Why think God caused the universe to exist?

[Jichard]

Your problem here is that you don't seem to know what an actual infinite is.

Your problem is that you don't understand that Craig denies that God exists infinitely into the past, which is just what I said.

"They can't say God's existence extends infinitely into the past, since defenders of Kalaam usually argue that it is impossible for something to extend infinitely into the past."

...the mathematical notion of an actual infinite is a quantitative concept. It concerns a collection of definite and discrete elements that are members of the collection. But when theologians speak of the infinity of God, they are not using the word in a mathematical sense to refer to an aggregate of an infinite number of elements. God's infinity is, as it were, qualitative, not quantitative. It means that God is metaphysically necessary, morally perfect, omnipotent, omniscient, eternal, and so on.

Nope. If God exists infinitely into the past, then each of God's temporal states could be numbered. And that would make God an actual infinite. Craig dodges that point by doing exactly what I said: denying that God exists infinitely into the past.

In other words, while God is eternal, he is not an actual infinite, and so there is no conflict with the Kalam Cosmological argument.

Once again, Craig does not think God exists infinitely into the past. You really need to learn the difference between:

1 : timeless existence (i.e. atemporal)

and:

2 : exisiting infinitely into the past (i.e. past-infinite)

You seem to think Craig is saying God exists as 2. That's false. He claims God is 1. Please learn the difference.

[JonathanL]

Your problem is that you don't understand that Craig denies that God exists infinitely into the past, which is just what I said.

"They can't say God's existence extends infinitely into the past, since defenders of Kalaam usually argue that it is impossible for something to extend infinitely into the past."

Nope. If God exists infinitely into the past, then each of God's temporal states could be numbered. And that would make God an actual infinite. Craig dodges that point by doing exactly what I said: denying that God exists infinitely into the past.



Once again, Craig does not think God exists infinitely into the past. You really need to learn the difference between:

1 : timeless existence (i.e. atemporal)

and:

2 : exisiting infinitely into the past (i.e. past-infinite)

You seem to think Craig is saying God exists as 2. That's false. He claims God is 1. Please learn the difference.

I don't know what you're replying to, but it's definitely not the post you're quoting.

[shunyadragon]

You've apparently misunderstood Craig's argument because what he objects to is an infinite number of causes and not the concept that something could eternally exist without a cause.

This is why the multiverse theory fails, because it requires an infinite number of causes.http://www.reasonablefaith.org/the-n...#ixzz3jlbGKj6l

The problem with this line of reasoning is that for the multiverse model to be true it does not require an infinite number of causes. It simply needs and uncaused cause - Natural Law, which is timeless and spaceless. Since the Quantum vacuum zero-state multiverse is likely timeless and spaceless, infinities are meaningless except within one of the possible universes like ours.

[shunyadragon]

Your problem here is that you don't seem to know what an actual infinite is.

Source: William Lane Craig

...the mathematical notion of an actual infinite is a quantitative concept. It concerns a collection of definite and discrete elements that are members of the collection. But when theologians speak of the infinity of God, they are not using the word in a mathematical sense to refer to an aggregate of an infinite number of elements. God's infinity is, as it were, qualitative, not quantitative. It means that God is metaphysically necessary, morally perfect, omnipotent, omniscient, eternal, and so on.

Read more: http://www.reasonablefaith.org/is-go...#ixzz3kj1oMoVQ

© Copyright Original Source

In other words, while God is eternal, he is not an actual infinite, and so there is no conflict with the Kalam Cosmological argument.

In other words, Natural Law may be an uncaused cause of a multiverse Quantum vacuum that is without time and space.

[JimL]

By "eternal in time," do you mean to say infinite in time? "Eternal" can be a bit ambiguous, as philosophers tend to use the word to mean two completely opposite things, and these two definitions can be easy to conflate or equivocate. "Eternal" can mean "for an infinite amount of time" or it can mean "entirely absent of time," depending upon its intention.

Assuming that "eternal" is a reference to the finitude of time, the primary problem that I would see with this idea is that it seems entirely plausible, on modern cosmology, that the universe may have had a first moment, and that it may not be past-infinite. There just does not seem to be a good reason, at this point, to conclude that the universe is past-infinite on the basis of physical evidence. So, just as I object to Dr. Craig's premise that the universe must be past-finite, in the Kalam Cosmological Argument, I would similarly object to the premise that the universe is past-infinite, which underlies the view which you have presented here.

So you think that the universe, our spacetime, the whole ball of wax, is both eternal and finite in extent, and that that scenario is just a brute fact? It doesn't seem logical to me that there is something rather than nothing, but that the something is finite. It seems to me that if the something that exists is a brute fact, then that brute fact existence must be unbounded, or infinite. I don't disagree that our universe is finite and had a beginning, but I doubt very much that its beginning is the beginning of the brute fact eternally existing something. Its true that we don't have physical evidence of existence beyond our universe, but we don't have evidence that there is nothing beyond it either. If there were nothing beyond it, then we would have the opposite question to deal with which is 'If it is a brute fact that there is something rather than nothing, then why is it also a brute fact that there is nothing rather than something?

Another problem for this view is tangential, but very important. Modern physics, particularly Relativity, has shown that the measure of elapsed time for any single event can and does vary depending upon the observer making that measurement. Three different observers in three different inertial reference frames can measure the time which elapses for the same event, and all three can yield measurements which are different from one another's, with absolutely no way of distinguishing whether one of these measurements is "correct" or "incorrect." Indeed, in modern physics, the view is that all three measurements are equally correct.

This poses a major problem for the A-Theory, as events which are still in the future for one observer may have already occurred for another observer. How can it be said that temporal progression is real if this progression is observer-dependent? William Lane Craig attempts to resolve this problem by the ad hoc assertion that there exists one correct inertial frame of reference (which I will call the "Aether Frame") and that all other reference frames are illusory. I've explained why I think this is a particularly poor assertion, here.

Does this measurment problem have to do with time itself, or does it have to do with the observers and their frame of reference. In other words does the event occur at a specific time, the correct time, and the observers just see it occur at differing times?

So, whether you hold to the A-Theory or the B-Theory, it remains that there must be something about the phenomenological experience of time which is entirely illusory. Neither understanding of Time can stay true to modern physics while perfectly matching our intuitive perceptions of how time works.

Well, either illusory or not quite understood. You may be right, I don't know, but the block universe idea as you have described it just doesn't sit well with me. Its like nothing at all exists other than brain states, whatever that would mean.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

It doesn't seem logical to me that there is something rather than nothing, but that the something is finite. It seems to me that if the something that exists is a brute fact, then that brute fact existence must be unbounded, or infinite.

Why? Why do you think it is more logical that something which exists as a brute fact be infinite in extent rather than finite? I am certainly unaware of any logical argument for such a case.

Its true that we don't have physical evidence of existence beyond our universe, but we don't have evidence that there is nothing beyond it either. If there were nothing beyond it, then we would have the opposite question to deal with which is 'If it is a brute fact that there is something rather than nothing, then why is it also a brute fact that there is nothing rather than something?

When we say, "Nothing exists beyond our universe," we are not saying that, beyond our universe, there exists an actual region which is best categorized as nothingness. That would be a nonsensical and self-defeating claim: if it is an actual region, it most certainly is not "nothing."

Rather, think of the precisely analogous claim, "Nothing exists north of the North Pole." Again, we're not saying that a region of nothingness actually does exist to the north of the North Pole. We're saying that there is no such thing as "north of the North Pole."

In exactly the same way, there is no such thing as "beyond our universe." The phrase is, itself, nonsensical. "Beyond" is a descriptor of spatial relation. In the absence of space, what is it intended to mean?

Does this measurment problem have to do with time itself, or does it have to do with the observers and their frame of reference. In other words does the event occur at a specific time, the correct time, and the observers just see it occur at differing times?

I talk about this exact question in the blog post which I linked, but let me quote my own work for the sake of brevity:

Well, either illusory or not quite understood. You may be right, I don't know, but the block universe idea as you have described it just doesn't sit well with me. Its like nothing at all exists other than brain states, whatever that would mean.

Quite the contrary, brain states are only one extremely tiny subset of the whole panoply of that which exists on the block universe view of space-time.

[Mountain Man]

Your problem is that you don't understand that Craig denies that God exists infinitely into the past, which is just what I said.

"They can't say God's existence extends infinitely into the past, since defenders of Kalaam usually argue that it is impossible for something to extend infinitely into the past."

Nope. If God exists infinitely into the past, then each of God's temporal states could be numbered. And that would make God an actual infinite. Craig dodges that point by doing exactly what I said: denying that God exists infinitely into the past.



Once again, Craig does not think God exists infinitely into the past. You really need to learn the difference between:

1 : timeless existence (i.e. atemporal)

and:

2 : exisiting infinitely into the past (i.e. past-infinite)

You seem to think Craig is saying God exists as 2. That's false. He claims God is 1. Please learn the difference.

I'm not sure why you think you're disagreeing me since you're pretty much parroting back exactly what I said.

Anyway, in your OP you say that "If theists [...] want to claim that God caused the universe to exist, then that commits these theists to claim that God temporally preceded the universe; that is: God existed before the universe did and did so in a temporal state."

This, too, is a misunderstanding of Craig's actual position:

Source: William Lane Craig

http://www.reasonablefaith.org/the-n...uments-for-god

© Copyright Original Source

and...

Source: William Lane Craig

Time has a savage way of gnawing away at existence, making our claim upon existence tenuous and fleeting. And surely this is incompatible with the life of a most perfect being, such as God is. A perfect being must have his life all at once, complete, never passing away or yet to come. In other words, the life of a perfect being must be a timeless existence in which he exists in an eternal now that never passes away.

This argument for divine atemporality strikes me as extremely plausible and powerful. And yet I don't think it's entirely demonstrative because I think that the fleetingness of time is diminished for an omniscient being. Part of the reason that time's tooth seems so savage to us is because we no longer have a complete memory of the past or anticipation of the future in our minds. But for an omniscient being who knows completely past, present, and future as though they were right now, the fleeting nature of time's passage is not so melancholy an affair. God can recall past events and relive them with a vividness and reality as though they were present. Similarly, He foreknows events to come in the future with the same sort of reality with which He can know present events. So for a being who has complete recollection of the past and complete foreknowledge of the future, the passage of time is not so severe and detrimental a defect as it is for us finite, temporal creatures. Nevertheless, in the absence of countermanding arguments for divine temporality, I do think this argument does give some plausible grounds for affirming that God is atemporal.

http://www.reasonablefaith.org/god-time-and-eternity

© Copyright Original Source

With this understanding of God -- that he does not have a past, present, or future but exists in an etneral "now" -- talking about him in temporal terms (i.e. as existing "before" the creation of the universe) doesn't make a bit of sense, and so your objection fails.

You know, before arguing against Craig's positions, you might want to trouble yourself to understand what his positions actually are.

[Mountain Man]

The problem with this line of reasoning is that for the multiverse model to be true it does not require an infinite number of causes. It simply needs and uncaused cause - Natural Law, which is timeless and spaceless. Since the Quantum vacuum zero-state multiverse is likely timeless and spaceless, infinities are meaningless except within one of the possible universes like ours.

You're basically substituting "Natural Law" for "God" in the argument. But unless Natural Law is a personal being, this solution doesn't work since Natural Law can't will a previously non-existent state of affairs into existence. As Craig notes (and I reference this above):

Source: William Lane Craig

http://www.reasonablefaith.org/the-n...uments-for-god

© Copyright Original Source

[Boxing Pythagoras]

You're basically substituting "Natural Law" for "God" in the argument. But unless Natural Law is a personal being, this solution doesn't work since Natural Law can't will a previously non-existent state of affairs into existence. As Craig notes (and I reference this above):

Source: William Lane Craig

http://www.reasonablefaith.org/the-n...uments-for-god

© Copyright Original Source

...how does personal agency resolve any of those issues? If a thing is timeless and changeless, what does it even mean to claim such a thing is a person? How can a timeless, changeless personal agent make a choice?

[Jichard]

I don't know what you're replying to, but it's definitely not the post you're quoting.

No, I'm replying to the post I quoted.

Do you have anything of sunstance to say?

[Jichard]

I'm not sure why you think you're disagreeing me since you're pretty much parroting back exactly what I said.

Nope. You misrepresented what I said so you could claim I misrepresent Craig's position. I corrected that misrepresentation by showing what I actually said and showing that what I said fairly represented Craig's position:

First, quote where I said:

Craig objects to an infinite number of causes

Because that's not what I said. What I actually said was:

"They can't say God's existence extends infinitely into the past, since defenders of Kalaam usually argue that it is impossible for something to extend infinitely into the past."

Anyway, in your OP you say that "If theists [...] want to claim that God caused the universe to exist, then that commits these theists to claim that God temporally preceded the universe; that is: God existed before the universe did and did so in a temporal state."

Quote-mine on your part. Here's more of what I actually wrote:

"Option B has some interesting implications, only some of which I'll discuss. If theists take option B and those theists still want to claim that God caused the universe to exist, then that commits these theists to claim that God temporally preceded the universe; that is: God existed before the universe did and did so in a temporal state."

So in that post, I made it clear that the consequent follows if theists want to claim that God exists and accept option B. You left out the bolded option B part, so you could pretend that I claimed that I claimed that the consequent only followed from the claim that God existed.

So, what is option B? I made that clear in the OP. Option B involves accepting causes temporally precede their effects:

"1 : If C causes E, then C temporally precedes E

[...]

option B : accept 1"

This, too, is a misunderstanding of Craig's actual position:

Not a misunderstanding at all, since I already know that Craig does not accept option B and I never claimed that Craig accepted option B, so what I said (about people who accept option B) does not apply to him. Instead, Craig takes option A and has the problems that come with it.

So your claim that I minuderstood Craig, is based on your quote-mining me.

With this understanding of God -- that he does not have a past, present, or future but exists in an etneral "now" -- talking about him in temporal terms (i.e. as existing "before" the creation of the universe) doesn't make a bit of sense, and so your objection fails.

"now" is a temporal notion denoting the present, so you've just made God temporal. "now" is not a notion that applies to atemporal things, anymore than "here" is a notion that applies to non-spatial things. So you if want to claim God is atemporal, you'll need to ditch notions like "now". Even if you claim that there is just one instant of time for God, that instant of time is still time and thus inapplicable to atemporal things.

You know, before arguing against Craig's positions, you might want to trouble yourself to understand what his positions actually are.

You know, you shouldn't use quote-mining to lie about what people have said, just so you can pretend they misrepresented Craig.

[37818]

First, quote where I said:

Craig objects to an infinite number of causes

Because that's not what I said. What I actually said was:

"They can't say God's existence extends infinitely into the past, since defenders of Kalaam usually argue that it is impossible for something to extend infinitely into the past."

Second, Craig objects to the idea that something can extend infinitely into the past. That's one reason why he employs the Hilbert's hotel thought experiment, for example.

Third, a multiverse is compatible with the multiverse being past-finite.



Already familiar with this. None of it rebuts what I wrote in the OP.

But since you like quoting Craig, here's a quote from Craig for you:

"The Existence of God and the Beginning of the Universe"
http://www.leaderu.com/truth/3truth11.html

"2.1 Argument based on the impossibility of an actual infinite.
2.11 An actual infinite cannot exist.
2.12 An infinite temporal regress of events is an actual infinite.
2.13 Therefore, an infinite temporal regress of events cannot exist."

Which supports what I said above:

"They can't say God's existence extends infinitely into the past, since defenders of Kalaam usually argue that it is impossible for something to extend infinitely into the past."

As theist I have the same objections. There must either be infinite creations by God or a finite temporal entity which has always coexisted both with and as God too. Or even both.

[Mountain Man]

...how does personal agency resolve any of those issues? If a thing is timeless and changeless, what does it even mean to claim such a thing is a person? How can a timeless, changeless personal agent make a choice?

You guys would do well to actually read some of Dr. Craig's writings, because he explains all of this stuff in great detail.

Source: The New Atheism and Five Arguments for God

http://www.reasonablefaith.org/the-n...uments-for-god

© Copyright Original Source

[Mountain Man]

"now" is a temporal notion denoting the present, so you've just made God temporal. "now" is not a notion that applies to atemporal things, anymore than "here" is a notion that applies to non-spatial things. So you if want to claim God is atemporal, you'll need to ditch notions like "now". Even if you claim that there is just one instant of time for God, that instant of time is still time and thus inapplicable to atemporal things.

So now you're reduced to arguing semantics. Nice.

Since we're temporal beings, our language is inherently temporally based, and so we have certain limitations when trying to discuss the nature of an atemporal being. Saying that God exists in an eternal "now" where past, present, and future are meaningless concepts is probably the closest we can get to describing a timeless being. In effect, God experiences the past, present, and future simultaneously. In other words, God's existence is not a series of discrete events but rather he eternally exists in his totality.

Now let's back up for a moment: in your OP, you never claimed that Craig didn't accept option B. On the contrary, you implied that Option B was the only available choice for proponent's of the Kalam Cosomological Argument since choosing A was a logical fallacy.

1 : If C causes E, then C temporally precedes E

Now, if theists want to still claim that God caused the universe to exist, then they have at least two options:
option A : don't accept 1
option B : accept 1

Option A just looks like special pleading. After all, why would theists reject a claim as well supported as 1, while accepting equally-supported (or less well-supported) claims they think help their theology, like the universe began to exist?

Option B has some interesting implications, only some of which I'll discuss. If theists take option B and those theists still want to claim that God caused the universe to exist, then that commits these theists to claim that God temporally preceded the universe; that is: God existed before the universe did and did so in a temporal state. But that creates at least three problems:

First, it creates problems for proponents of Craig's Kalaam argument, since they will have trouble accounting for God's temporal state. They can't say God's existence extends infinitely into the past, since defenders of Kalaam usually argue that it is impossible for something to extend infinitely into the past. Yet they also won't want to say that God existed for a finite amount of time into the past, since defenders of Kalaam normally argue that if X existed for a finite amount of time into the past then X must have a cause for it's existence, and they don't won't want to claim that God has a cause of it's existence. So they're stuck.

So the implication here is pretty clear: Craig, being a proponent of Kalam, must necessarily accept Option B or be guilty of special pleading. But now you're insisting that Craig doesn't accept option B, which I find very curious. So if Craig can't accept A and, according to you, doesn't accept B then what does Craig believe? Your argument seems so confused at this point that I'm not even sure if you know!

But actually, if you presented Craig with the premise that "If C causes E, then C temporally precedes E", he would challenge you to prove that casuality implies a temporal relationship:

could come into existence with no causal conditions whatsoever. That is truly bizarre. Why did time and the universe begin to exist at all? How could they begin to exist in the absence of any causal conditions?

[Jichard]

Are you ever going to address why you dishonestly quote-mined my post?

So now you're reduced to arguing semantics. Nice.

Since we're temporal beings, our language is inherently temporally based, and so we have certain limitations when trying to discuss the nature of an atemporal being. Saying that God exists in an eternal "now" where past, present, and future are meaningless concepts is probably the closest we can get to describing a timeless being. In effect, God experiences the past, present, and future simultaneously. In other words, God's existence is not a series of discrete events but rather he eternally exists in his totality.

You just admitted that what you just said about God is meaningless. So there's no reason for me to take it seriously.

Now let's back up for a moment: in your OP, you never claimed that Craig didn't accept option B.

Why did you quote-mine my post?

I never claimed that Craig accepted option B.

On the contrary, you implied that Option B was the only available choice for proponent's of the Kalam Cosomological Argument since choosing A was a logical fallacy.

Another misrepresentation. I never said that. I instead noted that neither option B nor option A would work for proponents of Kalaam, so proponents of Kalaam were screwed either way.

So the implication here is pretty clear: Craig, being a proponent of Kalam, must necessarily accept Option B or be guilty of special pleading.

Which is not the same as claiming that Craig actually accepts option B. After all, Craig engages in special peading when it suits his purposes.

But now you're insisting that Craig doesn't accept option B, which I find very curious. So if Craig can't accept A and, according to you, doesn't accept B then what does Craig believe? Your argument seems so confused at this point that I'm not even sure if you know!

You're apparently so confused that you can't the difference between:

If Craig does not accept 1, then Craig is guilty of special pleading

vs.:

Craig actually accepts 1

But actually, if you presented Craig with the premise that "If C causes E, then C temporally precedes E", he would challenge you to prove that casuality implies a temporal relationship:

Already did:

This critique starts with the following claim:

1 : If C causes E, then C temporally precedes E

This is another way of saying that a cause occurs before its effect.

So how to support 1? Well, one can support it in the same way that Craig tries to support his claim that everything that begins to exist has a cause: by pointing out that there are no known counterexamples to the claim and that every example we have of causation confirms the claim. Additionally, one can make a conceptual argument in support of the claim. For example, one can note that the very notion of causation involves production or transition; that is: the cause produces an effect, involving a transition from a state where the effect is present to a state where the effect is present. If this were otherwise (for example, if the effect was already there without any action being done by X), then it makes no sense to claim that that X is causally responsible for the effect. But this very production involves a transition from a time when the effect is not present a time where the effect is present [as Craig himself notes, on his notion of change, change entail there being time]. And the cause needs to be present at that earlier time (where the effect is not present) in order to exert the influence that results in the effect.

[...]

After all, why would theists reject a claim as well supported as 1, while accepting equally-supported (or less well-supported) claims they think help their theology, like the universe began to exist?

"The cosmic background radiation left over from the Big Bang approximately 14 billion years ago is the oldest of all fossils. The Big Bang at time zero is the most important of all boundary conditions for the very possibility of life in the Universe. In the Big Bang singularity, space and time do not exist, so causality cannot be operative. This leads us to conclude that the Big Bang was an uncaused event."

And Quentin Smith has made the point even more general, by noting that Craig has no coherent account of causation, on which his God could cause the universe to exist:

http://infidels.org/library/modern/q...causation.html