Trump's Christian supporters are unchristian

[oxmixmudd]

Let's see:Then it is possible for you to choose B, and infallibility is lost, even though you say you never would choose B. Why not? There seems to be no reason other than doing so would break your argument. How does having free will limit your ability to choose?

It doesn't limit my ability to choose, I am free to choose either one. Again, somehow you think God knowing my choice limits my choices. It doesn't. There is nothing that is causing me to choose what God knows I'll choose outside myself. It is possible for me to make either choice, but whichever choice I make, God will have known which one it was going to be.

Free will is the ability to choose between different possible courses of action. It doesn't fix what your choice is - that would be an inherent contradiction.

Correct, and God knowing my choice doesn't fix my choice. That is the concept that is assumed in the problem as you express it, and I am saying I think that is where the problem as it is expressed is incorrect. There is nothing determining my choice except me. Yet God knows what I'll choose.

Consider. My choice may not even exist in the past. It exists in the present but is open - I can chose either A or B. It if fixed in the future, I chose either A or B.

If God is present at all times, then he exist 'now' in each of these 'places'. The openness of the choice in the present does not contradict the fact the choice is made(closed) in the future. This is true of either a closed or open future. The past is always closed as seen from the future. Free will is the openness of the choice in the present. It is not the capacity to chose a choice that doesn't yet exist. And it is not the capacity to change a choice already made. It is the capacity to choose between A and B in the present without some external force determining that choice. God's knowledge of my choice in the future where my choice is fixed does not affect the openness of my choice in the present. I still have my choice. And whatever I choose will be what was chosen in the future. If God is at all times the present (I am that I am, Before Abraham was I am) and God does not change (the same yesterday, today, and forever), then what that means is not that the future is somehow fixed, but that whatever the future it is always 'known' by God as perceived by us in the present, in the past, or in the future.

If I understand you correctly you are saying that God doesn't know in advance what you will do - God only knows enough about you to predict what you will do with sufficient certainty.

That would be one way to express it, but if 'sufficient certainty' is 100%, then the difference between 'knowing' and 'predicting' (when evaluating infallibility) is indistinguishable. Indeed, to predict with 100% certainty is in fact to be infallible - yes? But to predict has no capacity to affect the choice as long as that prediction is unknown to the chooser. Thus, God remains infallible. But free-will remains a fact.

P.S. I don't think you're evil, or dumb, or deliberately misunderstanding. I think you are trying to support a false assumption rather that trying to determine the validity of that assumption.

Thanks, it seemed for a moment you were ascribing to me some sort of nefarious motive, which wasn't like you, and I was hoping that was not the case.

To be clear, could you define what you think that false assumption is?


Jim

[Roy]

I DO have a choice in every way that matters for meeting the definition of free-will, but my choice is also fixed by that self same free-will and God can thus know it absolutely.

How does having free will limit your ability to choose?

It doesn't limit my ability to choose, I am free to choose either one.

You said your choice was fixed by your free will. I see that I misinterpreted that.

Again, somehow you think God knowing my choice limits my choices.

No, I am still not making that assumption. I explicitly allow for the possibility that God knowing your choice does not limit what you choose.

It doesn't. There is nothing that is causing me to choose what God knows I'll choose outside myself. It is possible for me to make either choice, but whichever choice I make, God will have known which one it was going to be.

You, MM and Sparko have all made such statements. But all you are doing is repeating your assertions as if that somehow makes them valid.

Correct, and God knowing my choice doesn't fix my choice. That is the concept that is assumed in the problem as you express it, and I am saying I think that is where the problem as it is expressed is incorrect. There is nothing determining my choice except me. Yet God knows what I'll choose.

Consider. My choice may not even exist in the past. It exists in the present but is open - I can chose either A or B. It if fixed in the future, I chose either A or B.

If God is present at all times, then he exist 'now' in each of these 'places'.

You've now switched from your previous argument to using Sparko's argument instead. If God has seen what you chose, that's not foreknowledge.

The openness of the choice in the present does not contradict the fact the choice is made(closed) in the future. This is true of either a closed or open future. The past is always closed as seen from the future. Free will is the openness of the choice in the present. It is not the capacity to chose a choice that doesn't yet exist. And it is not the capacity to change a choice already made. It is the capacity to choose between A and B in the present without some external force determining that choice. God's knowledge of my choice in the future where my choice is fixed does not affect the openness of my choice in the present. I still have my choice. And whatever I choose will be what was chosen in the future. If God is at all times the present (I am that I am, Before Abraham was I am) and God does not change (the same yesterday, today, and forever), then what that means is not that the future is somehow fixed, but that whatever the future it is always 'known' by God as perceived by us in the present, in the past, or in the future.

It still comes down to whether it is possible for you to choose something other than what God knows you will choose.

Your answer is always that it is possible, but it will never happen. But you never say why it won't happen, you just assert that it won't, or fail to answer. That looks like avoiding dealing with a problem with your view.

To be clear, could you define what you think that false assumption is?

I think you are assuming that there is no conflict between free will and inerrant foreknowledge, and are unable to switch to asking whether there is such a conflict.

[oxmixmudd]

No, I am still not making that assumption. I explicitly allow for the possibility that God knowing your choice does not limit what you choose.

OK ...

You, MM and Sparko have all made such statements. But all you are doing is repeating your assertions as if that somehow makes them valid.

It's not a matter of just repeating statements Roy. In your argument one either backs away from choice A that God knew and B, or somehow God knowing forces me to pick A. If you take away any sort of forcing, and God is still correct, then there is no violation of free will. You keep saying the equivalent of If I pick what God knows I'll pick then I don't have a choice. But the free-will assumption says the choice and God's knowledge are not related. I won't pick other than what God knows I'll pick, but I still have an open and free choice - nothing is making me pick the choice God knows I'll pick. You cut the statement comparing prediction and knowledge, but I think it is very important so here it is again:

... if 'sufficient certainty' is 100%, then the difference between 'knowing' and 'predicting' (when evaluating infallibility) is indistinguishable. Indeed, to predict with 100% certainty is in fact to be infallible - yes? But to predict has no capacity to affect the choice as long as that prediction is unknown to the chooser. Thus, God remains infallible. But free-will remains a fact.

So if God can perfectly predict what I will do, then He 'knows' what I will do. But He is not causing it. And my capacity to chose is not being impinged upon.

You've now switched from your previous argument to using Sparko's argument instead. If God has seen what you chose, that's not foreknowledge.

It is if God is in all times at once and the same in all times. But I think it is easier to think of God's foreknowledge not as an observation in the past but as the capacity to predict perfectly.

It still comes down to whether it is possible for you to choose something other than what God knows you will choose.

No - that is NOT part of the definition of Free Will. It does not have to be possible for me to choose something other than what God knows I will choose for me to have Free-will. It is only necessary that my choices be undetermined by any outside or divine force. God's knowledge of what I will determine is not taking my choice away, or forcing me to choose one way or the other.

Your answer is always that it is possible, but it will never happen. But you never say why it won't happen, you just assert that it won't, or fail to answer.

I did say why. Because I will choose what I want to choose, and what I want to choose in a given moment in time is not defined by a random number generator operating off of variables hidden even to God, but by who I am, what I believe etc and thus can be predicted by a God who knows all.

That looks like avoiding dealing with a problem with your view.I think you are assuming that there is no conflict between free will and inerrant foreknowledge, and are unable to switch to asking whether there is such a conflict.

No, I summed it up in the statement that was cut. Perhaps the simplest way to understand what I'm saying is that God can predict with 100% certainty, but in doing so in no way defines my choice. The choices are available. I don't know anything about what God's predictions are. So my choice is free. But God's predictions are 100% accurate, which means He is never wrong, which means He is infallible.

1)So when it comes to the definition of infallible, it simply doesn't matter if God is predicting with 100% accuracy or knowing because he looked at the outcome in the future. Since God predicts with 100% accuracy, then He is infallible.
2)When it comes to the definition of free-will, as long as God is not in anyway controlling the outcome, then the choices are before me and I can chose from any of them I wish. Since that is the case, I have free will.


Ergo, God being infallible does not conflict with me having free-will, because to have free-will does not mean one's choices are unpredictable.


We can back up to one of my first comments on this.

If I have free-will, and I can discover what God is predicting I'll choose, then I could change that choice.

If I don't have free-will, and I can discover what God is predicting I'll choose, then I can't change that choice.

But either way, I can only find out what God is predicting if He tells me.


Now we've been arguing this for a while. But I personally believe there is something else afoot. I don't think God always chooses to 'predict' the future, but rather sometimes allows there to be several opportunities before us. He knows where they all end up - so He still knows all - excepting His divine choice not to know what we will choose. But in that case, the future is truly open, unrealized. The scripture indicates over an over again God is looking for willing followers, not robots, not automatons. This is why, I believe, He does not jump in on the scene all that often, why He requires faith. See, you believe God can't even privately know our futures without completely eradicating our free will! How much more if He jumped in on the scene independent of some active measure of faith on our part and started correcting everything we've messed up!

Alternatively, The reality is I've not been arguing from assumptions based on what I specifically believe about God as regards this issue. I am sincerely attempting to argue the logic of the argument itself as it relates to the definition of infallibility and free-will.




Jim

[Sparko]

Choose #1 or #2? Okay then, since B-theory seems to be your fav, explain how the future can both exist from one perspective, from an external perspective, and not exist from another, from an internal perspective?

wow you can't just choose #1 or #2?


You know what? never mind. I knew you would refuse to choose. I guess that means you have no free will. You are a robot.

[Sparko]

No I actually exist for a particular length of time. From the time I was conceived till the time I die. And even then I can continue to exist as a corpse for quite a while.



If you decide to choose to walk to the store tomorrow because you need some eggs and you don't feel like driving that is done of your own free will. You recognized you needed eggs, decided it was a nice day and walked.

Now all of a sudden God knew you would do that before you did! What changed? You still found out you needed eggs, decided it was a nice day and walked to the store. It was still your decision. You have not shown that God knowing you would make it took away your free will.

[Sparko]

Aside from the minor problem that any argument that begins 'something that can't happen happens' can lead to any conclusion including the opposite of the one you want, in your proposed scenario your free-will decision would remain a free-will decision because there are several ways in which you might choose a different option:
- my future self might be wrong
- my future self may be lying
- my knowledge of your decision might cause you to make a different choice

None of these options are available in you God scenario.

Let's assume your future self isn't a liar or an idiot. And I already stated that I am unaware of your knowledge of what I will choose. Why are you trying to make up exceptions to a simple hypothetical?


Just answer the question. How would your future self telling your present self what I will do tomorrow change my choice from being a free will choice?

[Roy]

Let's assume your future self isn't a liar or an idiot. And I already stated that I am unaware of your knowledge of what I will choose. Why are you trying to make up exceptions to a simple hypothetical?


Just answer the question. How would your future self telling your present self what I will do tomorrow change my choice from being a free will choice?

It wouldn't.

[Sparko]

It wouldn't.

So having foreknowledge of my choice doesn't create a lack of my choice being a free will choice.

And since your future self knows what I will choose, I will indeed choose that and nothing else.

The fact that someone DOES what is known they will do doesn't change the fact that they are doing it of their own free will.

[Roy]

How would your future self telling your present self what I will do tomorrow change my choice from being a free will choice?

So having foreknowledge of my choice doesn't create a lack of my choice being a free will choice.

And since your future self knows what I will choose, I will indeed choose that and nothing else.

You're assuming (among other things) that the future is immutable, i.e. it can't be changed by some-one or something travelling back in time.

Good luck supporting that assumption.

[Sparko]

You're assuming (among other things) that the future is immutable, i.e. it can't be changed by some-one or something travelling back in time.

Good luck supporting that assumption.

No, I was specifically stating that

1. You didn't travel back in time, you called your present self
2. I didn't know anything about it, so I could not change my decision based on any pre-knowledge

If you did tell me about it and I changed my decision, that would cause your future self to know that I did THAT instead which is what he would have told you I would do. Which you would tell me and then I would do something different and we would have a big loop of me flip flopping between the two choices. A type of paradox.

I am assuming that the future is as immutable as our past is. Because to your future self that called you, it WAS his past.

We can't change what we did yesterday, but that doesn't mean it wasn't free will. If you called yourself from today to yesterday and told you what I was going to do this morning, and didn't tell me about it, we would have the very same situation and I would still have done what I did freely.

[oxmixmudd]

No, I was specifically stating that

1. You didn't travel back in time, you called your present self
2. I didn't know anything about it, so I could not change my decision based on any pre-knowledge

If you did tell me about it and I changed my decision, that would cause your future self to know that I did THAT instead which is what he would have told you I would do. Which you would tell me and then I would do something different and we would have a big loop of me flip flopping between the two choices. A type of paradox.

I am assuming that the future is as immutable as our past is. Because to your future self that called you, it WAS his past.

We can't change what we did yesterday, but that doesn't mean it wasn't free will. If you called yourself from today to yesterday and told you what I was going to do this morning, and didn't tell me about it, we would have the very same situation and I would still have done what I did freely.

If time is a plane instead of a line, it might not work out like you say, as each conversation back is a retrocausal event that produces a new timeline in the plane, where the future self doing the calling is 1 iteration behind whatever mayhem would become of the call :)

Jim

[Roy]

You're assuming (among other things) that the future is immutable, i.e. it can't be changed by some-one or something travelling back in time.

Good luck supporting that assumption.

No, I was specifically stating that

1. You didn't travel back in time, you called your present self
2. I didn't know anything about it, so I could not change my decision based on any pre-knowledge

If you did tell me about it and I changed my decision, that would cause your future self to know that I did THAT instead which is what he would have told you I would do. Which you would tell me and then I would do something different and we would have a big loop of me flip flopping between the two choices. A type of paradox.

I am assuming that the future is as immutable as our past is.

Yes, I know. Your scenario falls apart if you remove that assumption. That's why it doesn't work to support your claims about God, because those claims don't allow you to remove that assumption - it's implicit in God's foreknowledge that no matter how far back in time you travel, you can't reach a point before God knows what will happen.

We can't change what we did yesterday, ...

If we can travel into or send information into the past - which your scenario involves - then maybe we can change what we did yesterday.

[JimL]

wow you can't just choose #1 or #2?


You know what? never mind. I knew you would refuse to choose. I guess that means you have no free will. You are a robot.

That is choosing #1 ya dope. That's the B-theory where all of time exists and god sees it all from and external perspective. If it all exists so that god can see it all from an external perspective, then it is all there from any perspective. Are you really so dumb that you can't understand that?

[Tassman]

No I actually exist for a particular length of time. From the time I was conceived till the time I die. And even then I can continue to exist as a corpse for quite a while.

God knows everything that has happened and will happen in the course of your limited life.

If you decide to choose to walk to the store tomorrow because you need some eggs and you don't feel like driving that is done of your own free will. You recognized you needed eggs, decided it was a nice day and walked.

The omniscient deity has always known you will walk to get your eggs on this occasion. How could he not, he's omniscient.

Now all of a sudden God knew you would do that before you did! What changed? You still found out you needed eggs, decided it was a nice day and walked to the store. It was still your decision. You have not shown that God knowing you would make it took away your free will.

[Roy]

That is choosing #1 ya dope. That's the B-theory where all of time exists and god sees it all from and external perspective. If it all exists so that god can see it all from an external perspective, then it is all there from any perspective. Are you really so dumb that you can't understand that?

That's a bit harsh. These aren't trivial conclusions - it can be hard to figure out the consequences of any particular set of premises.