Non-theistic Moral Realism

[shunyadragon]

No it is not clear at all, from your link:



So your own link agrees with me that God's foreknowledge does not mean causation.

I never claimed that my view nor the Baha'i belief concerns a disagreement on the issue of causation, and neither does Open Theism. The issue is the nature and concept of foreknowledge of God, and as documented my view and the Baha'i is a matter of fact 'Open Theism' concerning the nature of the foreknowledge of God.

[seer]

I never claimed that my view nor the Baha'i belief concerns a disagreement on the issue of causation, and neither does Open Theism. The issue is the nature and concept of foreknowledge of God, and as documented my view and the Baha'i is a matter of fact 'Open Theism' concerning the nature of the foreknowledge of God.

You are missing the Point Shuny, I used to be an Open Theist (after I was a Calvinist). One of their main points is that foreknowledge precludes freedom of the will. Your link agreed with what I said earlier that foreknowledge is not causation. That God could know the future without causing it.

Open theism revises this view in one way. It accepts the possibility that things could go one way or the other in the future, as the standard view does. It allows that there are some necessary truths about the future. It accepts that there are contingent things about the future. It just won't allow those contingent things to be true or false. If it's not necessary, they say, it must not be true either, even though truth is much weaker than necessity. Something can be true but not necessary. But for open theists, nothing about the future can be true but not necessary. The future is special somehow.

That forms the basis of the open theist's argument against foreknowledge. Once you deny that statements about future contingents can be true or false, then there simply are no truths about what free creatures will do unless those actions are necessary. There are no truths about my future except what's true of me in every possible future. With a robust sense of libertarian free will, many of our actions are free and thus could have been otherwise. Therefore, there are very few truths about my future. If there aren't such truths to know, then God cannot know them. Therefore, God only knows a very few truths about the future, things that are true in every possible future. http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/sh...Realism/page29

In other words if God knows I'm going to have eggs for breakfast tomorrow then it could not be a free act. I'm glad to see that the Bahai teaching agree with me.

[shunyadragon]

You are missing the Point Shuny, I used to be an Open Theist (after I was a Calvinist). One of their main points is that foreknowledge precludes freedom of the will. Your link agreed with what I said earlier that foreknowledge is not causation. That God could know the future without causing it.

There is no problem that God does have foreknowledge without causation, but as in 'Open Theism' NOT ALL foreknowledge of God is exhaustive and complete as in the Baha'i belief as cited.

Open theism revises this view in one way. It accepts the possibility that things could go one way or the other in the future, as the standard view does. It allows that there are some necessary truths about the future. It accepts that there are contingent things about the future. It just won't allow those contingent things to be true or false. If it's not necessary, they say, it must not be true either, even though truth is much weaker than necessity. Something can be true but not necessary. But for open theists, nothing about the future can be true but not necessary. The future is special somehow.

One point on the apparent misconception of Open Theism and the view of Baha'i beliefs is the fundamental truths are not variable in the future, it is the outcome of events and human choices that may vary and not subject to God's foreknowledge.

That forms the basis of the open theist's argument against foreknowledge. Once you deny that statements about future contingents can be true or false, then there simply are no truths about what free creatures will do unless those actions are necessary. There are no truths about my future except what's true of me in every possible future. With a robust sense of libertarian free will, many of our actions are free and thus could have been otherwise. Therefore, there are very few truths about my future. If there aren't such truths to know, then God cannot know them. Therefore, God only knows a very few truths about the future, things that are true in every possible future. http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/sh...Realism/page29

No agreement whatsoever. My view and the Baha'i Faith is that of open theism as cited in detail. Your source confirms this. Again it is not causation that is the issue, because it is the nature of foreknowledge.

Yes, the references you cited acknowledge there is God's foreknowledge of the future, but it is not exhaustive and complete in the Baha'i belief as it is in the Arminian view, and it most definitely allows for conditional and impending variation in the outcomes of future events and human decisions.

In other words if God knows I'm going to have eggs for breakfast tomorrow then it could not be a free act. I'm glad to see that the Bahai teaching agree with me.

That is not true of the Baha'i teaching on foreknowledge nor the view of 'Open Theism.'

[seer]

There is no problem that God does have foreknowledge without causation, but as in 'Open Theism' NOT ALL foreknowledge of God is exhaustive and complete as in the Baha'i belief as cited.

Shuny you said this:

First, in this belief Free Will is first limited by 'Original Sin,' and than God's foreknowledge of the future is exhaustive and complete, therefore the assertion of libertarian free will is a mere illusion, and human future choices are already fixed by God's foreknowledge.

So why would complete complete foreknowledge preclude free will, if foreknowledge does not equal causation?

[shunyadragon]

Shuny you said this:




So why would complete complete foreknowledge preclude free will, if foreknowledge does not equal causation?

. . . because the problem with complete and exhaustive foreknowledge by God, is not an issue of causation, but an issue that human free will would be an illusion, because all humans and decisions are known beforehand.

As I said before, God is the cause and determiner of the nature of foreknowledge in Creation, and if God determines God's foreknowledge is complete and exhaustive as to the details of all Creation from the beginning to the end?, therefore God's foreknowledge is determined before Creation even came into being.

[seer]

. . . because the problem complete and exhaustive foreknowledge by God, is not an issue of causation, but an issue that human free will would be an illusion, because all humans and decisions are known beforehand.

Again, if God's knowledge is not the cause then what is? How does knowledge impinge on our will - prevent us from acting or not acting?

[shunyadragon]

Again, if God's knowledge is not the cause then what is? How does knowledge impinge on our will - prevent us from acting or not acting?

All ready answered this exhaustively, and no need for further dialogue.

Is not God the ultimate Creator, determiner and cause of everything including the nature of God's foreknowledge?

[seer]

All ready answered this exhaustively, and no need for further dialogue.

Is not God the ultimate Creator, determiner and cause of everything including the nature of God's foreknowledge?

Yes and God determined that we have freedom of the will. But I see you can not answer my question. Foreknowledge does not impinge on our will, as you agreed.

[shunyadragon]

Yes and God determined that we have freedom of the will. But I see you can not answer my question. Foreknowledge does not impinge on our will, as you agreed.

Arminian concept of exhaustible and complete foreknowledge makes freedom of will meaningless, because all decisions and events are known including one's own judgement and salvation.

[Tassman]

That does not follow Tass, when I speak of limits I'm speaking largely of a man's relation to God. We can not approach God until He first draws us.

Evidence please.

The Arminian doctrine of Prevenient grace. I do for instance believe that a man has the ability to murder or not murder. He is therefore responsible for his actions.

A well socialised man will not, generally speaking, commit murder. He has been conditioned against such anti-social behaviour by his community. Conversely, a badly socialised man, e.g. one raised in a poor ghetto where gang warfare is the norm, is more likely to murder. So who is really responsible for our actions at the most basic level? Surely rehabilitation is the way to go rather than punishment.

And I don't know of any one who holds to Libertarianism that does not believe that there are some restrictions on our will. Perhaps you do.

[seer]

Arminian concept of exhaustible and complete foreknowledge makes freedom of will meaningless, because all decisions and events are known including one's own judgement and salvation.

No it doesn't, you already agreed that foreknowledge does not have any effect on our wills, on what we choose to do. Your own Bahai link made the point that foreknowledge does not preclude free acts, that foreknowledge is not causal. Unless you can show a link between our will/choices and foreknowledge you have no argument.

[seer]

Nonsense, show me anyone who holds to Libertarianism who believes the will is without any restrictions. If we have the ability to "do other than we did" in some cases, or most cases, then that is enough to undermine both determinism and compatibilism.

[shunyadragon]

One thing that is lost in this long discussion focusing on the Teleology of 'purpose and goals,' is that the bottom line of Teleology from different perspectives is; 'Does a given Teleology have explanatory power for explaining the existence of morals and ethics and the nature of being human? I have only addressed 'Is it possible that NMN, Utilitarian Teleology, or other Naturalist have explanatory power for non-Theist origins of morals and and ethics, and the nature of being human?' The question of which Teleology can explain human nature, cannot be isolated from the need of explanatory power of the existence of life and our physical existence.

The Theist perspective proposes that the Teleology requires a Divine 'goal and purpose' not only for the existence of morals and ethics, but for the existence of humanity, life and the nature of our physical existence. The problem remains that there is not any objective verifiable evidence for this, nor the necessity or guarantee? for the existence of life, and humanity as it is.

From the non-Theist Teleology perspective the explanatory power for natural origins for morals and ethics, human nature, and the existence of life and humanity is based on the foundation of the objective evidence of sciences including anthropology, sociology, and evolution, which demonstrates the survival value, and the progressive evolution in primitive forms in primates and other higher mammals with similar evolutionary requirements. This in no way 'proves anything' concerning the non-Theist explanations like NMN, Utilitarian Teleology, nor other naturalist teleologies, but the evidence clearly demonstrates it is a possible explanation. Some propose the need for a guarantee for the outcome of the existence of life, humanity and the nature of being human, but no such guarantee in 'purpose and goals' is needed for a natural explanation.

[seer]

From the non-Theist Teleology perspective the explanatory power for natural origins for morals and ethics, human nature, and the existence of life and humanity is based on the foundation of the objective evidence of sciences including anthropology, sociology, and evolution, which demonstrates the survival value, and the progressive evolution in primitive forms in primates and other higher mammals with similar evolutionary requirements.

Again, what is you point? This does not tell us what is right or wrong. War, killing, dominance, subjugation are just as much a part of our nature.

[shunyadragon]

Again, what is you point? This does not tell us what is right or wrong. War, killing, dominance, subjugation are just as much a part of our nature.

Well, again, again, and again ad nauseum, yes the utilitarian teleology, NMN, and other Natural teleologies do provide objective evidence that the positive morals and ethics indeed do have survival value in the survival of the human species.

Problem with your Theistic Teleology is that it fails miserably to consistently 'tell us what is right or wrong. War, killing, dominance, subjugation, which are of course just as much a part of our nature as other behaviors. I have wanted for a millennia of threads for you to define from the Theistic Teleological view definitely and consistently what is right and wrong concerning morals and ethics, and you have failed miserably.

Still waiting . . .