Mind is not reduceable to brain

[seer]

This may be off topic but I'll address your issue.

Right, let me expand on it. That metaphor was a rather succinct and would need to be fleshed out. In my view, the characters have a level of autonomy and "distance" from the author. As such while the narrative is in the mind of God, how it unfolds depends on how the overarching narrative was set up and how the limitedly autonomous characters live in the narrative. So while some elements of the overarching narrative are available to the characters, the author doesn't create, per se, an individual story in the character. But that leads to the ontology I'm proposing.

This is where it may get a bit dicey for many westerners because it incorporates elements of mysticism. My view is that God is a Living God. The ontology I'm using is what I call an aspect monism. It's similar to Vishishtadvaitism's qualified monism that Ramanuja espoused. In this ontology everything is an aspect of God. This means that God lives in each and everything (humans, animals, plants, elements, etc.), including with all the constraints associated with that particular being. Limited freedom, limited knowledge, limited understanding. In Christianity "kenosis" is a term similar to what I'm talking about, self-emptying. So each aspect (i.e. a character in the narrative) is actually a life of God in that aspect. So God self-limits God's self in that aspect. So from a mystical standpoint we are both our individual autonomous selves and part of God at the same time.

Now I should explain what I meant earlier by "distance". This addresses the nature of God. If this Life represented the entirety of God then there would be some sort of pantheism. But I also believe that while God lives, there is also a depth to God beyond that. So there is a "distance" (i.e. depth, but not a separation) from the abysmal character of God. I use the term "depth" because I want to avoid what I would say are dualistic tendencies in many theistic models. Paul Tillich called this the "dimension of depth" and it represents how religious experiences avail themselves to God's depth (to a certain degree).

All this has implications for a lot of things like free will, the problem of evil, prayer, morality, etc. but this is probably not the place to lay it out. If anyone is interested, I have summary and am in the process of adding detail here.

OK, but wouldn't Panentheism fit here better than Pantheism? With Panentheism you could have genuine "distance" and difference, without sacrificing the whole or the unity.

[stevegp49]

OK, but wouldn't Panentheism fit here better than Pantheism? With Panentheism you could have genuine "distance" and difference, without sacrificing the whole or the unity.

Yes, the ontology I'm proposing is similar to panentheism. However, the panentheistic formulations I've run across create more of "divide" between God and the world than I believe is warranted. They are also often couched in a worldview that sees this world as fallen with a need for some sort of salvation. I don't hold that view. Life is worth the risk of evil. No potential for evil, no life.

[seer]

Yes, the ontology I'm proposing is similar to panentheism. However, the panentheistic formulations I've run across create more of "divide" between God and the world than I believe is warranted. They are also often couched in a worldview that sees this world as fallen with a need for some sort of salvation. I don't hold that view. Life is worth the risk of evil. No potential for evil, no life.

Now that is interesting, I mean if there is evil two questions or points arise; first if we do in fact do evil then in one sense we are fallen. And second, what who defines evil?

[stevegp49]

Now that is interesting, I mean if there is evil two questions or points arise; first if we do in fact do evil then in one sense we are fallen. And second, what who defines evil?

It depends on what "fallen" means. If it means some sort of inherent corrupted state of affairs that will eventually be "fixed" then I wouldn't use that term. This is would be something like the platonic essentialist/existentialist model where there is an essential nature different from our existential nature. My view is that Life is as it should be or as Leibniz said this is the "best of all possible worlds". However, I also believe that there is a way that God in God's depth would have us (and God as an aspect) live in the midst of the challenges of life. There are ultimate morals or "shoulds" in life. This represents the ultimate moral basis for reality. When we fall short of those shoulds then one might call that evil, immoral, or wrong. But in my view, this struggle between acting as we should and not acting as we should is an eternal struggle that is entailed in living. There is no "fix" in the offing. Instead we should strive daily both as individuals and as societies to both discover and live as God would have us live.

So who decides what is evil? Tough one. Of course, God in God's depth knows what is evil and what is good but the challenge for us as an aspect of God is to try to discover what is the good and what is the evil. This has been attempted throughout the millenia and codified in the wisdom literature (i.e. Bible, Quran, Vedas, sayings of Confucius, philosophy, Tibetan Book of the Dead, I Ching, etc.) Those can be valuable resources as well one's own intellect, moral and religious sensibility, and religious experience. This also occurs in a dialog within communities. One reason it is so difficult is that situations are constantly changing and the good may be difficult to discern.

[shunyadragon]

It depends on what "fallen" means. If it means some sort of inherent corrupted state of affairs that will eventually be "fixed" then I wouldn't use that term. This is would be something like the platonic essentialist/existentialist model where there is an essential nature different from our existential nature. My view is that Life is as it should be or as Leibniz said this is the "best of all possible worlds". However, I also believe that there is a way that God in God's depth would have us (and God as an aspect) live in the midst of the challenges of life. There are ultimate morals or "shoulds" in life. This represents the ultimate moral basis for reality. When we fall short of those shoulds then one might call that evil, immoral, or wrong. But in my view, this struggle between acting as we should and not acting as we should is an eternal struggle that is entailed in living. There is no "fix" in the offing. Instead we should strive daily both as individuals and as societies to both discover and live as God would have us live.

This gets a little long and off topic of the 'Mind is not reduceable to brain' If you back up to the concept of neutral monism you referenced, which is basically the pantheistic concept of everything is reduceable to one undefinable 'neutral' substance, neither spirit nor material. This would be equivalent to the Quantum World described by science.

The concept of there is no 'fix,' and not broken, and the nature of our existence is as it is, is a very Buddhist

So who decides what is evil? Tough one. Of course, God in God's depth knows what is evil and what is good but the challenge for us as an aspect of God is to try to discover what is the good and what is the evil. This has been attempted throughout the millenia and codified in the wisdom literature (i.e. Bible, Quran, Vedas, sayings of Confucius, philosophy, Tibetan Book of the Dead, I Ching, etc.) Those can be valuable resources as well one's own intellect, moral and religious sensibility, and religious experience. This also occurs in a dialog within communities. One reason it is so difficult is that situations are constantly changing and the good may be difficult to discern.

Evil is not a problem unless you make it one. The evidence indicates that the nature of our physical existence, and human nature is consistent with a natural course of events, whether there is a God or God(s), or nothing at all. My view, assumes God exists, and our existence is created as with the intent of God's Creation unbroken. There are inherent imperfections in the physical Creation that some ancient religions interpret as 'evil,' but regardless God Created our physical existence predominately good. The intent of God in how and why Creation is as it is, is determined by the will of God, and beyond human speculation.

I believe the religions and spiritual wisdom of the world throughout the millennia is part of the evolving progressive revelation from God where humanity becomes more endowed with the perfection of the harmony of the good of Creation and the attributes of God. When one passed into the next world the imperfections of the physical world are left behind.

Since our physical Creation is a natural physical process, all the processes of the physical Creation may be researched, and studied by science, and likewise he relationship between the brain, and the mind and consciousness. There is no objective evidence that this is not possible.

[Jim B.]

You will have to clear and specific what you are referring to concerning the relationship between structure, functions and experience. There is no known evidence that functions that 'don't appear' to have a structural nor functional expression. Scientific references please that document this problem. This in and of itself is an 'argument from ignorance.'

Claiming something 'doesn't appear' is a rather vague anecdotal claim is the reason I am asking you to be more specific.

Note: Yes, consciousness exists continuously as a function of the brain as it does in most if not all mammals with a brain. It always has a function regardless of whether there is an experience associated with it.

"Don't appear" is what's called a "rhetorical device." As in so many issues, so with this topic, people have to make inferences to the best explanation, i.e. philosophical decisions based upon all the evidence and reason(s) that are deemed relevant. The empirical evidence here, as with countless other topics, is not and cannot be decisive. Even reductionists when it comes to consciousness (Block, Dennett, Strawson, etc)don't believe that this issue can be resolved primarily through empirical findings. Those findings can and must inform one's position but they can't determine it. It doesn't make any sense.

I didn't say that "functions don't appear to have a structural or functional expression," but that experiences don't.

Your asking for "scientific references" for this lack of functional expression suggests that maybe I'm not doing a very good job here. This is an extra-scientific question, because it touches on what empirical science can and cannot address.

[Jim B.]

So neither matter nor consciousness exist in their own right but they are both differing forms of a more fundamental substance? A difficult concept to swallow J. B. How would that work? You would still need to explain what the one is without the other, and though that can be explained with respect to matter, I don't see it being explained with respect to consciousness. How would you explain consciousness absent a connection to a matter?

The point is that one cannot exist without the other because each is an expression of a more fundamental reality. So we cannot have consciousness absent connection to the physical.

[Jim B.]

Source: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20001395

Aust N Z J Psychiatry. 2009 Nov;43(11):994-1006. doi: 10.3109/00048670903270506.
Evolution of human brain functions: the functional structure of human consciousness.
Cloninger CR1.

Abstract

The functional structure of self-aware consciousness in human beings is described based on the evolution of human brain functions. Prior work on heritable temperament and character traits is extended to account for the quantum-like and holographic properties (i.e. parts elicit wholes) of self-aware consciousness. Cladistic analysis is used to identify the succession of ancestors leading to human beings. The functional capacities that emerge along this lineage of ancestors are described. The ecological context in which each cladogenesis occurred is described to illustrate the shifting balance of evolution as a complex adaptive system. Comparative neuroanatomy is reviewed to identify the brain structures and networks that emerged coincident with the emergent brain functions. Individual differences in human temperament traits were well developed in the common ancestor shared by reptiles and humans. Neocortical development in mammals proceeded in five major transitions: from early reptiles to early mammals, early primates, simians, early Homo, and modern Homo sapiens. These transitions provide the foundation for human self-awareness related to sexuality, materiality, emotionality, intellectuality, and spirituality, respectively. The functional structure of human self-aware consciousness is concerned with the regulation of five planes of being: sexuality, materiality, emotionality, intellectuality, and spirituality. Each plane elaborates neocortical functions organized around one of the five special senses. The interactions among these five planes gives rise to a 5 x 5 matrix of subplanes, which are functions that coarsely describe the focus of neocortical regulation. Each of these 25 neocortical functions regulates each of five basic motives or drives that can be measured as temperaments or basic emotions related to fear, anger, disgust, surprise, and happiness/sadness. The resulting 5 x 5 x 5 matrix of human characteristics provides a general and testable model of the functional structure of human consciousness that includes personality, physicality, emotionality, cognition, and spirituality in a unified developmental framework.

© Copyright Original Source

Has nothing to do with the basic conceptual question.

[Jim B.]

No, Methodological Naturalism does not consider empirical investigation that are non-physical. The problem is the same for any philosophical or theological assumption concerning science. Philosophies like Ontological Naturalism and Theistic Evolution are in no way implied by Methodological Naturalism.

Methodological naturalism doesn't entitle someone who follows it to make ontological decisions, no? So I don't understand why you don't restrict yourself to the self-imposed parameters and modesty of the approach you claim to follow. Why can't you be satisfied with saying that those phenomena studied in association with consciousness that can be observed, measured and quantified are x, y, z... MN doesn't entitle you to infer from those correlations that consciousness IS x, or the nature of consciousness IS y. Those are ontological statements. Methodology alone is procedural, not substantive.

[Jim B.]

Yes, there are alternatives, but that does not change the issue.

Neutral Monism is more like pantheism with atheistic implications. It actually proposes a Quantum like nature underlying all of existence that is neither specifically mental nor physical, that is a unified nature. Bertrand Russell was an advocate of this view as an agnostic/atheist. Bertrand would support a reductionist view of the relationship between the brain, and the mind and consciousness.

That's a misrepresentation of neutral monism. Russell, at least at the time he proposed his version of nm would not have been a reductionist. The whole point of it is that it is not reductionist but expansionist. The quantum-like nature would be a physical description.

[Jim B.]

The alternative that I find appealing is idealism. Here's an image that shows the alternatives.

There are several reasons I find it appealing. If everything is mind then it would seem to lessen the hard problem of consciousness because phenomenal experience is associated with mind whereas it is not typically with the physical. I think semantics is important here. There is an intuitive sense that there is something different between mind and substance. A rock is not typically thought to have a mind. Since the "materials" of the brain are not thought to be categorically different from the materials of the rock, this creates the dichotomy of brain/mind. But what if both rocks and brains are not thought of as substances but as different kinds of "thought". Mind itself then constitutes all of reality. To use a metaphor, one can create an image of a rock and a brain in one's mind. They are both thoughts and not the substances itself. This is a monistic view where there is no dichotomy. Phenomenal experience then becomes the experience of those thoughts, just another aspect of mind. To me this provides a seamless integration.

Now with this type of approach there are issues to be dealt with. Berkeley advocated a subjective idealism (but may have change to some form of objective idealism later) but this creates an issue with common experience and can lead to solipsism. Then there are other strains of idealism like objective and absolute idealism that tend to avoid the problems of subjective idealism but in a lot of cases the overarching "mind" is essentially static or effete as Peirce called it. This "Mind" is basically responsible for the "habits" of natural law. I suppose this could be like an idealistic pantheism. I don't find this appealing because it still would, in my view, characterize sentient beings as merely automatons where there is no real freedom embedded in reality.

The approach I favor is what I call an ultimate idealism. Idealist Josiah Royce offers something like what I'm thinking about but seems to be inclined more toward an objective idealism. There have also been some eastern philosophers like Ramanuja who advocated a qualified monism that offers an ontology that would be compatible. Essentially what I am thinking about is that reality is constituted in the mind of God. To use a metaphor it might be like Author/Story. The author creates (constitutes) the story in their mind. The characters also have minds that are aspects of God's mind. Whereas God's mind constitutes it all, the characters have finite minds with their own experiences. Also since God is free, the characters also have some level of finite freedom. Now if you talk to narrative writers (and I've experienced this myself) they will tell you that sometimes the characters surprise them in what they do (free will?).

There are also other advantages, I think to this approach. The issues of choice and observation in quantum mechanics may disappear because every event is "observed" by God. The issue of divine action becomes more tenable because the "laws" of nature are not mindless forces but the habits of God's mind. Since they are habits instantiated to provide life, they can also be adjusted (within limits) to support a purpose (teleology). Prayer becomes efficacious. Meaning is embedded in reality. Morality has an ultimate basis.

I could say more but I'll stop there.

Interesting. The image is a good overview of the positions. I've always been skeptical of idealism, especially of the Berkleyan variety, but maybe you can persuade me.

Some questions: If everything that is is an idea in the mind of God, then would God not partake of "isness"? God's power to create things through thought would also be, but this would create a regress, because then He'd have to think of his power to create which would require His power to create,...Also, how would this idea affect the problem of evil? And also free will? If every one of my thoughts and actions comes into being through God's thought, how is it mine and how could it be free? The analogy of the author doesn't apply because God is creating everything from nothing, whereas a human author has extremely limited control and also willingly cedes control to chance, the subconscious, etc. All of thise factors, under idealism, would be completely under God'[s control.

[shunyadragon]

"Don't appear" is what's called a "rhetorical device." As in so many issues, so with this topic, people have to make inferences to the best explanation, i.e. philosophical decisions based upon all the evidence and reason(s) that are deemed relevant. The empirical evidence here, as with countless other topics, is not and cannot be decisive. Even reductionists when it comes to consciousness (Block, Dennett, Strawson, etc)don't believe that this issue can be resolved primarily through empirical findings. Those findings can and must inform one's position but they can't determine it. It doesn't make any sense.

I didn't say that "functions don't appear to have a structural or functional expression," but that experiences don't.

Your asking for "scientific references" for this lack of functional expression suggests that maybe I'm not doing a very good job here. This is an extra-scientific question, because it touches on what empirical science can and cannot address.

First, I believe your assertion of a 'mystery of consciousness' is a vague nebulous something that you define as an 'extra-scientific question, because it touches on what empirical science can and cannot address.' The related claim that 'The empirical evidence here, as with countless other topics, is not and cannot be decisive.' also represents a vague nebulous boundary that cannot be defined as you aspire to do.

Second, I believe you are over stating the skepticism of scientists, ie Block, Dennett, Strawson, in expressing what they believe science can and cannot explain empirically concerning the relationship between the brain, and the mind and consciousness. It is possible selectively cite some scientists to justify these vague limits, but over all no they do not place such limits empirically on the capability of science to explain this relationship.

I think Dennett expresses his objections to your view, as well as the objections to other philosophers here;

Source: https://www.nytimes.com/books/98/12/06/specials/dennett-consciousness.html

People resist the idea that consciousness can be explained in terms of unconscious physical processes because they are "reluctant to include themselves in the great fabric of the physical sciences," said Daniel C. Dennett during a telephone interview from his office at Tufts University in Medford, Mass., where he teaches everything from ethics to computer science. "They want to see themselves as exempt."

Just as Copernican theory overthrew the idea that we are at the center of the universe and Darwinian theory overthrew the idea that we are qualitatively different from beasts, he said, now the materialist explanation of consciousness is breaking down the last "wall of defense" against the idea that we are ordinary. We have already "abandoned the outer ramparts," and now we're being asked to abandon the "inner ramparts."

But if you think of your own thinking as the result of purely physical processes, he said, "the losses are not as great" as you might fear. "The shadow you refuse to look at is much worse than the shadow you actually look at." Indeed, he added, "consciousness explained is not diminished at all."

That is not to say it isn't changed. "Since consciousness, unlike earthquakes and diseases, is constituted by the beliefs you have about it, changing what you think changes the phenomenon itself."

After spending the last 30 years thinking about thinking, though, Mr. Dennett is ready to explore a new sensitive spot. "I am fascinated by the emotional difficulties people have with Darwinism" -- difficulties, he said, that "they don't have with Newton or Einstein or even quantum mechanics."

"To a very great extent our ideas about life, our fondest hopes about the meaning of life, are challenged by the Darwinian idea," he said. It's hard to square the idea that "the mind is something that evolved" with the idea that "minds are the source of meaning." Thus people feel repugnance toward Darwinism.

Given that Mr. Dennett enjoys killing people's sacred cows, it's not surprising that he is now the chairman of the committee that will award the Loebner Prize to the first computer that passes the so-called Turing Test -- by fooling a panel of judges into thinking it is human. The award is $100,000. But as yet Mr. Dennett doesn't see any winners on the horizon. "I think," he said, "I could unmask any computer in a minute." SARAH BOXER WE ARE WHAT WE SPEAK.

© Copyright Original Source

I believe reading his book, CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED would demonstrate that your scared cow of the 'mystery of consciousness,' will eventually go to the butcher block.

Your delusions of the gordian knot that the 'mystery' of the relationship between experiences and structural and functional expression is beyond an empirical explanation will easily fall in the future.

The reference I gave is only one of many that represent an ongoing process of the research into the empirical foundation of this relationship. It is relevant.

Block's proposals of problems of consciousness, are also being seriously challenged by latter works since 2007, see next post.

[shunyadragon]

Source: http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01399/full

Consciousness doesn't overflow cognition

Richard Brown*
Philosophy Program, LaGuardia Community College, City University of New York, Long Island City, NY, USA
Theories of consciousness can be separated into those that see it as cognitive in nature, or as an aspect of cognitive functioning, and those that see consciousness as importantly distinct from any kind of cognitive functioning. One version of the former kind of theory is the higher-order-thought theory of consciousness. This family of theories posits a fundamental role for cognitive states, higher-order thought-like intentional states, in the explanation of conscious experience. These states are higher-order in that they represent the subject herself as being in various world-directed first-order states and thus constitute a kind of cognitive access to one's own mental life. This distinctive cognitive access is postulated to account for what it is like for one to have a conscious experience.

One important challenge to this approach is Block's case for phenomenological overflow (Block, 2007, 2011, 2012). The basic argument is that, overall, the balance of evidence favors the identification of phenomenal consciousness with first-order non-cognitive states rather than our cognitive access to those states. Emerging clearly from the ensuing debate is that Block's argument is meant to establish that phenomenology overflows working memory. This is important because, unlike other theories, the higher-order thought theory can allow that our conscious experience overflows working memory. In addition, it can account for the subjective impression that there is overflow even if there isn't.

© Copyright Original Source

Considering the progress of science over time, history is a reliable witness that such delusions of vague limitations such as the 'mysteries of consciousness' will indeed fall.

[Jim B.]

First, I believe your assertion of a 'mystery of consciousness' is a vague nebulous something that you define as an 'extra-scientific question, because it touches on what empirical science can and cannot address.' The related claim that 'The empirical evidence here, as with countless other topics, is not and cannot be decisive.' also represents a vague nebulous boundary that cannot be defined as you aspire to do.

Second, I believe you are over stating the skepticism of scientists, ie Block, Dennett, Strawson, in expressing what they believe science can and cannot explain empirically concerning the relationship between the brain, and the mind and consciousness. It is possible selectively cite some scientists to justify these vague limits, but over all no they do not place such limits empirically on the capability of science to explain this relationship.

I think Dennett expresses his objections to your view, as well as the objections to other philosophers here;

Source: https://www.nytimes.com/books/98/12/06/specials/dennett-consciousness.html

People resist the idea that consciousness can be explained in terms of unconscious physical processes because they are "reluctant to include themselves in the great fabric of the physical sciences," said Daniel C. Dennett during a telephone interview from his office at Tufts University in Medford, Mass., where he teaches everything from ethics to computer science. "They want to see themselves as exempt."

Just as Copernican theory overthrew the idea that we are at the center of the universe and Darwinian theory overthrew the idea that we are qualitatively different from beasts, he said, now the materialist explanation of consciousness is breaking down the last "wall of defense" against the idea that we are ordinary. We have already "abandoned the outer ramparts," and now we're being asked to abandon the "inner ramparts."

But if you think of your own thinking as the result of purely physical processes, he said, "the losses are not as great" as you might fear. "The shadow you refuse to look at is much worse than the shadow you actually look at." Indeed, he added, "consciousness explained is not diminished at all."

That is not to say it isn't changed. "Since consciousness, unlike earthquakes and diseases, is constituted by the beliefs you have about it, changing what you think changes the phenomenon itself."

After spending the last 30 years thinking about thinking, though, Mr. Dennett is ready to explore a new sensitive spot. "I am fascinated by the emotional difficulties people have with Darwinism" -- difficulties, he said, that "they don't have with Newton or Einstein or even quantum mechanics."

"To a very great extent our ideas about life, our fondest hopes about the meaning of life, are challenged by the Darwinian idea," he said. It's hard to square the idea that "the mind is something that evolved" with the idea that "minds are the source of meaning." Thus people feel repugnance toward Darwinism.

Given that Mr. Dennett enjoys killing people's sacred cows, it's not surprising that he is now the chairman of the committee that will award the Loebner Prize to the first computer that passes the so-called Turing Test -- by fooling a panel of judges into thinking it is human. The award is $100,000. But as yet Mr. Dennett doesn't see any winners on the horizon. "I think," he said, "I could unmask any computer in a minute." SARAH BOXER WE ARE WHAT WE SPEAK.

© Copyright Original Source

I believe reading his book, CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED would demonstrate that your scared cow of the 'mystery of consciousness,' will eventually go to the butcher block.

Your delusions of the gordian knot that the 'mystery' of the relationship between experiences and structural and functional expression is beyond an empirical explanation will easily fall in the future.

The reference I gave is only one of many that represent an ongoing process of the research into the empirical foundation of relationship. It is relevant.

Bock's proposals of problems of consciousness, are also being seriously challenged by latter works since 2007, see next post.

I've read "Consciousness Explained." Here's a review of it by Galne Strawson:

http://www.academia.edu/411597/The_s...ness_Explained

First of all, Dennett is a philosopher and his book is one of drawing philosophical conclusions from empirical data. He doesn't claim that all we need is to list and tabulate empirical data and that reductionism is thereby established. What he presents are arguments and the debates he has with others (Searle, Chalmers, et al) are philosophical debates. If you misnterpret what the empirical data mean or if your logic is flawed, all the meter readings and brain scans in the world won't amount to a hill of beans.

Secondly, Dennett, as the review suggests, begs the question by stating at the outset that he must explain consciousness within the framework of contemporary physical science. He's already decided the issue from the start and embedded his conclusion into one of his premises.

Thirdly, he's deeply confused when he writes "There seems to be phenomenology but there really isn't" because phenomenology IS a seeming! Only someone intent on vindicating their prior commitment to materialism could possibly tie himself up into such ridiculous logical knots. His whole project is laughably procrustean.

The block quote you post of his is really irrelevant to this issue. It may be interesting psychologically but if used as an actual argument is argument from motive which is fallacious.

[Jim B.]

Source: http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01399/full

Consciousness doesn't overflow cognition

Richard Brown*
Philosophy Program, LaGuardia Community College, City University of New York, Long Island City, NY, USA
Theories of consciousness can be separated into those that see it as cognitive in nature, or as an aspect of cognitive functioning, and those that see consciousness as importantly distinct from any kind of cognitive functioning. One version of the former kind of theory is the higher-order-thought theory of consciousness. This family of theories posits a fundamental role for cognitive states, higher-order thought-like intentional states, in the explanation of conscious experience. These states are higher-order in that they represent the subject herself as being in various world-directed first-order states and thus constitute a kind of cognitive access to one's own mental life. This distinctive cognitive access is postulated to account for what it is like for one to have a conscious experience.

One important challenge to this approach is Block's case for phenomenological overflow (Block, 2007, 2011, 2012). The basic argument is that, overall, the balance of evidence favors the identification of phenomenal consciousness with first-order non-cognitive states rather than our cognitive access to those states. Emerging clearly from the ensuing debate is that Block's argument is meant to establish that phenomenology overflows working memory. This is important because, unlike other theories, the higher-order thought theory can allow that our conscious experience overflows working memory. In addition, it can account for the subjective impression that there is overflow even if there isn't.

© Copyright Original Source

Considering the progress of science over time, history is a reliable witness that such delusions of vague limitations such as the 'mysteries of consciousness' will indeed fall.

Maybe you don't understand the point I've been trying to make? The limitation isn't "vague" at all but razor sharp as logic. This research you refer to doesn't touch on why those cognitive processes should be conscious. Do you not think that you have to present any positive arguments on your behalf? All you have to do to any opposing position is hold up this giant placard that says SCIENCE!!!!