Compatibalism

[seer]

I don't know how you would get that from what I asked. I asked you to define "you" since you say "you" makes the choice. This is an area when semantics is extremely important.

That seems like a dodge to me. It really does not matter how you define "you" - "you" is still determined at all levels.

What? When the hell did I say that? I'm simply giving you the consequences that are entailed by your view, and that is your view negates the possibility that you have control over what you think and do because it requires that your thoughts be spontaneous fluctuations. Your view is the irrational one, not mine.

I asked you before the recent shut down if QM caused us to have random thoughts you said yes, because you claimed that QM made it so that not all things were determined.

[seer]

We're still waiting for you to admit your view is incoherent since you claim it allows for you to control your thoughts and actions, yet it requires they have no ultimate cause, which negates you from having control.

Well I'm glad you agree that you are in fact a sock puppet.

[seer]

But you're interpreting him to mean consciousness is something completely separate from the physical, like the way you typically think of a soul. He's not referring to something like that. He's referring to brains states that induce conscious mental states having the power to affect brain states that do not induce conscious mental states.

No Thinker, I am doing no such thing. I am only pointing to the fact he Mr. Shea clearly says that consciousness can have a causal role, can actually change sub-conscious states. You have long claimed that that did not happen. Remember you said our conscious states were no more than the steam off a steam engine.

[JimL]

That seems like a dodge to me. It really does not matter how you define "you" - "you" is still determined at all levels.

I think that what he is asking you seer is to define "you" in the sense of a free willed immaterial soul. How does that "you" work as a thinking, decision making thing, in a way that differs from the physical brain? Your just moving the goal posts, so to speak, without explanation as to the logic behind your idea. In other words what is your idea of a mind absent a physical brain, how do you say it works, and in what sense is it free?

I asked you before the recent shut down if QM caused us to have random thoughts you said yes, because you claimed that QM made it so that not all things were determined.

I'm not sure, but I think what is meant by that is that "we" by observation, can't determine things at the microscopic level, not that they are not determined in themselves. But don't quote me!

[Tassman]

But what in this picture is not completely determined in your world?

My world, as you quaintly put it, is logically coherent. Your world is logically incoherent. End of story.

Well I'm glad you admit that you are a biological sock puppet, that explains a lot.

Determinism is the position that every event, decision and action is causally determined by an unbroken chain of prior occurrences. This does not necessarily mean (as per your "sock-puppet analogy) that humans have no influence on the future and its events...this is Fatalism, NOT Determinism...but that the level to which humans have influence over their future itself is itself largely dependent on present and past.

[Tassman]

But what are our mental states and choices determined by Tass? I would argue that they are not only determined by antecedent events, or antecedent mental states, but that external extant events also play a role. In other words present mental states are not only dependent upon antecedent mental states, but also by events external to those antecedent mental states. In other words the brain doesn't exist in a vacuum. So the cause of present mental states, if they are to be defined as a cause, would be twofold, the state of things inside, as well as the state of things outside of the brain. Not sure if that comports with free will or not, but the fact that I have to think about it to come to a conclusion suggests to me that it might. What do you think?

Every occurrence is causally determined by an unbroken chain of prior events and this would include occurrences external to our antecedent mental states which also impact upon us. Hence causal determinism which ever way you look at it.

[seer]

My world, as you quaintly put it, is logically coherent. Your world is logically incoherent. End of story.

How on earth do you even know what is coherent or incoherent? You are just spitting out what your non-rational forces of nature masters determine you to spit out or believe.

[mattdamore]

Does B-theory imply strict determinism?

Jedidiah, are you a Calvinist? Because the B-Theory of time logically leads to strict determinism.

Hello, seer. Just FYI, I've read of B-theorists who adhere to libertarian freedom.

Briefly, some think that B-theory implies that our choices are a part of determinate reality. Because of this, our choices are 'ontologically' (rather than logically) necessary.¹

Imagine - roughly corresponding to a B-theory - a series of tenselessly existing temporal stages.

T1, T2, T3, T4, . . . Tn.

And imagine a space-time worm (which is 'us', according to the view) extending from T2 to T4. Imagine that the 'specious' present happens to be T3, for our purposes. If this worm has temporal parts ( . . . say, pT2, pT3, and pT3, where 'p' is a temporal part temporally located at T2, T3, and T4.), suppose that:

1. pT2 freely chooses to watch Back to the Future.

2. pT3 freely chooses to watch Terminator 2: Judgement Day.

3. pT4 freely chooses to watch Primer.

When cashing out 'freely choose', some B-theorists believe this can mean:

4. Able to choose among alternative possibilities.

The key word in 4 is "able". They insist that at pT2, I am "able to" refrain from watch Terminator 2, even though it is ontologically necessary that I watch Terminator 2 at T3. It is ontologically necessary because it is a part of determinate reality. But here is the key premise:

5. Watching Terminator 2 is a part of determinate reality because I freely watch Terminator 2 at T3.

That is, my temporal part (pT3) freely watches Terminator 2 at T3. This free act is what explains my watching Terminator 2 at T3 as being a part of determinate reality at T3. But at the same time, my watching Terminator 2 at T3 is ontologically necessary for me, since being a part of determinate reality implies ontological necessity. Let me put this in order:

6. Free acts explain why temporal parts at temporal stages are a part of determinate reality.
7. Being a part of determinate reality implies ontological necessity.
8. An act is free if the agent performing the act is "able" to choose among alternative possibilities.
9. Since 6 is explanatorily prior to 7, then ontological necessity does not imply "strict determinism".

By 'strict', I'm assuming you mean that kind of determinism which is, at least, incompatible with libertarian freedom.

Blessings.

________
Footnote:

¹ This is supposed to remove the sting from arguments against traditional arguments against logical or theological fatalism. Typically, such arguments go as follows:

1. Necessarily, (If X, then Y).
2. X.
C. Necessarily, Y.

Or,

1. Necessarily, (If God knows X, then Y will occur).
2. God knows X.
C. Necessarily, Y will occur.

The formal fallacy is the confusion of necessitas consequentiae (necessity of the consequences) with necessitas consequentis (necessity of the consequent). You probably knew that already; I just wanted to point that out really quick. If we plug in "ontological necessity", that same formal fallacy doesn't arise.

[seer]

Hello, seer. Just FYI, I've read of B-theorists who adhere to libertarian freedom.

Briefly, some think that B-theory implies that our choices are a part of determinate reality. Because of this, our choices are 'ontologically' (rather than logically) necessary.¹

Imagine - roughly corresponding to a B-theory - a series of tenselessly existing temporal stages.

T1, T2, T3, T4, . . . Tn.

And imagine a space-time worm (which is 'us', according to the view) extending from T2 to T4. Imagine that the 'specious' present happens to be T3, for our purposes. If this worm has temporal parts ( . . . say, pT2, pT3, and pT3, where 'p' is a temporal part temporally located at T2, T3, and T4.), suppose that:

1. pT2 freely chooses to watch Back to the Future.

2. pT3 freely chooses to watch Terminator 2: Judgement Day.

3. pT4 freely chooses to watch Primer.

When cashing out 'freely choose', some B-theorists believe this can mean:

4. Able to choose among alternative possibilities.

The key word in 4 is "able". They insist that at pT2, I am "able to" refrain from watch Terminator 2, even though it is ontologically necessary that I watch Terminator 2 at T3. It is ontologically necessary because it is a part of determinate reality. But here is the key premise:

5. Watching Terminator 2 is a part of determinate reality because I freely watch Terminator 2 at T3.

That is, my temporal part (pT3) freely watches Terminator 2 at T3. This free act is what explains my watching Terminator 2 at T3 as being a part of determinate reality at T3. But at the same time, my watching Terminator 2 at T3 is ontologically necessary for me, since being a part of determinate reality implies ontological necessity. Let me put this in order:

6. Free acts explain why temporal parts at temporal stages are a part of determinate reality.
7. Being a part of determinate reality implies ontological necessity.
8. An act is free if the agent performing the act is "able" to choose among alternative possibilities.
9. Since 6 is explanatorily prior to 7, then ontological necessity does not imply "strict determinism".

By 'strict', I'm assuming you mean that kind of determinism which is, at least, incompatible with libertarian freedom.

Blessings.

________
Footnote:

¹ This is supposed to remove the sting from arguments against traditional arguments against logical or theological fatalism. Typically, such arguments go as follows:

1. Necessarily, (If X, then Y).
2. X.
C. Necessarily, Y.

Or,

1. Necessarily, (If God knows X, then Y will occur).
2. God knows X.
C. Necessarily, Y will occur.

The formal fallacy is the confusion of necessitas consequentiae (necessity of the consequences) with necessitas consequentis (necessity of the consequent). You probably knew that already; I just wanted to point that out really quick. If we plug in "ontological necessity", that same formal fallacy doesn't arise.

Thanks Matt, though most atheists here believe that libertarian free will is incoherent whether B-Theory is involved or not. .

[Tassman]

How on earth do you even know what is coherent or incoherent? You are just spitting out what your non-rational forces of nature masters determine you to spit out or believe.

This is not how causal determinism works, as has been explained umpteen times, and you are being dishonest in pretending it is.

[seer]

This is not how causal determinism works, as has been explained umpteen times, and you are being dishonest in pretending it is.

Of course it is Tass, it can be no other way. Everything you think do or say, all your socialization, everything from top to bottom is determined. And determined, at bottom, by the non-rational forces of nature. You just don't want to admit that you are a slave to said forces. A mere biological sock puppet.

[Tassman]

Of course it is Tass, it can be no other way. Everything you think do or say, all your socialization, everything from top to bottom is determined. And determined, at bottom, by the non-rational forces of nature. You just don't want to admit that you are a slave to said forces. A mere biological sock puppet.

Your depiction of causal determinism is a parody. And your alternative, i.e. libertarian free-will, is logically incoherent and depends upon a liberal sprinkling of unverified god-magic.

[seer]

Your depiction of causal determinism is a parody. And your alternative, i.e. libertarian free-will, is logically incoherent and depends upon a liberal sprinkling of unverified god-magic.

Is is not a parody, it is exactly what you believe which you clearly laid out to Jim, and I quote:

Every occurrence is causally determined by an unbroken chain of prior events and this would include occurrences external to our antecedent mental states which also impact upon us.

So Tass, again, how on earth do you know when something is coherent or incoherent? How do you know that you were determined to have a correct understanding on this issue? Please show me the logic.

[The Thinker]

That seems like a dodge to me. It really does not matter how you define "you" - "you" is still determined at all levels.

There is no dodge. I'm not the one who needs to define the term. So once again, what does the "you" mean? It matters because compatibilists say "you" make a choice, but what they really mean is your brain that is determined by outside forces makes the choice, and they just call that you, since it's argued "you" are your brain, even though nothing's "free." So again, what is the "you" that makes the choice.

I asked you before the recent shut down if QM caused us to have random thoughts you said yes, because you claimed that QM made it so that not all things were determined.

No I never said that. My view is that QM is completely deterministic. It's probably the case that I had been explaining to you various views which you probably misinterpreted as being my view.

[The Thinker]

Well I'm glad you agree that you are in fact a sock puppet.

So when will you admit your view negates you having control over your thoughts? Are you in denial?