What was God doing?

[JimL]

Let me rephrase the question then: What was god doing in his eternal timelessness prior to the creation of time?

[MaxVel]

Cite an argument where that is a premise. Specifically, cite where Aquinas' First Way uses that as a premise. Otherwise:

AND how, in the age of quantum mechanics, it can be shown to be true that nothing (e.g. a sequence of motion) can extend infinitely into the past thereby requiring a kick-start from a hypothetical Prime Mover AKA God?

Can't make any connection between this and the First Way. Again, cite specifically where the First Way says this. You do understand the difference between a per se and a per accidens series, right?

[MaxVel]

Yeah right. So your apologist philosopher David Haines would know all about physics, right?

Wow. An irrelevant ad hominem. You've regressed from flapping your arms to flapping your gums.

[Adrift]

Let me rephrase the question then: What was god doing in his eternal timelessness prior to the creation of time?

Again, by asking this question it sounds like you're stuck thinking of God existing in the blackness of space for a very very long time. As Craig puts it in a response to a reader,

Source: http://www.reasonablefaith.org/creation-and-time

I argue that God, existing changelessly alone without the universe, is timeless. Time comes into existence at creation and so has a beginning and is finite in the past. God, in virtue of His real relation to the temporal world, becomes temporal at the moment of creation. So God exists timelessly without creation and temporally since the moment of creation.

1) If I am right, then there is no moment prior to creation. Rather time begins at creation. This is the classical Christian view, as defended, for example, by Augustine.

© Copyright Original Source

The reply is worth a read, and may anticipate further questions, but it's not exhaustive (I know he covers these issues in greater detail, but I probably can't remember off the top of my head).

[Leonhard]

Claim it? I've argued for it already in my last few posts in this thread and I've made the points I wish to make. If that's not enough for you, then so be it. I'm not going go around and around with you until you wear me down in disgust.

Your points being that quantum mechanics is weird, we probably don't know all about causality, the argument from motion is based on outdated metaphysics? I've gone through the past five or so posts from you and that's literally all I see. Its all fine if you're merely expressing your own opinions, and not actually making any arguments. None of these things are arguments per say, is wrong as I showed you (a point you failed to acknowledge), you've yet to say what's outdated about it so your argument amounts to little more than appeal to incredulity. You make baseless assertions such as the argument begging the question, without explaining in what way the conclusion is used as premise.

That's why I keep asking you to provide these arguments. I've honestly tried to find more substance than this, but I can't see any. If you've already posted it and I missed it then I'm sorry, and I'll gladly answer your points if you'd direct me to it.

[Leonhard]

Dude I've already addressed JimL#88on this as well as you here #92

I'll cite the relevant part here again so you don't have to browse.

But the real flaw is Aquinas' assumption that nothing (e.g. a sequence of motion) can extend infinitely into the past...this is an argument from ignorance.

It would be if indeed he ever made that argument, but he didn't. The argument from motion makes no claims about the past, only claims about essentially ordered chains of causality (per esse), a chain that goes into the past is merely historical, or accidental as its called among thomists. The argument isn't concerned with those.

Whenever St. Thomas speaks of a first cause in these arguments, he's always talking about first in an ontological sense, not a mere temporal sense.

But is the discussion now moving to a discussion of the argument from motion, rather than discussing whether the Christian God makes sense given JimL's rambling questions? I'm quite content to defend the former from the stand point of classical theology, but if we want to discuss the existence of God, I think that's for another thread.

[shunyadragon]

It would be if indeed he ever made that argument, but he didn't. The argument from motion makes no claims about the past, only claims about essentially ordered chains of causality (per esse), a chain that goes into the past is merely historical, or accidental as its called among thomists. The argument isn't concerned with those.

Whenever St. Thomas speaks of a first cause in these arguments, he's always talking about first in an ontological sense, not a mere temporal sense.

I believe the possibility of the nature of our physical existence being potentially eternal with Natural origins in eternal Natural Law as the "first cause" remains regardless of how the argument is worded in a temporal or ontological sense. Arguments whether our physical existence is finite or infinite has little or no meaning in the light of modern cosmology.

[Sea of red]

Your points being that quantum mechanics is weird, we probably don't know all about causality, the argument from motion is based on outdated metaphysics? I've gone through the past five or so posts from you and that's literally all I see. Its all fine if you're merely expressing your own opinions, and not actually making any arguments. None of these things are arguments per say, is wrong as I showed you (a point you failed to acknowledge), you've yet to say what's outdated about it so your argument amounts to little more than appeal to incredulity. You make baseless assertions such as the argument begging the question, without explaining in what way the conclusion is used as premise.

That's why I keep asking you to provide these arguments. I've honestly tried to find more substance than this, but I can't see any. If you've already posted it and I missed it then I'm sorry, and I'll gladly answer your points if you'd direct me to it.

You are picking on men of straw at this point.

I never stated QM was weird - those are your words. If you're to water down my points to make them sound silly for the people reading this then I'm going to stop responding to you.

[Sea of red]

Interesting. The version I've been using has slightly different premise: "(1) For it is certain and evident to the senses that something in this world moves.", so I don't think that falls under this quibble - I don't see it as saying 'only some things are in motion'. Secondly, I need to point out that 'motion' here means what we would call 'change' - it's not limited to objects (or atoms, particles, etc) physically moving from point A to point B. We have to be careful not to read our own terms back into the argument, such as thinking that Aquinas is talking only about physical movement here.

Alright, fair enough. I'll grant you that it doesn't necessarily kill the argument, but I think it's important see the world the way Aquinas saw it. He saw a world where objects were simply moving towards their natural places, and their 'natural' state was without motion. When we remember this and take into account the psychology behind it, I think it offers a way to understand why Aquinas came to the conclusion he did. We will never know, but it;s interesting to wonder if he would arrive at a different conclusion had he known modern physics.

Anyways, if Aquinas is not just talking about physical things in the universe, then is also talking about God?

To counter this premise we would need an example of something being caused to change by (a) something else that itself does not exist (as you've agreed below, this seems inherently impossible); or (b) of something changing with no cause of any kind. Note that examples of things where we don't know of a cause, or where the cause is undetermined aren't examples of (b).

I think I'll grant you this point since it's not really that big of a deal for either of us, and I don't want to get deep into the differences between classical physics and quantum mechanics.

I think we've rather skipped past the concepts of causality that Aristotle used and Aquinas developed, or even abandoned some of them, in order to take a more detailed look at one aspect of the workings of the universe, which we see in modern science. Edward Feser argues for this view in his book 'The Last Superstition' (which I'd highly recommend unless you're a Dawkins fanboi).

I'm no Dawkins loyalist but I'm not really interested in reading another book for or against New Atheism. Thanks for the suggestion anyways.

So I think that it's quite possible that things like QM don't really touch Aquinas' arguments, because they're operating at a different 'level'. They're looking at the 'how' of some types of casuality - 'How does change happen to these things at this level of detail?' whereas Aquinas is looking at questions like 'What does it mean to say that things change? How can we understand this in a holistic, coherent, and non-contradictory way? Why is it that things that are contingent exist at all, and what sustains them in existence here and now?

Then may I ask exactly how God brought the universe into existence? We can keep passing the buck or look for the ideas that best explain the properties of the universe, and have some hope of verification. If it's God then so be it, but I'd like it to be descriptive instead of something to fill in the blanks.

[Leonhard]

You are picking on men of straw at this point.

I never stated QM was weird - those are your words. If you're to water down my points to make them sound silly for the people reading this then I'm going to stop responding to you.

I keep asking you for the points and the arguments. And while it's true you've never called Quantum Mechanics weird, your general point is that it is so different as to challenge the argument, yet you don't explain in what way. At best you offered a point about radioactive decay, which I answered, but you keep asserting this point ad nauseum.

[Leonhard]

Then may I ask exactly how God brought the universe into existence? We can keep passing the buck or look for the ideas that best explain the properties of the universe, and have some hope of verification. If it's God then so be it, but I'd like it to be descriptive instead of something to fill in the blanks.

Specifically what are you asking for here? And in what way is this a challenge to the argument, which is quite satisfied simple with establishing that God is the cause of the universe. If you're talking about the beginning of the universe, then I think you're missing the point, as whether the universe has a beginning or not, the Argument from Motion, deal basically only with the fact that things change. Not how the universe came to be. Arguments that proceed from that are called cosmological arguments, such as the Kalam argument.

The argument from motion is agnostic as to whether the universe began to exist, or always did exist.

It shows how its possible for things that are composed both of actuality, and potentiality, to undergo change at all, by showing that something of pure actuality must exist. And this we call God.

[JimL]

Again, by asking this question it sounds like you're stuck thinking of God existing in the blackness of space for a very very long time. As Craig puts it in a response to a reader,

Source: http://www.reasonablefaith.org/creation-and-time

I argue that God, existing changelessly alone without the universe, is timeless. Time comes into existence at creation and so has a beginning and is finite in the past. God, in virtue of His real relation to the temporal world, becomes temporal at the moment of creation. So God exists timelessly without creation and temporally since the moment of creation.

1) If I am right, then there is no moment prior to creation. Rather time begins at creation. This is the classical Christian view, as defended, for example, by Augustine.

© Copyright Original Source

The reply is worth a read, and may anticipate further questions, but it's not exhaustive (I know he covers these issues in greater detail, but I probably can't remember off the top of my head).

If it makes no sense to ask what happened before time, then the logical response to that is that "nothing happened". Obviously the theistic view is that god existed prior to creation, prior to time, but the above perspective sounds more like god came into existence along with time and creation, because nothing happening prior to time is not much different than there being nothing "period."

[Tassman]

Specifically what are you asking for here? And in what way is this a challenge to the argument, which is quite satisfied simple with establishing that God is the cause of the universe. If you're talking about the beginning of the universe, then I think you're missing the point, as whether the universe has a beginning or not, the Argument from Motion, deal basically only with the fact that things change. Not how the universe came to be. Arguments that proceed from that are called cosmological arguments, such as the Kalam argument.

The argument from motion is agnostic as to whether the universe began to exist, or always did exist.

It shows how its possible for things that are composed both of actuality, and potentiality, to undergo change at all, by showing that something of pure actuality must exist. And this we call God.

[MaxVel]

I believe the possibility of the nature of our physical existence being potentially eternal with Natural origins in eternal Natural Law as the "first cause" remains regardless of how the argument is worded in a temporal or ontological sense.

This shows that your either haven't grasped; or can't grasp; or won't grasp the actual arguments that modern Thomism makes, and we are discussing here. If the arguments succeed, then your 'possibility' is shown false. So you can't wave it away with 'it might be correct, but other possibilities remain'.

Arguments whether our physical existence is finite or infinite has little or no meaning in the light of modern cosmology.

Irrelevant to the First Way, as has been pointed out to you more than once, Aquinas is talking about a ontological first, not a temporal first. Laws can't cause anything, they are simply describing how things that already exist usually behave. Unless you have some other meaning for 'Natural Law' it's incoherent to claim it can cause anything.

[MaxVel]

If it makes no sense to ask what happened before time, then the logical response to that is that "nothing happened".

No, because you've reintroduced time in that phrase. 'Happening' implies a transition of time; as does 'not happening'.

Obviously the theistic view is that god existed prior to creation, prior to time, but the above perspective sounds more like god came into existence along with time and creation, because nothing happening prior to time is not much different than there being nothing "period."

Not really. Maybe it would help if you thought of time as another dimension, like, length, and breadth, and height (that's 3).

Basically, the question 'What was happening before time began?' is nonsensical. It's not a coherent question that can be answered, or even needs an answer. It's like asking 'Where was everything before space existed?'. The terms used in the question contradict each other - 'where' implies a 'space' exists that the rest of the question implies doesn't exist.