Originally posted by Leonhard
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Again I'm not sure you understand hylomorphic dualism. It is specifically not claiming that there's a second substance, remote controlling the brain. There's no ghost in the machine. The soul is the substantial form of the body. It is because my body is human, and functioning normally, that I'm able to think and reason.
Yes, I agree that doesn't describe how this takes place in detail, but so what? Your objection was to the soundness of Libertarian Free Will, to which you continuously return to the interaction problem whenever someone describes causation that isn't material. All I have to do is describe, not defend, but describe one single case that is logically self-consistent in order to defend against the notion that it is incoherent.
Yes, I agree that doesn't describe how this takes place in detail, but so what? Your objection was to the soundness of Libertarian Free Will, to which you continuously return to the interaction problem whenever someone describes causation that isn't material. All I have to do is describe, not defend, but describe one single case that is logically self-consistent in order to defend against the notion that it is incoherent.
I really don't have to do more than that.
If they do, that is not a problem. They have souls as well.
You're straw-manning the argument. I never said, "We don't know how this is done, ergo soul." My argument, if I were to make it and I won't here, would be to use intentionality, aboutness and possible qualia (less certain about that one) to argue that reductionistic materialism has serious conceptual problems with even describing these, no matter how complex the science of neurology gets, it would not amount to an explanation of those hard problems (as Chalmers calls them). Then I would focus on where I think the crux of the problem is, and defend hylomorphic dualism which solves all the conceptual problems, those hard ones, and leaves the soft ones as to how this works in detail, to the neurology department.
It is no argument from ignorance. And it adds no problems to the mix. A Thomist expects the brain to work brainly and do mind stuff. Which it is quite capable of doing. We don't make any claim about there being a secret part of the brain that acts as a transmission reciever, this is rather what the Cartesian dualists expect, the body being a remote controlled meat puppet and the soul being the driver. That's quite absurd and indeed creates a whole host of problems.
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