Atheism And Moral Progress

[carpedm9587]

Arguments Against Moral Subjectivism Note: These are in rough form and need to be fine-tuned.

I'll respond to them as posted, an reprise if you fine-tune.

The Prescription Argument

1.) Moral subjectivism is the theory that there are no objective moral norms or standards.

2.) A norm or standard is objective if it can be applied to two or more individuals and when it holds true independently of an individual's beliefs and desires.

3.) If the subjectivist says that there are moral principles that more than one moral agent ought to follow, then

4.) he or she is saying that there are moral norms or standards that more than one moral agent ought to follow.

5.) In so doing, the subjectivist, therefore, contradicts subjectivism.

So this argument depends on what "ought to follow" means. If "ought to follow" is an appeal to an objective standard, then the moral subjectivist is indeed contradicting themselves. If the message is "ought to follow so as to achieve X," no such objective standard is necessary. Many of us begin our moral discussions with exploring the underlying value/cherish structure. We make the assumption that we value/cherish the same thing, and from that assumption springs the "ought." The moral subjectivist, to be consistent, should be saying things like, "if you value life and living, you ought to see wanton killing of others as immoral." A fairly reasonable argument can be made from valuing/cherishing life to a moral proscription on wanton killing.

The Autonomy Argument

1.) Subjectivism is the theory that moral principles are true relative only to an individual's beliefs and desires.

2.) Subjectivism requires the autonomy of individuals as its necessary condition. Given that there are individuals, their autonomy is required for subjectivism to exist for them.

3.) In order to insure the protection of the autonomy of individuals, respect for the autonomy of individuals is a moral necessity.

4.) Respect for the autonomy of individuals is therefore an objectively necessary moral principle for the existence of subjectivism, given that individuals exist, and that this truth does not depend upon an individual's beliefs or desires.

5.) There is therefore an objective moral principle which is true regardless of an individual's beliefs or desires.

6.) Therefore, subjectivism is false.

This one seems to fail at 2). What exactly is meant by the "autonomy of the individual" and why is it a requirement in order for moral subjectivism to be true? This seems to be an ill defined and unsubstantiated premise. Then 3) simply declares the existence of an objective moral norm (again unshown) and then says that its existence shows moral subjectivism is untrue.

Thought Experiment: Imagine a despot taking over a country and subjecting its people to his rule. Except for his family and a close circle of followers, he forces the entire rest of the population to undergo a simple painless procedure where a small implant is placed in their brains. This device prevents them from making 'free' decisions for the rest of their lives. They are content but they cannot decide things for themselves. Has something objectively bad happened?

No. There is no such thing as something "objectively bad." It is bad to someone(s) for some reason. "Bad" is a value judgment that requires a valuer. It is not the same as a mathematical or logical postulation. 2 + 2 will be four with or without a sentient mind to evaluate that in a given circumstance. A thing will be itself with or without a mind recognizing the fact. A thing is not "bad" if there is no mind there to assess this and a defined (and subjectively selected) metric for making the assessment.

The Is/Ought Argument

1.) The subjectivist claims that moral beliefs are really subjective preferences.

2.) Subjective preferences are descriptive statements.

3.) Moral beliefs are prescriptive statements.

4.) The subjectivist gives us no idea of how a descriptive statement is supposed to be converted into a prescriptive statement.

5.) Subjectivism is highly implausible at best and incoherent at worst.

Yeah - you've made this argument before and I don't find this version of it anymore compelling. I've actually responded to this. First, there is nothing to stop a proposition from being both descriptive AND prescriptive. We see this all the time and I've given examples. The argument appears to create a false dichotomy on which it hinges its conclusion.

[Jim B.]

Why? Justified to whom? Justified in terms of what?

Because when I adopt the 'moral point of view', as I'm arguing, I'm not just acting as me, my personal subjective self, as this person, but as a person, any person in a similar context. Therefore, I have to be ready to justify my action from that point of view within a space of reasons that are not my reasons except insofar as they are occurring inside my brain/mind. This space has to be equally accessible and open to all potential participants. This is what I meant by a "dialogue." The actual dialogue rarely happens. It's a conceptual construct.

Another level? What level would that be?

You 'see' only individual, subjective psychological motives when you look at morality and ethics. You claim that this is all that your unbiased seeing allows you to see. But I submit that this is all that your ontology allows you to count as 'real,' and hence, this is all that you can 'see.' Since morality and ethics are not primarily empirical fields, I submit that the ontology comes first. And of course, you'd be right in saying that my ontology orders how I see morality as well. But I'm saying that at least my ontology is more inclusive than yours; ie it includes and explains yours better than yours does mine. All you have is that "Religion did it!" But that doesn't explain very well all of the qualitative differences between our views that I've been pointing out. Something else must be at work.

What is "the equation?" What is the other side of the "equation?"

What I've been saying.

You do this a lot. These vague assertions and statements. So far, everything in this particular post falls in this category. They are not really arguments. What "things?"

Normativity, justification, the moral point of view....

How do you influence someone to do anything? How do you influence someone to like sushi? To enjoy a good football game? To spend time with their kids or help out at a soup kitchen? DO I need a "commonly agreed upon rational standard" to influence someone to vote? To eat spinach? To get a dog? Appealing to a commonly agreed upon rational standard is one way to influence. Sharing personal experience of a thing is another. Heck, I can influence some people by saying "Oprah thinks so." I can influence others by telling them the change in my life that X has wrought. Or the cataclysm that befell Y when they did X. To paraphrase someone, you are focusing on one possibility to the exclusion of all others.

I thought from the context it would be clear what I was talking about. I said "for reasons." The premise of my argument is that it's plausible that there are objective reasons for values, such as that suffering is a prima facie bad thing, or that the world not be destroyed by the equivalent of a child-alien for his amusement. When I adopt the moral point of view, I'm entering into this space (so the argument goes, just to make it clear so you don't accuse me of question-begging again) of reasons not as myself but as a person for whom at least some values hold objective truth. It is better that the child-alien not destroy the world for his amusement than not, and this value is not true just because I as Jim B. believe or desire it to be so for my own subjective psychological reasons. And this premise is more plausible than any possible premise of moral relativism.

Actually - it only does so if you assume the "reasons" are rooted in an objective framework - which is assuming your conclusion.

What are you and I doing right here? Even if we are not successful, we are still attempting to influence each other, and possibly third parties, through the use of reasons. Your presence and efforts here in this case speak far louder than your words, which is why I suggest again that you might be more of a realist than you give yourself credit for being.

And how does that accomplish anything? All sorts of unpleasant consequences arise from cars having combustion engines. That does not mean a car doe snot have a combustion engine. All sorts of unpleasant consequences arise from gravity. That doesn't mean gravity is false. You seem to be talking as if we have a choice. I'm not saying "morality SHOULD BE subjective." I am saying "morality IS subjective." All of the unpleasant consequences in the world won't change that reality.

That's how philosophical arguments work. You say "X is the case." And I say, "If X is the case, it entails Y and Z which are untenable." You either have to argue that "X does not in fact entail Y and Z" or that "Y and Z are not untenable." And I didn't say "unpleasant." I said "untenable." No we don't have a choice. I believe that morality simply IS normatively objective. I am saying the untenable logical consequences of relativism are a part of how we come to KNOW that it is false.

Unjustified to whom and by whom? "Justified" is again, a subjective notion. What is "justified" to one person is "unjustified" to another. What is "justified" in one legal system is "unjustified" in another. You continually circle back to positions that either beg the question - or simply make the "it can't be subjective because then it's not objective" argument in one form or another.

"There you go again." "Justified" is not a subjective notion, not in the way we are using that term. Do we have to revisit the meaning of the word "subjective"? You seem to want to cling to the "it can't be subjective..." line. Can you at least set that mantra aside and try to deepen your critique? Will you be using reasons that will be justified only subjectively?

[Jim B.]

So this argument fails at 2) by assuming its conclusion.

The argument is called the "Plausibility Argument." It's a "probabilisitic argument." It's about appearances, how things "appear" to most reasonable people. If you read more carefully, it's arguing from appearances to plausibility.

This argument fails in several ways. First, it fails at 2). Morality does not require moral dialogue. Moral dialogue is required when moral principles intersect with community/society. While I grant that most moral principles have to do with others, there are also moral principles that are entirely about the self. It is community/society that drives the need for dialogue - not morality. And that is true for everything involved with community/society - not just morality.

Morality requires the possibility of dialogue, the potential for and openness to dialogue. Morality cannot involve only the self in total isolation from others. It's social by its nature. Even "Develop one's talents" isn't entirely solipsistic. But that's kind of beside my point.

It also fails at 3) by assuming it's conclusion. As I have shown before, there are several avenues to moral dialogue that do NOT require an objective standard. From there, the rest of the argument again begs the entire question. Basically, this entire argument is a variation on "it cannot be subjective because then it would not be objective." And it begs the question quite badly.

You misunderstand what I mean by dialogue. I went into that in the previous post. Most of your examples require some commonly agreed to rational standard, such as what counts as credible evidence, although they would not all count as what is commonly thought of as 'rational dialogue.'. Exhortation, example setting etc don't neatly fit the parameters of rational dialogue. 3.) doesn't "beg the question" as you say, because there can be an ideal standard of rationality that is nevertheless compatible with moral subjectivism if it doesn't entail moral beliefs. At 5.) is where I say that no moral belief subjected to this scrutiny can be identical to one's subjective moral belief, so I can't be assuming that all beliefs subsumed under 3) are moral beliefs.

[carpedm9587]

Because when I adopt the 'moral point of view', as I'm arguing, I'm not just acting as me, my personal subjective self, as this person, but as a person, any person in a similar context. Therefore, I have to be ready to justify my action from that point of view within a space of reasons that are not my reasons except insofar as they are occurring inside my brain/mind. This space has to be equally accessible and open to all potential participants. This is what I meant by a "dialogue." The actual dialogue rarely happens. It's a conceptual construct.

Jim, you're assuming "objective" again without showing it. You are most certainly talking as you: that person. And A person. But "any" requires you to assume your conclusion.

You 'see' only individual, subjective psychological motives when you look at morality and ethics. You claim that this is all that your unbiased seeing allows you to see. But I submit that this is all that your ontology allows you to count as 'real,' and hence, this is all that you can 'see.' Since morality and ethics are not primarily empirical fields, I submit that the ontology comes first. And of course, you'd be right in saying that my ontology orders how I see morality as well. But I'm saying that at least my ontology is more inclusive than yours; ie it includes and explains yours better than yours does mine. All you have is that "Religion did it!" But that doesn't explain very well all of the qualitative differences between our views that I've been pointing out. Something else must be at work.

No - I don't see ONLY the individual. I understand the role of the community and society as well. I place PRIMACY on the individual, because that is my person experience, and the related experience of everyone I have ever talked to. It is my observation of the experiences of those around me. So there is no difference in inclusivity - only in primacy. And your claim to "explaining better than mine" is a highly subjective (and unsubstantiated) claim. The role of religion in promoting the objective framework model is fairly clear, and traces to the punisher god concept. It is consistent to all of the major religions. As fro "qualitative differences," again I have n idea what this vague reference is to. Qualitative differences between what and what?

What I've been saying.

You have proposed no equation that I am aware of, or parts thereof that I have omitted.

Normativity, justification, the moral point of view....

Subjective moralism has no difficulty with normativity, as I have shown. "Justification" is a vague term you have tossed around and still not explained, and is also a subjective concept. I haveno idea what "the moral point of view" refers to.

I thought from the context it would be clear what I was talking about. I said "for reasons." The premise of my argument is that it's plausible that there are objective reasons for values, such as that suffering is a prima facie bad thing, or that the world not be destroyed by the equivalent of a child-alien for his amusement. When I adopt the moral point of view, I'm entering into this space (so the argument goes, just to make it clear so you don't accuse me of question-begging again) of reasons not as myself but as a person for whom at least some values hold objective truth. It is better that the child-alien not destroy the world for his amusement than not, and this value is not true just because I as Jim B. believe or desire it to be so for my own subjective psychological reasons. And this premise is more plausible than any possible premise of moral relativism.

And you are assuming your conclusion again. I have shown over and over that good/bad are subjective assessments. The values do not reside in a thing instrinsically, but rather in the assessment of the valuer. Suffering is bad? Objectively? Tell that to the sadomasochist. Tell that to the weight lifter with the "no pain, no gain" mantra on their T-shirt. As for the child-alien destroying the world - it is better for most of us if they do not. But then we have a subjective valuing of our living/existence. The child-alien may not value our existence whatsoever, and instead value their own amusement more. You are, again, asserting objective frameworks you cannot show to exist or demonstrate must be the foundation for morality. All you can do is point to widespread agreement that most of us would see the actions of the child-alien as "immoral." Widespread agreement is not contrary to subjective morality. Indeed, it is predicted.

What are you and I doing right here? Even if we are not successful, we are still attempting to influence each other, and possibly third parties, through the use of reasons. Your presence and efforts here in this case speak far louder than your words, which is why I suggest again that you might be more of a realist than you give yourself credit for being.

What we are doing here, Jim, is discussing the ontological nature of morality and moralizing. We are the equivalent of two people disagreeing about helio-centric vs. geocentric. We are disagreeing about the nature of reality with respect to human (or sentient) moralizing. I am boldly stating that no moral statement is EVER objectively true or false - its truth of falseness can only ever be measured/expressed/derived subjectively. And I agree that I am a moral realist - but I avoid the term because my use of it does not align with yours. To me, a "moral realist" is someone who accurately grasps the REAL nature of morality (i.e., as subjective). It is why I find it the ultimate in irony that people who cling to the notion of morality as grounded in objective moral truths call themselves "moral realists" when I consider them out of touch with the actual nature of morality.

That's how philosophical arguments work. You say "X is the case." And I say, "If X is the case, it entails Y and Z which are untenable." You either have to argue that "X does not in fact entail Y and Z" or that "Y and Z are not untenable." And I didn't say "unpleasant." I said "untenable." No we don't have a choice. I believe that morality simply IS normatively objective. I am saying the untenable logical consequences of relativism are a part of how we come to KNOW that it is false.

And I was responding "untenable consequences," which just shifted to "untenable logical consequences." Assuming your insertion of "logical" means you believe you have found a logical contradiction that makes subjective morality a failed principle, I submit that you have not shown this. You have merely asserted it over and over again. I have responded to each of the problems" you have brought up and shown that they are NOT problems, and that you are pretty consistently begging the question OR resorting to some form of "it cannot be subjective because then it would not be objective." I will grant you that your versions of this latter argument are more subtle than Seer's, but you two are troding the same ground.

"There you go again." "Justified" is not a subjective notion, not in the way we are using that term. Do we have to revisit the meaning of the word "subjective"? You seem to want to cling to the "it can't be subjective..." line. Can you at least set that mantra aside and try to deepen your critique? Will you be using reasons that will be justified only subjectively?

OK - so then your challenge is to show how something is or is not justified in a way that is objectively true. I am claiming that there is no assessment of "justified" that is nt rooted in a subjectie assessment. This is true in the legal world (i.e., the notion of legally justified) and is it likewise true in the moral world. You will inevitably end up asserting "justified" in terms of something you value/cherish - and that will be your reasoning. But if you think you can do otherwise...I would like to see it.

As for setting the line you dislike aside and deepening the critique, if the arguments you make keep going to that place, I'm going to keep pointing it out. This is one of the primary reasons I have concluded that moral truths are subjective in nature: because the counter arguments usually end up being some form of exactly that non-argument. At least you can SEE that this is a non-argument (though you cannot seem to see that you keep going there). I don't think Seer ever really apprehended that "it cannot be subjective because then it wouldn't be objective" is not an actual argument.

Then there are the other two approaches Seer was somewhat infamous for resorting to: the appeal to outrage and the appeal to trivialization. They were happening so often I started calling them Techniques 1, 2, and 3 respectively to reduce typing.

[carpedm9587]

The argument is called the "Plausibility Argument." It's a "probabilisitic argument." It's about appearances, how things "appear" to most reasonable people. If you read more carefully, it's arguing from appearances to plausibility.

And it still fails at 2) for the reason I cited. It asserts as a premise what it is trying to show as a conclusion.

Morality requires the possibility of dialogue, the potential for and openness to dialogue. Morality cannot involve only the self in total isolation from others. It's social by its nature. Even "Develop one's talents" isn't entirely solipsistic. But that's kind of beside my point.

No - it doesn't "require" it. Morality in the context of society/community requires openness to dialogue. But then so too does legality, road planning and other infrastructure development, and even common behavioral norms that have nothings to do with morality (i.e., acceptable greetings, respect for personal space, etc.). It is not "morality" that requires the dialogue - it is morlaity in the context of society/community - as I previously noted.

You misunderstand what I mean by dialogue. I went into that in the previous post. Most of your examples require some commonly agreed to rational standard, such as what counts as credible evidence, although they would not all count as what is commonly thought of as 'rational dialogue.'. Exhortation, example setting etc don't neatly fit the parameters of rational dialogue. 3.) doesn't "beg the question" as you say, because there can be an ideal standard of rationality that is nevertheless compatible with moral subjectivism if it doesn't entail moral beliefs. At 5.) is where I say that no moral belief subjected to this scrutiny can be identical to one's subjective moral belief, so I can't be assuming that all beliefs subsumed under 3) are moral beliefs.

The only "rational standard" my previous examples "require" are the basic laws of logic. But then these are necessary for ANY rational discourse in either the subjective or objective realm. Beyond that, I can engage in a moral dialogue with anyone in any arena if I understand how moralizing works (by reasoning from what is valued/cherish to actions that impact these things) and then using that understanding to discuss any given moral principle with anyone whatsoever. And the argument has gone well off the rails before it ever gets to 5). 3) is not a true premise and the question begging begins at 4).

[Tassman]

Tass you said I did not have "substantive evidence." What is substantive evidence? Scientific evidence? What?

[Jim B.]

This argument fails in several ways. First, it fails at 2). Morality does not require moral dialogue. Moral dialogue is required when moral principles intersect with community/society. While I grant that most moral principles have to do with others, there are also moral principles that are entirely about the self. It is community/society that drives the need for dialogue - not morality. And that is true for everything involved with community/society - not just morality.

You'd have to know what "moral dialogue' means first before you knew if the argument fails at 2.) Morality is a discursive activity, like virtually every field of human activity, so yeah, morality requires moral dialoque. And even if there are moral principles entirely about the self, that does not mitigate the need for moral dialogue at all.

It also fails at 3) by assuming it's conclusion. As I have shown before, there are several avenues to moral dialogue that do NOT require an objective standard. From there, the rest of the argument again begs the entire question. Basically, this entire argument is a variation on "it cannot be subjective because then it would not be objective." And it begs the question quite badly.

Nearly all the examples you cited required some standards of rationality that are equally open to all participants, such as "What counts as justifiable reasons for believing or doing something?" "Who/What counts as a justifiable witness/evidence?" "Why should I put my faith in Oprah?" "Or in Carp?" How should I spend my time and energy? There are some areas of opinion and action that are deemed private and usually exempt from public criticism, and this demarcation changes, but there are other areas that are generally regarded as open to public rational critique. These comments only have to do with public opinion and not necessarily with how things really are. And it does not necessarily cut along the "objective/subjective" line either.

[Jim B.]

So this argument depends on what "ought to follow" means. If "ought to follow" is an appeal to an objective standard, then the moral subjectivist is indeed contradicting themselves. If the message is "ought to follow so as to achieve X," no such objective standard is necessary. Many of us begin our moral discussions with exploring the underlying value/cherish structure. We make the assumption that we value/cherish the same thing, and from that assumption springs the "ought." The moral subjectivist, to be consistent, should be saying things like, "if you value life and living, you ought to see wanton killing of others as immoral." A fairly reasonable argument can be made from valuing/cherishing life to a moral proscription on wanton killing.

Yes, when pressed you can always conditionalize your "ought" to get out from under that burden. The thing is, you'd be surprised how often you've slipped into the "prescriptive mode" in our exchanges. And I'm sure you can come up with a 'condition' under which to explain every one of them. Let's see, I think you've talked at length about the importance of rational coherence of the subjectivist's values, how his principles ought to be in line with his values and his values ought to be in line with the best evidence, etc.... If I ask the subjectivist how I as a fellow subjectivist ought to think and act, what do you think s/he would say? And would they conditionalize their answer?

This one seems to fail at 2). What exactly is meant by the "autonomy of the individual" and why is it a requirement in order for moral subjectivism to be true? This seems to be an ill defined and unsubstantiated premise. Then 3) simply declares the existence of an objective moral norm (again unshown) and then says that its existence shows moral subjectivism is untrue.

I probably could have written this one better. Subjectivism requires that people act on their own free will, I assume? If people have no wills of their own, as in the thought experiment, they can't form their own beliefs and desires, and so they couldn't be subjectivists, or could they?

No. There is no such thing as something "objectively bad." It is bad to someone(s) for some reason. "Bad" is a value judgment that requires a valuer. It is not the same as a mathematical or logical postulation. 2 + 2 will be four with or without a sentient mind to evaluate that in a given circumstance. A thing will be itself with or without a mind recognizing the fact. A thing is not "bad" if there is no mind there to assess this and a defined (and subjectively selected) metric for making the assessment.

So only experiences are good or bad? That's an odd proposition. If I painlessly convert you to the state of a perfectly content 3 month old infant for the rest of your life (Thomas Nagel's example) nothing bad has happened to you? Deprivation can also be a bad thing. A loss, a negation can be a bad thing,not just something experienced.

Yeah - you've made this argument before and I don't find this version of it anymore compelling. I've actually responded to this. First, there is nothing to stop a proposition from being both descriptive AND prescriptive. We see this all the time and I've given examples. The argument appears to create a false dichotomy on which it hinges its conclusion.

Your examples were not to the point though. They were things like: If you want to go to the Post office, you ought to turn left. Those are conditional oughts. Morality has to do with unconditional oughts, with oughts that are categorical, normative, and universalizable. The examples about pizza check none of those boxes. Feel free to post some of your own arguments whenever! Ifever!

[Jim B.]

The Fallibility Argument (Again)

Moral Subjectivism is the theory that a person's subjective moral beliefs and/or desires actually constitute moral truths. If this is true, how does the theory account for moral fallibility? If I say that I believe that X is morally wrong, the subjectivist would have to say that for me, X is in fact morally wrong. That is my moral truth. But if two weeks later I change my mind and come to believe that X is actually morally permissible, and that I was mistaken two weeks before, what would the subjectivist say? That the moral truth has changed? That I was wrong two weeks ago but correct now? Or that I am wrong now about being wrong two weeks ago? At what time in my life am I 'right' about moral truths?

The Moral Disagreement Argument

Imagine two moral subjectivists having a disagreement. Bob says that Stalin was a bad person. Bill says that Stalin was not a bad person. According to moral subjectivism, there is no public moral fact of the matter as to whether or not Stalin was a bad person. There are only subjective beliefs and desires regarding the matter. So, consequently, Bob and bill cannot be disagreeing about whether in fact "Stalin was a bad person" according to subjectivism, because there is no fact of the matter. For this moral theory, asking this question independently of subjective beliefs is like asking "How much does beauty weigh?" When Bob and Bill think they are disagreeing about Stalin's moral character, they are really talking about their respective beliefs and desires, and about nothing else.

[carpedm9587]

You'd have to know what "moral dialogue' means first before you knew if the argument fails at 2.) Morality is a discursive activity, like virtually every field of human activity, so yeah, morality requires moral dialoque. And even if there are moral principles entirely about the self, that does not mitigate the need for moral dialogue at all.

Jim - my issue is with the word "requires." Morality in the context of community/society requires dialogue - but that is a function of community/society - not of morality per se. You are (once again) associating a need/requirement to the wrong attribute of a thing. And when morality is about the self entirely, it may benefit from dialogue, but it does not require it. Combining these, the argument fails because one of its premises is not true.

Nearly all the examples you cited required some standards of rationality that are equally open to all participants, such as "What counts as justifiable reasons for believing or doing something?"

Why does this have to be a common standard? Again - this is my point. What "justifies" for one person will "not justify" for another. What "justifies" for one society will "not justify" for another. Justification itself is a subjective concept. How one will see it will depend on their opinions, ideas, and beliefs.

"Who/What counts as a justifiable witness/evidence?" "Why should I put my faith in Oprah?" "Or in Carp?" How should I spend my time and energy? There are some areas of opinion and action that are deemed private and usually exempt from public criticism, and this demarcation changes, but there are other areas that are generally regarded as open to public rational critique. These comments only have to do with public opinion and not necessarily with how things really are. And it does not necessarily cut along the "objective/subjective" line either.

Sorry, Jim, but most of this simply is not true. As with morality, there can be dialogue and agreement on what constitutes "justification," but the entire exercise is subjective and the individual will have primacy in that decision/evaluation. There is no "objective standard" for "putting faith in Oprah." Widespread alignment on a moral precept or the sense of "justification" does not mean it is based on a "common standard" any more than widespread enthusiasm for pizza, Beenie Babies, or pet rocks does.

[seer]

That is not what I'm asking Tass, what would evidence for God look like? Are you speaking of scientific evidence? Historical evidence? Personal experience? What?

[carpedm9587]

Yes, when pressed you can always conditionalize your "ought" to get out from under that burden. The thing is, you'd be surprised how often you've slipped into the "prescriptive mode" in our exchanges.

Of course I have. Morality is not only our process for categorizing past and present actions, it is our process for categorizing future actions as well. That leads us to prescription. There is nothing about this that is inconsistent with subjectivism. I have out lined this argument several times, and shown how we engage in subjective prescription all the time.

And I'm sure you can come up with a 'condition' under which to explain every one of them. Let's see, I think you've talked at length about the importance of rational coherence of the subjectivist's values, how his principles ought to be in line with his values and his values ought to be in line with the best evidence, etc.... If I ask the subjectivist how I as a fellow subjectivist ought to think and act, what do you think s/he would say? And would they conditionalize their answer?

Actually, I don't believe I ever said "importance." What I DID say was that incoherence in a moral framework, when the person holding that moral framework is a rational, reasoning, thinking person, is an avenue for engaging in moral dialogue. I don't believe I ever said his moral framework "ought" to be aligned with what he/she values/cherishes. I noted that morality is our process for selecting actions that protect/enhance/nurture what we value/cherish. It's rather like saying "our shopping is the process we use for securing food that we enjoy and nourishes us." There is a difference between: "shopping is the process used to secure food that we enjoy and nourishes us" and "we ought to shop for food that we enjoy and nourishes us." The first is descriptive of what shopping is. The second is prescriptive. I have made the former statement - but not the latter. I have been discussing the nature of morality - not specific moral positions.

I probably could have written this one better. Subjectivism requires that people act on their own free will, I assume? If people have no wills of their own, as in the thought experiment, they can't form their own beliefs and desires, and so they couldn't be subjectivists, or could they?

Well...no. At least not the way you frame it here. Morality in general assumes that the moral agent is "free" to form moral positions. Of course, there is "free" and there is "free." None of us is ever 100% "free." We are constrained in many ways - and influenced in even more. But subjectivism doesn't require this freedom per se. You are again attributing something to the wrong part of the "equation," as you say. Anything that is subjective requires a sense of I - of sentience. Otherwise, by definition, there is no individual whose beliefs, opinions, ideas color the conclusion. But there is no "ought" associated with this. The fact is, without "I" there is no possibility of subjectivism. Likewise, with no mass there is no possibility of gravity. That doesn't mean that a thing "ought to have mass."

So only experiences are good or bad?

No.

That's an odd proposition. If I painlessly convert you to the state of a perfectly content 3 month old infant for the rest of your life (Thomas Nagel's example) nothing bad has happened to you? Deprivation can also be a bad thing. A loss, a negation can be a bad thing,not just something experienced.

Nothing "objectively" bad has happened to me - because "bad" is a value assessment that requires a valuer. It is "bad to X for reasons Y," it is not just "bad" in and of itself. A tornado is not "bad." Pulling the trigger on a gun is not "bad." Pulling the lever on a line of gas is not "bad." A thing has no value until it is valued. That would seem to me to be fairly self evident.

Your examples were not to the point though. They were things like: If you want to go to the Post office, you ought to turn left. Those are conditional oughts. Morality has to do with unconditional oughts, with oughts that are categorical, normative, and universalizable. The examples about pizza check none of those boxes.

Yes - they are conditional oughts...as are moral oughts. "If you want to protect/enhance/nurture X you ought to do (or not do) Y." The post office example is actually quite universalizable, given the same post office and starting position, ANYONE who wishes to go to that post office ought to turn left. I am assuming you are using "categorical" to mean "unambiguously explicit and direct." Any conditional ought can be made unambiguous and explicit. I'm not sure why normative is an issue here. Both the moral "ought" and the "post office" ought deal with behavior. The difference is one concerns things we cherish/value deeply, and one concerns something we cherish/value fleetingly and trivially. I believe I started out by saying morality is a form of sorting, and is about subjective preferences - different in degree from "valuing/cherishing pizza" but not in kind. Indeed, if one were to value/cherish pizza sufficiently, they would begin to express acts related to pizza in moral terms. Consider India and the lowly cow.

Feel free to post some of your own arguments whenever! Ifever!

I'm disappointed. My impression was that you were an exception to the rule around here - more interested in exploring the concept then scoring cheap emoji points and ridiculing. Was that a false impression?

As for arguments, I've given mine, Jim. They are based on observation, experience, and my understanding of the human person. There is no "logical proof" that morality is subjective. If someone can a) show me that it cannot be or b) actually demonstrate the existence of objective moral standards, then my position will change. Until then, I will believe what I see around me every day, and what my reason tells me is simple common sense.

[carpedm9587]

The Fallibility Argument (Again)

Moral Subjectivism is the theory that a person's subjective moral beliefs and/or desires actually constitute moral truths. If this is true, how does the theory account for moral fallibility? If I say that I believe that X is morally wrong, the subjectivist would have to say that for me, X is in fact morally wrong. That is my moral truth. But if two weeks later I change my mind and come to believe that X is actually morally permissible, and that I was mistaken two weeks before, what would the subjectivist say? That the moral truth has changed? That I was wrong two weeks ago but correct now? Or that I am wrong now about being wrong two weeks ago? At what time in my life am I 'right' about moral truths?

We assess all moral propositions from the perspective of our current moral framework. So if I used to hold position "X," and I now hold position "not X," I will see my previous position as "wrong." But let's look at what you are actually arguing here. This argument you are making is rooted in the subjective nature of morality, and can be made about ANYTHING that is subjective. Take the legal system. It is subjective to the society that conceives it. It can and does change, sometimes even reversing itself. Does that eliminate "legal fallibility?" No - it makes that fallibility likewise subjective. Unlike objective principles (e.g., laws of reason, laws or mathematics), there is no objective norm against which to assess moral fallibility. So you have just pointed out that subjective moralism does not have an not objective frame of reference. Again - this is not an argument - it is a repetition of something widely known and something I have never disputed: a subjective framework does not have an objective reference point. Much as you hate it - you just went back to "subjective moralism is not objective." We already know that.

The Moral Disagreement Argument

Imagine two moral subjectivists having a disagreement. Bob says that Stalin was a bad person. Bill says that Stalin was not a bad person. According to moral subjectivism, there is no public moral fact of the matter as to whether or not Stalin was a bad person. There are only subjective beliefs and desires regarding the matter. So, consequently, Bob and bill cannot be disagreeing about whether in fact "Stalin was a bad person" according to subjectivism, because there is no fact of the matter. For this moral theory, asking this question independently of subjective beliefs is like asking "How much does beauty weigh?" When Bob and Bill think they are disagreeing about Stalin's moral character, they are really talking about their respective beliefs and desires, and about nothing else.

And this is exactly the same argument. Stalin may indeed not be bad to Bill and bad to Bob and both statements can be true at the same time because they are not about the same person doing the assessing. We see this all the time. Your "there is no fact of the matter" is actually "there is no objective fact of the matter." Leaving "objective" out of the sentence does not eliminate the fact that this is what you are saying. To which my only response is, "correct - there is no objective fact of the matter, because morality is subjective." You have gone neatly back to objecting that "subjective morality is not objective." We know that. We also know that green is not blue. What is happening here is analogous to this:

Jim sees a car and notes the color is blue.
Michel sees the same car and notes the color is red.
Jim wants to convince Michel that the car is blue and not red.
To convince Michel, Jim keeps arguing "but red is not blue!"

This argument will not convince Michel. Michel already knows that red is not blue. Continually repeating "red is not blue" will not make the case that this particular car is blue rather than red.

Jim sees humans moralizing and notes that morality is based on objectively true/false moral principles.
Michel sees the same humans moralizing and notes that morality is based on subjectively true/false moral principles.
Jim wants to convince Michel that morality is based on objective moral principles, not subjective ones.
To convince Michel, Jim keeps arguing "subjective is not objective!"

This argument will not convince Michel. Michel already knows that subjective is not objective. Continually repeating "subjective is not objective" will not make the case that this particular thing (moralism) is objective rather than subjective.

As for "they are not disagreeing," that is an odd statement. Bob says "Pizza tastes good." Bill says "Pizza tastes bad." I doubt few people would question that these are subjective assessments, and I cannot imagine anyone saying "they aren't disagreeing" (double negative and all). They disagree in their assessment of the taste of pizza. Now it is true that Bob is actually saying "pizza tastes good to me," and Bob is actually saying "pizza tastes bad to me." So in reality, both statements can be simultaneously true with no logical conflict because they are about two different assessors of "taste." But this disagreement on how pizza tastes will then drive decision making between the two of them.

[Jim B.]

Jim - my issue is with the word "requires." Morality in the context of community/society requires dialogue - but that is a function of community/society - not of morality per se. You are (once again) associating a need/requirement to the wrong attribute of a thing. And when morality is about the self entirely, it may benefit from dialogue, but it does not require it. Combining these, the argument fails because one of its premises is not true.

"Requires" as in "has as a necessary concomitant." "Discourse" as in "communication of ideas, information, etc., especially by speaking or writing." Even a moral principle that is meant for the self entirely, such as, "Cultivate one's talents," is communicated to oneself and to others by way of language, ie "communication of ideas, information, etc.,..." Even if the intended beneficiary is one person, the principle is discursive in intent. It's not like a private message written in a private code only one other person knows.

Why does this have to be a common standard? Again - this is my point. What "justifies" for one person will "not justify" for another. What "justifies" for one society will "not justify" for another. Justification itself is a subjective concept. How one will see it will depend on their opinions, ideas, and beliefs.

In some matters, you're right. In other matters, there are normative limits and what would count as acceptable. If I follow Oprah for reasons X in guiding my reading selection, no one will care. If I follow Oprah for reasons y in whether I keep my promise to you or not, then we're in a different justificatory framework. Then I realize that I have to submit my reasons to a different kind of scrutiny, a public ideal consensus. It's no longer me the subjective self who is the justifier but a person in that situation. I adopt the moral point of view, where I set aside my immediate self-interest (I want to read this book cause Oprah said so and the cover looks cool). I think everyone does this but they interpret it differently depending on their prevailing theory. Randians see it as RSI, Utilitarians as the maximal utility output for the greatest numbers, etc. It's plastic enough to admit of numerous interpretations, ... but I think if you strip away the ideologies you get down to a basic irreducible moral pov, which stubbornly refuses to to be reduced to anything else.

Sorry, Jim, but most of this simply is not true. As with morality, there can be dialogue and agreement on what constitutes "justification," but the entire exercise is subjective and the individual will have primacy in that decision/evaluation. There is no "objective standard" for "putting faith in Oprah." Widespread alignment on a moral precept or the sense of "justification" does not mean it is based on a "common standard" any more than widespread enthusiasm for pizza, Beenie Babies, or pet rocks does.

In most of these areas I agree with you. But just the fact that you are trying to persuade me and others of your ideas using reasons, the fact that you are trying to justify your ideas and reasons belies your subjectivism. What we are doing on here seems to be a performative faith that there is or at least ought to be a rational standard that we can appeal to for our reasons. A true subjectivist it seems would be content with his subjective opinions and not bother with all this -- since there are no objective rational standards to appeal to anyway, why bother?

[Jim B.]

Of course I have. Morality is not only our process for categorizing past and present actions, it is our process for categorizing future actions as well. That leads us to prescription. There is nothing about this that is inconsistent with subjectivism. I have out lined this argument several times, and shown how we engage in subjective prescription all the time.

Prescriptive statements are still odd for a subjectivist to make. I believe you've said, in effect, one ought to use reason in formulating one's moral framework. What is "reason" for a subjectivist? Is there a standard for it that applies to all subjectivists? What does it look like? Who are you to say what this standard looks like? And why ought a subjectivist apply reason in formulating his or her moral framework? How do you know that is not just your opinion? Who are you to tell other subjectivists what to do?

Actually, I don't believe I ever said "importance." What I DID say was that incoherence in a moral framework, when the person holding that moral framework is a rational, reasoning, thinking person, is an avenue for engaging in moral dialogue. I don't believe I ever said his moral framework "ought" to be aligned with what he/she values/cherishes. I noted that morality is our process for selecting actions that protect/enhance/nurture what we value/cherish. It's rather like saying "our shopping is the process we use for securing food that we enjoy and nourishes us." There is a difference between: "shopping is the process used to secure food that we enjoy and nourishes us" and "we ought to shop for food that we enjoy and nourishes us." The first is descriptive of what shopping is. The second is prescriptive. I have made the former statement - but not the latter. I have been discussing the nature of morality - not specific moral positions.

Well, I'm not in the mood for dumpster diving right now and going back through all the posts, but I do recall some implicit if not explicit prescriptive statements.

Well...no. At least not the way you frame it here. Morality in general assumes that the moral agent is "free" to form moral positions. Of course, there is "free" and there is "free." None of us is ever 100% "free." We are constrained in many ways - and influenced in even more. But subjectivism doesn't require this freedom per se. You are again attributing something to the wrong part of the "equation," as you say. Anything that is subjective requires a sense of I - of sentience. Otherwise, by definition, there is no individual whose beliefs, opinions, ideas color the conclusion. But there is no "ought" associated with this. The fact is, without "I" there is no possibility of subjectivism. Likewise, with no mass there is no possibility of gravity. That doesn't mean that a thing "ought to have mass."

"Free" as in circumstantially free of internal and external contraints, not necessarily metaphysically free. So a "zombie" with an implant device in his brain preventing him from forming his 'own' beliefs and desires could still be a subjectivist?

No.

No, it's not the case that only experience can be good or bad? But then you seem to contradict yourself immediately below.

Nothing "objectively" bad has happened to me - because "bad" is a value assessment that requires a valuer. It is "bad to X for reasons Y," it is not just "bad" in and of itself. A tornado is not "bad." Pulling the trigger on a gun is not "bad." Pulling the lever on a line of gas is not "bad." A thing has no value until it is valued. That would seem to me to be fairly self evident.

You're begging the question, of course. You ought to read Nagels' essay "Death." Good and bad require a valuer but when and how are the crucial questions. Deprivation and negation or privation all require 'valuers' as you say, but it's not as simple as you might think.

Yes - they are conditional oughts...as are moral oughts. "If you want to protect/enhance/nurture X you ought to do (or not do) Y." The post office example is actually quite universalizable, given the same post office and starting position, ANYONE who wishes to go to that post office ought to turn left. I am assuming you are using "categorical" to mean "unambiguously explicit and direct." Any conditional ought can be made unambiguous and explicit. I'm not sure why normative is an issue here. Both the moral "ought" and the "post office" ought deal with behavior. The difference is one concerns things we cherish/value deeply, and one concerns something we cherish/value fleetingly and trivially. I believe I started out by saying morality is a form of sorting, and is about subjective preferences - different in degree from "valuing/cherishing pizza" but not in kind. Indeed, if one were to value/cherish pizza sufficiently, they would begin to express acts related to pizza in moral terms. Consider India and the lowly cow.

The conditionality of morality is rationality, ie it is so broad and universal as to contain its own conditions for being, that is, be self-subsuming. In other words, if I can "understand" anything at all, then I by definition fall under the conditions of morality.

I could "value/cherish" counting the blades of grass in my backyard, or looking at online animal porn all day, but my cherishing these activities would not make them "moral." There are some other criteria for what constitutes moral actions other than the "value/cherishing" quotient that may not be up to me or any other individual.

I'm disappointed. My impression was that you were an exception to the rule around here - more interested in exploring the concept then scoring cheap emoji points and ridiculing. Was that a false impression?

As for arguments, I've given mine, Jim. They are based on observation, experience, and my understanding of the human person. There is no "logical proof" that morality is subjective. If someone can a) show me that it cannot be or b) actually demonstrate the existence of objective moral standards, then my position will change. Until then, I will believe what I see around me every day, and what my reason tells me is simple common sense.

That's pretty wan as far as ridiculing goes! Sorry if I hurt your feelings. I have yet to see an argument from you. The closest you came was the "Diversity Thesis" which is pretty lackluster and a pretty terrible argument. I think with the amount of investment you apparently have in this thing, showing you that it "cannot be" is very unlikely. I think any reasonable person with an open mind would conclude that the preponderance of reasons points to it being highly implausible.