Is everything part of God's plan?

[RBerman]

Those passages seem representative of the Bible's view: When something happens, it is in some sense God behind it...

I'm not sure that's the same thing we are talking about here. That could refer to God using all things for his overall plan, as opposed to God causing/predetermining all things. Or to God being the source of the being of everything else.

I'll allow that such passages admit of multiple interpretations, in isolation from each other. I'm more interested in the cumulative weight of the text, which is to point in a Godward direction when someone asks, "Why did X happen?" This is not even a uniquely Christian view; it's simply the ancient view of life. I've been re-reading the Odyssey, and it strikes me how often the major plot points revolve around something the gods either do directly, or persuade men to do when they were not previously disposed to do so.

Not preventing is not the same thing as causing either.

It is not exactly the same thing, true. A plan may achieve its purposes through either active or passive means; it's a plan all the same.

No single verse says, "Everything is part of God's plan," true. But if the murder of God's own son, the most heinous sin ever, is part of God's "definite plan" (Acts 2:23) it becomes difficult to imagine the grounds on which lesser sins would be excluded. Isaiah 45:7 speaks of God making "light and darkness... well-being and calamity..." That smells like a merism for "everything."

Could this not refer to God being the Creator of all (the ultimate source of all being), having total power over everything, and cause of what the pagans call fortune? As opposed to causing/determining everything?

Antonymic constructions in the Bible ("Alpha and Omega," "heaven and earth," etc.) are typically held to be merisms for "everything." It makes sense to me that the pair of similar statements I quoted in Isaiah 45:7 should be understood with a similarly comprehensive scope. I don't know what "total power over everything" would entail if not "causing/determining everything." Again, the determination could be either active or passive, as we noted above, but that does not make it any less planned.

The murder of Jesus would be explained by Molinists as being done by LFW, while the content of Middle Knowledge is not planned/determined by God.

I can't keep straight which threads we are and are not supposed to be mentioning Molinism in. When I brought up Middle Knowledge in a recent post, you said it wasn't relevant to your interest, yet you yourself immediately appeal to it. I guess that was in the other thread? The two topics seems sufficiently close as to bleed into each other.

At any rate, obviously Molinists will appeal to human actions as having been done by LFW, but it doesn't seem appropriate to gloss Acts 2:23 as, "It was God's definite plan for wicked men to either murder or not murder Jesus, as they so chose by their LFW."

It also occurs to me that some/most human actions being LFW does not mean all human actions are LFW. E.g., it could be that Pharaoh first LFW chose to harden his heart, before God hardened Pharaoh's heart. In such a case, God would just be making permanent the kinds of choices that Pharaoh has already freely been making.

Molinists typically see the need for LFW on the grounds that it would be wrong for God to punish men for decisions not made with LFW. So which is it? Is LFW indispensable for moral accountability, or not?

[hedrick]

[The Remonstrant]

hendrick:

The interesting thing about open theism is that God can (according to this view), in a sense, "wing it", in time. Openness advocates maintain that God is temporal and not in possession of exhaustive definite foreknowledge (EDF) because the future is literally non-existent. Yet seeing as God is infinitely wise and all-knowing (at least in the openness sense of the term),¹ he has literally been prepared before the foundation of the world for all "might-counterfactuals" as Gregory A. Boyd refers to them (according to his theory of "neo-Molinism").

Proponents of the open view think of God as omniscient in the sense that God knows all that is logically possible for God to know. Future (libertarian) free-will acts are, by their very nature, "unknowable". Contingencies are not certainties. If God infallibly knew in advance what you or I were going to do tomorrow in exhaustive detail, this would imply that our choices were predetermined. Some openness advocates refer to God's mode of knowledge as presentism (or present knowledge) or dynamic omniscience (a term coined by John Sanders, author of The God Who Risks, I believe).

This is all far too speculative for me. (I am not an open theist.)

[dacristoy]

If everything (including sin) is a part of God's plan, then the word "disobedience" becomes non-existent in our relationship with him. Sounds silly huh?

[RBerman]

If everything (including sin) is a part of God's plan, then the word "disobedience" becomes non-existent in our relationship with him. Sounds silly huh?

That would indeed be silly if true, but it's not. Disobedience is going against God's commands. If our disobedience allowed us to escape God's plan, then we would be defeating God. Now that would be silly. But God's plan includes our disobedience of God's commands, which is how he can bring good out of evil.

[hedrick]

This is all far too speculative for me.

I know all of that. I even think it fits well with the way God acts in the OT and arguably the NT. Without it a lot of things about changing his mind and discovering things have to be taken as figures of speech. The problem for me is that I don't see any way it can be true without making God part of the universe. He has to be in time or future makes no sense. But time is part of the created universe. I've gotten answers to this, but they don't make any sense to me. If he's part of the universe I don't see how he can be the creator.

However Gen 1 can be read as saying that God started with preexisting stuff and organized it. That works, mostly, but still leaves us with the question of where God comes from. The best hope I have is that the universe came out of some larger system, that system is eternal and has God as an eternal part of it, and somehow it has a time that corresponds to our time even though it can't actually be our time. I'm not sure the last statement even makes sense.

So basically, open theism looks likely to me Biblically but questionable scientifically. Given the great uncertainties about this part of cosmology, I tend to regard open theism as likely but not certain.

[The Remonstrant]

hedrick:

I was unaware you were inclined toward open theism.

It seems to me that the open view is becoming increasingly speculative with Oord and co. going beyond Pinnock. It appears there is no going back now. Openness proponents are moving toward panentheism and seriously calling into question (or outright denying) creatio ex nihilo. For my part, I while I quite enjoy Pinnock's Most Moved Mover, and still find it valuable, I am finding myself more and more wary of the trajectory I see openness advocates traversing as time elapses. It seems many have almost a craving for novelty and speculating over tenuous theories. (Open theists also appear to almost unanimously support some form of theistic evolution and are prone to rejecting any form of scriptural inerrancy.)

[hedrick]

hedrick:

I was unaware you were inclined toward open theism.

It seems to me that the open view is becoming increasingly speculative with Oord and co. going beyond Pinnock. It appears there is no going back now. Openness proponents are moving toward panentheism and seriously calling into question (or outright denying) creatio ex nihilo. For my part, I while I quite enjoy Pinnock's Most Moved Mover, and still find it valuable, I am finding myself more and more wary of the trajectory I see openness advocates traversing as time elapses. It seems many have almost a craving for novelty and speculating over tenuous theories. (Open theists also appear to almost unanimously support some form of theistic evolution and are prone to rejecting any form of scriptural inerrancy.)

I'm not interested in either philosophical speculation or novelty. I'm part of a fairly liberal PCUSA church. But I'm more interested in Jesus scholarship than philosophical speculation. Panentheism, evolution and rejecting inerrancy are fairly common with us. However I still haven't been able to make any sense of panentheism. Evolution and a rejection of inerrancy are obvious to me. I don't see how any sane person can accept inerrancy. The main attraction of open theism for me isn't philosophical. It's that I think it's the most consistent with the way God is portrayed in Scripture. I don't doubt that God has a long-term plan for us. I'm just not so sure that it includes every detail. I don't think the evidence is all in on creatio ex nihilo, but I'm skeptical.

[dacristoy]

That would indeed be silly if true, but it's not. Disobedience is going against God's commands. If our disobedience allowed us to escape God's plan, then we would be defeating God. Now that would be silly. But God's plan includes our disobedience of God's commands, which is how he can bring good out of evil.

Strong's Hebrew Definition for # 04784
04784 // hrm // marah // maw-raw' //
a primitive root; TWOT - 1242; v

AV - rebel 19, rebellious 9, provoke 7, disobedient 2, against 1,
bitter 1, changed 1, disobeyed 1, grievously 1, provocation 1,
rebels 1; 44

1) to be contentious, be rebellious, be refractory, be disobedient
towards, be rebellious against
1a) (Qal) to be disobedient, be rebellious
1a1) towards father
1a2) towards God
1b) (Hiphil) to show rebelliousness, show disobedience, disobey

[Joel]

I'll allow that such passages admit of multiple interpretations, in isolation from each other. I'm more interested in the cumulative weight of the text, which is to point in a Godward direction when someone asks, "Why did X happen?"

As far as that cumulative weight, I have not seen that yet. I haven't got that impression.

Secondly, it seems that when people are thinking rationally, they don't ask "Why did X happen" if they know the cause. eg., why did the glass break? because it fell to the ground. Why did X happen? Because RBerman chose to do it.
Although people may still ask that question out of emotion. Or asking in different senses, such as wondering why RBerman did it. Or asking how it fits into the overall story of the world, or asking why God didn't stop RBerman.

I recall C. S. Lewis arguing that natural science (earlier natural philosophy) was founded on certain Christian (and ancient Greek philosophical) ideas about causality. That it would not have arisen among other ancients who thought everything was the whim of the gods and thus there was no deeper order to be found, or underlying principles of causality and being.

It is not exactly the same thing, true. A plan may achieve its purposes through either active or passive means; it's a plan all the same.

Sure, but my atheist friend in the OP has in mind the idea of God causing/controlling everything. (Thus he's asking how can RBerman control his actions if God controls RBerman's actions.) My friend's objection disappears if we are talking about RBerman acting and God not preventing RBerman.

Could this not refer to God being the Creator of all (the ultimate source of all being), having total power over everything, and cause of what the pagans call fortune? As opposed to causing/determining everything?

Antonymic constructions in the Bible ("Alpha and Omega," "heaven and earth," etc.) are typically held to be merisms for "everything." It makes sense to me that the pair of similar statements I quoted in Isaiah 45:7 should be understood with a similarly comprehensive scope. I don't know what "total power over everything" would entail if not "causing/determining everything." Again, the determination could be either active or passive, as we noted above, but that does not make it any less planned.

I wasn't questioning the "everything" part. I was questioning what it is that is being predicated of "everything."

Is it, for example, saying that God causes everything, or that God has power over everything? The difference in the latter is that having power to do X is not the same thing as doing X. Having total power over X does not imply using that power to control everything about X. If we are talking about something "passive" as you say, then the OP dilemma disappears.

On the other hand, sometimes "everything" doesn't literally mean everything. (Like how omnipotence is said to be the power to do anything, but, if you want to get technical, must be refined/qualified to refer to anything logically possible.)

I can't keep straight which threads we are and are not supposed to be mentioning Molinism in. When I brought up Middle Knowledge in a recent post, you said it wasn't relevant to your interest, yet you yourself immediately appeal to it. I guess that was in the other thread? The two topics seems sufficiently close as to bleed into each other.

It was the other thread. The topics are certainly related. I've been trying to deal with them as separately as possible, but there may be overlap.

At any rate, obviously Molinists will appeal to human actions as having been done by LFW, but it doesn't seem appropriate to gloss Acts 2:23 as, "It was God's definite plan for wicked men to either murder or not murder Jesus, as they so chose by their LFW."

My understanding of Molinism is that people had 'already' (in some sense) LFW chosen to murder Jesus. That was already the case in middle knowledge before the creation of the space-time universe. In creating the universe, God caused that already-made choice to actualize in the universe.

There might be other possibilities. Perhaps open theists would take "delivered over by the predetermined plan" to mean only delivered into their hands (to do to him what they pleased).

It also occurs to me that some/most human actions being LFW does not mean all human actions are LFW. E.g., it could be that Pharaoh first LFW chose to harden his heart, before God hardened Pharaoh's heart. In such a case, God would just be making permanent the kinds of choices that Pharaoh has already freely been making.

Molinists typically see the need for LFW on the grounds that it would be wrong for God to punish men for decisions not made with LFW. So which is it? Is LFW indispensable for moral accountability, or not?

What I meant is that Pharaoh first did evil on his own and thus already deserved the punishment he got.

I'm reminded of an Aesop fable I recently read about a dog, when digging up bones, who dug up human bones and treasure that was buried with the human(s). The gods of the underworld were angry and punished the dog by making the dog intensely avaricious, such that the dog remained guarding the treasure until he died of thirst. The dog wasn't being punished for the avarice; rather the avarice (and presumably loss of free will), and its consequence of death, was all punishment for disturbing the grave(s). It's possible that something similar was the case for Pharaoh.

[RBerman]

As far as that cumulative weight, I have not seen that yet. I haven't got that impression.

OK. For obvious reasons I'm not going to quote the whole Bible.

Sure, but my atheist friend in the OP has in mind the idea of God causing/controlling everything. (Thus he's asking how can RBerman control his actions if God controls RBerman's actions.) My friend's objection disappears if we are talking about RBerman acting and God not preventing RBerman.

I would question your atheist friend about why, if you can easily prevent something bad from happening, failing to prevent it is not morally equivalent to causing it. Passive intentionality seems no less culpable than active intentionality, if the latter is culpable in the first place. Also, I'm not sure whether "control" is the best word to describe people acting according to their innate preferences and values, which they did not choose for themselves.

I wasn't questioning the "everything" part. I was questioning what it is that is being predicated of "everything." Is it, for example, saying that God causes everything, or that God has power over everything? The difference in the latter is that having power to do X is not the same thing as doing X. Having total power over X does not imply using that power to control everything about X. If we are talking about something "passive" as you say, then the OP dilemma disappears. On the other hand, sometimes "everything" doesn't literally mean everything. (Like how omnipotence is said to be the power to do anything, but, if you want to get technical, must be refined/qualified to refer to anything logically possible.)

That limitation of "everything" is not much of a limitation, since logically impossible things do not even exist, and our ability to talk about such nonexistent things just shows that language does not always correspond to reality. As for the rest, I agree that "having power to do X is not the same thing as doing X," but if we allow for passive determination, then God's comprehensive power over X seems equivalent to God's determining of X, whether that power is exercised actively or passively. God has purposed that everything be as it is, else it would be different.

It was the other thread. The topics are certainly related. I've been trying to deal with them as separately as possible, but there may be overlap.

Hence my confusion at being told that Molinism was not germane to the topic. But it's your thread, er threads.

My understanding of Molinism is that people had 'already' (in some sense) LFW chosen to murder Jesus. That was already the case in middle knowledge before the creation of the space-time universe. In creating the universe, God caused that already-made choice to actualize in the universe. There might be other possibilities. Perhaps open theists would take "delivered over by the predetermined plan" to mean only delivered into their hands (to do to him what they pleased).

Middle knowledge of future choices in an as-yet-unactualized-universe seems a curious thing to include in things "already" done. But I still haven't comprehended how middle knowledge ("If person, P, were in situation, S, then P would freely perform action, A (or P(S->A)).") even leaves LFW room to do anything. I do see the perceived desire for LFW to somehow mediate our choices based on the assumption that it's essential for moral accountability, but that essentiality seems poorly grounded.

What I meant is that Pharaoh first did evil on his own and thus already deserved the punishment he got.

We have no way to ascertain the truth of that idea. All we know from Scripture is that Pharaoh's punishment came after a string of times that "He hardened his heart" and a subsequent string of times in which "God hardened his heart." I for one am inclined to see the two statements as having no important distinction, operating simultaneously in all cases at different levels of causation, so that Pharaoh's self-hardening was the result of God's higher agency at work. But even if I'm wrong, and there was one string of times that "Pharaoh [but not God] hardened his heart" followed by a different string of times that "God [but not Pharaoh] hardened Pharaoh's heart," even then we only have the one final punishment after the whole string. We don't get to see another scenario in which only Pharaoh hardened his heart, and he received the same punishment all the same.

I'm reminded of an Aesop fable I recently read about a dog, when digging up bones, who dug up human bones and treasure that was buried with the human(s). The gods of the underworld were angry and punished the dog by making the dog intensely avaricious, such that the dog remained guarding the treasure until he died of thirst. The dog wasn't being punished for the avarice; rather the avarice (and presumably loss of free will), and its consequence of death, was all punishment for disturbing the grave(s). It's possible that something similar was the case for Pharaoh.

In that case, Pharaoh was not actually punished for anything he did after the fourth or fifth plague. Again, the Bible doesn't actually give us any direct grounds to reach such conclusions; you'd have to have already arrived at your belief in order to get that out of the text of Exodus. But your story of the dog does somehow remind me of the problem that heaven provides for LFW. If LFW is necessary for actions to have moral significance, and if LFW entails the possibility of sin, then either men in heaven have LFW, and there's a possibility that they will sin; or else men in heaven don't have LFW, and their eternal praise of God is of no moral significance. Either seems problematic.

[RBerman]

As I said, we are never "commanded to disobey." Yet sometimes we do disobey, and even our disobedience is incorporated into God's greater plan for the cosmos.

[FarEastBird]

As far as I know, the Bible doesn't say that everything is part of God's predetermined plan.

The truth is that God is the creator of EVERYTHING.

ALL things were made by him; and without him was NOT ANY THING made that was made. John 1:3

16 For by him were ALL THINGS created, that are in heaven, and that are in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or powers: ALL THINGS WERE CREATED BY HIM, and for him: 17 And he is before all things, and by him ALL THINGS CONSISTS. Col 1:16-17

I form the light, and create darkness: I make peace, and create evil: I the LORD DO ALL THESE THINGS. Isa 45:7

It is not openly taught that God is the creator of all things because it takes maturity of understanding to take this doctrine. As you may know, such question is itself posed by people who are mature in understanding.

This doctrine also explains why Jesus is known, or understood, as the TRUTH. The fulness of reality is known, or understood, to be of God's plan of creating all things according to Christ (Eph 3:9). All the reality is hanged on Christ.

And, of course, the consequence of the doctrine that God created all things is that man has no real life; that man has no free will, and merely described as mere vessel. Paul is even clear that the evil vessel is created by God, Paul argued:

20 Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus? 21 Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour? Rom 9:20-21

And from knowing that man is mere vessel, we know, and understand, how Christ is the LIFE. There is no other living being but God. The life of God is understood through Christ. For God's actions, or being, is understood through what He does through Christ (Rom 1:16-20).

And because God creates all things through Christ, by these we know, and understand, that Christ is the WAY. As Paul said, "For we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus unto good works, which God hath before ordained that we should walk in them." (Eph 2:10) On the latter part of his epistle, he said, "In whom also we have obtained an inheritance, being predestinated according to the purpose of him who worketh ALL things after the counsel of his own will:" (Eph 1:11)

The reason our election is given through mercy is because man has no free will. Man is just mere vessel to show God's glory. Man's election was not due to anything valuable in man, rather it is God himself who makes man to be righteous and holy. Again, as Paul said, "we are his workmanship."

Now, as concerning God creating evil, Ecclesiastes simply tell us the purposes: 1. to fear God, and 2. that man has no preeminence above a beast:

14 I know that, whatsoever God doeth, it shall be for ever: nothing can be put to it, nor any thing taken from it: and God doeth it, that men should fear before him. 15 That which hath been is now; and that which is to be hath already been; and God requireth that which is past. 16 And moreover I saw under the sun the place of judgment, that wickedness was there; and the place of righteousness, that iniquity was there. 17 I said in mine heart, God shall judge the righteous and the wicked: for there is a time there for every purpose and for every work. 18 I said in mine heart concerning the estate of the sons of men, that God might manifest them, and that they might see that they themselves are beasts. 19 For that which befalleth the sons of men befalleth beasts; even one thing befalleth them: as the one dieth, so dieth the other; yea, they have all one breath; so that a man hath no preeminence above a beast: for all is vanity. Eccl 3:14-19

I am sure many will not believe these things regarless they read it clearly in their Bible.

A secondary question for discussion: If every human choice was part of God's plan, then does that mean that God intended each human to commit every act of sin he commits? Or does "God's plan" have multiple meanings (e.g., such that X can be planned in some sense, but not intended or caused by God)?

How can a man which is merely a vessel can commit sin? As Jesus himself said, "And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free." Having knowledge of the truth that it is God who created and elected me, and made me who I am, then why would I find flaw of my imperfection? It is now God who works in me according to His purpose in Christ, my sins are not imputed in me anymore.

But of course, the vessels unto destruction are always walking in darkness. Out of ignorance, they claim being freed from sin but not knowing or understanding those things.

[dacristoy]

As I said, we are never "commanded to disobey." Yet sometimes we do disobey, and even our disobedience is incorporated into God's greater plan for the cosmos.

That is true Mr. Berman. As with Joseph and his brothers, God wanted Joseph in Egypt, he did not plan the brothers evil, but he did incorporate it into his plan to get Joseph into Egypt. Yet untoward conclusions have God perpetrating the evil that his brothers intended in order to accomplish his plans. Sooooo, not true.

[dacristoy]

God is absolutely necessary to our ability to make choices, and where good and evil are concerned so is Satan. God provides us with the options necessary for choice to exist. This is how God exercises control over his creation; through options, not through determination...