To what extent can ethics be anchored in reason?

[carpedm9587]

Carpedm, I went to the alien thing for a reason. To show that your a priori assumptions do not logically lead to ethical truths or facts. Any more than those assumptions tell us whether it is ethical or unethical to kill or eat cows or dogs or cats...

I understand that, Seer. I think our problem is suggested in your language. You are apparently looking for "ethical truths" or "ethical facts." Depending on exactly how you are using those terms, I suspect that you need a moral statement to have an objective truth to it. It has to arise from outside the person or it is not "real" - it is merely "opinion" or "preference." Please correct me if I am wrong about that. I have heard this view espoused multiple times, and I used to hold it myself (when I was Christian).

I have found that view to be circular, so I no longer hold it. Morality is indeed a form of "preference." If it is reasoned, it should be preference rooted in reality and fact - but a moral statement is not itself a "fact." It is an expression of how a person believes action OUGHT to proceed in order for it to be called "good." But "good" is a value judgment - it is subjective. Ergo, morality is intrinsically subjective. That model appears to align perfectly with what I see around myself every day. So far, I have not found a reason to shift that view. It is possible I will find that reason in these discussions, but I have to admit I consider that unlikely.

As for the link between a priori truths (like existence and happiness), I have outlined my reasoning several times, acknowledged I used "logical" sloppily, and clarified the reasoning strategy I use to arrive at a moral code. I understand you do not accept it. From my side, I do not see where you have shown it to be flawed, so I will continue to use it until such time as it is shown to be faulty. I'm sure you fell much the same about your world ethical process: until someone shows it to be flawed, you are not going to abandon it.

[seer]

I understand that, Seer. I think our problem is suggested in your language. You are apparently looking for "ethical truths" or "ethical facts." Depending on exactly how you are using those terms, I suspect that you need a moral statement to have an objective truth to it. It has to arise from outside the person or it is not "real" - it is merely "opinion" or "preference." Please correct me if I am wrong about that. I have heard this view espoused multiple times, and I used to hold it myself (when I was Christian).

I have found that view to be circular, so I no longer hold it. Morality is indeed a form of "preference." If it is reasoned, it should be preference rooted in reality and fact - but a moral statement is not itself a "fact." It is an expression of how a person believes action OUGHT to proceed in order for it to be called "good." But "good" is a value judgment - it is subjective. Ergo, morality is intrinsically subjective. That model appears to align perfectly with what I see around myself every day. So far, I have not found a reason to shift that view. It is possible I will find that reason in these discussions, but I have to admit I consider that unlikely.

OK so the aliens harvesting us for food is not unethical, if they don't believe it is unethical. Nazi's gassing Jewish children is not unethical if they don't believe it is unethical. Got it...

As for the link between a priori truths (like existence and happiness), I have outlined my reasoning several times, acknowledged I used "logical" sloppily, and clarified the reasoning strategy I use to arrive at a moral code. I understand you do not accept it. From my side, I do not see where you have shown it to be flawed, so I will continue to use it until such time as it is shown to be faulty. I'm sure you fell much the same about your world ethical process: until someone shows it to be flawed, you are not going to abandon it.

Yet as soon as I introduced aliens into the situation your a priori assumptions had no weight or currency, you had no rational ground to call their act of harvesting unethical. And yes you have your reasons for believing as you do, but so did the Maoist and Stalinist. And given their political and social goals their reasoning was not flawed either...

[carpedm9587]

OK so the aliens harvesting us for food is not unethical, if they don't believe it is unethical. Nazi's gassing Jewish children is not unethical if they don't believe it is unethical. Got it...

You did omit a few fairly important words. It may not be unethical to them. Their moral code may permit it, depending on what their moral code is and how they arrived at it. An alien may see us as nothing more than cattle, and it would not be a "moral evil" to eat us. Nazis may see Jewish children as "not human" so it may be outside their moral code to gas those children. My moral code will not permit that, and I doubt the moral code of most people would permit it - yours for example.

Yet as soon as I introduced aliens into the situation your a priori assumptions had no weight or currency, you had no rational ground to call their act of harvesting unethical. And yes you have your reasons for believing as you do, but so did the Maoist and Stalinist. And given their political and social goals their reasoning was not flawed either...

Actually - the a priori goodness of my existence and happiness would lead me to evaluate their action as immoral, because it negates that. Given they are (presumably) a sentient species, and my moral code is premised largely on sentience, I come to that conclusion. Likewise universalizing their action leads me to evaluate it as evil. As for Maoist and Stalinists, If the basis for their morality is the same as mine, they presumably will arrive at the same moral code, so they either have a different basis, they have a flaw in their reasoning, or they are not acting in accordance with their own moral code.

[seer]

You did omit a few fairly important words. It may not be unethical to them. Their moral code may permit it, depending on what their moral code is and how they arrived at it. An alien may see us as nothing more than cattle, and it would not be a "moral evil" to eat us. Nazis may see Jewish children as "not human" so it may be outside their moral code to gas those children. My moral code will not permit that, and I doubt the moral code of most people would permit it - yours for example.

Then who is correct? You or the Alien's? The point is that your a priori assumption about the goodness of your existence does not inform this question in the least.

Actually - the a priori goodness of my existence and happiness would lead me to evaluate their action as immoral, because it negates that. Given they are (presumably) a sentient species, and my moral code is premised largely on sentience, I come to that conclusion. Likewise universalizing their action leads me to evaluate it as evil. As for Maoist and Stalinists, If the basis for their morality is the same as mine, they presumably will arrive at the same moral code, so they either have a different basis, they have a flaw in their reasoning, or they are not acting in accordance with their own moral code.

Well their moral code or more rightly their political goal served by an ethical system would not be the same as yours. And equally without flaws. In other words the internal consistency of a moral theory doesn't get us far in deciding on what is ethical or not. BTW - I'm not sure we couldn't universalize the destruction of the Jewish people, taking their property and wealth for the greater good.

[carpedm9587]

Then who is correct? You or the Alien's? The point is that your a priori assumption about the goodness of your existence does not inform this question in the least.

I am correct from the perspective of my moral framework; the alien is correct from the perspective of his. You are, from my perspective, attempting to take an internal subjective reality (a moral framework) and make an objective assessment. As I told you, your apparent need for an objective moral code is what leads to these questions. I don't have those questions because I accept morality as a subjective thing. By definition, it is a statement about classifying action as "good" or "ungood." Those are subjective value judgments.

As an analogy, if I say, "that car is moving at 67 miles per hour, and someone else says, "no, they're moving at 1,070 miles per hour," and a third person says, "no - they are traveling at 66,600 miles per hour," they can all be correct if the first person is standing on the ground observing the car in motion, the second is on the space station looking at the car through a telescope, and the third is on voyager looking back at the car through a (very powerful) telescope). Each has a different frame of reference - but there is only one car in motion. From their frame of reference, however, they are correct.

Likewise, there is only one person committing a given action, and three different people can see exactly the same action, but they can and will assess the morality of that action differently if their moral frameworks are different.

Well their moral code or more rightly their political goal served by an ethical system would not be the same as yours. And equally without flaws. In other words the internal consistency of a moral theory doesn't get us far in deciding on what is ethical or not. BTW - I'm not sure we couldn't universalize the destruction of the Jewish people, taking their property and wealth for the greater good.

If it is true that their internal moral code is consistent, then we can conclude that they are acting morally according to their moral code. As noted, they are not acting morally according to yours, mine, or that of most of the world.

As for the "destruction of the Jewish people," if you narrowly define any action, of course it univeralizes because it does not change. "Killing 5' 11" males with orange hair and a pimple in the middle of their forehead" universalizes without contraction because it is the same if all of us do it or if one of us does it. However, "killing someone because of an unacceptable personal attribute" doesn't. It is the more general form of the statement.

It may be time, Seer, to shift from defining WHAT a moral code is, to the topic your have been skirting for some time: Do I have the right to enforce my moral code on someone else? Alternatively, we could go in another direction you've been hinting at: how can any moral code by "valid" or "true" if it is not objective? They are both questions I am prepared to discuss - if you are so inclined.

[demi-conservative]

"Emotivist" is apparently someone who proposes a model of ethics based on emotion. I have never heard that term before, so thanks for expanding my vocabulary. As I have not, in any place I know of, advocated an emotional basis for morality, I have to reject the term as not being applicable to me.

We'll see!!!

Main point, of course, is that redefining of yours is like emotivists.

As for the rest of the claim, as far as I can tell, I am using words consistent with standard dictionary usage.

Please don't be dumb. Point is that for technical discussion, you can't just use layman dictionary, and say 'my usage meets all the 59 meanings this word can mean'.

[seer]

Likewise, there is only one person committing a given action, and three different people can see exactly the same action, but they can and will assess the morality of that action differently if their moral frameworks are different.

So ultimately there are no right or wrong answers when it come to moral questions.

It may be time, Seer, to shift from defining WHAT a moral code is, to the topic your have been skirting for some time: Do I have the right to enforce my moral code on someone else? Alternatively, we could go in another direction you've been hinting at: how can any moral code by "valid" or "true" if it is not objective? They are both questions I am prepared to discuss - if you are so inclined.

I don't generally label it objective, but rather universal. That there are universal moral truths, that are authoritative i.e. the law of God. There are universal moral truths to discover that we are ultimately accountable to. That we live in a just and moral universe rather than an unjust and amoral universe. And I would agree with Kant that any moral system that is devoid of justice is irrational, he uses his argument as a proof for God, it goes like this:

(1) Moral behaviour is rational.
(2) Morality behaviour is only rational if justice will be done.
(3) Justice will only be done if God exists.
Therefore:
(4) God exists.

http://www.philosophyofreligion.info...oral-argument/

[carpedm9587]

We'll see!!!

Main point, of course, is that redefining of yours is like emotivists.

Short of the definition of the term, I know nothing about emotivists arguments. As I would reject an argument based on "emotion" as a rational way to arrive at a morality, I can't say I'm strongly inclined to go exploring in that direction. As for "redefining," I understand you have that perspective. You have not offered an alternate definition from an alternate "authoritative" source that conflicts with the ones I've offered, so I do not have much to respond to except to point back to the definitions I have offered and ask, "where exactly have I redefined anything?"

Please don't be dumb. Point is that for technical discussion, you can't just use layman dictionary, and say 'my usage meets all the 59 meanings this word can mean'.

A layman dictionary? A technical discussion? Demi, the discussion is about the meaning of English words in a debate being executed in the English language. Just what dictionary do you think I should be using? Merriam Webster is a recognized authority on the English language. I use other dictionary's as well (American College, Oxford, Collins, etc.), but I see no purpose in quoting each of them if they essentially align with one another. And 59 meanings of "authoritative" and "authority?" I posted 10, but I would be interested in knowing what the other 40+ are.

[carpedm9587]

So ultimately there are no right or wrong answers when it come to moral questions.

You word "ultimately" in this sentence essentially means "absolutely" or "objectively." It seems you are asking if there is an absolute reference against which to judge moral claims, and my answer would be "no." Morality is not an objective exercise - it is a subjective one. So a thing cannot be "objectively" or "ultimately" or "absolutely" right or wrong - it is right or wrong as measure against moral code X, which means it will evaluate differently depending on which moral code you are using.

I don't generally label it objective, but rather universal. That there are universal moral truths, that are authoritative i.e. the law of God. There are universal moral truths to discover that we are ultimately accountable to. That we live in a just and moral universe rather than an unjust and amoral universe. And I would agree with Kant that any moral system that is devoid of justice is irrational, he uses his argument as a proof for God, it goes like this:

(1) Moral behaviour is rational.
(2) Morality behaviour is only rational if justice will be done.
(3) Justice will only be done if God exists.
Therefore:
(4) God exists.

http://www.philosophyofreligion.info...oral-argument/

"Universal" or "objective," as used here, are essentially synonymous. Your framework is a moral truth that binds all people in all places at all times. As I have noted, I have found most all such claims to be circular, or the reasoning to be flawed in some respect.

The argument you make here is not really an argument for objective morality - it is an extended syllogism that is essentially a moral argument for the existence of god. The syllogism is, as far as my somewhat ancient philosophical brain cells can tell, valid. However, you have shown yourself to have expertise in philosophy and logic, so you know that in order for the conclusion to be true, the syllogism must be valid AND the premises must be true. Let's break them down.

(1) Moral behaviour is rational - I'll accept this as true, setting aside the fact that it often is not (i.e., based on Demi's comments, I would suggest the "emotivist" approach is likely not "rational."). But I accept that moral reasoning SHOULD be rational, or it's not really moral reasoning.

(2) Morality behaviour is only rational if justice will be done. - Here, Kant jumps the rails. First of all, in a subjective moral framework, what is "justice" for me may not be "justice" for someone else, and vice versa. Kant is adopting an "absolute" or "universal" framework for morality without justification, and then driving his conclusions to his desired outcome. Furthermore, while it may be upsetting to us that someone is not "brought to justice" and benefits from their ill deeds, that physical reality does not alter the rationality of the moral framework. That would be like saying, "I have taken a reasoned, rational approach to parenting, but my kids are doing drugs and holding up convenience stores - ergo my parenting must have been irrational." Our moral framework tells us how we ought to behave - provides us with a measuring stick of assessing behavior - it does not ensure that behavior will be executed or guarantee outcomes. Kant is doing what I believe you have been doing from the outset: confusing having a moral code with enforcing a moral code.

(3) Justice will only be done if God exists. - Again, this premise cannot be shown to be true. Kant is still in an "absolute" place. His argument is basically that, because some people die having benefited from their "ill deeds," that justice must come in a form of afterlife. Well, that is not always true, so his "only" is problematic. It fails on another front: justice does not require a god. Justice (as he is apparently defining it) only requires an afterlife, not a god. It requires that the end not come until justice is done. If death is not the end, and one is continually reincarnated until "justice is done," this premise would fail as well. I don't believe that, mind you, but it does show one of several weaknesses of the premise. In this one premises, Kant is making the logical mistake of assuming his conclusion.

Therefore: (4) God exists. Due to the failure to show #2 and #3 are true, this is not shown to be true either. That does not disprove the existence of god, of course. It merely says that the assertion "god exists" has not been shown to be true.

All moral arguments for the existence of god I have ever encountered, Seer, fail because they make the same error: they assume a universal/absolute version of morality, which presupposes a god (from whence would such a moral framework emanate other than a god?), so they are inherently circular. The most common statement I hear, and you have skirted this several times in various ways, is that a moral code cannot be "true" or "valid" unless it is "objective" or "absolute" or (as you used), "universal." But when pressed to define what "true" in this comment means, the definition almost always comes back to "objective," "absolute," or "universal," which renders the original statement, "a moral code cannot be objective unless it is objective," or "a moral code cannot be absolute unless it is absolute," or "a moral code cannot be universal unless it is universal." All three statements are true, but they are tautologies and meaningless for assessing reality.

If one sets aside the assumption that morality MUST be objective (to us), universal, or absolute, and accepts subjective morality as a possible framework, suddenly the assumptions being made become clear.

[seer]

"Universal" or "objective," as used here, are essentially synonymous. Your framework is a moral truth that binds all people in all places at all times. As I have noted, I have found most all such claims to be circular, or the reasoning to be flawed in some respect.

Sheesh Carpedm, how is your moral theory not circular? You define the terms then label behaviors that conform or not to those terms as moral or immoral. Don't be hypocritical.

(1) Moral behaviour is rational - I'll accept this as true, setting aside the fact that it often is not (i.e., based on Demi's comments, I would suggest the "emotivist" approach is likely not "rational."). But I accept that moral reasoning SHOULD be rational, or it's not really moral reasoning.

Good...

(2) Morality behaviour is only rational if justice will be done. - Here, Kant jumps the rails. First of all, in a subjective moral framework, what is "justice" for me may not be "justice" for someone else, and vice versa. Kant is adopting an "absolute" or "universal" framework for morality without justification, and then driving his conclusions to his desired outcome. Furthermore, while it may be upsetting to us that someone is not "brought to justice" and benefits from their ill deeds, that physical reality does not alter the rationality of the moral framework. That would be like saying, "I have taken a reasoned, rational approach to parenting, but my kids are doing drugs and holding up convenience stores - ergo my parenting must have been irrational." Our moral framework tells us how we ought to behave - provides us with a measuring stick of assessing behavior - it does not ensure that behavior will be executed or guarantee outcomes. Kant is doing what I believe you have been doing from the outset: confusing having a moral code with enforcing a moral code.

Would you consider a moral system that had prohibitions against rape but never punished or curtailed the crime (allowing it to run rampant) to be rational? I would not.

(3) Justice will only be done if God exists. - Again, this premise cannot be shown to be true. Kant is still in an "absolute" place. His argument is basically that, because some people die having benefited from their "ill deeds," that justice must come in a form of afterlife. Well, that is not always true, so his "only" is problematic. It fails on another front: justice does not require a god. Justice (as he is apparently defining it) only requires an afterlife, not a god. It requires that the end not come until justice is done. If death is not the end, and one is continually reincarnated until "justice is done," this premise would fail as well. I don't believe that, mind you, but it does show one of several weaknesses of the premise. In this one premises, Kant is making the logical mistake of assuming his conclusion.

I'm not sure how the system of reincarnation decides anything morally. Or makes moral judgements. As fas as I know only MINDS make moral judgements. God is a MIND, unless you believe there is a mind guiding the reincarnation process or if you can demonstrate how a non-thinking thing can make moral judgements

Therefore: (4) God exists. Due to the failure to show #2 and #3 are true, this is not shown to be true either. That does not disprove the existence of god, of course. It merely says that the assertion "god exists" has not been shown to be true.

I don't agree with your conclusions for the reasons stated..

All moral arguments for the existence of god I have ever encountered, Seer, fail because they make the same error: they assume a universal/absolute version of morality, which presupposes a god (from whence would such a moral framework emanate other than a god?), so they are inherently circular. The most common statement I hear, and you have skirted this several times in various ways, is that a moral code cannot be "true" or "valid" unless it is "objective" or "absolute" or (as you used), "universal." But when pressed to define what "true" in this comment means, the definition almost always comes back to "objective," "absolute," or "universal," which renders the original statement, "a moral code cannot be objective unless it is objective," or "a moral code cannot be absolute unless it is absolute," or "a moral code cannot be universal unless it is universal." All three statements are true, but they are tautologies and meaningless for assessing reality.

You accuse the theist if arguing in a circle, yet that is exactly what you do with your moral theory. Which would also make your system "meaningless for assessing reality". Now what?

[carpedm9587]

Sheesh Carpedm, how is your moral theory not circular? You define the terms then label behaviors that conform or not to those terms as moral or immoral. Don't be hypocritical.

Umm... I am using dictionary definitions and have cited the source, and then following to reasoned conclusions. You statement does not show circularity, at least not as far as I can tell.

Good...

Would you consider a moral system that had prohibitions against rape but never punished or curtailed the crime (allowing it to run rampant) to be rational? I would not.

Again, I see you as conflating the moral system with enforcement of the moral system. I do not believe it is rational to have a moral system that says, "X is wrong" and then not take steps to enforce it. But failure to enforce a moral system does not render the moral system itself irrational. It just means it is not being followed through on.

I am getting the sense that, for you, the moral framework and the implementation of that moral framework are one and the same. That may be our disconnect.

I'm not sure how the system of reincarnation decides anything morally. Or makes moral judgements. As fas as I know only MINDS make moral judgements. God is a MIND, unless you believe there is a mind guiding the reincarnation process or if you can demonstrate how a non-thinking thing can make moral judgements

I did not say reincarnation itself makes moral judgments. Kant is saying that justice requires a god because many people do not seem to get justice in life, so there has to be an afterlife in which they get justice - and says that implies a god. I am saying it implies nothing of the sort. If a person is perpetually reincarnated until "justice is done," the problem of "justice not being done in life" goes away - it will be done in a later life. Now HOW justice is done and who is imposing it is still a point on which we disagree.

I don't agree with your conclusions for the reasons stated..

You accuse the theist if arguing in a circle, yet that is exactly what you do with your moral theory. Which would also make your system "meaningless for assessing reality". Now what?

You will have to show the circularity, Seer, so I can address it. I have shown the circularity of most "objective moral" arguments (substitution of meaning), and the problem with Kant's argument (assumption of moral universalism/objectivity). So can you outline exactly how you see the circularity of the case I have made? I'm not seeing it.

[seer]

Umm... I am using dictionary definitions and have cited the source, and then following to reasoned conclusions. You statement does not show circularity, at least not as far as I can tell.

What? Of course it is circular. You subjectively define the parameters and then tag behaviors that conform or not conform to those parameters as moral or immoral. If you think that it isn't circular I would like to see a deductive syllogism with a premise that doesn't beg the question.

Again, I see you as conflating the moral system with enforcement of the moral system. I do not believe it is rational to have a moral system that says, "X is wrong" and then not take steps to enforce it. But failure to enforce a moral system does not render the moral system itself irrational. It just means it is not being followed through on.

I am getting the sense that, for you, the moral framework and the implementation of that moral framework are one and the same. That may be our disconnect.

Yes it is a disconnect, a moral system that had prohibitions against rape but never punished or curtailed the that crime can not be rational in my mind.

I did not say reincarnation itself makes moral judgments. Kant is saying that justice requires a god because many people do not seem to get justice in life, so there has to be an afterlife in which they get justice - and says that implies a god. I am saying it implies nothing of the sort. If a person is perpetually reincarnated until "justice is done," the problem of "justice not being done in life" goes away - it will be done in a later life. Now HOW justice is done and who is imposing it is still a point on which we disagree.

And I'm saying that your counter example of reincarnation does not make sense, since moral judgements come from rational creatures. Something, even in reincarnation, has to be deciding what behaviors are acceptable or not, to move towards that prefered moral state. If it is not a mind, what is it? Gas, rock, gravity, the moon - what? So we are not escaping Kant's point.

You will have to show the circularity, Seer, so I can address it. I have shown the circularity of most "objective moral" arguments (substitution of meaning), and the problem with Kant's argument (assumption of moral universalism/objectivity). So can you outline exactly how you see the circularity of the case I have made? I'm not seeing it.

Ok, why is murder wrong?

[carpedm9587]

What? Of course it is circular. You subjectively define the parameters and then tag behaviors that conform or not conform to those parameters as moral or immoral. If you think that it isn't circular I would like to see a deductive syllogism with a premise that doesn't beg the question.

I thought I gave you that. It would look like this (by way of example):

Premise 1) Existence is a good (true a priori)
Premise 2) Some choices of action can compromise my existence
Conclusion: My choices of action that compromise my existence are not "a good"

Universalizing it simply requires observing that each of us sees our existence as a good, and my choices and actions can compromise the existence others just as their actions can compromise mine. So my existence is better assured if people not only value their own lives, but that of those around them, ergo I must value the lives of others as well.

Yes it is a disconnect, a moral system that had prohibitions against rape but never punished or curtailed the that crime can not be rational in my mind.

Then that is a major part of our disagreement. I do not think in those terms. If I did, then I would be forced to conclude that a law against stealing is "irrational" if there is no infrastructure to enforce it. The law is not made rational or irrational by enforcement or lack of enforcement. It IS irrational to fail to put an enforcement mechanism in place, but that does not render the law itself irrational if the law was based on clear reasoning and is an appropriate way to achieve a desired end.

This explains why you keep skewing to "enforcement" when I have been focusing on the moral code itself. I'll try to adjust my responses/thinking to the fact that you think this way.

And I'm saying that your counter example of reincarnation does not make sense, since moral judgments come from rational creatures. Something, even in reincarnation, has to be deciding what behaviors are acceptable or not, to move towards that preferred moral state. If it is not a mind, what is it? Gas, rock, gravity, the moon - what? So we are not escaping Kant's point.

No one is arguing against the position "it requires a mind to derive a moral code." Our difference is that you believe that mind must be god's, and I believe ALL minds derive moral codes. Let me try again to outline why Kant's argument fails.

His position is that some people seem to reach the end of life with no justice - ergo there must be an afterlife in which justice is meted out - and he uses that argument to claim that this requires a god - so god must exist. I am pointing out that is not the case. If a person ends life, and then is reincarnated into a new life, justice can be meted out in the new life. So an afterlife is not required. Who meets out justice? In my worldview it would be society. In yours it would be god. But it does not REQUIRE a god.

In other words, here is a perfectly reasonable alternative to Kant's argument: a person lives and defies all commonly held moral precepts. At death, they are reincarnated as another person, and they continue to be reincarnated until justice is done. Justice is meted out by the society in which they live. When it is meted out, and the person has turned wholly to the good, they cease reincarnating. "Good" of course as it is defined by the social collective. Minds - but no god.

OK, why is murder wrong?

"Murder" is wrong by definition. Murder is defined as "the unlawful premeditated killing of one human being by another." So "murder is wrong" is a tautology.

[seer]

I thought I gave you that. It would look like this (by way of example):

Premise 1) Existence is a good (true a priori)
Premise 2) Some choices of action can compromise my existence
Conclusion: MY choices of action that compromise my existence are not "a good"

But carpedm, didn't we already agree, like with the Alien example, that the good of your existence is a subjective consideration? That compromising your existence by eating you is not an unethical act for the Alien. So why is your existence good? Simply because you say your existence is good. Thus we have begged the question.

Universalizing it simply requires observing that each of us sees our existence as a good, and my choices and actions can compromise the existence others just as their actions can compromise mine. So my existence is better assured if people not only value their own lives, but that of those around them, ergo I must value the lives of others as well.

Again we have begged the question. What if I don't value the existence of others and still prosper and gain power? Like the Maoist or Stalinist? How does Universalization amount to anything more than opinion?

Then that is a major part of our disagreement. I do not think in those terms. If I did, then I would be forced to conclude that a law against stealing is "irrational" if there is no infrastructure to enforce it. The law is not made rational or irrational by enforcement or lack of enforcement. It IS irrational to fail to put an enforcement mechanism in place, but that does not render the law itself irrational if the law was based on clear reasoning and is an appropriate way to achieve a desired end.

How do you achieve a desired end if you deem rape immoral with no enforcement? What is the desired end? To slow or end the practice or to simply pontificate?

His position is that some people seem to reach the end of life with no justice - ergo there must be an afterlife in which justice is meeted out - and he uses that argument to claim that this requires a god - so god must exist. I am pointing out that is not the case. If a person ends life, and then is reincarnated into a new life, justice can be meeted out in the new life. So an afterlife is not required. Who meets out justice? In my worldview it would be society. In yours it would be god. But it does not REQUIRE a god.

That again does not make sense. If one is reincarnated into a new life, what keeps a record of the past wrongs? How does the new society know that a man was a murderer in the past life for instance? Even here we need a MIND behind it all.

In other words, here is a perfectly reasonable alternative to Kant's argument: a person lives and defies all commonly held moral precepts. At death, they are reincarnated as another person, and they continue to be reincarnated until justice is done. Justice is meeted out by the society in which they live. When it is meeted out, and the person has turned wholly to the good, they cease reincarnating. "Good" of course as it is defined by the social collective. Minds - but no god.

But you have been saying that morality is subjective. How do you know that his new society wouldn't find the man's bad acts from the old society laudable? You still need some definition of justice that rises above mere relative cultural considerations.

[carpedm9587]

But carpedm, didn't we already agree, like with the Alien example, that the good of your existence is a subjective consideration? That compromising your existence by eating you is not an unethical act for the Alien. So why is your existence good? Simply because you say your existence is good. Thus we have begged the question.

Again, Seer, you are evaluating my statements from an "absolute" or "universal" point of view. My moral code is exactly that - my moral code. I use it to evaluate my actions, and those of the people around me. But you cannot take a subjective moral code and apply it absolutely. I can evaluate the alien's action as immoral and the alien can evaluate theirs as moral, and we can both be right from the perspective of our individual moral codes.

My existence is "good" to me - the alien's to them - the rock's to them. If you do not see your own existence as a good - then I am not sure how to help. A priori truths are not provable.

Again we have begged the question. What if I don't value the existence of others and still prosper and gain power? Like the Maoist or Stalinist? How does Universalization amount to anything more than opinion?

And again, you are taking a subjective moral proposition and attempting to objectivize it. The moral code described is about how "I" should act. Although I may evaluate the actions of others according to that self-same moral code - it is not the code others may have, and they may come to other conclusions.

The fact that most of us come to the same basic moral conclusions is a function of the fact that we are a) all rational, b) all live in the same universe, and c) all start with the same a priori truths. So we tend to end up with highly similar moral codes. But that can be changed if someone has a strong predisposition in one direction or another (i.e., homosexuality repulses me, so my moral code gets skewed by that reality).

How do you achieve a desired end if you deem rape immoral with no enforcement? What is the desired end? To slow or end the practice or to simply pontificate?

Is there a emogi? If not, there should be. "If I desire to see my child go to college, I should save some money" is a perfectly rational statement. If I do not actually save money for their college does not change the fact that the statement is rational - it merely means I am behaving irrationally. "People should not steal" is a perfectly rational statement if it is based on solid premises. If there is no enforcement for "not stealing" does not change the rationality of the statement - it merely means that society is acting irrationally - by not putting an enforcement means in place.

Why you do not see this is beyond me - but we clearly look at this differently. Perhaps someone else will have insight into the matter.

That again does not make sense. If one is reincarnated into a new life, what keeps a record of the past wrongs? How does the new society know that a man was a murderer in the past life for instance? Even here we need a MIND behind it all.

Seer, you're picking nits, and I strongly suspect you know it. Who cares how the "past wrongs" are recorded? They could be imprinted on the conscience of the person in question, they could be encoded in a subconscious collective memory, they could be written on the surface of the moon with a magic marker. They could be imprinted on their karma - emblazoned on their forehead. The point is, there are a multitude of ways that "justice" could be done without recourse to a god and without obviating the need for a mind. Kant's argument simply dismisses any and all alternatives and assumes its conclusion. It is circular.

But you have been saying that morality is subjective. How do you know that his new society wouldn't find the man's bad acts from the old society laudable? You still need some definition of justice that rises above mere relative cultural considerations.

They might find them laudable - ending the cycle. If the definition of what is moral changes, then "justice" will with it. That has happened throughout the ages, even within Christian circles. Slavery was defined as moral by many Christians - now it is not. Torture was defined as moral by many Christians - now it is not (mostly). Homosexuality was prohibited by most Christians - now THAT is in the process of changing. "Interest on a loan" used to be considered an immoral practice, now it is widely accepted.

Even among those who adhere to an "absolute" definition of morality - morality changes. It would seem to me time to acknowledge that morality is actually a subjective assessment - not an objective one.

Would that we could have this discussion over a beer and pizza - I suspect it would unfold differently. If you are ever in the vicinity of Burlington, Vermont - the beer and pizza are on me!