A shared challenge regarding the foundation of ethics

[Anomaly]

Leibniz also makes the statement that God could not create a world in which 2 + 3 = 6. His point is the same about ethics.

What we are looking for is that which cannot be different, which could not, no matter how the world was created, be different. That kind of moral truths

Addendum to last post... I think truth itself meets the criteria of predominant value or qualitative state that could not be different in other worlds. I can't imagine a universe in which the false would have acceptable normative value or could be the quality beings would strive for. In his great little book On Truth Harry Frankfurt writes, "...notions of truth and of factuality are indispensable...for imbuing the exercise of rationality with meaningful substance. They are indispensable even for understanding the very concept of rationality itself. Without them, the concept would have no meaning, and rationality itself (whatever it might turn out to be, if anything, in such deprived conditions) would be of very little use."

This is a consideration of truth from just one perspective--its relationship to the rational--but it seems to me its indispensability can be extrapolated out seamlessly to the moral sphere too. Even if the Genesis account of creation is metaphor the symbolic structure of a wholly true [perfect] existence stained by fragmental falsity is, given truth's requisite necessity as our 'value of choice', to me a strong proof of God's hand in the book's inspiration. And similar connections are found throughout, strengthening its revelatory relation to God as Truth.

[shunyadragon]

Coming in late and not sure the thread is still alive, but been reading here and wanted to share an idea aimed to these comments from post #25.

Seer:
Charles:

I've been working on a hypothesis following Avicenna that truth is in the essence of things. [Bear with me, this is actually going somewhere pertinent to the op.] I broaden this to the notion that from a reductive point of view, essence contains value or one of two possible denominations--true or false. Following traditional Christian thinking, human choice has the power to fragmentally falsify what was originally a wholly true creation.

Presuppositions relevant to the discussion are:
1) All goods are derivatives of truth. Degrees of falsification produce degrees of good; perfect is an interchangeable term with wholly true. This works for moral and material things, i.e., the value of a bar of gold (in reference to the assigner(s) of gold's value) is relative to its impurities. Impurity is a falsification of the purity or truth of gold.
2) Truth has two aspects, descriptive (virtually inert) and prescriptive (forceful).
3) Descriptive truth in convergence with descriptive falsity produces a mild tension in intellectual apprehension, as in 2+3=6. Prescriptive truth and falsity create a more robust resistance. The moral sense is in effect our perception of fragmentally falsified truth in reference to an external standard, in this case absolute prescriptive truth. For example the willful torture of an innocent human being for pleasure is a falsification of the good of that person's mental and physical health. Health is a good we possess relative to our biological system's truth value; hence, the falsification of truth in the state of affairs in which the torture took place.
4) To say God is perfect or entirely good is simply to say He is wholly True. The Gen story of creation presents the proper standard, that all things conform to truth.

From within the model above Seer would be correct that moral value references the perfection (Truth) of God's nature. Why this is good is because we know intuitively and experientially that the true is in all ways and at all times better [in all those ways better can be construed] than the false.

An interesting feature of this idea is that because truth itself is the simple standard for all good, it's available to and can be seen to operate equally within theist and atheist minds; both either resist or unite with moral truths to the extent essence and cognitive functions are falsified. Disagreements are between persons in possession of various degrees of falsification relative to standards external to the conversation--moral discussions ebb and flow in degrees of variance with truth itself. My two cents worth anyway.

Even though I believe the 'truth' exists from the perspective of God. this is a claim based on faith. The problem with this is it does not work for a 'simple standard' from the human perspective. The bold above demonstrates the problem of making a substantial argument from the perspective of any one of the many diverse religious beliefs. This also neglects that it is possible that morals and ethics can evolve naturally.

The bottom line is the claim of truth is too nebulous an argument to be convincing.

[Anomaly]

Hello Shuynyadragon, thanks for responding.

this is a claim based on faith.

Yes, the view of truth I contend for is faith-based but it might also be true, and it seems to me appropriate to the discussion. I think this view of truth offers a reasonable and somewhat unique fit within several areas of value theory.

it does not work for a 'simple standard' from the human perspective. The bold above demonstrates the problem of making a substantial argument from the perspective of any one of the many diverse religious beliefs.

against

This also neglects that it is possible that morals and ethics can evolve naturally.

[Charles]

Even though I believe the 'truth' exists from the perspective of God. this is a claim based on faith. The problem with this is it does not work for a 'simple standard' from the human perspective. The bold above demonstrates the problem of making a substantial argument from the perspective of any one of the many diverse religious beliefs. This also neglects that it is possible that morals and ethics can evolve naturally.

The bottom line is the claim of truth is too nebulous an argument to be convincing.

In very few words you say some very important things in this post. Though I find Anomaly's texts interesting and challenging I think these few words point to a very important truth about the entire aproach.

[seer]

Though I find Anomaly's texts interesting and challenging I think these few words point to a very important truth about the entire aproach.

Then you would have to agree that there are no transcendent or universal moral truths to move towards or discover. Because if there are Anomaly's points would stand, even if we never fully discovered them or understood them.

[Charles]

Then you would have to agree that there are no transcendent or universal moral truths to move towards or discover. Because if there are Anomaly's points would stand, even if we never fully discovered them or understood them.

I am not completely sure what your point is. Anomaly's claim is faith based. I do not think we should start out with a faith based aproach. That does not in and of itself rule out that we could find universal moral truths after having started not faith based. But, as I said, I may have missed your point, so correct me and write a few more lines if what you wanted to point to was something different.

[seer]

I am not completely sure what your point is. Anomaly's claim is faith based. I do not think we should start out with a faith based aproach.

There is nothing else, even for you as we discussed.

That does not in and of itself rule out that we could find universal moral truths after having started not faith based. But, as I said, I may have missed your point, so correct me and write a few more lines if what you wanted to point to was something different.

Well Shuny's point was that moral beliefs were too diverse to come to any firm conclusions. You seemed to agree. My point is that epistemology is not ontology. That these moral truths could exist even if we were clueless. So diversity of ethical opinion does nothing to tell us about ontological realities.

[Charles]

There is nothing else, even for you as we discussed.



Well Shuny's point was that moral beliefs were too diverse to come to any firm conclusions. You seemed to agree. My point is that epistemology is not ontology. That these moral truths could exist even if we were clueless. So diversity of ethical opinion does nothing to tell us about ontological realities.

Yes, we discussed that, and if as you know, I disagreed with you and wrote far more on my opinion than you did on yours. I have got far more than you have got and far more than you realise.

I agreed with Shuny's point that "The bottom line is the claim of truth is too nebulous an argument to be convincing." I find this to point to the weak part in Anomaly's reasoning.

[Anomaly]

Anomaly's claim is faith based. I do not think we should start out with a faith based aproach.

I agreed with Shuny's point that "The bottom line is the claim of truth is too nebulous an argument to be convincing." I find this to point to the weak part in Anomaly's reasoning.

Well, is value mind-independent? I don't see how it could be, but I'm not a philosopher. But if it could be and the notion of value in essence turned out to be correct, value as we appear to apprehend it would seem to still be limited to true and false with true standing as the only obvious base for prescription--the false leads naturally to disunity, corruption of harmony and accord leading to chaos. With faith removed from the equation moral and ethical direction remains the same.

In this world it seems a large coincidence that value--having the inviolable character of a kind of scientific law or principle--as a feature of the natural world coincides so strongly with Biblical principles and those of other religions.

[Tassman]

Then you would have to agree that there are no transcendent or universal moral truths to move towards or discover. Because if there are Anomaly's points would stand, even if we never fully discovered them or understood them.

[siam]

Well, is value mind-independent? I don't see how it could be, but I'm not a philosopher. But if it could be and the notion of value in essence turned out to be correct, value as we appear to apprehend it would seem to still be limited to true and false with true standing as the only obvious base for prescription--the false leads naturally to disunity, corruption of harmony and accord leading to chaos. With faith removed from the equation moral and ethical direction remains the same.

In this world it seems a large coincidence that value--having the inviolable character of a kind of scientific law or principle--as a feature of the natural world coincides so strongly with Biblical principles and those of other religions.

Truth/falsehood(error)---I can agree that "Truth" can lead us to unity, harmony and peace and error to fragmentation, imbalance, and discord.....but....
In the Islamic context the primary framework (after Tawheed) on thinking of these ideas is in the context of weight/measure (Qadr = measure/destiny)..therefore "value" of an essence has degrees depending on relationship of one "value" to another.....therefore, even if the ethical principles (essence) in its broadest articulation may be universal---its implementation is usually particular (and circumstantial)

The example in the Quran is the story of the 2 sons of Adam---one son threatens to kill the other, the other son decides to not lift his hand to kill---"if you stretch your hand against me to kill you, it is not for me to stretch my hand against you to kill you: for I do fear God, the cherisher of the worlds" (Surah 5 verse 28)...Life has "value" and this can be a universal ethical principle, as is the consequent principle---life has value---therefore do not kill. But, when one life is threatened by another life (both of equal value)---the consequent "do not kill" has to be weighed/measured differently as the saving of life (self-defense) also becomes a means of preserving the ethical principle (life has value)---even if such self-defense might lead to loss or harm to another life.....(with caveats).....

a general ethical principle can be "universal"---not because of theism/God---but because the interaction of human nature with the environment/circumstances creates "patterns" ....action/reaction ...cause/effect....etc. The nature of humanity has similarities and so our reactions to "reality" have commonalities....
Yet, our articulations and implementations of ethics/morality are different. This is because the way we make connections with "reality" is different---in part because of our language and in part because of our meta-narrative/paradigm. These 2 things help us form coherence out of the "reality" we experience and while the essence of the experience (of reality) is probably similar---its articulation is necessarily different.....
...the universal/timeless and particular/time-bound aspects of ethical principles must lead to harmony that leads to peace (balanced = Qadr)---if they are "Truth".
in order to create such balance---the ethical principles themselves must have an inherent balance in themselves---in Eastern thinking---this is done by balancing "rights" with responsibilities---so, if "Life" has value---then its preservation is a responsibility/obligation and the fulfillment of this responsibility forms the "right" to life of oneself and the other....

...the cultivation of responsibility occurs within a paradigm (meta-narrative/worldview) which then permeates to the group/members and to the communities and families...this can make the ethical/moral system self-sufficient---without the need of an outside enforcement mechanism.....but---insofar as there are multiple paradigms---there are going to be a plurality of "systems"....

[seer]

Yes, we discussed that, and if as you know, I disagreed with you and wrote far more on my opinion than you did on yours. I have got far more than you have got and far more than you realise.

Bottom line Charles, you believe in universal moral truths but can not prove it. Yes you wrote a lot, but you never actually got there apart from first accepting unprovable assumption.

I agreed with Shuny's point that "The bottom line is the claim of truth is too nebulous an argument to be convincing." I find this to point to the weak part in Anomaly's reasoning.

So there is no truth? No moral truth? It is all too nebulous to figure out?

[seer]

I was speaking with Charles who does believe that there are universal moral truths.

[Anomaly]

Truth/falsehood(error)---I can agree that "Truth" can lead us to unity, harmony and peace and error to fragmentation, imbalance, and discord.....but....
In the Islamic context the primary framework (after Tawheed) on thinking of these ideas is in the context of weight/measure (Qadr = measure/destiny)..therefore "value" of an essence has degrees depending on relationship of one "value" to another.....therefore, even if the ethical principles (essence) in its broadest articulation may be universal---its implementation is usually particular (and circumstantial)

Okay, I find a lot of agreement so far.

...Life has "value" and this can be a universal ethical principle...a general ethical principle can be "universal"---not because of theism/God---but because the interaction of human nature with the environment/circumstances creates "patterns" ....action/reaction ...cause/effect....etc. The nature of humanity has similarities and so our reactions to "reality" have commonalities....

Back to the question: where does this value life has come from? I don't see interactions and patterns created with others within various cultural environments as having any ethical meaning per se. They have ethical guidance because imo it [value] exists in our reality a priori to living a life. If there's no value in "is", the interactions, cultural settings, etc. are just clusters of inert matter bumping around in time and space. This seems to place value, if there is any, in essence. How does value endue essence when there aren't any minds to perceive/create it?

Where do you see cause and effect's place in ethics?

[Anomaly]

The bottom line is the claim of truth is too nebulous an argument to be convincing.

particularization and valueinformationalis a feature important to the ethics side of discussion. Material particulars change in configuration and form macroscopically even while the underlying valuevalue in essence organizes and arranges the particulars of mattervalue-driven mechanism.

Before moving to the more complicated prescriptive side of things, the question is still begging: while the metaphysical model above is at least intuitively able to describe a naturalist hypothesis of value in essence and how it might work in a physical universe, where would value have come from? If you insist discussion be limited to the natural state we should have some reasonable explanation of how it would work in the fundamentals.