Atheism And Moral Progress

[carpedm9587]

"Requires" as in "has as a necessary concomitant." "Discourse" as in "communication of ideas, information, etc., especially by speaking or writing." Even a moral principle that is meant for the self entirely, such as, "Cultivate one's talents," is communicated to oneself and to others by way of language, ie "communication of ideas, information, etc.,..." Even if the intended beneficiary is one person, the principle is discursive in intent. It's not like a private message written in a private code only one other person knows.

There is no "requirement" for me to communicate a moral principle that is entirely about myself to anyone else. If the moral principle is about interaction within the community - that requires dialogue, but that need is introduced by the context of community/society, just as ANY other interaction within a community requires dialogue, and the subjective nature of the context (e.g., morality, choosing a community logo, deciding on the rules for the common park, or making a decision about whether or not to drop the sickly oak in front of the town clerk's office) does not make that dialogue impossible. It may make it more difficult, but that does not mean these things are less subjective because subjectivity complicates dialogue.

In some matters, you're right. In other matters, there are normative limits and what would count as acceptable.

Yes - there are. Those "acceptable limits" are subjectively determined by the individuals that comprise the community or group in question and they can and do differ from context to context.

If I follow Oprah for reasons X in guiding my reading selection, no one will care. If I follow Oprah for reasons y in whether I keep my promise to you or not, then we're in a different justificatory framework.

So this is incredibly vague. I have no idea what you are trying to say or how this helps you make your case.

Then I realize that I have to submit my reasons to a different kind of scrutiny, a public ideal consensus.

I have to submit my reasons to scrutiny by whomever I wish to have agree with me. This is no different than the "burden of proof" discussion. The burden of proof is always on the person who wishes to convince. If I want to convince you to see things as I do, then I am going to have to provide enough evidence/information to influence your beliefs. If I do not, then I will not convince and your beliefs will not change. This says nothing about subjectivity/objectivity.

ETA: These days, even providing that information doesn't do much to change entrenched mind-sets.

It's no longer me the subjective self who is the justifier but a person in that situation.

This sentence makes no sense to me. The person seeking to justify is the justifier, by definition.

I adopt the moral point of view, where I set aside my immediate self-interest (I want to read this book cause Oprah said so and the cover looks cool). I think everyone does this but they interpret it differently depending on their prevailing theory. Randians see it as RSI, Utilitarians as the maximal utility output for the greatest numbers, etc. It's plastic enough to admit of numerous interpretations, ... but I think if you strip away the ideologies you get down to a basic irreducible moral pov, which stubbornly refuses to to be reduced to anything else.

You are back into the world of very vague generalities, Jim. I have no response because I have no idea what point you think you are making.

In most of these areas I agree with you. But just the fact that you are trying to persuade me and others of your ideas using reasons, the fact that you are trying to justify your ideas and reasons belies your subjectivism.

No - but nice try.

Look, Jim - we are discussing the nature of morality (ontology). I believe it is subjective and you believe it is objective. We are examining the issue and the arguments. I am giving you my reasons for why I think as I do, and I have been assuming you are doing the same. I have no vested interest in what you conclude when we are done. History on this site suggests your views will not be changed by anything I put forward. That is a matter of some indifference to me. Your belief that morality is objective will not make it so. You do not interact with me except on these pages, so your moral ontology and even your individual moral positions (which I don't actually know) will have little no impact on me.

This attempt, on your part, strikes me as the debate trick I once witnessed in a debate between a theist and an atheist, in which the theist claimed that all rationality springs from god, so the atheist had lost the debate simply by attempting to use logic to make his points. It's a bit of a "presumptive win," IMO. And, frankly, I don't care a great deal about "the win." I'm looking to see if you are offering any points I have not previously considered, and if they suggest an error in my own philosophy. What you do with your own philosophy is entirely your business.

What we are doing on here seems to be a performative faith that there is or at least ought to be a rational standard that we can appeal to for our reasons. A true subjectivist it seems would be content with his subjective opinions and not bother with all this -- since there are no objective rational standards to appeal to anyway, why bother?

So there are two thoughts that come to mind. First, we are talking about moral ontology - not individual moral principles, and having a discussion about the nature of moralizing. I like to test my own beliefs and find little use in testing them with someone who agrees with me. Learning, in my experience, arises largely from error and disagreement.

Second, moral subjectivism does not create a "why do I care what you think mindset," for the obvious reason: we live in community and a significant number of our moral precepts have to do with how we interact with others and they with us. If I see a harm being done by the community to something I value/cherish, I will do what I can to influence the community to a) value/cherish differently or (if they already do) reason differently from what they value/cherish to their moral positions. Only when that fails will I resort to ignore, isolate/separate, or contend. There is no inconsistency with moral subjectivism and this dynamic.

[Jim B.]

We assess all moral propositions from the perspective of our current moral framework. So if I used to hold position "X," and I now hold position "not X," I will see my previous position as "wrong." But let's look at what you are actually arguing here. This argument you are making is rooted in the subjective nature of morality, and can be made about ANYTHING that is subjective. Take the legal system. It is subjective to the society that conceives it. It can and does change, sometimes even reversing itself. Does that eliminate "legal fallibility?" No - it makes that fallibility likewise subjective. Unlike objective principles (e.g., laws of reason, laws or mathematics), there is no objective norm against which to assess moral fallibility. So you have just pointed out that subjective moralism does not have an not objective frame of reference. Again - this is not an argument - it is a repetition of something widely known and something I have never disputed: a subjective framework does not have an objective reference point. Much as you hate it - you just went back to "subjective moralism is not objective." We already know that.

This defense is one extended exercise in question-begging. "We assess all moral propositions from the perspective of our current moral framework," assumes a subjectivist perspective, and is like saying "The astronomer assesses the heavens from the perspective of his telescope lens." It assumes the point at issue.

You seem to assume that because moral positions change, this is sufficient evidence to conclude that there is no objective fact of the matter ( a variation of the so-called "Diversity Thesis" Argument ). But just pointing out that things change and that there is diversity of opinion about a matter is very poor evidence that there is no fact of the matter. There is wide disagreement about scientific and social facts, especially where strong interests are involved affected by different answers to a disputed question. This last factor is present throughout ehtics to a uniquely high degree. But the degree to which agreement can be achieved and social prejudices transcended in the face of strong social pressures suggests that something real is being investigated.

You say that I keep repeating "Morality can't be subjective because then it can't be objective," when in fact you are making the charge over and over that "Morality can't be objective because it changes" with no supporting evidence or arguments as to why this should be compelling.

Who says the legal system is subjective to the society that adopts it? Legal systems are rooted to a large degree in moral systems, so to assume that legal systems are subjective is to once again beg the crucial question. When law reverses itself, such as interracial marriage, it usually tracks underlying changes in moral thought, in this case having to do with racial equality and racial justice. To assume that the subjectivity of legal systems is based in nothing more than diversity among such systems is to repeat the same mistake of the "Diversity Thesis" Argument.

Furthermore, subjectivism is a meta-ethical theory about moral truths. There is no corresponding "Meta-legal theory" purporting to explain "legal truths" in a philosophic sense.

The "Fallibility Argument" is meant to point out the absurdity of the subjectivist position., that moral positions are 'true' for me only when i happen to be holding them. Consider the case of the "Moral Waverer": For him, torturing kids is fine for now, but it's morally wrong five minutes from now, and then it's fine five minutes later. This is a gedanken, and although it's unlikely to occur, it's a conceivability experiment meant to expose a conceptual weakness of the theory. The overwhelmingly common conception of morality and moral beliefs is that for moral assessments to make sense, they must be grounded in something more substantial and durable than the occurent propositional states happening in individual brains, states which are notoriously fleeting and unreliable.

"We already know that" you write at the end. That sums up pretty well the question-begging throughout. But then we already know that. I'll get to the second one next.

[carpedm9587]

Prescriptive statements are still odd for a subjectivist to make. I believe you've said, in effect, one ought to use reason in formulating one's moral framework.

No, I said most people use reason to go from what they value/cherish to their moral positions. If they do, and if you find a flaw in that reasoning, it is one way you can convince someone to alter their moral stance. Personally, I think using the basic laws of reason to arrive at any decision conclusion is a good thing, but there are a whole lot of people who come to moral conclusions for no other "reason" then disgust, fear, "following the herd" or any number of other approaches that defy logic. When I encounter those people, I know that reasoning is not a way to convince because reasoning is not how they arrived at their moral framework. That's actually a new insight I learned here, on TWeb.

What is "reason" for a subjectivist?

I don't speak for all subjectivists. For me - I refer to the basic laws/principles of logic.

Is there a standard for it that applies to all subjectivists?

Same answer.

What does it look like?

Really?

Who are you to say what this standard looks like?

Who says I was proposing a standard?

And why ought a subjectivist apply reason in formulating his or her moral framework?

I take it as a fundamental axiom that "being rational" is generally better than "being irrational"

How do you know that is not just your opinion?

Of course it's my opinion.

Who are you to tell other subjectivists what to do?

Where did I tell a subjectivist what to do?

Well, I'm not in the mood for dumpster diving right now and going back through all the posts, but I do recall some implicit if not explicit prescriptive statements.

Morality is often prescriptive. No disagreement there.

"Free" as in circumstantially free of internal and external contraints, not necessarily metaphysically free. So a "zombie" with an implant device in his brain preventing him from forming his 'own' beliefs and desires could still be a subjectivist?

Sentience is required for subjectivism. And since "subjective" means "influenced by opinions, ideas, and beliefs," I would take it as a given that a person rendered incapable of forming "opinions, ideas, and beliefs" cannot be said to be truely a subjectivist on any topic, by definition. But then again, "free" is not a binary condition. We are all influenced to greater or lesser degrees by a variety of factors, so our subjectivism will likewise bear the mark(s) of the influence.

No, it's not the case that only experience can be good or bad? But then you seem to contradict yourself immediately below.

I've reviewed what I've written and I'm not seeing it.

You're begging the question, of course. You ought to read Nagels' essay "Death." Good and bad require a valuer but when and how are the crucial questions. Deprivation and negation or privation all require 'valuers' as you say, but it's not as simple as you might think.

Again, you've gone into the world of vague generalities. However, if you believe it is possible for "good" or "bad" to be intrinsic to a "thing" independent of a valuer and a subjectively selected metric for making the evaluation, then cite just ONE example and you will utterly destroy my position.

The conditionality of morality is rationality, ie it is so broad and universal as to contain its own conditions for being, that is, be self-subsuming. In other words, if I can "understand" anything at all, then I by definition fall under the conditions of morality.

That's a mouthful, and I confess I have no clue what you are trying to say.

I could "value/cherish" counting the blades of grass in my backyard, or looking at online animal porn all day, but my cherishing these activities would not make them "moral."

They might. It depends on the degree to which you value/cherish. For example, if you came to believe that the blades of grass in your backyard were the very carpet on which your god would someday return, and this god wished you to ensure the number and health of each and every blade, like the proverbial cow in India, suddenly actions related to the grass would take on moral significance. So long as the value you place on your lawn is "I like the color and it feels good on my feet," actions related to it will not rise to the level of "morality." As I said from the outset - we reserve the world "morality" for actions related to the things we MOST value/cherish.

There are some other criteria for what constitutes moral actions other than the "value/cherishing" quotient that may not be up to me or any other individual.

Again - a vague statement. What criteria? If not up to you or an individual, then who are these criteria up to?

That's pretty wan as far as ridiculing goes!

Agreed.

Sorry if I hurt your feelings.

I don't believe I said anything about "hurt feelings." I was expressing disappointment in the occurrence of a dynamic whose absence I was enjoying. I made the decision, last week, to disconnect from the other discussions on this forum because they have run their course for me. They have become predictable and are largely an opportunity for ridicule and snide comments. The opportunity to learn is minimal, and the dynamic has become tiresome. You are the only one I am still engaging with and this is the only remaining topic. When we are done, my guess is I'll move on. If you engage in that fashion, that will likely happen sooner rather than later. Life's too short.

I have yet to see an argument from you. The closest you came was the "Diversity Thesis" which is pretty lackluster and a pretty terrible argument.

I have said, on several occasions, that there is really no "argument" (in the formal philosophical sense) to "prove" morality is subjective. I can provide you with the evidence that leads me to that conclusion (which I have done several times. However, proving a subjective reality is next to impossible, especially if the person I am speaking with is not experiencing it as subjective. That is common, presumably due to the long history of indoctrination into "objective moralizing." Of course there is also the possibility that I am wrong in my observations - but I have yet to see an argument that convinces me of that. And, frankly, if morality IS grounded in objective truths, then that argument should be fairly straightforward to make. Yet it is not manifesting.

The evidence that tells me that morality is subjective and the individual is the principle is all around us.

1) There is no moral position I have ever encountered that does not trace back to something the person who holds it values/cherishes and seeks to protect/enhance/nurture.
2) Valuing/cherishing is a subjective phenomenon.
3) When there is a disconnect between individual moral positions and those of the community, the vast majority of humans will eschew that of the community and hold to their own. When we agree with the "deviant," we see them as a "hero" for standing against "the crowd." When we disagree, we see them as a "threat" to the community - as even mentally ill.

1) and 2) speak to subjectivity, 3 speaks to primacy. Add to that the utter lack of any defensible argument for an objective basis for morality that does not reduce to a restatement of definitions, or any demonstrable, existent objective standard, and I remain a moral subjectivist.

I think with the amount of investment you apparently have in this thing, showing you that it "cannot be" is very unlikely. I think any reasonable person with an open mind would conclude that the preponderance of reasons points to it being highly implausible.

If you gave me any argument that was an actual argument and did not either beg the question, or simply reaffirm the difference between subjective/objective, then my mind would change. After all - it changed once. I used to be a moral objectivist. Now I am not. If I can change once, I can change again. But I am not going to change without a viable, compelling, argument. I would hope you would not either. If you do not find the evidence I have compelling, then you should maintain your belief that morality is a phenomenon rooted in objective truths.

Our disagreement in the ontological nature of morality is interesting, but it ultimately doesn't change anything. It simply informs me if/when we ever discuss a particular moral principle. I would need to uncover what you consider to be the "objective truth" underlying your position. If I cannot shift our view on it - then we will be left with ignore, isolate/separate, and/or contend.

[Jim B.]

And this is exactly the same argument. Stalin may indeed not be bad to Bill and bad to Bob and both statements can be true at the same time because they are not about the same person doing the assessing. We see this all the time. Your "there is no fact of the matter" is actually "there is no objective fact of the matter." Leaving "objective" out of the sentence does not eliminate the fact that this is what you are saying. To which my only response is, "correct - there is no objective fact of the matter, because morality is subjective." You have gone neatly back to objecting that "subjective morality is not objective." We know that. We also know that green is not blue. What is happening here is analogous to this:

Jim sees a car and notes the color is blue.
Michel sees the same car and notes the color is red.
Jim wants to convince Michel that the car is blue and not red.
To convince Michel, Jim keeps arguing "but red is not blue!"

This argument will not convince Michel. Michel already knows that red is not blue. Continually repeating "red is not blue" will not make the case that this particular car is blue rather than red.

Jim sees humans moralizing and notes that morality is based on objectively true/false moral principles.
Michel sees the same humans moralizing and notes that morality is based on subjectively true/false moral principles.
Jim wants to convince Michel that morality is based on objective moral principles, not subjective ones.
To convince Michel, Jim keeps arguing "subjective is not objective!"

This argument will not convince Michel. Michel already knows that subjective is not objective. Continually repeating "subjective is not objective" will not make the case that this particular thing (moralism) is objective rather than subjective.

As for "they are not disagreeing," that is an odd statement. Bob says "Pizza tastes good." Bill says "Pizza tastes bad." I doubt few people would question that these are subjective assessments, and I cannot imagine anyone saying "they aren't disagreeing" (double negative and all). They disagree in their assessment of the taste of pizza. Now it is true that Bob is actually saying "pizza tastes good to me," and Bob is actually saying "pizza tastes bad to me." So in reality, both statements can be simultaneously true with no logical conflict because they are about two different assessors of "taste." But this disagreement on how pizza tastes will then drive decision making between the two of them.

Once again, I am not saying "It is not subjective because it cannot then be objective." I am saying "It cannot be subjective because then it cannot account for moral disagreement, which a preponderance of ethicists would agree is an essential feature of morality." A kind of "morality" which forecloses on even the possibility of moral disagreement would be hard pressed to find many advocates among ethicists who'd label it as a legitimate moral system. You can either dispute that it cannot account for moral disagreement or you can dispute that disagreement is an essential feature of morality. It's hard to see how you escape the charge of "special pleading" if you choose the latter. And it's hard ot see how you escape the first horn of the dilemma either.

I agree that according to subjectivism there is no fact of the matter as to whether or not Stalin was a bad dude or not. That's not the issue here. I agree that Stalin is a good guy for Bob and a bad guy for Bill. What I am saying is "The moral status of Joseph Stalin" has no corresponding public truth value on subjectivism. So Bill and Bob are not arguing over "The moral status of Joseph Stalin." They are reporting on their respective subjective states. When they disagree over the taste of pizza, it is the actual taste of pizza as it interacts with their taste buds. There is a physical pizza there with common physical properties. Unless there is something physically wrong with either or both of them, there is a fact of the matter, assuming that radical empirical skepticism is not true, even though there's no way to adjudicate their disagreement because the disagreement turns on a matter of taste.

[Jim B.]

Of course it's my opinion.

But if that's just your opinion, then it might not be!

Sentience is required for subjectivism. And since "subjective" means "influenced by opinions, ideas, and beliefs," I would take it as a given that a person rendered incapable of forming "opinions, ideas, and beliefs" cannot be said to be truely a subjectivist on any topic, by definition. But then again, "free" is not a binary condition. We are all influenced to greater or lesser degrees by a variety of factors, so our subjectivism will likewise bear the mark(s) of the influence.

Well, "freedom" can be a binary concept. As in circumstantial freedom and even in metaphysical freedom, if such a thing exists. I can be free of debt, free from prison, metaphysically free. "Free" does not necessarily mean having no limits.

I've reviewed what I've written and I'm not seeing it.

I thought you were saying that only experiences can be good or bad. Maybe I misread. Now you're saying it's not the case that only experiences are good and bad.

Again, you've gone into the world of vague generalities. However, if you believe it is possible for "good" or "bad" to be intrinsic to a "thing" independent of a valuer and a subjectively selected metric for making the evaluation, then cite just ONE example and you will utterly destroy my position.

This is another tangent into another avenue of value theory that I'm not overly-inclined to go down at the moment. I wasn't saying that good or bad were intrinsic to a "thing" although that is possible. I can link to Nagel's article.

They might. It depends on the degree to which you value/cherish. For example, if you came to believe that the blades of grass in your backyard were the very carpet on which your god would someday return, and this god wished you to ensure the number and health of each and every blade, like the proverbial cow in India, suddenly actions related to the grass would take on moral significance. So long as the value you place on your lawn is "I like the color and it feels good on my feet," actions related to it will not rise to the level of "morality." As I said from the outset - we reserve the world "morality" for actions related to the things we MOST value/cherish.

You're referring to non-moral beliefs, not to morality. They have to do with what the person believes the fabric of reality is made up of. This is or can be logically distinct from morality and often heavily influences it. It accounts for much of the so-called diversity among moral beliefs.

Again - a vague statement. What criteria? If not up to you or an individual, then who are these criteria up to?

Morality is like religion or language or customs of any sort. It's a cultural institution. Who is the English language "up to"? Who is in charge?

I have said, on several occasions, that there is really no "argument" (in the formal philosophical sense) to "prove" morality is subjective. I can provide you with the evidence that leads me to that conclusion (which I have done several times. However, proving a subjective reality is next to impossible, especially if the person I am speaking with is not experiencing it as subjective. That is common, presumably due to the long history of indoctrination into "objective moralizing." Of course there is also the possibility that I am wrong in my observations - but I have yet to see an argument that convinces me of that. And, frankly, if morality IS grounded in objective truths, then that argument should be fairly straightforward to make. Yet it is not manifesting.

The evidence that tells me that morality is subjective and the individual is the principle is all around us.

1) There is no moral position I have ever encountered that does not trace back to something the person who holds it values/cherishes and seeks to protect/enhance/nurture.
2) Valuing/cherishing is a subjective phenomenon.
3) When there is a disconnect between individual moral positions and those of the community, the vast majority of humans will eschew that of the community and hold to their own. When we agree with the "deviant," we see them as a "hero" for standing against "the crowd." When we disagree, we see them as a "threat" to the community - as even mentally ill.

1) and 2) speak to subjectivity, 3 speaks to primacy. Add to that the utter lack of any defensible argument for an objective basis for morality that does not reduce to a restatement of definitions, or any demonstrable, existent objective standard, and I remain a moral subjectivist.



If you gave me any argument that was an actual argument and did not either beg the question, or simply reaffirm the difference between subjective/objective, then my mind would change. After all - it changed once. I used to be a moral objectivist. Now I am not. If I can change once, I can change again. But I am not going to change without a viable, compelling, argument. I would hope you would not either. If you do not find the evidence I have compelling, then you should maintain your belief that morality is a phenomenon rooted in objective truths.

Our disagreement in the ontological nature of morality is interesting, but it ultimately doesn't change anything. It simply informs me if/when we ever discuss a particular moral principle. I would need to uncover what you consider to be the "objective truth" underlying your position. If I cannot shift our view on it - then we will be left with ignore, isolate/separate, and/or contend.

I wholeheartedly agree with all of your premises but disagree with your frame. I disagree with how you interpret it. The commitments we bring to experience color what and how experience what we do. And with all due respect, I believe you misread my arguments, some of them rather badly, such as the "Plausibility Argument" and others where you saw question-begging and I don't believe there was any. Some of them could have been more clearly stated. But that's philosophy. And your mind changed once; was that when you converted to atheism? I get the impression that it all happened "of a piece, " that you might think of it all fitting together. But maybe I'm wrong.

I don't think we're going to get much further with this back and forth. Maybe we can shift gears, go deeper, ...

[Tassman]

That is not what I'm asking Tass, what would evidence for God look like? Are you speaking of scientific evidence? Historical evidence? Personal experience? What?

[seer]

Tass, if you say I have no evidence for God I have every right to ask what you mean by evidence. Scientific evidence? Historical evidence? Personal experience? If you have no idea what you mean by evidence then we are dead in the water.

[carpedm9587]

Once again, I am not saying "It is not subjective because it cannot then be objective."

YOu are not using those words, Jim - but that is what most of your arguments reduce to - when you look at them carefully.

I am saying "It cannot be subjective because then it cannot account for moral disagreement, which a preponderance of ethicists would agree is an essential feature of morality." A kind of "morality" which forecloses on even the possibility of moral disagreement would be hard pressed to find many advocates among ethicists who'd label it as a legitimate moral system. You can either dispute that it cannot account for moral disagreement or you can dispute that disagreement is an essential feature of morality. It's hard to see how you escape the charge of "special pleading" if you choose the latter. And it's hard ot see how you escape the first horn of the dilemma either.

So first, appealing to a majority doesn't make your case. A preponderance of ethicists are objectivists as well; it doesn't make them right. A preponderance of the planet believe in a geocentric universe. It didn't make them right either. "Truth" is not determine by vote.

Second, I have already responded to the "moral disagreement" argument multiple times. I'll let my previous responses stand.

I agree that according to subjectivism there is no fact of the matter as to whether or not Stalin was a bad dude or not. That's not the issue here. I agree that Stalin is a good guy for Bob and a bad guy for Bill. What I am saying is "The moral status of Joseph Stalin" has no corresponding public truth value on subjectivism.

Of course there is a "public truth" associated with Stalin: it is the collective view of the public. If an individual finds Stalin's actions immoral, they are (subjectively) immoral to that person. If the members of a society collectively find Stalin's actions immoral, then they are (subjectively) immoral to that society. What there is not is some abstract, objectively true for ALL people, evaluation of Stalin's actions. There is no "objectively true" moral norm against which to assess individual moral norms. There are simply a wide variety of individual voices, and a significant number of documented moral norms from a variety of cultures, societies, religions, etc., each of them subjective to the group that created it.

So Bill and Bob are not arguing over "The moral status of Joseph Stalin." They are reporting on their respective subjective states.

Correct - they are reporting their subjective assessment of the morality of Stalin's actions.

When they disagree over the taste of pizza, it is the actual taste of pizza as it interacts with their taste buds. There is a physical pizza there with common physical properties. Unless there is something physically wrong with either or both of them, there is a fact of the matter, assuming that radical empirical skepticism is not true, even though there's no way to adjudicate their disagreement because the disagreement turns on a matter of taste.

There is a real pizza that really interacted with taste buds. There was a real Stalin that really interacted with people and really committed particular acts with particular consequences. And there is no "guaranteed" way to adjudicate their disagreement for either situation. There are ways to influence someone to like pizza - but they are not guaranteed to be successful. There are ways to influence someone to evaluate Stalin differently than they currently do - but they are not guaranteed to be successful.

Why? Because there is no objective frame of reference to which all moral codes "ought" to align. None has ever been shown to exist. No one can make the case that one even MUST exist. You have not done so once since we started. Every challenge I have put forward to you - any one of which would defeat my position with ONE example, you have failed to provide even that one example.

When stripped right down to it, you are arguing that morality cannot be subjective because then it would lack a characteristic that can only be provided by being objective. First, you have not shown that subjective morality cannot have that characteristic. You have merely shown that subjective morality may not have that characteristic. Indeed, moral disagreement is still possible, but resolution of that disagreement is not guaranteed. Second, that argument reduces to what I have been saying all along: it cannot be subjective because then it's not objective - which is not an argument.

[carpedm9587]

But if that's just your opinion, then it might not be!

At this point, I have lost all track of what "that" refers to. As best I can tell, it refers to the proposition that "reasoning to a moral conclusion is better than not reasoning to a moral conclusion." If that's the argument you want to make, go for it. It would put you in the position of arguing that irrationality is somehow better than rationality.

Well, "freedom" can be a binary concept. As in circumstantial freedom and even in metaphysical freedom, if such a thing exists. I can be free of debt, free from prison, metaphysically free. "Free" does not necessarily mean having no limits.

Like I said - there's "free" and then there's "free." But this appears to be another tangent.

I thought you were saying that only experiences can be good or bad. Maybe I misread. Now you're saying it's not the case that only experiences are good and bad.

What I have said, consistently, is that "good" or "bad" are values assessed by a valuer according to a defined metric. Because each valuer can and does value differently, the assessment of "good" and "bad" is individualized. Because the choice of metric is subjectively selected, the assessment of "good" and "bad" is also subjective. If you think otherwise, I have already invited you to provide ONE example of an assessment of "good" or "bad" that does NOT involve a valuer and a subjectively selected metric. I believe, for any "good" or "bad" assessment you provide, I can give you a valuer/metric in which that same thing will be evaluated as the opposite of the value you propose.

This is another tangent into another avenue of value theory that I'm not overly-inclined to go down at the moment. I wasn't saying that good or bad were intrinsic to a "thing" although that is possible. I can link to Nagel's article.

I love to read - so link away. Meanwhile, I am not 100% sure this is a tangent. Your tendency to see "good" and "bad" as intrinsic to a thing rather than resident in the mind of the valuer seems to me to be of a part with your claim that morality is based on objective truths.

You're referring to non-moral beliefs, not to morality. They have to do with what the person believes the fabric of reality is made up of. This is or can be logically distinct from morality and often heavily influences it. It accounts for much of the so-called diversity among moral beliefs.

I am referring to what I have said from the outset: what we value/cherish is the basis for what actions we see as moral/immoral. Because valuing/cherishing is both individualized and subjective, so too is morality. It is the differences in how/what we value/cherish (and the relationship between the things we value/cherish) that primarily accounts for differences in moral principles. It is the significant commonality of our experience (i.e., all humans, all on this planet, all sentient, all mammals, all oxygen-breathing, etc.) that accounts for the significant cohesion in moral frameworks, and the significant alignment we see between documented social frameworks (i.e., the ten commandments, Hammurabi's Law, the UN charter on human rights, the Hindu concept of Dharma, etc.).

Morality is like religion or language or customs of any sort. It's a cultural institution. Who is the English language "up to"? Who is in charge?

Now this is a decidedly odd statement for someone arguing for morality being rooted in objective truth. What you have just said here is completely consistent with what I have been saying: morality IS (in part) a cultural institution. That is, the moral code of a society/group are subjective to that society/group. When the significant majority of any community adopts/accepts a particular moral precept, that precept becomes, in effect, the moral norm or that culture/society. No one person is "in charge." In this respect, it is indeed like language. That does not make the moral norm of a society a basis for claiming "objective truth" as a basis for morality in any way that is different from the fact that your moral framework is objectively real to me and mine to you. My ideas, opinions, and beliefs do not dictate your moral framework, so your moral framework has an objective reality to me. Likewise, my ideas, opinions, and beliefs do not dictate the cultural moral framework, so the cultural moral framework has an objective reality to me. But I do participate in the cultural framework. I can influence it. Likewise, I participate in language, and I can influence it. All of this is perfectly consistent with subjectivism.

ETA: and this statement also seems to fly in the face of your use of "normative." I have to admit that I have been struggling with your use of that word. I have long associated "normative" with "ought" and "prescription." Both are consistent with subjective morality. But there is another understanding of "normative" that it is rooted in what is "actually" moral/immoral, independent of a cultural/social/individual norm. THIS interpretation of "normative" is not consistent with subjective morality and ONLY consistent with morality as an objective exercise. Sometimes you seem to use normative in this latter sense, which seems to fly in the face of your statement above.

I wholeheartedly agree with all of your premises but disagree with your frame. I disagree with how you interpret it. The commitments we bring to experience color what and how experience what we do.

I am aware that you disagree with my view of the ontological nature of morality. However, you have not made a case that leads me to reinterpret the information and premises to align with yours.

And with all due respect, I believe you misread my arguments, some of them rather badly, such as the "Plausibility Argument" and others where you saw question-begging and I don't believe there was any.

Then respond to the response with more than vague generalities. Pick one you think is "the strongest," clean it up to the degree you think is necessary, and let's examine it.

Some of them could have been more clearly stated. But that's philosophy.

It is indeed. I am not a fan of locking someone into a "but you said" box. If you think you misstated something, or I misunderstood something, let's look at it and determine whether or not that is true. If I have no understood you, either due to your wording or my misinterpretation, then I am not actually responding to your arguments - which is a pointless exercise. I'd rather be responding to what you actually MEAN rather than what you may have said or what I may have misinterpreted.

And your mind changed once; was that when you converted to atheism? I get the impression that it all happened "of a piece, " that you might think of it all fitting together. But maybe I'm wrong.

My journey to atheism was a gradual one over a period of about a decade. At the outset I was a seminary student studying to be a catholic priest and very devoted to "my god." At the conclusion I was an atheist. It was not something I set out to be. Indeed, the journey started with a decision on my part to make myself more open to the god that I loved. I had no clue, when I made that decision, that it would result in me becoming atheist. Once I acknowledged that my views had become atheist, I began to explore the implications for all of the rest of the things I believed. Eventually, I came to a re-examination of my moral/ethical world. Unable to root morality in a god, I found myself asking "so what is morality actually rooted in?" I realize that there are atheists who are still so-called "moral realists" (I have to admit that I chuckle every time I type that label. From my perspective, it is a very ironic appellation) but I never found the arguments they made very compelling. That left me exploring the unthinkable: maybe morality is NOT rooted in objective moral truths. Maybe it is yet another in a long list of subjective/individualized parts of the human experience. When I let myself go there, the pieces fell into place and made sense. It's kind of like those "magic eye" images: once you can see the embedded image, it's pretty much impossible to NOT see it.

I don't think we're going to get much further with this back and forth. Maybe we can shift gears, go deeper, ...

I will follow your lead if you think there is a better way to proceed.

[seer]

If you think otherwise, I have already invited you to provide ONE example of an assessment of "good" or "bad" that does NOT involve a valuer and a subjectively selected metric. I believe, for any "good" or "bad" assessment you provide, I can give you a valuer/metric in which that same thing will be evaluated as the opposite of the value you propose.

That is so disingenuous Carp. Everything is dependent on subjective evaluation, including the laws of logic. Does that make then any less objective?

[carpedm9587]

That is so disingenuous Carp. Everything is dependent on subjective evaluation, including the laws of logic. Does that make then any less objective?

I have to wonder, Seer - are you even capable of engaging in a discussion without questioning the integrity of the other person?

Until you show some sign that you are, I think I'll leave you to talk with Tass. It's a tiresome dynamic.

[seer]

I have to wonder, Seer - are you even capable of engaging in a discussion without questioning the integrity of the other person?

Until you show some sign that you are, I think I'll leave you to talk with Tass. It's a tiresome dynamic.

Carp, that there are subjective evaluations tells us nothing about whether objective truths (moral or otherwise) exist or not. It is not even a consideration, logically. And you know this, that is why your objection is disingenuous.

[carpedm9587]

Carp, that there are subjective evaluations tells us nothing about whether objective truths (moral or otherwise) exist or not. It is not even a consideration, logically. And you know this, that is why your objection is disingenuous.

Disengenuous: not candid or sincere, typically by pretending that one knows less about something than one really does.

Last word to you. I'll engage again when you show yourself capable of posting without questioning my integrity. I've grown tired of that style of discussion and no longer want to engage with people who discourse in this fashion.

[carpedm9587]

Jim -

I'm not sure where you want to go with "deeper," but perhaps it might be worth taking a moment to define terms. You've been tossing "descriptive" and "normative" around in various posts, suggesting that I have a tendency to go back and forth between the two. Here is how I understand and use these terms:

DESCRIPTIVE: a claim that asserts that such-and-such IS the case.
NORMATIVE: a claim that asserts that such-and-such OUGHT to be the case.

Descriptive is fairly straightforward, and I think we both use it consistently. "Normative" is more complex. I will explain how I use the term.

When it comes to specific moral principles (e.g., wanton killing is wrong), these principles can be applied to past or future action (if you think about it, the present is an illusion and I do not include it here). When such a principle is applied to a past action, it is largely descriptive (the action has happened - and we are simply categorizing it). When it is applied to a future action, it can be either. We can be saying, "if you do this, it will be wrong," or we can be saying "you ought do (or not do) X." That is what moralizers do: assess the morality of action in the past or possible action in the future. When we are dealing with the future, and we are expressing an "ought," then morality becomes prescriptive (i.e., it identifies the recommended or "right" course of action).

When it comes to moral ontology, we can only be descriptive. We are talking about the nature of morality itself. We are not saying "morality ought to be X or Y." We are saying "morality is X or Y." You are saying that morality IS rooted in objective truths, and I am saying that morality IS rooted in subjective truths only. It does not matter what either of us WANTS it to be, or thinks it OUGHT to be. What matters is what it actually, objectively, IS.

Would you disagree with any of this?

[seer]

Disengenuous: not candid or sincere, typically by pretending that one knows less about something than one really does.

Last word to you. I'll engage again when you show yourself capable of posting without questioning my integrity. I've grown tired of that style of discussion and no longer want to engage with people who discourse in this fashion.

First Carp, don't be such a snowflake. Second, how can I see your objection as sincere? I know you know better from our past discussions. Logically there is no connection with our subjective understanding or evaluation of ethics with whether universal moral truths exist or not. Any more than our subjective evaluation of logical truths tells us about their universality.