Faith Without Reason (A Response to Richard Dawkins, et al)

[JonathanL]

I might be a little bit overly harsh, but as someone who's not particularly blessed with a sensus divinatus, I don't see how such a claim can be justified. But, perhaps that's why I'm a Christian. I see Christianity as being eminently refutable, simply produce Jesus' body.

How would you know it's His body?

Also, if you are to believe the Catholics and Orthodox you can go and see Jesus' Body every time communion is held somewhere near you.

[psstein]

How would you know it's His body?

Also, if you are to believe the Catholics and Orthodox you can go and see Jesus' Body every time communion is held somewhere near you.

Crucifixion generally left pretty distinctive marks. A number of years ago, the body of a crucified man was discovered near Jerusalem. The damage to the bones (as well as the fact the guy still had a nail and a chunk of wood with him) indicated a crucifixion. If the authorities produced the body of a crucified man from Joseph's tomb, it's a reasonable inference it was Jesus of Nazareth.

I believe in the true presence, yes. I'm talking about the full, Earthly body of Jesus, which ascended into heaven.

[ShrimpMaster]

Unfortunately this is the weakest possible argument, which is the reason a said that his argument could be applied to many possible beliefs including atheism.

But it doesn't apply to atheism...

[ShrimpMaster]

Plantinga is miles ahead of me when it comes to philosophy/theology/etc. I'm a college student who studies NT after only recently becoming a Christian, so take what I say with a grain of salt.

However, Plantinga's reformed epistemology seems, to me at least, like a disaster. On just a very surface level, I think it's open to the (unfair) caricature of "Christianity is true because I feel it's true," which is a statement I think anyone who's read any of the pop atheist screeds happens to have heard. On a deeper level, I'm an evidentialist. I think we ought to believe in things we have good evidence for. Now what actually constitutes evidence is a different question, but the simple dodge of "there's no evidence for x" seems to a) not define what evidence is and b) fails to explain how the evidence presented is not representative of the point. Therefore, as an evidentialist, I don't really see how "the internal witness of the Holy Spirit" is not a circular argument. Well, how do you know the internal witness of the Holy Spirit? By having the internal witness of the Holy Spirit?

I might be a little bit overly harsh, but as someone who's not particularly blessed with a sensus divinatus, I don't see how such a claim can be justified. But, perhaps that's why I'm a Christian. I see Christianity as being eminently refutable, simply produce Jesus' body.

Hi psstein, first, i dont think the instigation of the Holy Spirit should be equated to feelings. I dont think that is a part of plantingas model. Second, the model is not circular. The sensus divinitatus produces the belief in God in a properly basic way and the Holy Spirit furnishes the believer with Christian beliefs. How a Christian comes to know the Holy Spirit has done this is an entirely different question.

[shunyadragon]

But it doesn't apply to atheism...

Why not? If the atheists believe their belief is consistent with the intellectual life of an atheist that would make it consistent with reality of some sort. If it is Realized that the atheist does not need to provide a proof of the model he is supplying. In order for the atheist's model to be successful he just needs it to be possible. That is really all the objection calls for. If the atheist's model is even possible, then it furnishes an answer to the objection.

I could substitute virtually any belief in the argument and it would work. This line of reasoning is too egocentric to be an effective argument.

IF "X" believes that their belief is consistent with reality of some sort therefore . . .

[ShrimpMaster]

Why not? If the atheists believe their belief is consistent with the intellectual life of an atheist that would make it consistent with reality of some sort. If it is Realized that the atheist does not need to provide a proof of the model he is supplying. In order for the atheist's model to be successful he just needs it to be possible. That is really all the objection calls for. If the atheist's model is even possible, then it furnishes an answer to the objection.

I could substitute virtually any belief in the argument and it would work. This line of reasoning is too egocentric to be an effective argument.

IF "X" believes that their belief is consistent with reality of some sort therefore . . .

First, it is a model - not an argument. This model does not apply to atheism or naturalism. Any kind of model from naturalism that adopts something like the instigation of the Holy Spirit would be entirely contradictory. How can you have a supernatural entity within naturalism?

[firstfloor]

How can you have a supernatural entity within naturalism?

A supernatural entity must be able to act on natural substances in a way that can be perceived naturally for it to be said to exist.

[shunyadragon]

First, it is a model - not an argument. This model does not apply to atheism or naturalism. Any kind of model from naturalism that adopts something like the instigation of the Holy Spirit would be entirely contradictory. How can you have a supernatural entity within naturalism?

The problem is not whether is an argument or model. The model as worded doe not make the assumption as to whether there is a supernatural being or not, nor does it 'adopt something like the instigation of the Holy Spirit.'

To fit atheism, and many many variations, beliefs and religions you simply have to plug in the alternate beliefs including the possibility of atheism.

It simply argues weakly for the possibility of the belief being true.

[shunyadragon]

Crucifixion generally left pretty distinctive marks. A number of years ago, the body of a crucified man was discovered near Jerusalem. The damage to the bones (as well as the fact the guy still had a nail and a chunk of wood with him) indicated a crucifixion. If the authorities produced the body of a crucified man from Joseph's tomb, it's a reasonable inference it was Jesus of Nazareth.

I believe in the true presence, yes. I'm talking about the full, Earthly body of Jesus, which ascended into heaven.

Problem there are records of many if not thousands crucifixions during the time Jesus lived. They have found a had impaled by nail. Could that be Jesus's hand? Yes it could, but not likely. They sarcophagus with the names of Joseph, Jesus, and Mary on it from the time of Jesus. There were remains in it, could this be Jesus family? No way of knowing.

[Jichard]

JRichard: your responses are mostly around the basicality of beliefs, but I don't see that as a strong objection to Plantinga's model. It is mostly because all the criteria you supply is arbitrary.

You haven't shown that the criterion is universal sanction is arbitrary. If anything, Plantinga's position is the arbitrary one, since it provides no good reason for choosing one belief as properly basic over another. Instead, it's stuck in a form of epistemic relativism, where each community gets to define the beliefs they want as "properly basic" by fiat. So, for example, one could define belief in the Great Pumpkin's existence as properly basic.

Futher, even if you do provide a grounding for PBB without God does that actually handle Plantinga's model? I don't think so. As long as Plantinga's model is even possible, then he has answered the objection. Plantinga's model does not even need to be the strongest model possible. It just needs to be possible.

I made at least two objections to your OP's main point, none of which were addressed by what you wrote above.

First, Plantinga's defense is trivial, and can be employed in defense of almost any position. All one has to do is include an epistemic claim as apart of one's position. For example, an atheist could employ Plantinga's defense by doing the following:

1) define your atheist as including epistemic statements like the following: I came to my atheist position in a rational way, such that I can justifiably lack belief that God exists
2) then note that if anyone makes a de jure objection to your position, then they are also making a de facto objection as well, since they would be denying your epistemic statement

One could even do the same for belief in the Great Pumpkin's existence; just include epistemic claims like the following: I came to my belief in the Great Pumpkin in a rational way, such that I can justifiably belief in the Great Pumpkin. Then note that if anyone makes a de jure objection to your position, then they are also making a de facto objection as well.

Second, Plantinga's defense doesn't actually convert de jure objections to de facto objections, since it involves and ad hoc re-definition and strawman of what Christianity is committed to. After all, Christianity is not necessarily committed to anything like the extended A/C. So someone can have a de jure objection (without a de facoto objection) to what Christianity is actually committed to, even if they have a de facto objection to the strawman of Christianity that Plantinga erects.
To put this another way:

Call minimal Christianity or M-Christianity, the form or Christianity that includes the jointly necessary and sufficient conditions for being Christian. I'm denying that M-Christianity includes something like the extended A/C model.
Now, of course, a Christian could accept something like the extended A/C model and include this model in their form of Christianity. Call this form of Christianity (which includes something like the extended A/C model) AC-Christianity. I'm denying that AC-Christianity is entailed by M-Christianity.
I'm also saying that even if de jure objections to AC-Christianity commit one to de facto objections to AC-Christianity, that fails to rebut the fact that de jure objections to M-Christianity do not commit one to de facto objections to M-Christianity.

[ShrimpMaster]

You haven't shown that the criterion is universal sanction is arbitrary. If anything, Plantinga's position is the arbitrary one, since it provides no good reason for choosing one belief as properly basic over another. Instead, it's stuck in a form of epistemic relativism, where each community gets to define the beliefs they want as "properly basic" by fiat. So, for example, one could define belief in the Great Pumpkin's existence as properly basic.

First, Plantinga's defense is trivial, and can be employed in defense of almost any position. All one has to do is include an epistemic claim as apart of one's position. For example, an atheist could employ Plantinga's defense by doing the following:
1) define your atheist as including epistemic statements like the following: I came to my atheist position in a rational way, such that I can justifiably lack belief that God exists
2) then note that if anyone makes a de jure objection to your position, then they are also making a de facto objection as well, since they would be denying your epistemic statement

Reformed epistemology cannot be supplied to bring a defense to any position. Atheism does not have the instigation of the Holy Spirit. Further, naturalism does not provide a foundation for the rational certainty of the human beliefs. Sure, by chance, evolution could produce a true belief (by accident), but there would be no way for humans to verify the truth value, since evolution is not a belief producing mechanism aimed at the production of true beliefs.

Second, Plantinga's defense doesn't actually convert de jure objections to de facto objections, since it involves and ad hoc re-definition and strawman of what Christianity is committed to. After all, Christianity is not necessarily committed to anything like the extended A/C. So someone can have a de jure objection (without a de facoto objection) to what Christianity is actually committed to, even if they have a de facto objection to the strawman of Christianity that Plantinga erects.
To put this another way:
Call minimal Christianity or M-Christianity, the form or Christianity that includes the jointly necessary and sufficient conditions for being Christian. I'm denying that M-Christianity includes something like the extended A/C model.
Now, of course, a Christian could accept something like the extended A/C model and include this model in their form of Christianity. Call this form of Christianity (which includes something like the extended A/C model) AC-Christianity. I'm denying that AC-Christianity is entailed by M-Christianity.
I'm also saying that even if de jure objections to AC-Christianity commit one to de facto objections to AC-Christianity, that fails to rebut the fact that de jure objections to M-Christianity do not commit one to de facto objections to M-Christianity.

The Christian scriptures include numerous passages that show the Holy Spirit instigates true beliefs in believers (John 16:13)... It also includes passages about faith and true belief. It even includes passages about the belief in God as properly basic (Romans 1:19). Further, this model is actually apart of minimal Christianity because the beliefs produced by the Holy Spirit would include things like "the Holy Spirit has produced these true beliefs in me", etc... Whether a lay-Christian actually understands this or not or does the work to figure it out is another question. Unless you plan on busting your objections out on your hopeless roommate or something?

[shunyadragon]

Reformed epistemology cannot be supplied to bring a defense to any position. Atheism does not have the instigation of the Holy Spirit. Further, naturalism does not provide a foundation for the rational certainty of the human beliefs. Sure, by chance, evolution could produce a true belief (by accident), but there would be no way for humans to verify the truth value, since evolution is not a belief producing mechanism aimed at the production of true beliefs.

Again, the nature and structure of the 'model' does not make any theological presuppositions. It only assumes that a belief is 'properly basic' and 'consistent with reality of some sort.'
You have not answered the problem of why not? Falling back on Theistic assumptions for the argument does resolve the problems that the basic assumptions and structure of the 'model' applies to any belief system

If the atheists believe their belief is consistent with the intellectual life of an atheist that would make it consistent with reality of some sort. If it is Realized that the atheist does not need to provide a proof of the model he is supplying. In order for the atheist's model to be successful he just needs it to be possible. That is really all the objection calls for. If the atheist's model is even possible, then it furnishes an answer to the objection.

I could substitute virtually any belief in the 'model' and it would work. This line of reasoning is too egocentric to be an effective argument.

IF "X" believes that their belief is consistent with reality of some sort therefore . . .

This discussion of the definition may help:

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Basic_belief

Categories of beliefs:

Foundationalism holds that all beliefs must be justified in order to be believed. Beliefs therefore fall into two categories:
Beliefs that are properly basic, in that they do not depend upon justification of other beliefs, but on something outside the realm of belief (a "non-doxastic justification")
Beliefs that derive from one or more basic beliefs, and therefore depend on the basic beliefs for their validity

Description of basic beliefs:

Within this basic framework of foundationalism exist a number of views regarding which types of beliefs qualify as properly basic; that is, what sorts of beliefs can be justifiably held without the justification of other beliefs.

© Copyright Original Source

The highlighted above is a weak assumption that any one model only justifies one belief.

[ShrimpMaster]

shunyadragon: your objection is akin to the Great Pumpkin objection in Plantinga's book. The objection goes as such; Reformed epistemology is so liberal that it allows belief in any sort of far-fetched entity to be justified as simply foundational or basic. For example, someone might take as basic the belief that The Great Pumpkin is all-powerful, just as the Reformed epistemologist takes a similar belief in God as basic. Perhaps the belief is grounded in an experiential belief, such as Plantinga describes. Thus, the objection intends to show that there must be something wrong with Reformed epistemology if it allows belief in the Great Pumpkin to be warranted as basic.But how is this a problem for theism being construed as properly basic if true?can be reduced to absurdity, but the objection does no such thing. . Excerpts taken from rightreason.org

[Jichard]

I think you're again misunderstanding the criterion of universal sanction. If you want to review the criterion further, I suggest reading Tyler Wunder's discussion of the subject, or the blogpost I linked to.

Universal sanction is not about whether a particular belief is pragmatically indispensable. It's about whether the class of beliefs of which that belief is apart is universal sanctioned. And with that point in mind, it becomes clear that a memory belief is universally sanctioned, since the class of memory beliefs is universally sanctioned. Wunder makes this very point. For example:

""

Theistic belief is not universally sanctioned since the class of theistic beliefs are pragmatically dispensable. We know that this class of belief is pragmatically dispensable since there are hundreds of millions of atheists who lack the class of theistic beliefs, and get on just fine.

(2) The belief that only universally sanctioned beliefs are properly basic is not itself universally sanctioned.

False. That belief is actually universally sanctioned. For example, if you don't accept that universally sanctioned beliefs are properly basic (i.e. you don't accept that members of the class of pragmatically indispensable beliefs are appropriate starting points for reasoning, in the absence of strong defeators for those beliefs), then you're going to have massive trouble getting starting points for reasoning in your everyday life.

But neither is there any evidence that only universally sanctioned beliefs are properly basic.

There's evidence that universally sanctioned beliefs are properly basic. For example, one piece of particularist evidence is that universal sanction explains cases of belief that seem (primae facie) to be properly basic, such as memory beliefs.

It shifts the burden of proof over to you, to actually show that theistic belief is properly basic. That's importance because beliefs don't get to be properly basic by fiat; otherwise, one could label any old absurd belief as properly basic and use that to dodge criticism of the belief (as per the Great Pumpkin objection and the charge of epistemic relativism). One instead needs to provide some reason for treating a belief as properly basic. Universal sanction provides such a reason. But neither you nor Plantinga provide a reason for treating theistic belief as properly basic. So that means we have no reason to treat theistic belief as properly basic.

Universal sanction is superior to Plantinga's position, since it doesn't fall prey to the epistemic relativism that plagues Plantinga's position, especially in the form of the Great Pumpkin objection. And I just addressed your aformentioned objections.

I do not know where you got that idea from; I'm not a global skeptic. And nowhere did I imply that universally sanctioned beliefs [or more precisely: a belief that is in a universally sanctioned class of beliefs] are not warranted.

I think you're again conflating a discussion of proper basicality with a discussion of warrant. I'm discussing proper basicality, not warrant, since universal sanction is being offered as a criterion of proper basicality, not warrant. If you want to discuss warrant and a criterion of warrant, that's another matter.

Reformed epistemology cannot be supplied to bring a defense to any position. Atheism does not have the instigation of the Holy Spirit.

One doesn't need to employ Reformed epistemology in order to employ a defense akin to Plantinga's. Instead, as I noted in my previous post, one just needs to define one's position as including certain epistemic claims, such as claiming that one's position is rational and warranted. Reformed epistemology is simply one way of doing that; there are other's ways available.

Further, naturalism does not provide a foundation for the rational certainty of the human beliefs.

Which is irrelevant, since certainty is not required for knowledge nor warrant nor proper basicality.

Sure, by chance, evolution could produce a true belief (by accident), but there would be no way for humans to verify the truth value, since evolution is not a belief producing mechanism aimed at the production of true beliefs.

I already addressed that:

False. This is an issue dealt with by philosophers of biology like Paul Griffiths (though one need not accept Griffith's account of "truth" to accept the other aspects of his reply). To discuss it further, what you wrote makes as little sense as saying:

"Genetic/developmental processes would be aimed at producing wings that are conducive to the survival of the species. Whether those wings fly is not relevant to evolution."

The mistakes with such a claim are apparent. For example, it overlooks the fact that wings help the organism's survival, in large part, due to the wings being capable of flight. Parallel point for beliefs and cognitive processes: they tend to help the organisms survival, in large part, due to the beliefs being true and the cognitive processes resulting in largely true beliefs. To put the point another way: you're basically overlooking the features (such as being true) that help a trait realize the role of aiding in an organism's survival. Roles have realizers.

Now, of course, you can construct some logically possible scenario where false beliefs promote survival. But that doesn't undermine the point, anymore than does pointing out some logically possible scenario in which wings aid an organism's survival without that aid being due to flight. Logical possibility does not imply plausibility or being likely.

The Christian scriptures include numerous passages that show the Holy Spirit instigates true beliefs in believers (John 16:13)... It also includes passages about faith and true belief.

The Bible also includes passages where God seems to befuddle people's cognitive systems for God's own purposes. For example: by hardening people's hearts, by sowing confusion amongst people (for instance: by blocking their ability to communicate), etc. Similarly, God could have designed humans such that they are quite prone to being befuddled and confused by God, befuddled/confused by aspects of a fallen world, etc. This might be particularly amenable to something like Calvinism, where God saves whom God chooses to save, and will either leave the rest to their own confusions or actively participate in confusing them.

It even includes passages about the belief in God as properly basic (Romans 1:19).

Unless you're calling hundreds of millions of atheists liars, then God's existence has not been made plain to everyone nor does everyone know of a God who exists (with a divine nature and eternal power).

By the way, how did you get "the belief in God as properly basic" from that verse? Because I don't see it. I can see Paul claiming that God's existence is made plain to some people. If you take that to imply proper basicality, then quite a few absurd beliefs would be properly basic, as per the Great Pumpkin objection. For example, it could be plain to some people that the Great Pumpkin exists, and thus, on your criterion, belief in the Great Pumpkin's existence is properly basic.

Further, this model is actually apart of minimal Christianity because the beliefs produced by the Holy Spirit would include things like "the Holy Spirit has produced these true beliefs in me", etc... Whether a lay-Christian actually understands this or not or does the work to figure it out is another question.

I dot think you recognize how strong a claim you're making. Remember, minimal Christianity includes the claims jointly necessary and sufficient for being a Christian. So what you said above entails that if someone does not accept that:

"the beliefs produced by the Holy Spirit would include things like "the Holy Spirit has produced these true beliefs in me", etc."

then they aren't Christian. And if being Christian is a pre-requisite for salvation, then that means they aren't saved unless they accept the above quoted claim.

Those are some incredible strong claims you're making. And I reject them. I don't see where in the Bible it's said that, in order to be Christian, one needs to accept something like the A/C model or think that the Holy Spirit has produced true beliefs in ones. It suffices to believe that Jesus Christ is God, to have faith in him, to think he's the sole means to one's salvation, etc. without knowing what produced these beliefs in oneself (for example: not knowing if they result from the Holy Spirit).

[ShrimpMaster]

JRichard: I won't respond to your entire post. We are mostly talking past each other at this point and I don't have the time to complete a thorough response.

Universal sanction is not about whether a particular belief is pragmatically indispensable. It's about whether the class of beliefs of which that belief is apart is universal sanctioned.

First, by relativizing beliefs to classes you do yourself no favor. First, I would say that theistic beliefs are universally sanctioned, because theistic beliefs would even include beliefs like "God does not exist", etc... In which case you end up with a class of beliefs that include contradictory results per the individual. Classes do no justice. Further, this type of universal sanction is now arbitrary. Who decides the classes? I know your response already and you will tell me that atheism is not a belief or negative beliefs don't qualify or something. Arbitrary.

Second, your response concerning evolution and natural selection is just sad. Do you even understand the Origin of Species? My point is that evolution is concerned with survival. Truth value and survival are not synonymous. Let's take the example of a frog. A frog is sitting on a lilly pad and sees a black dot (bug) flying about in front of him. He then shoots out his tongue and eats it. Let's see here, we now have a frog who is performing his duties according to natural selection that are condusive for his survival, but what about the beliefs that frog maintains concerning the fly? Does he actually consider it food? What if he thinks it something completely different from a food source? My point is that these beliefs are irrelevant to whether or not the frog shoots his tongue out of his mouth and eats the fly.

The rest of your post I don't think is response worthy.