This question was raised in my mind by some of RBerman's posts saying that humans are morally responsible for their actions even though they lack LFW. I'm wondering how that can be.
Consider the following to perhaps help the discussion along:
1) If a rock falls and lands on a human, killing them, we do not say that the rock is morally culpable for murder. It is simply the result of the inexorable laws of physics (or was proximately caused by God or some other agent).
2) Suppose that while falling through the air the rock is given consciousness and is aware that it is about to kill the human. It seems that this would not make the rock culpable for the death, because the rock doesn't cause it to happen (it's just the laws of physics).
3) Suppose that while falling and conscious, the rock likes the idea that it is going to kill the human and desires that it happen. Now the rock may be culpable for its immoral thoughts, but not for the death itself, because the rock did not cause it to happen.
4) Suppose the previous scenario except that the rock gains its consciousness and desire just before the rock falls. Again not culpable for the death, because the rock did not cause it to happen. Even though the rock does what it most desires, which seems to be the common non-libertarian definition of "free will". Thus doing what one most desires is not sufficient for moral culpability.
5) Suppose the previous scenario except that there is some causal connection between the rock's desire and the rock falling (e.g., the rock falls because of its desire to fall). But also suppose that the rock's desire/will is not LFW. The rock does not have any ability to choose or desire otherwise than it does. Thus the rock's choice is determined by something other than the rock's will (e.g., the inexorable laws of physics or caused proximately by God or some other external agent). Thus the situation seems morally the same as (1): the rock is not morally culpable, because the event is the result of external forces: the inexorable laws of physics or proximately caused by God. The insertion of the rock's desire in the chain of causation seems to be just the insertion of one more domino in the causal chain of the laws of physics. It doesn't imply that the rock caused the event any more than in scinario (1).
Thus I don't see moral responsibility for the death in any of these cases. And I don't see how we can get there without giving the rock LFW.
Possible objection: I recall seeing a post of RBerman's where he was saying that LFW is a modern invention. However, it seems to be an ancient concept. Aristotle (in Nicomachean Ethics 3.1) recognizes that moral praise or blame requires voluntary action that (1) originates in the agent and (2) who has knowledge of the circumstances of the action. This doesn't exist if the sufficient cause is external to the agent, which is the case without LFW so that the agent's desire/will is not determined by the agent but by external causes.
And Boethius (in The Consolation of Philosophy) addressed the conflict of free will and foreknowledge. He seems to assume LFW, otherwise there would be no apparent conflict to resolve. He proposes the solution that God exists independently of time and sees all of space-time in an eternal present. (As far as I know Boethius was the first to explicitly state this solution.) The problem he sees and the solution he gives imply that he has LFW in mind.
I give these examples to perhaps ward off the objection that the problem only exists in modernist thinking because one supposes that the concept of LFW and its connection to moral responsibility are modern inventions.
I would ask anyone who responds to explain/define what their alternative to LFW is and then explain how there can be human moral culpability.
Consider the following to perhaps help the discussion along:
1) If a rock falls and lands on a human, killing them, we do not say that the rock is morally culpable for murder. It is simply the result of the inexorable laws of physics (or was proximately caused by God or some other agent).
2) Suppose that while falling through the air the rock is given consciousness and is aware that it is about to kill the human. It seems that this would not make the rock culpable for the death, because the rock doesn't cause it to happen (it's just the laws of physics).
3) Suppose that while falling and conscious, the rock likes the idea that it is going to kill the human and desires that it happen. Now the rock may be culpable for its immoral thoughts, but not for the death itself, because the rock did not cause it to happen.
4) Suppose the previous scenario except that the rock gains its consciousness and desire just before the rock falls. Again not culpable for the death, because the rock did not cause it to happen. Even though the rock does what it most desires, which seems to be the common non-libertarian definition of "free will". Thus doing what one most desires is not sufficient for moral culpability.
5) Suppose the previous scenario except that there is some causal connection between the rock's desire and the rock falling (e.g., the rock falls because of its desire to fall). But also suppose that the rock's desire/will is not LFW. The rock does not have any ability to choose or desire otherwise than it does. Thus the rock's choice is determined by something other than the rock's will (e.g., the inexorable laws of physics or caused proximately by God or some other external agent). Thus the situation seems morally the same as (1): the rock is not morally culpable, because the event is the result of external forces: the inexorable laws of physics or proximately caused by God. The insertion of the rock's desire in the chain of causation seems to be just the insertion of one more domino in the causal chain of the laws of physics. It doesn't imply that the rock caused the event any more than in scinario (1).
Thus I don't see moral responsibility for the death in any of these cases. And I don't see how we can get there without giving the rock LFW.
Possible objection: I recall seeing a post of RBerman's where he was saying that LFW is a modern invention. However, it seems to be an ancient concept. Aristotle (in Nicomachean Ethics 3.1) recognizes that moral praise or blame requires voluntary action that (1) originates in the agent and (2) who has knowledge of the circumstances of the action. This doesn't exist if the sufficient cause is external to the agent, which is the case without LFW so that the agent's desire/will is not determined by the agent but by external causes.
And Boethius (in The Consolation of Philosophy) addressed the conflict of free will and foreknowledge. He seems to assume LFW, otherwise there would be no apparent conflict to resolve. He proposes the solution that God exists independently of time and sees all of space-time in an eternal present. (As far as I know Boethius was the first to explicitly state this solution.) The problem he sees and the solution he gives imply that he has LFW in mind.
I give these examples to perhaps ward off the objection that the problem only exists in modernist thinking because one supposes that the concept of LFW and its connection to moral responsibility are modern inventions.
I would ask anyone who responds to explain/define what their alternative to LFW is and then explain how there can be human moral culpability.
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