The Universe: Designed?

[Roy]

Here we go again. Imagine all the puddles waking to discover that, despite their wide varieties of shapes and sizes, every one of their containers is a precise fit. This CANNOT be coincidence. Therefore it must be design. What else could it be?

I think a better way to express it, which omits the necessity clause, is to say that:

We exist, therefore however unlikely the circumstances under which we could exist, they must have occurred.

Roy

[Roy]

We don't need to actually KNOW a value to one part in 10^60 in order to calculate that the SENSITIVITY of the value is one part in 10^60. You are, in essence, confusing accuracy and precision.

The more normal way to express this sensitivity is to say that the mass density of the early universe had to be fine-tuned to one part in 10^60.

Ok, I understand that. But I've never seen anything to support the 10^60 fine tuning claim outside of apologetics (your own source refers to another work that I can't find on-line). And without that I'm unconvinced that the required precision can be calculated so finely when the actual value is so hard to measure.

I'm also unimpressed that none of the sources I've ever seen using this 10⁶⁰ precision ever mention that we don't know the actual value to that level of precision.

Source: Robin Collins

[url="http://commonsenseatheism.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/Collins-The-Teleological-Argument.pdf"]Of course, if one cites this fine-tuning of gravity, one cannot then treat the fine-tuning of the force of the Big Bang or matter density of the Big Bang as an independent fine-tuning.

© Copyright Original Source

Like they do in this video?

Roy

[jordanriver]

And the multiverse argument actually supports there being some kind of God, at least in one them. And given infinite past even now all of them.

How do you figure?

Source: [B

NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC NEWS[/B]source

© Copyright Original Source

and here too, Paul Steinhardt speaking (start around 9:20 in the video)

Source: Two Paul Steinhardt Projects: "Cyclic Universe" and "Quasicrystals"

(start around 9:20) "....as we began to understand inflation better, a serious disease emerged, a serious flaw emerged that we're still dealing with today, and that is that, although I told you that inflation comes to an end, our ideas, it actually doesn't come to an end, ...it comes to end in certain patches of space, but most of space keeps inflating away, and the reason why this happens is because of the same quantum fluctuations that are producing the wrinkles that we're seeing will occasionally produce regions of space which don't inflate, which do not end inflation when they were supposed to, and stay inflating, and although they seem rare, and you seem like you could ignore them at first, they can't be ignored because they're inflating, so within a matter of instance they occupy more space in the region, in the normal region, what you would say was "the normal region of space"
Now, the process continues, the part thats inflating again tries to end inflation, again it fails but leaving another patch, and another patch, and another patch, producing patches, an infinite number of patches over time. The real problem is that these patches are not all alike, again due to the rare quantum effects, an infinite number of them might be like us, but an infinite number of them would not be like us, every prediction that inflation was supposed to make and supposed to be famous for, there would be an infinite number of regions which it would not be true,
...so the theory broke down, developed this disease that, it produced what we called a multiverse, not a universe, which is everywhere the same, but a multiverse, in which anything that could conceivably imagine happening would happen an infinite number of times...
...such a theory has no predictive value, thats the problem, and so one had to ask the question, is there a way of curing that, or do we need to seek an alternative
and so the cyclic model came out of that......."
source

© Copyright Original Source

otoh, considering,
whats the odds of there actually being a DC Universe, or a Marvel Universe,

with the multiverse, the odds would be met, and somewere out there BAT-MITE EXISTS!

[oxmixmudd]

We don't need to actually KNOW a value to one part in 10^60 in order to calculate that the SENSITIVITY of the value is one part in 10^60. You are, in essence, confusing accuracy and precision.

The more normal way to express this sensitivity is to say that the mass density of the early universe had to be fine-tuned to one part in 10^60. This is how Hugh Ross and others generally express it. But if the mass density were assumed to be fixed, then the gravitational constant would have to be fine-tuned to one part in 10^60, as the video says. In this, the video follows Robin Collins, who explains:

Source: Robin Collins

The Teleological Argument, p. 215
... There is, however, a fine-tuning of gravity relative to other parameters. One of these is the fine-tuning of gravity relative to the density of mass-energy in the early universe and other factors determining the expansion rate of the Big Bang – such as the value of the Hubble constant and the value of the cosmological constant. Holding these other parameters constant, if the strength of gravity were smaller or larger by an estimated one part in 1060 of its current value, the universe would have either exploded too quickly for galaxies and stars to form, or collapsed back on itself too quickly for life to evolve.10

10. This latter fine-tuning of the strength of gravity is typically expressed as the claim that the density of matter at the Plank time (the time at which we have any confidence in the theory of Big Bang dynamics) must have been tuned to one part in 1060 of the so-called critical density (e.g. Davies 1982, p. 89). Since the critical density is inversely proportional to the strength of gravity (Davies 1982, p. 88, eqn. 4.15), the fine-tuning of the matter density can easily be shown to be equivalent to the aforementioned claim about the tuning of the strength of gravity. Of course, if one cites this fine-tuning of gravity, one cannot then treat the fine-tuning of the force of the Big Bang or matter density of the Big Bang as an independent fine-tuning. (See Section 5.1.1 for how to combine cases of fine-tuning.)

© Copyright Original Source

This would have been my reply to Roy's rebuttal as well. Our set of constants is tightly constrained to what they are independent of how accurately we can measure what they are.

Fine tuning is a bit of a problem for those that require a purely natural solution to the existence of the Universe. How could it exist as a singleton assuming the current state is one of an infinite number of possible randomly occurring outcomes of a 'big bang' like event? Enter the infinite multiverse. But even the multiverse is a weak solution to that problem, in that the multiverse only solves the problem if the set of possible outcomes has unlimited scope.

That is, in the multiverse solution - there needs to be a reason for universes to take on a full range of possible values with non-zero probabity - OR- that they would tend towards something close to our values*. For example, there are an infinite number of possible values for the gravitational constant between 12 and 13. So why then should I expect an infinite number of universes to make the current value of the gravitational constant a virtual certainty and not some value between say 12 and 13? I could easily have an infinite set of universes pop out of 'big bang' like events all of which have GC values between 12 and 13 and no possibility of being like our own.

The virtual certainty of there being an infinite number of universes like our own is not reasonable either, in that this assumes the number of possible values is countable, and that the resultant evolution of such a universe is deterministic ... i.e. what of the quantum state and true randomness?

And it goes on ad infinitum. The ancients put the Earth on a series of supports, each of which must be standing on something else. The Multiverse is not much different. It just moves the problems farther away. The reason for a cause, I think, can't be explained scientifically because there is always another 'why', another cause before the current first cause - unless one posits without explanation that a first or ultimate cause is not necessarily needed. And there we enter the realm of faith, and my belief in an ultimate cause is then no less logical than someone else's belief no such ultimate cause is required.

The point then of fine tuning arguments is that it is, in fact, more logical, based on what we know, to posit an ultimate cause than to blindly believe there need be no such ultimate cause.

Jim

* This represents two distinct solutions. Big Bang like events need to have the capacity to create universes with ANY possible constraint, or Big Bang like events need to have some reason they would create universes which would necessarily encompass OUR set of values. Otherwise our universe could not be an expected natural outcome. Either way, we are left looking for WHY big bang like events would make these kinds of universes.

[Roy]

The ancients put the Earth on a series of supports, each of which must be standing on something else. The Multiverse is not much different. It just moves the problems farther away.

But the idea of a designer does that too.

I don't know why the universe exists, but positing a creator merely leads to the question of why the creator exists. And how that creator overcame the fine-tuning issue.

Roy

[Boxing Pythagoras]

Source: NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC NEWS

The problem with a multiverse is that anything that can happen will happen an infinite number of times, and that makes calculating probabilities—such as the odds that Earth-size planets are common—seemingly impossible.
source

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and here too, Paul Steinhardt speaking (start around 9:20 in the video)

Source: Two Paul Steinhardt Projects: "Cyclic Universe" and "Quasicrystals"

a multiverse, in which anything that could conceivably imagine happening would happen an infinite number of times...
...such a theory has no predictive value, thats the problem[/SIZE]
source

© Copyright Original Source

I'm perfectly willing to grant these points, for the sake of argument, but at best that only tells us that certain Multiverse hypotheses are unfalsifiable. It doesn't support 37818's claims that "...the multiverse argument actually supports there being some kind of God, at least in one them" and that "given infinite past even now all of them." I was asking him to support these claims.

otoh, considering,
whats the odds of there actually being a DC Universe, or a Marvel Universe,

with the multiverse, the odds would be met, and somewere out there BAT-MITE EXISTS!

You're making a common mistake, here. Saying that all things which can possibly exist actually exist is not the same thing as saying all things which are conceivable can possibly exist. If a conceivable universe is not actually possible, then it doesn't matter if a multiverse contains infinite universes-- an impossible universe is not amongst them.

[Roy]

I'm perfectly willing to grant these points, for the sake of argument, but at best that only tells us that certain Multiverse hypotheses are unfalsifiable. It doesn't support 37818's claims that "...the multiverse argument actually supports there being some kind of God, at least in one them" and that "given infinite past even now all of them." I was asking him to support these claims.

I suspect the reasoning is that in an infinite set, anything that can happen will.

Roy

[shunyadragon]

I suspect the reasoning is that in an infinite set, anything that can happen will.

Roy

The first problem is that the 'anything' that can happen is not definable, yet. It may not be possible that many variations of universes nor multiverses are possible.

[jordanriver]

We need Paul Steinhardt to join the discussion here.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

I suspect the reasoning is that in an infinite set, anything that can happen will.

I think that's the reasoning as well. I'm wondering what justifies the claim that the existence of deity is a thing which can happen.

[oxmixmudd]

But the idea of a designer does that too.

I don't know why the universe exists, but positing a creator merely leads to the question of why the creator exists. And how that creator overcame the fine-tuning issue.

Roy

I think the reason for positing a designer (let's get real, for positing God) is that from what we know, intelligent causes are what typically produce events or constructs with real probabilities indistinguishable from zero. So if the probability of our universe is so vanishingly low as to be non-existent, we can , based on what we know, posit an intelligent cause as a 'reasonable' conclusion.

But 'getting real', the reason we posit God or don't posit God is dependent more on our own internal sense of whether or not such a being exists. My experience and life tells me there is a God. It's not an objective thing, in that there are potentially other explanations for that which I accept as evidence for God, but, to me, those explanations seem far less likely than that the God of the Bible is in fact a real being who interacts with us based on our faith.

In the end I am convinced that faith in God, or the rejection of that same faith, is not fundamentally based on the objective - but rather other elements most would deem subjective. Objective elements (e.g. science) can lend support to the decision to believe or not to believe, but I tend to think they are not the source of the decision.


Jim

[37818]

How do you figure?

Well, how much time did it take for our limited intelligence to arrive? Given an infinite past - any super intelligence would seem to us to have no beginning.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

Well, how much time did it take for our limited intelligence to arrive? Given an infinite past - any super intelligence would seem to us to have no beginning.

I don't know what you're attempting to say, here. What part of a multiverse hypothesis implies that any deity exists?

[phank]

I think the reason for positing a designer (let's get real, for positing God)

Let's get even MORE real - for positing YOUR god, of the many thousands of gods people have invented.

is that from what we know, intelligent causes are what typically produce events or constructs with real probabilities indistinguishable from zero.

This is exactly backwards. In a complex universe with countless independent processes occurring simultaneously, the result is guaranteed to be one preposterous coincidence after another. Now, if we ring in a superman (and let's be real again - the Christian god is treated as a person with human emotions and motivations, but great physical powers), presumably that superman will impose predictability and coherence onto that universe. We see little of this, and the future remains as opaque as ever.

So if the probability of our universe is so vanishingly low as to be non-existent, we can , based on what we know, posit an intelligent cause as a 'reasonable' conclusion.

Except of course that ANY conceivable universe is so improbable as to be near impossible. So we're back to the "every bridge hand is a miracle" argument. Just THINK of the infinity of ways the puddle's container could fail to precisely fit the puddle. Could it possibly be that the exact shape and size of the puddle's container came first, and that any water that filled it HAD to be an exact fit? Could it not also be the case that any universe is necessarily going to constrain what is possible within it?

But 'getting real', the reason we posit God or don't posit God

This gets annoying. Why do you never identify the particular god you wish, and explain why any of the other gods, equally devoutly believed in, are disqualified? At the very least, you could refer to "the Christian God", to distinguish it from the Islamic or Hundu gods.

is dependent more on our own internal sense of whether or not such a being exists. My experience and life tells me there is a God. It's not an objective thing, in that there are potentially other explanations for that which I accept as evidence for God, but, to me, those explanations seem far less likely than that the God of the Bible is in fact a real being who interacts with us based on our faith.

And of course it's sheer coincidence that nearly all believers accept the god of their parents and their culture, and take THAT god for granted while ignoring all the others. If I had been raised from infancy believing in the Great Green Arkleseizure, and everyone around me did the same, and there were Green churches on every other street corner, and prayers were submitted to the GGA before public meetings, and so on ad nauseum, then it would be amazing if my experience and life did NOT tell me that the GGA is real. Of course, there are potentially other explanations (the least complex of which need not explain the origin or existence of the GGA), but TO ME no other explanation would be remotely as satisfying as the GGA, whom I know in my heart of hearts is as real as sunshine.

In the end I am convinced that faith in God, or the rejection of that same faith, is not fundamentally based on the objective - but rather other elements most would deem subjective. Objective elements (e.g. science) can lend support to the decision to believe or not to believe, but I tend to think they are not the source of the decision.

I agree. Beliefs not based on evidence, cannot be altered with evidence. But here we're getting into the discussion of whether the lack of utility of a superfluous god matters, except in the imaginations of those trained to believe in them. So we can say "here is how this works" OR we can say "here is how this works AND there is this god I believe in." Nothing is added to the explanation, but perhaps a great deal is added to the emotional requirements of the explainer.

[robrecht]

... In a complex universe with countless independent processes occurring simultaneously, the result is guaranteed to be one preposterous coincidence after another. ...

I am curious just about this part. Are there truly independent processes?