How can there be human moral culpability without libertarian free will?

[RBerman]

I've been in enough discussions like ours to see how these passages are an affront to the modern mindset, and how we try to contort them away from their most straightforward sense, but we would do better just to admit our situated-ness and say, "God's thoughts are not as our thoughts. The Lord gives, and the Lord takes away. Blessed be the name of the Lord."

[RBerman]

But only because you are bringing in additional premises, that aren't necessary for the discussion. From what I understand, you are critiquing a syllogism like:

1) Humans are morally accountable.
2) LFW is necessary for human moral accountability.
3) Therefore humans have LFW.

You are saying that questioning (3) is relevant to the discussion because we know (1) is true, so if (3) is false, then (2) must also be false.
Okay. But that supposes that premise (1) is relevant to the discussion in the first place. It supposes that premise (2) cannot be examined on its own grounds. This thread is not about that syllogism.

And again, even if you show that (3) and (2) are false (which I don't think you can do), then you still haven't addressed my objections--the reasons to think that absence of LFW implies absence of moral accountability. How would we deal with them? Overturning them would seem to overturn fundamental ideas about human moral accountability.

That's the problem, Joel. I haven't actually seen a defense of (2), only an appeal to consensus. That is not an argument. Are you willing to assume the burden of proof for your positive claim?

Consider also 1 Cor 10:13 "No temptation has overtaken you but such as is common to man ; and God is faithful, who will not allow you to be tempted beyond what you are able, but with the temptation will provide the way of escape also, so that you will be able to endure it." But persons able to endure/withstand temptation sometimes do give into it. That sounds like LFW to me.

It sounds like a choice, certainly. I see nothing in the text that requires LFW.

As I've said before, humans automatically believe they have LFW. They believe it primae facie from their constant experience as men. It is shocking and disturbing for men to suppose that they lack LFW. That is why the LFW-vs-fate question has been such a captivating question throughout the history of human thought. It would never even occur to a human to question his LFW if it weren't for concepts such as fate (or predestination). Humans through history have recognized, as self-evident, their own LFW and its connection with the sense of morality. It takes some other, conflicting concept for humans to even question that. Thus there is nothing circular about my reasoning.

You are certainly correct that many human documents over the years use language which has interesting implications for the "fate vs human agency" discussion. But as I mentioned in another post recently, it's not hard to find ancient documents even among non-Christians which paint life as primarily guided by forces outside of human control. Of course, none of that proves anything for Christians. All that matters (or should matter) to us is what the Bible says on the matter. If LFW can be demonstrated from the Bible either directly or indirectly (i.e. its indispensability), then it should be accepted. However:

Thus, unless you have some proof that there is no LFW (which nobody in history has managed to prove), then please get back to addressing the thread topic and my objections.

Negatives are notoriously difficult to prove. If that's your criterion for my participation in this thread, then I should withdraw. My own far more modest goal is to point out the Scriptures which say that moral responsibility is the product of God's comprehensive sovereignty. He holds us accountable for our actions, regardless of the reasons we think we do or do not do them, and while He does not contest "You made me this way!" He does not consider it an excuse.

[dacristoy]

There is no way that an individual whose actions are irresistibly compelled by another being (God) can be held morally accountable for the things that he/she is compelled to do.

Most/all animals are instinctively compelled to do what they do. There is no Great white Throne of judgment for animals mentioned in scripture.

I agree whit your comments concerning LFW,

What if free will simply consists in acting according to your nature? If God said that he made something for the purpose of destroying it, are we in a privileged position to criticize his justice?

Acting according to our nature is classic freewill as long as the possibility acting differently is present. If we are compelled by our nature it is not the same as being compelled by God.

I do not, nor have I ever considered myself worthy to strive against my creator. Please understand Mr. Berman that it is not my creator that I strive against in this discussion, it is you and you alone. You often attempt to position those that disagree with you in the untenable position of disagreeing with God.
(Snip)

I've been in enough discussions like ours to see how these passages are an affront to the modern mindset, and how we try to contort them away from their most straightforward sense, but we would do better just to admit our situated-ness and say, "God's thoughts are not as our thoughts. The Lord gives, and the Lord takes away. Blessed be the name of the Lord."

[The Remonstrant]

I am of Arminius and Episcopius.

[Joel]

That's the problem, Joel. I haven't actually seen a defense of (2), only an appeal to consensus. That is not an argument. Are you willing to assume the burden of proof for your positive claim?

Well the thread topic is more about what is the relation between human will and moral responsibility.

Consider also 1 Cor 10:13 "No temptation has overtaken you but such as is common to man ; and God is faithful, who will not allow you to be tempted beyond what you are able, but with the temptation will provide the way of escape also, so that you will be able to endure it." But persons able to endure/withstand temptation sometimes do give into it. That sounds like LFW to me.

It sounds like a choice, certainly. I see nothing in the text that requires LFW.

It seems to be a clear case of being able to do otherwise than what you chose.

Thus, unless you have some proof that there is no LFW (which nobody in history has managed to prove), then please get back to addressing the thread topic and my objections.

Negatives are notoriously difficult to prove. If that's your criterion for my participation in this thread, then I should withdraw.

No, disproving LFW is not at all necessary for you in this thread. As I've pointed out repeatedly: that is not even the thread topic. It is you who have brought up the objection that LFW does not (or cannot) exist, so as to make the thread topic moot.

You say here that "negatives are notoriously difficult to prove." But it is you saying that the thread topic is moot because of this negative. If you want to dismiss the thread topic because of this objection, then it seems the burden is on you to make that case. Otherwise the thread topic is, at minimum, open for debate.

My own far more modest goal is to point out the Scriptures which say that moral responsibility is the product of God's comprehensive sovereignty. He holds us accountable for our actions, regardless of the reasons we think we do or do not do them, and while He does not contest "You made me this way!" He does not consider it an excuse.

Sure, if you want to argue that free will has no impact on moral responsibility (that humans are equally responsible whether they move out of free will or are caused to move by another), that would certainly be relevant to the thread topic. Feel free to argue that. But then also you need to respond to the objections that I've laid out that haven't been addressed.

[FarEastBird]

I would ask anyone who responds to explain/define what their alternative to LFW is and then explain how there can be human moral culpability.

There is no need for LFW for God to convict man of sin when man falls into sin. When God gave the law to Israel, it is a given that men cannot fulfill all laws, yet God condemned men for failing to do all the laws. The evilness nature of man does not necessarily only apply when man intentionally do evil. The fact is, if man cannot know good and evil it would even make him more dangerous creature than animals. A lion can kill ten, but a man who claim to be religious, and because of ignorance, kills hundreds.

The Jews in Rom 10:1-3 failed to submit to the righteousness of God due to ignorance, and Paul is even willing to put himself accursed for their sakes. So, anyone who cannot submit unto the righteousness of God is condemned, whether s/he failed willingly or unwillingly.

With regards to man being in the image of God, only the elect were the ones to be in the image of God (Rom 8:29).

[Joel]

There is no need for LFW for God to convict man of sin when man falls into sin. When God gave the law to Israel, it is a given that men cannot fulfill all laws, yet God condemned men for failing to do all the laws. The evilness nature of man does not necessarily only apply when man intentionally do evil.

So men are just as guilty whether it is accidental or intentional?

Or what if I grab your hand and physically manipulate it to do something evil? Are you just as guilty of that evil as if you had done it intentionally?

[RBerman]

Well the thread topic is more about what is the relation between human will and moral responsibility.

Specifically, you were wondering how humans can be morally responsible in the hypothetical absence of LFW. The answer is: Because God makes us responsible, in that he holds us accountable for violating his precepts. No appeal to LFW is necessary. Free will (doing what you most desire to do) is involved in any choice, but without the supposition philosophical baggage of libertarian free will being necessary.

It seems to be a clear case of being able to do otherwise than what you chose.

"Able" comes in different flavors. Every smoker is able to do the thing involved in not smoking: Not putting a cigarette in his mouth. Despite that, few choose to quit. Externally speaking, we never have to sin. There is always a way out. Yet we regularly choose to sin anyway.

Sure, if you want to argue that free will has no impact on moral responsibility (that humans are equally responsible whether they move out of free will or are caused to move by another), that would certainly be relevant to the thread topic. Feel free to argue that. But then also you need to respond to the objections that I've laid out that haven't been addressed.

I argue that libertarian free will is unnecessary for a Christian view of moral responsibility. All that's necessary is to know that God gave man commands and will hold men accountable for whether those commands have been followed.

[Joel]

Specifically, you were wondering how humans can be morally responsible in the hypothetical absence of LFW. The answer is: Because God makes us responsible, in that he holds us accountable for violating his precepts. No appeal to LFW is necessary. Free will (doing what you most desire to do) is involved in any choice, but without the supposition philosophical baggage of libertarian free will being necessary.

I understand that that is your position. What I want to know is how you then deal with the objections I've presented.

Perhaps start with the question I just put to FarEastBird:

Is a man just as guilty whether his motion (or its effects) is accidental or intentional?
Or what if I grab your hand and physically manipulate it to do something evil? Are you just as guilty of that evil as if you had done it intentionally?

(I'm also not a fan of that definition of "free will". It seems merely tautological. Why the qualifier "free"? Why not just call that simply "will"? But I'll deal with it.)

"Able" comes in different flavors. Every smoker is able to do the thing involved in not smoking: Not putting a cigarette in his mouth. Despite that, few choose to quit. Externally speaking, we never have to sin. There is always a way out. Yet we regularly choose to sin anyway.

These seem to be both cases of LFW--of being able to do any of multiple options. If you are constrained by your nature to sin, then you did not have a way out.

[RBerman]

I understand that that is your position. What I want to know is how you then deal with the objections I've presented.

Perhaps start with the question I just put to FarEastBird:

Is a man just as guilty whether his motion (or its effects) is accidental or intentional?
Or what if I grab your hand and physically manipulate it to do something evil? Are you just as guilty of that evil as if you had done it intentionally?

Those are separate questions.
1) Maybe; it depends on the scenario. Accidents can be caused by negligence.
2) Maybe. Am I acting according to my nature in what you externally moved me to do? Or are you causing me to act against my nature?

(I'm also not a fan of that definition of "free will". It seems merely tautological. Why the qualifier "free"? Why not just call that simply "will"? But I'll deal with it.)

Dunno about "tautological," but perhaps redundant. I would be happy just to call it "will." If "free" means simply "libertarian" then "LFW" is a redundant term as well. Yet these terms have apparently acquired some mileage.

These seem to be both cases of LFW--of being able to do any of multiple options. If you are constrained by your nature to sin, then you did not have a way out.

"Constrained by your nature" seems an odd term; I'm not sure I can accept nature as a meaningful "constraint" for the purposes of this discussion. I think of a constraint as something which prevents you from doing what you want to do, not something which affects the things you want to do.

[Joel]

Those are separate questions.
1) Maybe; it depends on the scenario. Accidents can be caused by negligence.
2) Maybe. Am I acting according to my nature in what you externally moved me to do? Or are you causing me to act against my nature?

1) So you agree that a person can, in certain cases, be not responsible for their motions. (not willful negligence)
2) Does it matter? Is it your position that if the externally caused motion only happens to be a motion you would like, then you are morally accountable for the motion?

New question:

3) Although there are sins of thought, do you acknowledge that there is a moral difference between (a) thoughts and feelings/desires/impulses that arise unbidden and (b) those which are volitional and thus morally accountable? Otherwise there would be no difference between being tempted to commit mental sin and actually committing mental sin.

Dunno about "tautological," but perhaps redundant. I would be happy just to call it "will." If "free" means simply "libertarian" then "LFW" is a redundant term as well. Yet these terms have apparently acquired some mileage.

I suspect it is due to calvinists wanting to claim to believe in "free will", so that they don't sound ridiculous.

These seem to be both cases of LFW--of being able to do any of multiple options. If you are constrained by your nature to sin, then you did not have a way out.

"Constrained by your nature" seems an odd term; I'm not sure I can accept nature as a meaningful "constraint" for the purposes of this discussion. I think of a constraint as something which prevents you from doing what you want to do, not something which affects the things you want to do.

We can use a different word than "constrain", if you like. Perhaps "limit"? The nature of a thing limits the thing. It makes it be one kind of thing rather than another or all things. There may be, on the other hand, room for much variation within those limits. It seems that in your view, however, the person who sins does so because the limits of the person's nature contained only that one option--to sin. There was not a way out.

[RBerman]

1) So you agree that a person can, in certain cases, be not responsible for their motions. (not willful negligence)
2) Does it matter? Is it your position that if the externally caused motion only happens to be a motion you would like, then you are morally accountable for the motion?

New question:

3) Although there are sins of thought, do you acknowledge that there is a moral difference between (a) thoughts and feelings/desires/impulses that arise unbidden and (b) those which are volitional and thus morally accountable? Otherwise there would be no difference between being tempted to commit mental sin and actually committing mental sin.

1) The easiest example that comes to mind is when the motion does not arise from the person choosing to do that motion.
2) Legally, I don't think the strictures of a human court would allow us to hold someone accountable for an action that was intended yet never actually committed with intent. As Christians, we have the whole "adultery in his heart" angle though.
3) Temptations to mentally sin do seem different than either physically or mentally sinning. We have competing desires between which we choose. If we had morally perfect natures, we would not even desire to sin.

I suspect it is due to Calvinists wanting to claim to believe in "free will", so that they don't sound ridiculous.

I don't know the history of that terminology and can't comment either way.

We can use a different word than "constrain", if you like. Perhaps "limit"? The nature of a thing limits the thing. It makes it be one kind of thing rather than another or all things. There may be, on the other hand, room for much variation within those limits. It seems that in your view, however, the person who sins does so because the limits of the person's nature contained only that one option--to sin. There was not a way out.

"Limit" seems no better than its synonym "constrain." At least to me, both of them sound like, "I was trying to do something but could not." That's not what we're talking about. We're talking about not wanting to do some things, based on who we are, and the circumstances in which we are placed.

[Joel]

1) So you agree that a person can, in certain cases, be not responsible for their motions.

1) The easiest example that comes to mind is when the motion does not arise from the person choosing to do that motion.

!! Isn't that what I've been saying? Without LFW, motions do not arise from the person choosing, but from a prior cause (as opposed to LFW where a causal chain arises in the agent). Thus it seems you have admitted here that lack of LFW makes a person not accountable for their motions.

2) Legally, I don't think the strictures of a human court would allow us to hold someone accountable for an action that was intended yet never actually committed with intent. As Christians, we have the whole "adultery in his heart" angle though.

We might consider whether mental sin of desiring to do it is as bad as desiring it + doing it. It's also not clear that that makes the guy morally accontable for the motion, right? But in this case, the person isn't necessarily desiring it either. He may be asleep while someone else moves his hand. Is he morally accountable for the motion?

3) Temptations to mentally sin do seem different than either physically or mentally sinning. We have competing desires between which we choose. If we had morally perfect natures, we would not even desire to sin.

Also, as we see here, the desire to sin may be unbidden, for which we are not morally accountable. But in your view, the desires are always the cause of our choices, and thus are themselves unbidden, thus it would seem we are never morally accountable.

"Limit" seems no better than its synonym "constrain." At least to me, both of them sound like, "I was trying to do something but could not." That's not what we're talking about. We're talking about not wanting to do some things, based on who we are, and the circumstances in which we are placed.

Whatever. You pick the term to refer to the thing which I clearly described. Regardless what name by which we call it, there is no "way out". Contrary to scripture.

[RBerman]

!! Isn't that what I've been saying? Without LFW, motions do not arise from the person choosing, but from a prior cause (as opposed to LFW where a causal chain arises in the agent). Thus it seems you have admitted here that lack of LFW makes a person not accountable for their motions.

Only by your LFW-dependent definition of "choose" which I have said several times that I don't accept. When people decide according to their nature, they choose to perform certain motions. The question of whether motions arise "from a prior cause (as opposed to LFW)" does not enter into the discovery of whether or not someone is choosing.

We might consider whether mental sin of desiring to do it is as bad as desiring it + doing it. It's also not clear that that makes the guy morally accontable for the motion, right? But in this case, the person isn't necessarily desiring it either. He may be asleep while someone else moves his hand. Is he morally accountable for the motion?

A person who is asleep is not making any choices. When his body is manipulated externally, his actions do not arise from his choices, which arise from his nature.

Also, as we see here, the desire to sin may be unbidden, for which we are not morally accountable. But in your view, the desires are always the cause of our choices, and thus are themselves unbidden, thus it would seem we are never morally accountable.

The reality of the unbidden temptation to sin, as one desire among many, is not sin. However, when that desire to sin wins out and becomes the choice to sin, whether regarding a mental action or a physical one, then one is morally accountable for having "sinned."

Whatever. You pick the term to refer to the thing which I clearly described. Regardless what name by which we call it, there is no "way out". Contrary to scripture.

There is indeed always a way out, another choice, than to sin. That is Paul's point.

[Joel]

1) So you agree that a person can, in certain cases, be not responsible for their motions.

1) The easiest example that comes to mind is when the motion does not arise from the person choosing to do that motion.

!! Isn't that what I've been saying? Without LFW, motions do not arise from the person choosing, but from a prior cause (as opposed to LFW where a causal chain arises in the agent). Thus it seems you have admitted here that lack of LFW makes a person not accountable for their motions.

Only by your LFW-dependent definition of "choose" which I have said several times that I don't accept. When people decide according to their nature, they choose to perform certain motions. The question of whether motions arise "from a prior cause (as opposed to LFW)" does not enter into the discovery of whether or not someone is choosing.

I was using your meaning of "choosing", not mine. This point does not have to do with whether the person is choosing, but from where the motion arises. In your concept of choosing, the motion arises not with the person, but always from a prior cause (even though they are "choosing" according to your definition). And thus, by your own admission above, this makes them not morally accountable.

You might try to say that it arises with the person in the sense of being the immediate cause. But it seems that is only the same sense as saying that the bullet's motion arose from the burning gunpowder (rather than from the gunman), or that one domino falling arose from the preceding domino falling. Thus it doesn't make sense to attribute accountability to something for being the immediate cause. Rather what is relevant is where the motion originally arose: e.g. what caused the first domino to move. or what started the rube goldberg machine going (and who set it up).

A person who is asleep is not making any choices. When his body is manipulated externally, his actions do not arise from his choices, which arise from his nature.

I understand you to be saying here that you are agreeing that the person is not accountable for his body being manipulated externally.
I further understand you to be saying here that moral accountability requires that a person choose the motion.

I note that with these admissions of yours (and those admissions in the past few posts) that you do acknowledge that there are some discernible criteria for moral accountability (as opposed to your previous claims).

Now, for further clarification, you've said before that the act of choosing necessarily involves competing desires. Would you agree that in a hypothetical situation in which a person feels desire for only one action and considers (or perceives) no alternatives, and the person acts on that desire, then is the person, in your view, choosing?

Is a person morally accountable for their action in such a situation (with no perceived alternative)?

The reality of the unbidden temptation to sin, as one desire among many, is not sin. However, when that desire to sin wins out and becomes the choice to sin, whether regarding a mental action or a physical one, then one is morally accountable for having "sinned."

Really? It seems that if an unbidden impulse wins out, then this unbidden impulse compelled you. People generally think that this lessens one's moral accountability (eg., from murder to manslaughter) or even eliminates it, such as in temporary insanity, or coercion, or torture, or if the impulse arose because someone drugged you or manipulated you, or Braniac or mad scientist caused that impulse in you and caused it to be the strongest impulse you felt. Is everyone wrong in thinking that an overwhelming unbidden impulse lessens or removes moral accountability?

Whatever. You pick the term to refer to the thing which I clearly described. Regardless what name by which we call it, there is no "way out". Contrary to scripture.

There is indeed always a way out, another choice, than to sin. That is Paul's point.

Right. So then we have:

1) Your view implies that there is no way out.
2) There is indeed always a way out.
3) Therefore your view cannot be correct.