Mind is not reduceable to brain

[Jim B.]

Methodological naturalism doesn't entitle someone who follows it to make ontological decisions, no? So I don't understand why you don't restrict yourself to the self-imposed parameters and modesty of the approach you claim to follow. Why can't you be satisfied with saying that those phenomena studied in association with consciousness that can be observed, measured and quantified are x, y, z... MN doesn't entitle you to infer from those correlations that consciousness IS x, or the nature of consciousness IS y. Those are ontological statements. Methodology alone is procedural, not substantive.

Eagerly waiting for a reply!

[Jim B.]

First, I believe your assertion of a 'mystery of consciousness' is a vague nebulous something that you define as an 'extra-scientific question, because it touches on what empirical science can and cannot address.' The related claim that 'The empirical evidence here, as with countless other topics, is not and cannot be decisive.' also represents a vague nebulous boundary that cannot be defined as you aspire to do.

Second, I believe you are over stating the skepticism of scientists, ie Block, Dennett, Strawson, in expressing what they believe science can and cannot explain empirically concerning the relationship between the brain, and the mind and consciousness. It is possible selectively cite some scientists to justify these vague limits, but over all no they do not place such limits empirically on the capability of science to explain this relationship.

I think Dennett expresses his objections to your view, as well as the objections to other philosophers here;

Source: https://www.nytimes.com/books/98/12/06/specials/dennett-consciousness.html

People resist the idea that consciousness can be explained in terms of unconscious physical processes because they are "reluctant to include themselves in the great fabric of the physical sciences," said Daniel C. Dennett during a telephone interview from his office at Tufts University in Medford, Mass., where he teaches everything from ethics to computer science. "They want to see themselves as exempt."

Just as Copernican theory overthrew the idea that we are at the center of the universe and Darwinian theory overthrew the idea that we are qualitatively different from beasts, he said, now the materialist explanation of consciousness is breaking down the last "wall of defense" against the idea that we are ordinary. We have already "abandoned the outer ramparts," and now we're being asked to abandon the "inner ramparts."

But if you think of your own thinking as the result of purely physical processes, he said, "the losses are not as great" as you might fear. "The shadow you refuse to look at is much worse than the shadow you actually look at." Indeed, he added, "consciousness explained is not diminished at all."

That is not to say it isn't changed. "Since consciousness, unlike earthquakes and diseases, is constituted by the beliefs you have about it, changing what you think changes the phenomenon itself."

After spending the last 30 years thinking about thinking, though, Mr. Dennett is ready to explore a new sensitive spot. "I am fascinated by the emotional difficulties people have with Darwinism" -- difficulties, he said, that "they don't have with Newton or Einstein or even quantum mechanics."

"To a very great extent our ideas about life, our fondest hopes about the meaning of life, are challenged by the Darwinian idea," he said. It's hard to square the idea that "the mind is something that evolved" with the idea that "minds are the source of meaning." Thus people feel repugnance toward Darwinism.

Given that Mr. Dennett enjoys killing people's sacred cows, it's not surprising that he is now the chairman of the committee that will award the Loebner Prize to the first computer that passes the so-called Turing Test -- by fooling a panel of judges into thinking it is human. The award is $100,000. But as yet Mr. Dennett doesn't see any winners on the horizon. "I think," he said, "I could unmask any computer in a minute." SARAH BOXER WE ARE WHAT WE SPEAK.

© Copyright Original Source

I believe reading his book, CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED would demonstrate that your scared cow of the 'mystery of consciousness,' will eventually go to the butcher block.

Your delusions of the gordian knot that the 'mystery' of the relationship between experiences and structural and functional expression is beyond an empirical explanation will easily fall in the future.

The reference I gave is only one of many that represent an ongoing process of the research into the empirical foundation of this relationship. It is relevant.

Block's proposals of problems of consciousness, are also being seriously challenged by latter works since 2007, see next post.

It's important to point out that Dennett is not a reductionist but an eliminativist. Block and Strawson are both reductionists.

[shunyadragon]

Maybe you don't understand the point I've been trying to make? The limitation isn't "vague" at all but razor sharp as logic. This research you refer to doesn't touch on why those cognitive processes should be conscious. Do you not think that you have to present any positive arguments on your behalf? All you have to do to any opposing position is hold up this giant placard that says SCIENCE!!!!

Describing a 'mystery of consciousness' and 'extra-scientific question, because it touches on what empirical science can and cannot address.' is about as sharp and distinct as San Francisco fog.

You need to be more specific with references, which you said: "Your asking for "scientific references" for this lack of functional expression suggests that maybe I'm not doing a very good job here. This is an extra-scientific question, because it touches on what empirical science can and cannot address."

You have completely failed to distinguish between what empirical science can and cannot address, except propose vague undefined limits. Philosophical propositions that claim to limit science are meaningless.

The boundary is clear from the scientific perspective; What can be objectively observed as evidence can be the basis for a falsifiable hypothesis and theory.

You failed to respond concerning your reference to the primitive nature of "being" you believed parallels the nature of consciousness. What is this "being" you are referring to here?

[shunyadragon]

It's important to point out that Dennett is not a reductionist but an eliminativist. Block and Strawson are both reductionists.

This does not change the landscape of the questions involved here. I do not believe they put the limits on science that you propose in this thread.

[shunyadragon]

Methodological naturalism doesn't entitle someone who follows it to make ontological decisions, no? So I don't understand why you don't restrict yourself to the self-imposed parameters and modesty of the approach you claim to follow. Why can't you be satisfied with saying that those phenomena studied in association with consciousness that can be observed, measured and quantified are x, y, z... MN doesn't entitle you to infer from those correlations that consciousness IS x, or the nature of consciousness IS y. Those are ontological statements. Methodology alone is procedural, not substantive.

I believe I understand the problem, but I believe the disagreement, er . . . ah . . . problem is a two way street.

Yes, Methodological Naturalism is procedural and informative, and not substantive of anything beyond the informative nature of our physical existence. Philosophical assumptions of Ontological Naturalism are of course, independent, ah . . . but yes materialists do believe that Methodological Naturalism is ultimately far more reliable than the testimony of Theist religions concerning the nature of reality, therefore they go with the discipline with the higher track record. I do not agree, but their conclusions are not illogical nor irrational. If it were not for the Baha'i Faith I would philosophically an ontological naturalist, a strong agnostic/weak atheist probably like Einstein, and many other scientists and philosophers.

The problem is that you are reluctant to accept or be " satisfied with saying that those phenomena studied in association with consciousness that can [potentially] be observed, measured and quantified are x, y, z... MN, without proposing philosophical limitations. You also make philosophical assumptions that you to infer from those correlations that consciousness IS is limited or cannot be x, or the nature of consciousness IS limited or cannot be y.

[JimL]

The point is that one cannot exist without the other because each is an expression of a more fundamental reality. So we cannot have consciousness absent connection to the physical.

I think that you are trying to have it both ways J.B. If each, i.e. consciousness and matter, are differing expressions or aspects of one and the same fundamental substance, then being that they are different expressions of that substance, they are different and independent of each other. Just as matter can obviously exist absent consciousness, consciousness should then, in this conception, be able to exist absent matter. So the idea that there is a more fundamental substance to which both consciousness and matter belong doesn't solve the problem. I agree that consciousness is dependent upon matter, as a property thereof, but that imo is due to the form that matter takes, i.e. the form of a nervous system, a brain. I see no reason to assume a more fundamental and unevidenced substance in order to explain consciousness.

[shunyadragon]

I've read "Consciousness Explained." Here's a review of it by Galne Strawson:

http://www.academia.edu/411597/The_s...ness_Explained

First of all, Dennett is a philosopher and his book is one of drawing philosophical conclusions from empirical data. He doesn't claim that all we need is to list and tabulate empirical data and that reductionism is thereby established. What he presents are arguments and the debates he has with others (Searle, Chalmers, et al) are philosophical debates. If you misnterpret what the empirical data mean or if your logic is flawed, all the meter readings and brain scans in the world won't amount to a hill of beans.

Secondly, Dennett, as the review suggests, begs the question by stating at the outset that he must explain consciousness within the framework of contemporary physical science. He's already decided the issue from the start and embedded his conclusion into one of his premises.

Thirdly, he's deeply confused when he writes "There seems to be phenomenology but there really isn't" because phenomenology IS a seeming! Only someone intent on vindicating their prior commitment to materialism could possibly tie himself up into such ridiculous logical knots. His whole project is laughably procrustean.

The block quote you post of his is really irrelevant to this issue. It may be interesting psychologically but if used as an actual argument is argument from motive which is fallacious.

The Block quote is very relevant concerning whether consciousness is reducible to the physical function and structure of the brain. Remember you cited Block first.

As before, selectively citing philosophers weakens your argument when one reads deeper. It is common that different philosophers will disagree, but a closer look will reveal that these disagreements do not necessarily support your case. First you cite Dennett as a skeptic of science demonstrating the physical relationship, but than a closer look at Dennett shows the reverse. Now you cite Strawson criticizing Dennett. Strawson endorses the view that nature clearly may manifest itself in mental activity. Strawson is also controversial in endorsing a form of panpsychism.

It is best that you cite more scientists who address the problem of the relationship between structure, function, and experience in terms of the relationship between the brain, and the mind and consciousness.

[stevegp49]

First a bit on terms. In my experience, discussions concerning consciousness are notoriously imprecise in what is meant by a term used. Unfortunately the term consciousness is a catch-all term for many things.

From the Stanford Encyclopedia:

An animal, person or other cognitive system may be regarded as conscious in a number of different senses.

Sentience. It may be conscious in the generic sense of simply being a sentient creature, one capable of sensing and responding to its world (Armstrong 1981). Being conscious in this sense may admit of degrees, and just what sort of sensory capacities are sufficient may not be sharply defined. Are fish conscious in the relevant respect? And what of shrimp or bees?

Wakefulness. One might further require that the organism actually be exercising such a capacity rather than merely having the ability or disposition to do so. Thus one might count it as conscious only if it were awake and normally alert. In that sense organisms would not count as conscious when asleep or in any of the deeper levels of coma. Again boundaries may be blurry, and intermediate cases may be involved. For example, is one conscious in the relevant sense when dreaming, hypnotized or in a fugue state?

Self-consciousness. A third and yet more demanding sense might define conscious creatures as those that are not only aware but also aware that they are aware, thus treating creature consciousness as a form of self-consciousness (Carruthers 2000). The self-awareness requirement might get interpreted in a variety of ways, and which creatures would qualify as conscious in the relevant sense will vary accordingly. If it is taken to involve explicit conceptual self-awareness, many non-human animals and even young children might fail to qualify, but if only more rudimentary implicit forms of self-awareness are required then a wide range of nonlinguistic creatures might count as self-conscious.

What it is likeSubject of conscious states. A fifth alternative would be to define the notion of a conscious organism in terms of conscious states. That is, one might first define what makes a mental state a conscious mental state, and then define being a conscious creature in terms of having such states. One's concept of a conscious organism would then depend upon the particular account one gives of conscious states (section 2.2).

Transitive Consciousness. In addition to describing creatures as conscious in these various senses, there are also related senses in which creatures are described as being conscious of various things. The distinction is sometimes marked as that between transitive and intransitive notions of consciousness, with the former involving some object at which consciousness is directed (Rosenthal 1986).

Now although I have my doubts, I'm agnostic as to whether science can explain the "what it's like" variety or what is commonly called phenomenal consciousness or the qualia aspect. First, what this is talking about is subjective experience. Since science is an empirical endeavor, the key problem I see is how to take a measurement. How do you measure a subjective experience? Now there can and have been numerous measurements of brain activity that may correlate to phenomenal consciousness but that's a correlation, not a measurement of the subjective experience. Heck, I can't even quantify for myself what it is like for me to see red. Or perhaps a better example would be, how do you measure the difference in subjective experience of what it's like to be a sighted person versus one who was born blind?

[stevegp49]

Some questions: If everything that is is an idea in the mind of God, then would God not partake of "isness"? God's power to create things through thought would also be, but this would create a regress, because then He'd have to think of his power to create which would require His power to create,...

I think in theology our formulations are constrained by our own experiences, so that's why I used the Author/Story metaphor. The story is not the totality of the author and their being. It's just a creation stemming from who they are.

Also, how would this idea affect the problem of evil? And also free will? If every one of my thoughts and actions comes into being through God's thought, how is it mine and how could it be free? The analogy of the author doesn't apply because God is creating everything from nothing, whereas a human author has extremely limited control and also willingly cedes control to chance, the subconscious, etc. All of thise factors, under idealism, would be completely under God'[s control.

Let me use another, albeit inadequate, metaphor. In role play games, the person takes on a role that has certain attributes and constraints. If they are good at it they suspend their own self and become the role. It's still them playing the role but they have taken on a different persona. A Christian analogy might be Jesus as the Christ. God self-emptied (kenosis) to become a human. According to most Christian theology Jesus was both God and human. However, God in Jesus accepted the constraints of being human with limited knowledge and understanding, even about God. Jesus had a free will and, in fact, made pivotal decisions throughout his life. I would suggest that Jesus had freedom because he participated (in a limited scope) in God's freedom.

The question about the problem of evil in the type of idealism I'm proposing is involved and depends on ontology. Rather than post it all here, if anyone is interested here are links to my discussion on ontology and on the problem of evil

[Jim B.]

Describing a 'mystery of consciousness' and 'extra-scientific question, because it touches on what empirical science can and cannot address.' is about as sharp and distinct as San Francisco fog.

Physical science systematically studies physical reality. Physical reality is comprised of that which can be empirically observed, measured, quantified in terms of its causal relations. So IF there is something real that falls outside of this definition of physical reality, that thing would not be within the purview of scientific experimentation and knowledge. If there is a God, for instance, depending on the nature of that God, it may fall outside of this definition of physical reality, as already defined. Would that God, assuming there is such a God, be scientifically knowable through observation, experimentation and reduction?

Saying that what is real is exhausted by what is physical is a metaphysical assertion that cannot be scientifically verified. In the same way, your saying that MN entitles you to say that there are no limits to empirical knowledge cannot be empirically verified. Saying that there are no conceivable limits to empirical knowledge is likewise a metaphysical assertion, not an empirical one. This is the very reason why logical positivism has been abandoned, because it made statements, such as "All true statements are either empirically or analytically true." That statement cannot meet its own criteria because it cannot be verified either logically or empirically.

You need to be more specific with references, which you said: "Your asking for "scientific references" for this lack of functional expression suggests that maybe I'm not doing a very good job here. This is an extra-scientific question, because it touches on what empirical science can and cannot address."

Experimental science does not and cannot deal with questions about its own limits or nature or its underlying assumptions. That's why there is this branch of knowledge known as "Philosophy of Science." You probably think that's all hokum, but you should really check into it sometime. You should try to know at least a little about the things you so summarily dismiss. Science generally does not question or need to justify its own pre-suppositions because those pre-suppositions are not subject to experimental observation and control. Those assumptions are what science works with, those are its tools of trade. So there would be no "scientific literature" investigating these underlying concepts that science dependsupon. What would science use to investigate such things? It's not in that line of work. Like asking philosophy what the surface temp of the sun is. Both result from deep confusion. To think that science has no need of an elaborate set of concepts to undergird it is quite naive and would be contradicted by most scientists you ask. it's funny how we hear such naivete only from the science groupies and rarely from the scientists themselves such as Einstein, Oppenheimer and others who tend to be far more modest and reflective about their own practice.

You have completely failed to distinguish between what empirical science can and cannot address, except propose vague undefined limits. Philosophical propositions that claim to limit science are meaningless.

So science deals with the systematic knowledge of those things that are physical, through observation, experiment, peer review, replicability, etc. What can be objectively observed is what science studies. it takes the appearances of physical things, such as the color red, and it attempts to remove the appearance of redness ( the appearance of redness after all is only useful to denote what is to be scientifically investigated.) Once the investigation of red begins, the appearance can be dispensed with, except as a marker. Through the study of the physics of light and light reflectances, etc, it is discovered that redness is reducible, methodoligically and ontologically, to a certain range of photon emissions, 600 nm. Red as a physical phenomenon has been successfully reduced, so that we know that it's "nothing but" these underlying truths. We can eliminate the subjective experience of color from "real" color. "Real" color has undergone an ontological reduction to light reflectances. Likewise, heat can be reduced to mean molecular motion, solidity to molecular movement in lattice structures and sound to air waves. The appearances of these things are irrelevant, except as markers, to the actual reduction. But when we come to the appearances themselves, this pattern of reduction cannot work, because this pattern crucially relies on an appearance/reality distinction. It relies on an objective observation of what is essentially objectifiably distinct from the observer. The appearances can no longer be cast aside in favor of what the objective reality underlying them is because it's the appearances themselves that are in question. Consciousness is connected essentially to first-person points of view, subjective points of view, and this first-person nature cannot be set aside, as was done with color, heat, etc, without losing what is essential to it, its first-person nature. Rather than standing in the way of our understanding of a phenomenon, the appearances relating to consciousness are what essentially make it up. With conscious experience, thre's no distinction between observation and the thing observed. Standard model of observation doesn't apply.

Reality is not just objective reality. Some things can only be understood from the inside. Such as what it's like to be a bat.

Exclusion of consciousness from the natural world was a useful methodology in the 17th century. It allowed science to investigate phenomena that were measurable, objective and meaningless, i.e. free of intentionality. But the exclusion was based on a partial truth; a larger truth is that consciousness is part of the natural world. It cannot be excluded without begging the question and losing its essential traits.

You failed to respond concerning your reference to the primitive nature of "being" you believed parallels the nature of consciousness. What is this "being" you are referring to here?

I think you missed the point. I wasn't drawing a "parallel" between the two other than the fact that IF consciousness is a basic property, it may be brute, primitive, not explainable in terms of anything else, the way that "being" "space-time" etc might be.

[Jim B.]

This does not change the landscape of the questions involved here. I do not believe they put the limits on science that you propose in this thread.

It was meant as a clarification, not to "change the landscape," although you might want to know a little about those you would enlist as "allies" if they have basic disagreements with you.

[shunyadragon]

Physical science systematically studies physical reality. Physical reality is comprised of that which can be empirically observed, measured, quantified in terms of its causal relations. So IF there is something real that falls outside of this definition of physical reality, that thing would not be within the purview of scientific experimentation and knowledge.

This has been very upfront concerning the reality of MN from the very beginning. There are indeed limits to MN where there is not objective evidence for the falsification of theories and hypothesis. Those

I am not sure why you have not understood this.

If there is a God, for instance, depending on the nature of that God, it may fall outside of this definition of physical reality, as already defined. Would that God, assuming there is such a God, be scientifically knowable through observation, experimentation and reduction?

No, and I haver even hinted that God, God(s), spiritual realms beyond the physical are remotely verified by objective evidence.

Saying that what is real is exhausted by what is physical is a metaphysical assertion that cannot be scientifically verified.

Tentatively True, but the definition is clear for MN. What cannot be verified by objective evidence, and repeatable in experimentation is beyond the realm of science.

In the same way, your saying that MN entitles you to say that there are no limits to empirical knowledge cannot be empirically verified. Saying that there are no conceivable limits to empirical knowledge is likewise a metaphysical assertion, not an empirical one. This is the very reason why logical positivism has been abandoned, because it made statements, such as "All true statements are either empirically or analytically true." That statement cannot meet its own criteria because it cannot be verified either logically or empirically.

Your misrepresenting me here, which has happened on occasion in our dialogue. I never stated there are no conceivable limits to the application of MN. The problem has always been you have been trying to place vague nebulous limits that apply to a vague undefined notion of the 'mystery of consciousness.'

Experimental science does not and cannot deal with questions about its own limits or nature or its underlying assumptions.

Yes it can concerning the limits of What cannot be verified by objective evidence, and repeatable in experimentation is beyond the realm of science. The problem is still that out cannot provide any vague undefined 'mystery of consciousness' as a limit as to what science can and cannot objectively falsify using scientific methods.

That's why there is this branch of knowledge known as "Philosophy of Science." You probably think that's all hokum, but you should really check into it sometime. You should try to know at least a little about the things you so summarily dismiss.

This statement is very arrogant and accusatory from you, and it is dismissed as even Troolish. It is best to defer your insulting manner to yourself.

Science generally does not question or need to justify its own pre-suppositions because those pre-suppositions are not subject to experimental observation and control. Those assumptions are what science works with, those are its tools of trade.

Elementary my dear Watson!

So there would be no "scientific literature" investigating these underlying concepts that science depends upon. What would science use to investigate such things? It's not in that line of work. Like asking philosophy what the surface temp of the sun is. Both result from deep confusion. To think that science has no need of an elaborate set of concepts to undergird it is quite naive and would be contradicted by most scientists you ask. it's funny how we hear such naivete only from the science groupies and rarely from the scientists themselves such as Einstein, Oppenheimer and others who tend to be far more modest and reflective about their own practice.

All the above is nice and interesting, but kind of boring.

The problem remains the fact that you are trying to put vague, nebulous and undefined limits on MN concerning the relationship between the brain, and the mind and consciousness, and wave a magic wand and call it the 'mystery of consciousness.'

So science deals with the systematic knowledge of those things that are physical, through observation, experiment, peer review, replicability, etc. What can be objectively observed is what science studies. it takes the appearances of physical things, such as the color red, and it attempts to remove the appearance of redness ( the appearance of redness after all is only useful to denote what is to be scientifically investigated.) Once the investigation of red begins, the appearance can be dispensed with, except as a marker. Through the study of the physics of light and light reflectances, etc, it is discovered that redness is reducible, methodoligically and ontologically, to a certain range of photon emissions, 600 nm. Red as a physical phenomenon has been successfully reduced, so that we know that it's "nothing but" these underlying truths. We can eliminate the subjective experience of color from "real" color. "Real" color has undergone an ontological reduction to light reflectances. Likewise, heat can be reduced to mean molecular motion, solidity to molecular movement in lattice structures and sound to air waves. The appearances of these things are irrelevant, except as markers, to the actual reduction. But when we come to the appearances themselves, this pattern of reduction cannot work, because this pattern crucially relies on an appearance/reality distinction. It relies on an objective observation of what is essentially objectifiably distinct from the observer. The appearances can no longer be cast aside in favor of what the objective reality underlying them is because it's the appearances themselves that are in question. Consciousness is connected essentially to first-person points of view, subjective points of view, and this first-person nature cannot be set aside, as was done with color, heat, etc, without losing what is essential to it, its first-person nature. Rather than standing in the way of our understanding of a phenomenon, the appearances relating to consciousness are what essentially make it up. With conscious experience, thre's no distinction between observation and the thing observed. Standard model of observation doesn't apply.

Yawn.

Reality is not just objective reality. Some things can only be understood from the inside. Such as what it's like to be a bat.

So what?!?!?! not relevant to your problem of the magic wand of the 'mystery of consciousness.'

Exclusion of consciousness from the natural world was a useful methodology in the 17th century. It allowed science to investigate phenomena that were measurable, objective and meaningless, i.e. free of intentionality. But the exclusion was based on a partial truth; a larger truth is that consciousness is part of the natural world. It cannot be excluded without begging the question and losing its essential traits.

True, apparently you are still partially in the 17th century.

I think you missed the point. I wasn't drawing a "parallel" between the two other than the fact that IF consciousness is a basic property, it may be brute, primitive, not explainable in terms of anything else, the way that "being" "space-time" etc might be.

It was not clear then and it is not clear now what you are referring to as "being."

[Jim B.]

I believe I understand the problem, but I believe the disagreement, er . . . ah . . . problem is a two way street.

But you haven't put forward any actual arguments yet, but keep repeating the same phrases again and again. How is one to interpret that? Actually your position, as far as any argument can be teased out, is an argument from ignorance:
1. Any limits to empirical knowledge would be in principle empirically verifiable.
2. No limits to empirically knowledge have so far been empirically verified.
3. therefore, there are no limits to empirical knowledge in principle.

Yes, Methodological Naturalism is procedural and informative, and not substantive of anything beyond the informative nature of our physical existence. Philosophical assumptions of Ontological Naturalism are of course, independent, ah . . . but yes materialists do believe that Methodological Naturalism is ultimately far more reliable than the testimony of Theist religions concerning the nature of reality, therefore they go with the discipline with the higher track record. I do not agree, but their conclusions are not illogical nor irrational. If it were not for the Baha'i Faith I would philosophically an ontological naturalist, a strong agnostic/weak atheist probably like Einstein, and many other scientists and philosophers.

Theist religions is a strawman. I never brought up theist religions. You still haven't addressed how it is you think that MN justifies you in saying what consciousness (ontologically) is or that there are no limits to what empirical science can understand and reduce. At best, it provides a method for understanding a certain range of phenomena, physical phenomena. To reach beyond those procedural limits is to make philosophical decisions that are not justified within the self-described limits of that method.

[Jim B.]

The Block quote is very relevant concerning whether consciousness is reducible to the physical function and structure of the brain. Remember you cited Block first.

I cited Block firstas an example of a reductionist.

As before, selectively citing philosophers weakens your argument when one reads deeper. It is common that different philosophers will disagree, but a closer look will reveal that these disagreements do not necessarily support your case. First you cite Dennett as a skeptic of science demonstrating the physical relationship, but than a closer look at Dennett shows the reverse. Now you cite Strawson criticizing Dennett. Strawson endorses the view that nature clearly may manifest itself in mental activity. Strawson is also controversial in endorsing a form of panpsychism.

I never cited Dennett as a "skeptic of science." Dennett is very pro-science. His commitment to physical science as being all-explanatory is the reason why he resorts to eliminativism. I cited Strawson because I happen to agree with a number of his points, especially that Dennett's whole book is an elaborate exercise in question-begging and bait and switch. And I know that Strawson is a physicalist; that was one of the points, that even physicalists can see that Dennett is deeply confused.

It is best that you cite more scientists who address the problem of the relationship between structure, function, and experience in terms of the relationship between the brain, and the mind and consciousness.

It is best that you stop arguing from authority, i.e. hiding behind the prestige of science and actually mount an argument of your own. Scientists do not and cannot speak on the limits of science. If they do, they are no longer speaking as scientists but as philosophers. That's perfectly legitimate. Einstein did it often but he would not have thought he was doing physics when he was doing so. It's like asking MN to prove that it supports ON, but by using just the tools and concepts of MN. That's not what it does. Science is not magic. It has a definition, a structure, a method and supporting concepts. It cannot magically answer every conceivable question, not even in principle. Perhaps it will change one day, expanding its assumptions and/or its definition of the physical, but then it would be something else. It wouldn't be what we define now as "science."

[seer]

It is best that you stop arguing from authority, i.e. hiding behind the prestige of science and actually mount an argument of your own.

Good luck...