Those who are against substance dualism claim that there are conceptual difficulties with the idea that an immaterial mind can interact with a physical body.
The following is a quote from the IEP about dualism:
"Since the mind is, on the Cartesian model, immaterial and unextended, it can have no size, shape, location, mass, motion or solidity. How then can minds act on bodies? What sort of mechanism could convey information of the sort bodily movement requires, between ontologically autonomous realms? To suppose that non-physical minds can move bodies is like supposing that imaginary locomotives can pull real boxcars."
The article is located here: https://www.iep.utm.edu/dualism/#SH7c
How do you respond that to this claim?
The following is a quote from the IEP about dualism:
"Since the mind is, on the Cartesian model, immaterial and unextended, it can have no size, shape, location, mass, motion or solidity. How then can minds act on bodies? What sort of mechanism could convey information of the sort bodily movement requires, between ontologically autonomous realms? To suppose that non-physical minds can move bodies is like supposing that imaginary locomotives can pull real boxcars."
The article is located here: https://www.iep.utm.edu/dualism/#SH7c
How do you respond that to this claim?
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