Homophobic Trump...

[carpedm9587]

I don't see how this solves the problem. It's your subjective opinion that "having the people around me NOT optimize what I perceive to be good is equal in value to me as having them optimize it" is absurd on the face of it, but why do you even believe that?

If I value personal possession, so have a proscription against stealing, it seems fairly obvious to me that having people around me who also value personal possession and have the same moral proscription will mean my personal possessions are less likely to be taken. That seems simply obvious on the face of it.

If I value living and life, so have a proscription against random killing, it seems fairly obvious to me that having people around me who also value life and living and have the same moral proscription will mean my life is less likely to be taken. That seems simply obvious on the face of it.

As far as I can see you're simply pushing the problem back one step, but you're not solving it. You're simply moving the need for justification onto another subjective value, but it's still there glaring anyone who looks at it in the face.

Perhaps I am missing the "problem" you think I need to solve? Morality is subjective/relative - from its crest to its roots. So we will always be pushing back on the next "subjective thing." The problem is...?

And the belief that existence is preferrable to non-existence is rationally arrived at in your worldview how exactly?

I find it inconsistent to find value in living/experiencing and simultaneously consider ending that existence. For anything given thing, "being" is a good because "not being" eliminates any possibility of good.

I'm not about to slough through 40 pages of back and forth with you and seer for something that would take you 5-10 minutes to type down, at most.

I just put it in my response to Sparko.

"Your opinion is duly noted" is a quite appropriate way to respond to any assertion from you about morality and moral reasoning.

Yes - it is. Morality is a form of personal opinion. For anyone not willing to engage in moral discussions/debate, there is simply no other response. When Sparko and Seer insist homosexuality is wrong, my only possible response (I have become aware) is "your opinion is duly noted." They aren't speaking out of absolute/objective moral norms - they are merely repeating the dictates of an ancient book projected on a supreme being to lend it authority. They are not going to change their views until they cease making that book and/or that god the center of their valuing. Until then - no argument will convince them one iota.

[carpedm9587]

I think a very basic error in Carpe's way of describing moral reality is his idea that we all work from our own moral framework. He seems to insist it is relative/subjective since an individual must hold the idea. That, however, does not follow, since an individual can work with a framework that is not subjective. Claiming otherwise is begging the question.

An individual can work with ideas that arise form others - and we do that when we seek to convince one another of one moral position or another. That does not make morality something based on an absolute/objective reality. We're not talking physics, here, Charles. We're talking about assessing the "goodness" of an act. Goodness, value, benefits are all subjective exercises. As I have noted - if all sentient minds cease to exist - laws and morality will cease to exist. The physical principles on which this universe operates will not.

And if you change the nature of the valuer, then which acts are seen as moral/immoral will also change.

But the so-called absolute/objective moral thinker (and I use "so-called" because I don't think there IS such a being) has a problem: they cannot show the existence of an absolute/objective framework nor can they escape the relative/subjective nature of their own moralizing.

[JonathanL]

Yes, Chrawnus - they are. They are both a form of preference - one culinary and the other moral. Unless I miss my guess, you are sliding into Sparko and Seer's error: objecting that moral relativism/subjectivism is not absolute/objective. As I've said to them - that's not an objection or an argument - it's a restatement of the definition of the terms.

There are no such thing as "moral preferences". There are "moral obligations", but "moral preferences" makes about as much sense as "weightless mass". Morality is inherently about obligations, while preferences by their very nature cannot be obligatory, so combining the two words together makes a term that's completely meaningless. It makes no more sense to speak of "moral preferences" than it does to speak of "triangles without edges and vertices". I'm not objecting that moral relativism/subjectivism is not absolute, or objective, I'm asserting that "moral relativism/subjectivism" is nonsensical and contradictory gobbledygook.

OK - explain exactly how they are "completely different."

See above regarding the part about how morality is inherently about obligation.

It has nothing to do with pretense, Chrawnus. ALL moral frameworks are "built from the ground up using (sometimes) circular reasoning." Yours. Mine. Seer's. Sparko's. All of them. They are all subjective/relative to what we value. That's simply how it works. When push comes to shove - we will end up with, "because I value X" as our justification. For Sparko and Seer (and presumably you) it will be because you value your god - or you value the books of the bible. Morality is a form of preference. It is not different in kind from the other things in life we prefer except a) it is about behavior) and b) it is a term we tend to use for behavior related to what we most closely value.

Indeed - moral law and moral frameworks have much in common with social law and social frameworks.

But it's not "because person A values x" that makes that persons moral framework subjective (ignoring the fact that I believe that the term "subjective moral framework" is inherently a contradiction) or objective, what makes that persons moral framework subjective or objective is whether the values he builds his moral framework on are subjective or objective.

And you might assume that there are no objective values, only subjective, and therefore there are no objective moral frameworks, and under that assumption you would be correct in the assumption that everyone's "moral" frameworks would be subjective in nature. But in that case I would just drop the pretense of calling them "moral frameworks" to begin with, and just call them what they are, namely "preferential frameworks", i.e "frameworks for how to behave in order to get the world to align with the values you prefer".

[seer]

It depends on the circumstances related to the suicide.

Right, completely subjective.

Sure it does - that is where the social contract comes in. It is why we seek alignment in our moral frameworks. What I value is best protected when everyone around me is valuing and moralizing as I do. It is the basis for the "golden rule."

No Carp, that does not logically follow. Just ask the Maoist. You are not doing well.

Which suggests a world where everyone does that which puts me at greater risk, ergo, a choice I reject.

Another subjective rationalization.

I do subjectively value my own life - no question about it.

For now...

I am not having a problem rationally justifying my existence. I enjoy life. I savor living. It brings me joy. It brings me happiness. It would be an irrational act for me to seek to end that reality - by definition. Happiness is what we are drawn to - not what we escape from.

That was not the point, you valued your own life long before you overlaid any rational justification. Rational justification has nothing to do with why we value our own lives. It is emotive and intuitive, or biological.

But it seems far more rational to me than "what does the book say?"

Why? Do you have some objective standard for that claim? Or is that merely what you subjectively believe?

[carpedm9587]

If two people can logically reason complete opposite conclusions, then your reasoning is meaningless.

No. It is absolutely/objectively meaningless - but it is relatively/subjectively meaningful. So you are again complaining "green is not blue," which is still not an argument, no matter how many different ways you find to say the same thing.

It is as seer said, just ad-hoc after the fact justification for your values.

I'm pretty sure all justification is done "after the fact"

And "ad hoc" literally means "to this." It usually is used to mean "as necessary" or "as needed." I don't have a problem with any moral argument being described as "ad hoc."

Your reasoning is no better than someone who reasons that they base their morals on a book they believe was inspired by God.

Well- yes, it is. Because there is no reasoning involved in the latter (at least that I have seen thus far). There can be in the former, which was my point.

[seer]

If two people can logically reason complete opposite conclusions, then your reasoning is meaningless. It is as seer said, just ad-hoc after the fact justification for your values. Your reasoning is no better than someone who reasons that they base their morals on a book they believe was inspired by God.

It is "post hoc" justification Carp, what you have been doing all along.

[carpedm9587]

There are no such thing as "moral preferences". There are "moral obligations", but "moral preferences" makes about as much sense as "weightless mass". Morality is inherently about obligations, while preferences by their very nature cannot be obligatory, so combining the two words together makes a term that's completely meaningless. It makes no more sense to speak of "moral preferences" than it does to speak of "triangles without edges and vertices". I'm not objecting that moral relativism/subjectivism is not absolute, or objective, I'm asserting that "moral relativism/subjectivism" is nonsensical and contradictory gobbledygook.

Chrawnus - assuming you (like Seer and Sparko) base your moral framework on the bible and "god's word," then you have a moral preference for the precepts of the bible. It is entirely subjective to you. Had you been born in the Middle East you would likely have been quoting the Quran instead. We all have moral preferences. I prefer to call it what it is. We see our moral preferences as obligations on our actions, but they are derived internally based on external stimuli. Serr and Sparko have a preference to see homosexuality as sinful. They have that preference because they base their moral framework on the text of the bible (as they interpret it). Your attempt to define your way to an objection is simply not apt. Triangles are physical and/or geometric realities with a particular definition.

See above regarding the part about how morality is inherently about obligation.

I don't see that as solving your problem. Laws place upon us obligations. That does not make the legal system "absolute/objective." Obligations are about the limits we accept from others or impose on ourselves. I have an obligation to pay my taxes because I choose to live in this country. That does not make the tax laws objective/absolute. I have a sense of obligation to provide for my family. That obligation does not arise from some absolute/objective source. It arises from a combination of the laws of this and, and the things I was raised to (and have come to) value. It springs internally.

But it's not "because person A values x" that makes that persons moral framework subjective (ignoring the fact that I believe that the term "subjective moral framework" is inherently a contradiction) or objective, what makes that persons moral framework subjective or objective is whether the values he builds his moral framework on are subjective or objective.

It is both. Ultimately, what we value is (at least in part) subjectively arrived at. I can give my reasons for valuing life - but eventually I will get to the subjective experience of living and how I feel about it. There is no escaping that all moral reasoning ultimately traces to subjective roots.

And you might assume that there are no objective values, only subjective, and therefore there are no objective moral frameworks, and under that assumption you would be correct in the assumption that everyone's "moral" frameworks would be subjective in nature.

Exactly. "Valuing," by definition, requires a valuer. It is a subjective act. There is no value if there is no one and nothing there to perceive that value.

But in that case I would just drop the pretense of calling them "moral frameworks" to begin with, and just call them what they are, namely "preferential frameworks", i.e "frameworks for how to behave in order to get the world to align with the values you prefer".

The world is used to using "moral" to talk about how we determine "right or ought action" from "wrong or ought not action." "Preference framework" is not wrong. It's merely too wide. Thge moral framework is a subset of our overall preference framework.

[carpedm9587]

Right, completely subjective.

Agreed.

No Carp, that does not logically follow. Just ask the Maoist. You are not doing well.

You do love your Maoist. Again, if the Maoist values power over life - they will reason to a different conclusion. That we CAN use reason to align moral frameworks doesn't mean we ALWAYS can. So - to repeat.

Moral reasoning introduces the possibility of alignment (as previously described). It does not guarantee it. Continually pointing to a case where it doesn't lead to that doe snot make your case. What you are doing is akin to this.

Claim: Exercising is generally better than not exercising
Objection: Tell that to the guy who just got off the treadmill and had a heart attack!

That there are exceptions, and places where it does not work does not obviate the general observation. It puts you in the absurd position of arguing "a rational approach cannot be shown to be better than an irrational one." I would take that claim to be an odd one on its face, and a sign of the weakness of your position that you have to resort to it.

Another subjective rationalization.

Actually - a fairly reasonable observation.

For now...

Valuing can change - and with them moral frameworks will change.

That was not the point, you valued your own life long before you overlaid any rational justification. Rational justification has nothing to do with why we value our own lives. It is emotive and intuitive, or biological.

Of course. As I have said many times, we ultimately arrive at subjective valuing. Indeed, we begin with adoptive valuing - blindly accepting what those around us lead us to as children. As we mature, we think through what we value, add our own experiences to the mix, and make our valuing our own - unless (of course) we hand it off wholesale to just another herd.

Why?

Because that act enslaves me to the moral framework of someone else, with no opportunity to think for myself and no freedom to assess what they are saying. I will just blindly adopt their position. Would you see such behavior as good if we did it with eating (I'll always eat what is most popular) or any other part of human life?

Do you have some objective standard for that claim?

I have the observation that we all have reasoning brains. Perhaps we should consider using them?

Or is that merely what you subjectively believe?

Probably subjective, at least in part.

[Charles]

An individual can work with ideas that arise form others - and we do that when we seek to convince one another of one moral position or another. That does not make morality something based on an absolute/objective reality. We're not talking physics, here, Charles. We're talking about assessing the "goodness" of an act. Goodness, value, benefits are all subjective exercises. As I have noted - if all sentient minds cease to exist - laws and morality will cease to exist. The physical principles on which this universe operates will not.

These are mere assertions and not arguments. You are mainly begging the question once again. You seem to simply rule out the idea that anything objective could exist in this realm. Moral reality could be objective and still be dependent on the existence of human beings. It would be no problem saying there is an objective standard on how humans should behave towards each other which would of course not be of any use when humans cease to exist.

And if you change the nature of the valuer, then which acts are seen as moral/immoral will also change.

Unless there is an objective standard.

But the so-called absolute/objective moral thinker (and I use "so-called" because I don't think there IS such a being) has a problem: they cannot show the existence of an absolute/objective framework nor can they escape the relative/subjective nature of their own moralizing.

Who are you talking about? Kant, Mill or? And where are your arguments?

[carpedm9587]

It is "post hoc" justification Carp, what you have been doing all along.

I'm pretty sure justification is "post hoc" by definition, though I suppose someone could try to justify something they are about to do as well.

It's not clear to me, however, why when the justification is being articulated matters or affects its accuracy?

[carpedm9587]

These are mere assertions and not arguments.

So I invite you to make the case for moral principles existing in the absence of any sentience to concieve of them or to act in any way.

You are mainly begging the question once again. You seem to simply rule out the idea that anything objective could exist in this realm.

I have never seen anyone demonstrate the existence of such constructs, as I noted.

Moral reality could be objective and still be dependent on the existence of human beings.

You'll have to explain what you mean. You're suggesting that morality is absolute/objective AND dependent on the existence of humanity. That would seem, at first blush, to be a contradiction in terms.

It would be no problem saying there is an objective standard on how humans should behave towards each other which would of course not be of any use when humans cease to exist.

I didn't say "of use," Charles. You are shifting the target a bit here. I am saying that absolute/objective principles do not exist. They do not exist because moralizing is a function of the sentient brain. It is a form of categorization of action. If all sentient minds cease to exist, the distance between the sun and the earth will not change - the radiant heat of the sun will not change - but the concept of law and morality will cease to exist. Not only will there be no one to articulate or conceive the concept - the actions they seek to categorize will not exist.

I would say - if you are going to make a claim of existence of a thing - you ought to be able to show that it does, indeed, exist.

Unless there is an objective standard.

Again - I invite you to show that such a thing exists. I think I have shown fairly well how the act of moralizing is a subjective one.

Who are you talking about? Kant, Mill or? And where are your arguments?

I'm not drawing from any philosopher or philosophy, Charles. I find all of them to fail before they start by simply assuming an absolute/objective base for moralizing. As I said to Seer and Sparko many times - the entire objection to relative/subjective morality always (in my experience) boils down to ONE continually repeated argument in many forms: moral relativism/subjectivism is not moral absolutism/objectivism. That is not an argument - it's a restatement of the meaning of the terms. It is a statement I have agreed to repeatedly. So what?

If you can answer that "so what" in a way that does not simply return to that definition, we'll actually be getting somewhere and you might convince me that morality has an absolute/objective basis. If not....

[JonathanL]

If I value personal possession, so have a proscription against stealing, it seems fairly obvious to me that having people around me who also value personal possession and have the same moral proscription will mean my personal possessions are less likely to be taken. That seems simply obvious on the face of it.

If I value living and life, so have a proscription against random killing, it seems fairly obvious to me that having people around me who also value life and living and have the same moral proscription will mean my life is less likely to be taken. That seems simply obvious on the face of it.



Perhaps I am missing the "problem" you think I need to solve? Morality is subjective/relative - from its crest to its roots. So we will always be pushing back on the next "subjective thing." The problem is...?

Everything, unless you're content with building a moral framework out of thin air. But as far as I can tell you seem to have no problem doing that.

I find it inconsistent to find value in living/experiencing and simultaneously consider ending that existence. For anything given thing, "being" is a good because "not being" eliminates any possibility of good.

It might be inconsistent, but why is acting inconsistently with your own values worse than acting in accordance with them? A person who values his existence but decides to take his own life on some strange random impulse might have acted against his own values, but in your worldview you're unable to explain why either choice, snuffing out his own existence, or continuing it, was preferable to one or the other. You might just introduce another set of subjective values to support the values you used to argue that existence is preferrable to non-existence, but then we're back at the "pushing the problem one step backwards" part again.

I just put it in my response to Sparko.

You're arguing that using reasoning to arrive at moral conclusions is preferrable to getting your moral beliefs "from the book", or by "following the herd" because when you're using reasoning you can get from,

1) Attempt to influence the underlying valuing so they align (these may be done by rational arguments, emotional arguments, social arguments, etc. to 2) When the underlying valuing aligns, use reason to arrive at a common moral conclusion.

Something which you cannot do when you get your morals "from the book", or "the herd."

I have two immediate thoughts popping up in my head right now. One is (and I think you suspect what it is already, even before reading it), I don't see how to justify being able to move from 1) to 2) in a worldview with subjective values, it just seems to be a case of "because I said so", in which case you're no better of than the people who build their moral frameworks based on the bible, or based on the "herd" they're following. You've simply pushed the point of contention backwards a step and exchanged "because the bible says so", or "because other people say so" to "because I say so".

My other thought is that I don't see how at least the people who get their morals "from the book" cannot use reasoning to arrive at moral conclusions. True, they might be constrained by what the book says, and might not be able to speculate as wildly as someone who's not bound by the book, but there is nothing that says that they cannot use their reasoning to inform their reading of the book they adhere to, and what sort of principles, values and rules that they extract from it.

Yes - it is. Morality is a form of personal opinion. For anyone not willing to engage in moral discussions/debate, there is simply no other response. When Sparko and Seer insist homosexuality is wrong, my only possible response (I have become aware) is "your opinion is duly noted." They aren't speaking out of absolute/objective moral norms - they are merely repeating the dictates of an ancient book projected on a supreme being to lend it authority. They are not going to change their views until they cease making that book and/or that god the center of their valuing. Until then - no argument will convince them one iota.

"Speaking out of absolute/objective norms" and "repeating the dictates of an ancient book" (leaving out the "projected on a supreme being to lend it authority" part because that's something I have my doubts about whether you're going to be able to justify) are not necessarily in contradiction with each other. It's possible that they are "speaking out absolute/objective moral norms from the dictates of an ancient book" as well.

[seer]

Agreed.



You do love your Maoist. Again, if the Maoist values power over life - they will reason to a different conclusion. That we CAN use reason to align moral frameworks doesn't mean we ALWAYS can. So - to repeat.

Moral reasoning introduces the possibility of alignment (as previously described). It does not guarantee it. Continually pointing to a case where it doesn't lead to that doe snot make your case. What you are doing is akin to this.

Claim: Exercising is generally better than not exercising
Objection: Tell that to the guy who just got off the treadmill and had a heart attack!

That there are exceptions, and places where it does not work does not obviate the general observation. It puts you in the absurd position of arguing "a rational approach cannot be shown to be better than an irrational one." I would take that claim to be an odd one on its face, and a sign of the weakness of your position that you have to resort to it.

So you are saying that there are objectively better moral ends or goals, like the objectively better ends when exercising?

Of course. As I have said many times, we ultimately arrive at subjective valuing. Indeed, we begin with adoptive valuing - blindly accepting what those around us lead us to as children. As we mature, we think through what we value, add our own experiences to the mix, and make our valuing our own - unless (of course) we hand it off wholesale to just another herd.

Right you are using a post hoc rationalization again. The point is one does not need a logical justification to value his life, it is completely unnecessary. And any justification that jumps off of that is merely, again, post hoc reasoning. Reading back into the non-rational, emotive valuing of one's life.

Because that act enslaves me to the moral framework of someone else, with no opportunity to think for myself and no freedom to assess what they are saying. I will just blindly adopt their position. Would you see such behavior as good if we did it with eating (I'll always eat what is most popular) or any other part of human life?

I have the observation that we all have reasoning brains. Perhaps we should consider using them?

You are again giving me a subjective reason, I asked for an objective grounding. And how do you know that your subjective brain is coming to correct moral conclusions? Without begging the question?

[Charles]

So I invite you to make the case for moral principles existing in the absence of any sentience to concieve of them or to act in any way.



I have never seen anyone demonstrate the existence of such constructs, as I noted.



You'll have to explain what you mean. You're suggesting that morality is absolute/objective AND dependent on the existence of humanity. That would seem, at first blush, to be a contradiction in terms.



I didn't say "of use," Charles. You are shifting the target a bit here. I am saying that absolute/objective principles do not exist. They do not exist because moralizing is a function of the sentient brain. It is a form of categorization of action. If all sentient minds cease to exist, the distance between the sun and the earth will not change - the radiant heat of the sun will not change - but the concept of law and morality will cease to exist. Not only will there be no one to articulate or conceive the concept - the actions they seek to categorize will not exist.

I would say - if you are going to make a claim of existence of a thing - you ought to be able to show that it does, indeed, exist.



Again - I invite you to show that such a thing exists. I think I have shown fairly well how the act of moralizing is a subjective one.



I'm not drawing from any philosopher or philosophy, Charles. I find all of them to fail before they start by simply assuming an absolute/objective base for moralizing. As I said to Seer and Sparko many times - the entire objection to relative/subjective morality always (in my experience) boils down to ONE continually repeated argument in many forms: moral relativism/subjectivism is not moral absolutism/objectivism. That is not an argument - it's a restatement of the meaning of the terms. It is a statement I have agreed to repeatedly. So what?

If you can answer that "so what" in a way that does not simply return to that definition, we'll actually be getting somewhere and you might convince me that morality has an absolute/objective basis. If not....

Well, if someone is thirsty and you offer them salt instead of water and I point out that salt will not solve the problem because the person needs water would you then say: "That is not an argument - it's a restatement of the meaning of the terms." It is rather simple. Your idea that you can continually point to it being a "restatement of the meaing of terms" and go on to say "So what?" is based on the idea that the meaning of terms is not important to the case discussed. You have completely failed to show why it is not important. If you did not in any way try to argue that certain actions are better or worse than others, you could say "So what?". What you are actually saying "So what?" to so far are all the ideas you present yourself. Or you are allowing me to say exactly that to every argument you can come up with. So what? You are simply presenting an idea while claiming that I have no reason what so ever to agree with you, unless I happen to do so already.

The idea that philosophers "start by simply assuming an absolute/objective base for moralizing" seems to be yet another question begging idea about moral reasoning. Where is the evidence?

The point that you seemed to find a bit contradicting was the point that there could be moral standards that are objective on how humans should treat each other. The fact that such standards would not apply when humans cease to exist would not prove them to be subjective. It would only prove that the reality in which they apply no longer exists.

If your best argument is that those who oppose you point out to what words actually mean and you cannot show them why that meaning is not important I don't think you have a very strong case.

I will admit that pointing to what objective standards are, why and how is very difficult and if you want to point out that I am not doing so in this post or the previous, you are absolutely right. That would be another thread and it would take a lot of time.

[Sparko]

No. It is absolutely/objectively meaningless - but it is relatively/subjectively meaningful. So you are again complaining "green is not blue," which is still not an argument, no matter how many different ways you find to say the same thing.

I am not arguing green is not blue. You are the one making the claim that your basis in morality is better because it is rationally based versus our "book based". yet you just admitted that someone can rationally come to exactly the opposite moral view than you. So your rationality is useless. It is nothing more than rationalization, not rationality. It is something you tell yourself so that you feel justified in your view, but it means absolutely nothing logically since someone else can use rational arguments that are just as valid as yours yet come to the opposite conclusion. Your rational basis is no better than basing your morality on the toss of a coin. You might get heads and claim stealing is wrong and I might get tails and say stealing is fine. No difference.

I'm pretty sure all justification is done "after the fact"

then your basis for your morals is just a fairy tale and means nothing.

And "ad hoc" literally means "to this." It usually is used to mean "as necessary" or "as needed." I don't have a problem with any moral argument being described as "ad hoc."

It means your claimed basis in morality is nothing but a sham.

Well- yes, it is. Because there is no reasoning involved in the latter (at least that I have seen thus far). There can be in the former, which was my point.

I can just as easily argue that my basis in morality is better because it is based on a book and yours is inferior because no book is involved. Your "reasoning" is useless and means nothing.