hold universally,

The law of non-contradiction - a human concept with limited applicability- does not apply to any system that is non-binary.

which makes your musing or conclusions meaningless...

In what way would that make my "musing" meaningless? To realize that human concepts have limited applications does not render a "conclusion meaningless". Get real.

[Zara]

Trust me, I'm not doing this for their sake.

There's also a non-zero risk that once this form of nutjob gets into power, they might deem it necessary to genetically engineer future humans not to be susceptible to such "illusions" by just getting rid of feelings completely. The joy of science and insane "scientists".

[seer]

The law of non-contradiction - a human concept with limited applicability- does not apply to any system that is non-binary.


In what way would that make my "musing" meaningless? To realize that human concepts have limited applications does not render a "conclusion meaningless". Get real.

Of coarse it is, as Carp mentioned, rationally you are "dead in the water." You have no rational basis for any claim since it opposite could be equally true.