Non-theistic Moral Realism

[Adrift]

So we are back to nature alone, and nature (as we see in ourselves and the animal kingdom) can be both kind and cruel, selfish and selfless. They are both part of our nature. Now NMN comes along and tells us it is objectively wrong to give way to certain natural impulses - but why? Why deny one aspect of our nature and not another? If there is no teleology for the human person where do these objective standards come from? Certainly not from nature.

You know, I know a few Laveyan Satanists and nihilists in the scene who have used this line of thought exactly. They don't believe in being wicked to people for no good reason, but they are very much into the idea of not allowing religion and social norms to force them to deny their full nature including their darker side.

[shunyadragon]

Where does the the text you quote say that a man can force his wife to have sex?

All ready cited the relevant scripture and references to Christian beliefs. The obligation is the wife cannot refuse sex regardless.

Again, no specific laws in the Bible forbidding ALL forms of rape.

Really where does Baha'u'llah used it for marital rape?

Reread the references, they are clear and refer to all forms of violence against women.

And I'm still waiting for you to tell me how loving your wife as yourself leads to rape or violence.

The problem is not 'how loving your wife as yourself leads to rape or violence.' The problem is with the scripture I cited and Christian beliefs that prevented marital rape being illegal until the '1970 - 1990 period of change due to secular pressure.

Please note it was secular communist countries that first passed laws against marital rape.

[seer]

You know, I know a few Laveyan Satanists and nihilists in the scene who have used this line of thought exactly. They don't believe in being wicked to people for no good reason, but they are very much into the idea of not allowing religion and social norms to force them to deny their full nature including their darker side.

Exactly, of course you could push it with Nazis and Stalinists or Maoists. Where there are near zero moral roadblocks.

[mattdamore]

This is the upshot. I think NMN would work if human beings were created for a purpose, if there was an overriding teleology. If there was a soul that was designed to function properly if it followed certain moral principles. But this is exactly what the non-theist must deny. So we are back to nature alone, and nature (as we see in ourselves and the animal kingdom) can be both kind and cruel, selfish and selfless. They are both part of our nature. Now NMN comes along and tells us it is objectively wrong to give way to certain natural impulses - but why? Why deny one aspect of our nature and not another? If there is no teleology for the human person where do these objective standards come from? Certainly not from nature.

Thanks for your response seer. I do think that some versions of NMN are coupled with Aristotelean teleology, where proper functioning is in terms of developing the virtues. It's hard to know exactly how the virtues relate to moral principles. Some think that the virtues can stand alone but I don't think that works. Others think that the principles are logically prior to the virtues. For example, the virtue of honesty is derived from the principle, "One ought to tell the truth.", or "One ought not to willfully deceive." Whether a non-theist cannot adhere to teleology is an interesting question. Do you think it could be a sort of artificial teleology? For example, Hobbes thought that entering into a social contract would contribute to social and individual flourishing. In the same way, the non-theist could argue that adopting the moral point of view (to include the cultivation of virtue) will contribute to individual flourishing and social harmony. From the standpoint of prudential self-interest, it might behoove the non-theist to adopt this moral life, as it might behoove those in the state of nature to enter into a social contract.

Perhaps this addresses your next point. You ask why someone should go along with NMN. If the above is any help, it would be advantageous to adopt an artificially contrived teleology to concoct a procedure for cultivating virtue. The motivation to adopt such a teleology might be the avoidance of the alternative: a state of nature.

Lastly, where do these objective moral values come from? This is a challenging question. From what I've read, NMN might say that such values are a brute fact, not capable of further analysis: an ontological primitive. You say the values cannot come from Nature. By 'nature', do you mean the physical universe? If so, NMN might agree. Such values are instantiated in Nature, but the ontology of these values are typically normative properties supervening on non-normative properties, because the non-normative properties "make" the normative properties come to be.

[mattdamore]

I think the best way to assert non-theistic moral realism is to argue that moral law comes logically from biological reality. For example, if we go to six qualities of living things (i.e., metabolism, homeostasis, reproduction, etc.) then we might assert that moral actions do not infringe on a living thing's ability to maintain those attributes, and that immoral actions do infringe on a living thing's ability to maintain those attributes. Using reason, we should be able to expound a good deal of moral law. Objections from moral anthropology aside (e.g., "But Guaca, not all people agree on these things!"), that would give us a non-theistic basis for morality.

fwiw,
guacamole

Hello guacamole. Thanks for your response. You ground the moral law on biological attributes:

a. An act is moral if and only if an act does not infringe on an organism's ability to maintain its biological attributes.
b. An act is immoral if and only if an act infringes on an organism's ability to maintain its biological attributes.

Let's call this version of moral realism "moral biologism". Before I can say anything really substantive, would you mind listing all six biological attributes, with a brief explanation of the attribute? That would help me a bunch.

[seer]

Thanks for your response seer. I do think that some versions of NMN are coupled with Aristotelean teleology, where proper functioning is in terms of developing the virtues. It's hard to know exactly how the virtues relate to moral principles. Some think that the virtues can stand alone but I don't think that works. Others think that the principles are logically prior to the virtues. For example, the virtue of honesty is derived from the principle, "One ought to tell the truth.", or "One ought not to willfully deceive." Whether a non-theist cannot adhere to teleology is an interesting question. Do you think it could be a sort of artificial teleology? For example, Hobbes thought that entering into a social contract would contribute to social and individual flourishing. In the same way, the non-theist could argue that adopting the moral point of view (to include the cultivation of virtue) will contribute to individual flourishing and social harmony. From the standpoint of prudential self-interest, it might behoove the non-theist to adopt this moral life, as it might behoove those in the state of nature to enter into a social contract.

Sure the non-theist could have a goal in mind, like flourishing or harmony. And there may be objectively better ways to reach said goals. But the goals themselves remain subjective. But in the big picture there is no teleology for human kind - not even for our survival...

Perhaps this addresses your next point. You ask why someone should go along with NMN. If the above is any help, it would be advantageous to adopt an artificially contrived teleology to concoct a procedure for cultivating virtue. The motivation to adopt such a teleology might be the avoidance of the alternative: a state of nature.

Yes, but that would not really be objective, would it?

Lastly, where do these objective moral values come from? This is a challenging question. From what I've read, NMN might say that such values are a brute fact, not capable of further analysis: an ontological primitive. You say the values cannot come from Nature. By 'nature', do you mean the physical universe? If so, NMN might agree. Such values are instantiated in Nature, but the ontology of these values are typically normative properties supervening on non-normative properties, because the non-normative properties "make" the normative properties come to be.

How is the underlined potion any more than an assertion? What does it mean to say that certain values are normative? How do non-normative properties make the normative properties come to be - I have no idea what that is supposed to mean. Perhaps you could flesh that out more for me.

[mattdamore]

Sure the non-theist could have a goal in mind, like flourishing or harmony. And there may be objectively better ways to reach said goals. But the goals themselves remain subjective. But in the big picture there is no teleology for human kind - not even for our survival...

Good point. In response, could NMN argue as follows. There is an objective relationship that holds between non-normative properties and normative properties (I'll get to your concern that this is merely assertive below - and I'll abbreviate non-normative properties as NNP and normative properties as NP). Suppose it is the case that there is such an objective relationship R. According to the model, R is objective because the "making-relation" is objective. NNP are brute, objective facts; NP supervene upon NNP. But there is another relation R₁, according to which the moral agent uses various NNP's as reasons for actions. Such reasons for actions can be rational or irrational. If rational, then such reasons serve to substantiate the content of moral principles prescribing moral behavior. If irrational, then such reasons fail to substantiate the content of moral principles prescribing such. Therefore, if moral behavior is linked to moral principles according to objective rationality (R₁), then moral agents can agree on an objective teleology, aligned with the proper functioning of human nature. If this holds, then not only are there objective ways to reach such a goal, the goal itself seems just as objective, since the goal is linked according to objective rationality. If it did happen that moral agents disagreed on the goal, it would be on pain of irrationality. This is different than what I was saying before. Let me know what you think.

How is the underlined potion any more than an assertion? What does it mean to say that certain values are normative? How do non-normative properties make the normative properties come to be - I have no idea what that is supposed to mean. Perhaps you could flesh that out more for me.

Yes, that was an assertion. My apologies. I'm visiting the wife away from school right now. I return on Monday. The book from which I got NMN is in my dorm room. As soon as I get back I'll be able to better flesh it out. From my horrible memory, a normative value is a value that prescribes a certain action. NP supervene upon the value. On the other hand, NNP, in this case, are properties with intrinsic value: justice, prudence, courage, compassion, temperance, etc. Once a morally relevant state of affairs S instantiate a particular NNP (e.g. Smith displayed courage taking the beachhead.), such NNP's cause NP's (One ought to display courageous qualities in wartime.) Such an NNP 'makes' it to be the case that NP supervene upon NNP. NNP has such causal powers, while NP does not. NNP has causal powers because such are properties of things that can be verified by the empirical sciences. For example, a wartime correspondent could verify that a solder displayed courageous qualities taking a beachhead. This heuristic isn't perfect. Like I said, I don't have the book in front of me. But that's as close as I can get for right now.

[guacamole]

Hello guacamole. Thanks for your response. You ground the moral law on biological attributes:

a. An act is moral if and only if an act does not infringe on an organism's ability to maintain its biological attributes.
b. An act is immoral if and only if an act infringes on an organism's ability to maintain its biological attributes.

It's a start. There are obviously going to be conflicting cases and a hierarchy of morality.

Let's call this version of moral realism "moral biologism". Before I can say anything really substantive, would you mind listing all six biological attributes, with a brief explanation of the attribute? That would help me a bunch.

Sure. And I'm not sure I understand the-ins-and-outs of all of them:

1. Organisms grow and develop.
2. Organisms have a metabolism.
3. Organisms reproduce.
4. Organisms maintain a well-ordered or balanced internal environment (homeostasis) and thus respond to their environment.
5. Organisms show internal or external movement.
6. Organisms are made up of one or more cells.

In addition, this list is not universally agreed upon. Some people list more. Some fewer depending on whether or not you do or don't want something to be considered alive (#6 and viruses, for example).

fwiw,
guacamole

[seer]

Good point. In response, could NMN argue as follows. There is an objective relationship that holds between non-normative properties and normative properties (I'll get to your concern that this is merely assertive below - and I'll abbreviate non-normative properties as NNP and normative properties as NP). Suppose it is the case that there is such an objective relationship R. According to the model, R is objective because the "making-relation" is objective. NNP are brute, objective facts; NP supervene upon NNP. But there is another relation R₁, according to which the moral agent uses various NNP's as reasons for actions. Such reasons for actions can be rational or irrational. If rational, then such reasons serve to substantiate the content of moral principles prescribing moral behavior. If irrational, then such reasons fail to substantiate the content of moral principles prescribing such. Therefore, if moral behavior is linked to moral principles according to objective rationality (R₁), then moral agents can agree on an objective teleology, aligned with the proper functioning of human nature. If this holds, then not only are there objective ways to reach such a goal, the goal itself seems just as objective, since the goal is linked according to objective rationality. If it did happen that moral agents disagreed on the goal, it would be on pain of irrationality. This is different than what I was saying before. Let me know what you think.

Yes, that was an assertion. My apologies. I'm visiting the wife away from school right now. I return on Monday. The book from which I got NMN is in my dorm room. As soon as I get back I'll be able to better flesh it out. From my horrible memory, a normative value is a value that prescribes a certain action. NP supervene upon the value. On the other hand, NNP, in this case, are properties with intrinsic value: justice, prudence, courage, compassion, temperance, etc. Once a morally relevant state of affairs S instantiate a particular NNP (e.g. Smith displayed courage taking the beachhead.), such NNP's cause NP's (One ought to display courageous qualities in wartime.) Such an NNP 'makes' it to be the case that NP supervene upon NNP. NNP has such causal powers, while NP does not. NNP has causal powers because such are properties of things that can be verified by the empirical sciences. For example, a wartime correspondent could verify that a solder displayed courageous qualities taking a beachhead. This heuristic isn't perfect. Like I said, I don't have the book in front of me. But that's as close as I can get for right now.

Matt, I'm have a problem following your argument, I'm sure it's my fault. But it seems to hinge on the idea that there is a teleology for human beings, a purpose or goal. I don't see how that is possible with non-theism. Perhaps you can explain this a bite more.

[shunyadragon]

Matt, I'm have a problem following your argument, I'm sure it's my fault. But it seems to hinge on the idea that there is a teleology for human beings, a purpose or goal. I don't see how that is possible with non-theism. Perhaps you can explain this a bite more.

There has never been a problem of a teleology for a purpose of the human human being is the survival of the species from a secular scientific perspective, an omnivorous, intelligent and social species which requires morals, ethics, social order and altruism to survive as do other primates and higher intelligent mammals, also have primitive morals, ethics, social orders, and altruism in a simpler form to support their need to survive. Survival of the species is good.

The natural process of evolution of all life are the processes of Creation by God that result in the supreme Talisman of Creation Humanity. Creation is a very natural process that reflects the same results as discovered by Methodological Naturalist scientific processes and results of the secular view of the nature of our physical existence.

[JimL]

I've been thinking of non-theistic moral realism (NMN) for a while and I was wondering what everyone thought of it.

NMN: There are objective moral values and duties. The values supervene on intrinsically valuable non-normative properties, and the intrinsically valuable non-normative properties make or cause normative objective values to be. The intrinsically valuable non-normative properties also serve as reasons for action, which serve as the action-guiding principles grounding duties. The duties are objective because the reasons are objective; and the reasons are objective because the intrinsically valuable non-normative properties are objective.

NMN admits the existence of brute moral facts and grounds it in the primitive "making-relation" subsisting between the non-normative properties and the normative properties of the values upon which they supervene. The theist is wont to ask about the metaphysical grounding of the non-normative properties themselves. But the non-theist protests that this explanation-expectation is unnecessary because the brute fact of the "making-relation" is sufficient for the grounding. Any objection, they say, lodged against its being a brute fact could equally apply to God's nature/commands.

This is a heavily summarized view from a philosopher from DePauw University called Erik Wielenberg.

If i'm understanding you correctly, i believe i came to the same conclusion, though articulated it in a less educated way. Morals are objective because what is right and what is wrong is related to what is objectively in the best or worst interests of the subject, and the subject in this case is humanity. Make sense?

[seer]

If i'm understanding you correctly, i believe i came to the same conclusion, though articulated it in a less educated way. Morals are objective because what is right and what is wrong is related to what is objectively in the best or worst interests of the subject, and the subject in this case is humanity. Make sense?

No Jim, I don't think that is what he is saying since I believe his view depends on there being a teleology for humankind. But that can not be the case for the non-theist, it certainly can be the case for the theist. But Matt needs to explain that a bit more.

[shunyadragon]

It's a start. There are obviously going to be conflicting cases and a hierarchy of morality.

There are obvious conflicting cases and a hierarchy of morality in the natural world regardless.

Sure. And I'm not sure I understand the-ins-and-outs of all of them:

1. Organisms grow and develop.
2. Organisms have a metabolism.
3. Organisms reproduce.
4. Organisms maintain a well-ordered or balanced internal environment (homeostasis) and thus respond to their environment.
5. Organisms show internal or external movement.
6. Organisms are made up of one or more cells.

In addition, this list is not universally agreed upon. Some people list more. Some fewer depending on whether or not you do or don't want something to be considered alive (#6 and viruses, for example).

fwiw,
guacamole

First as far as science is concerned viruses are living organisms regardless of the opinions of some.

This is your selective list, and yes it would not be universal list by any measure. You would need to cite scientific references to give your list a meaningful scientific secular context. The list changes as living organisms become more complex.

[seer]

There has never been a problem of a teleology for a purpose of the human human being is the survival of the species from a secular scientific perspective....

Nonsense Shuny, teleology means a plan or purpose. Nature does not have a plan or purpose for our survival, and more than it had for all the millions of species that went extinct before us. Therefore the rest of your argument falls apart - as usual.

[shunyadragon]

Nonsense Shuny, teleology means a plan or purpose. Nature does not have a plan or purpose for our survival, and more than it had for all the millions of species that went extinct before us. Therefore the rest of your argument falls apart - as usual.

False, survival of the species through adaptive change, or the replacement of more adaptive species when others go extinct is indeed the purpose in a scientific secular view of nature. Survival is good. This is what the objective evidence indicates in science.