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Cogito ergo sum

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What's your position on the mind-body problem?

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  • Originally posted by Volt View Post
    We know the substance of our thoughts and sensations; after all we think them and feel, hear, taste, smell and see them. The existence and contents of our minds aren't in question or ambiguity. The building blocks of the mind itself may be unknown, but that doesn't throw its existence into question It's what's "out there" that is, because we have no access to it and never will, something we can't possibly know or be aware of like the mind which I doubt the existence of.
    If the building blocks of the mind, or the substance thereof is in question, then so to would be the substance of thoughts and sensations. When you say that "we" think, feel, smell and see them, who is the "we" if not the mind? The body can't do these things if it is not itself conscious, if it is just a bog of atoms. If on the other hand it is the body that through the brain experiences these sensations, then a distinct and immaterial mind would be superfluous.
    As for the claims of Materialism. Remember the apple example? We perceive it as red, a certain size, weight, feel, smell, etc. Strip all those things away, all the sensations that we call an "apple," and tell me what's left. Try to describe it. That's our independent, external reality.
    If you take away its existence, then it doesn't exist. Not sure what your point is here Volt.


    Correct, assuming you're referring to ultimate causation, i.e. the "first mover," so to speak. However, simply because this all-encompassing mind is the original creator of the thoughts and sensations that we share doesn't mean that it retains absolute control over them.
    Well then you must be refering to a mind that differs from the traditional meaning of mind. You'll have to explain how a thought becomes a reality independent of its thinker.


    Our observation doesn't in and of itself cause shared reality to spring into existence, no. Our minds apparently aren't that robust.
    Agreed. But that seems to be in contradiction to your interpretation of wave function collapse.


    Observation only apparently causes it. That's the data, anything more is interpretation.
    Apparently collapses is also an interpretation. The data only shows that the observation and the collapse occur in cunjuction. From that perspective one could just as reasonably suggest that the collapse causes the observation.
    As for the mind not actively causing anything: consider any kind of physical interaction. One object bumps into another; it effects it by energy transfer. Same sort of thing from an Idealistic premise. The mind coming into direct contact with sensations and alters them in some way.
    But that is not the argument as far as QM goes. In order to have direct contact with something that something has to already be there . QM's suggests that observation is the cause of the objects being there. Again the object, and the observation of the object occur together, not as a result of the ones interaction with the other, because neither exists until both exist.


    Partly, yes. I never said that Idealism advocated absolute free will, much less complete causality via the human mind!
    Partly?


    Yes. Your point?
    How so? You have no direct information about your environment. If you open your eyes you have direct information about the world around you, close them and you have only a fuzzy notion of what it looks like.


    I eagerly await criticism. No, seriously.
    Sorry, wish I had more time. I'll try to get back to it.
    Last edited by JimL; 04-09-2014, 06:59 PM.

    Comment


    • Originally posted by JimL View Post
      First, to deduce that other minds exist, is to deduce that there is an external reality within which all minds exist. If that external reality is God, which I assume is what you are infering, then we as minds, are nothing more than thoughts produced by that external reality, i.e. God., and thoughts in and of themselves have no will beyond the will of the mind that produced them. One, that would mean we are nothing but a dream, and two, our actions would be determined by the dreamer. The only possible solution I can see for this problem, the problem of us being nothing but the determined dream of an all encompassing mind, is if the external reality, or that which in Idealistic monism might be called God, is not a mind at all, which brings us back to materialistic monism.
      Never heard that line of reasoning before. Seems consistent, certainly, and it re-introduces absolute determinism.

      I can only think of two criticisms:

      1. First, (in a gross oversimplification) we can think of the human mind as an information processor, in which it receives data--whether actively or passively--and produces a response. This process only works so far as there is still data to be processed, i.e. unknown data. As soon as the human mind knows everything, we can predict that it would become inactive, inert. Now, the omniscient, omnipotent God-mind must think in a different way from human minds because of this. Since God is omniscient by definition, he already knows everything, and in order to also satisfy the definition of being a mind that created our external reality, he must think in some manner. It's an apparent contradiction (God must think, but can't) until we consider perception: it's constantly changing, i.e. there is a "time flow."

      My point is this: Idealism's God-mind doesn't, can't, think like a human mind, in which total control is exerted whenever possible over our thoughts to make a conclusion or response. It must maintain our external reality--all those ideas--somehow, but not by arriving at only one possible conclusion like a typical information processor within time. The best description I can propose of the way this God-mind thinks is "time" itself: keeping all the ideas of reality within a restricting framework of physical laws, ideas to be tweaked and tampered with by human minds that come into contact with them.

      2. "We are nothing but a dream." If I understand your argument correctly, you're equating human minds to a set of ideas, i.e. a dream? That's equating an inert vs an active substance, like saying that a pianist is himself the notes played on the piano. Now, if the pianist is indistinguishable from the notes, the equation is sound. But the fact that I can create of my own will--lucid dreams, daydreams, conscious thought process that can be interrupted or altered at any time--suggests that "I" am distinguishable. Your argument relies on the premise that a mind can only create an inert object. That's certainly true for a human mind. But for a God-mind, that we infer has created and/or maintains all reality as we know it? I don't see any reason to dismiss the possibility. Also, there seem to be at least two reasons to make this possibility a probability: a) "I" am distinguishable from inert thoughts, and b) by definition, God doesn't think as the human mind does, and therefore isn't bound by the same rules as the human mind. Thoughts?

      But it does assert that all that does exist, exists inside of a mind, is the product of a mind, and does not exist external to a mind. Do I have that right?
      You do, as far as the inert "external reality." There is some wiggle room in whether one mind can be created by and/or exist "inside" another, simply because there isn't enough information. Just because all we know of inert reality exists inside our mind, doesn't necessarily imply that minds themselves are dependent on another for existence.

      Well of course. The model is all we have. That doesn't mean that we should ignore the fact that there is a gap in our knowledge as to how the one represents the other. If we can not trust that the model is representative of the reality then we might as well fold up our tents and go home, so to speak.
      Agreed. My argument is that there is an alternative.

      Well, we can assume anything when blind to the factual nature of things. But it is solipsism, which afaics is synonomous with Idealistic monism, which is a meaningless illusion. Materialistic monism may be meaningless as well, but at least it is not an illusion, at least we are not a dream, there is a reality to our existence there that exists independent of a mind.
      If we end up concluding that Idealistic Monism is equivalent to Solipsism, I'll happily flip sides.

      Yes, but if idealistic monism were true, then it wouldn't be we who are thinking, we would be being thought. Our thoughts would be as much of an illusion as we ourselves are. I think it a mistake though to define the physical brain as nothing more than a collection of inert thoughts.
      I'll admit that I've heard objections to Idealism in the form of, "then everything is an illusion!!" before, but not with a line of logic that justifies the claim like yours. It certainly has me up against the wall. That said, the brain is...well, first of all, I dislike categorizing anything of reality as mere data, in the strict sense of the word. So far as I know, there are two kinds of knowledge:

      1. "Knowing" in terms of repeatable data, such as the color of your eyes, hair, etc. Similarities of perception wherein the context is meaningless, because all these parts of data about the person is a partial reconstruction, at best.

      2. Sensory information as a whole, such as a person. For example, you can describe someone as "fiery" or "meek," in addition to all the data of their physical appearance. But it's never enough to capture everything that this person is; at some point in the description, there is nothing more to say than, "you just have to meet them to know them." Art in general falls into this category, and music is an example of pure knowledge in this sense--it exists as relative differences which must be experienced; it doesn't reconstruct or symbolize emotional meaning so much as carry it over directly, as a whole into our minds.

      The brain is fascinating because it can be reconstructed in discrete parts--Broca's area, etc--as data, but has a huge depth of interaction with the latter form of knowledge, altering a person's personality if different parts of the brain are disturbed.

      Bah, sorry, rambling. The point is, there isn't a white and black categorization of inert vs active, mind vs matter. They are effectively, inseparably intertwined, and we can only analytically distinguish them. The brain is a perfect example of this interconnected nature of reality.

      If reality is a product of mind, then there can be only one mind that it is a product of, which means that if reality consists of many minds, then those minds too are the product of the one mind. The product of a mind is thought, and thought has no reality of its own and does nothing of its own.
      I follow your logic, and it follows from Idealism's premises, but I suspect that it's too much black and white, so to speak. Consider your own mind: you have a will, and different instincts. Run or fight, and judgment to war between the two. Ditto if we consider interaction between 2+ minds: there is a war of wills over control of the shared idea, regardless of its origin. Origin doesn't necessarily imply total, perpetual control, does it?

      Personally, and sorry to keep repeating it, but Idealistic monism seems to be nothing more than solipsism from what i've so far gathered from your discription. Perhaps you could better explain to me how it isn't?
      Working on it, see above. To be quite honest, I've never encountered your particular objection before, so I may have to take a break and get back to you later, if only to mull it over and do some more digging. You may just be right about it.

      Yes, actually on third thought, the all encompassing mind would be an external reality with regards to the minds existing within it and so from their point of view, if we can call it that, the wave function would merely be describing the possibilities within the dream that they are a part of.
      Sounds like the best description we have so far. I'll have to remember it.

      Sorry, just don't have time to finish replying. i'll get back to it as soon as i can. Thanks.
      I know the feeling.

      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Second Post~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

      Originally posted by JimL View Post
      If the building blocks of the mind, or the substance thereof is in question, then so to would be the substance of thoughts and sensations. When you say that "we" think, feel, smell and see them, who is the "we" if not the mind? The body can't do these things if it is not itself conscious, if it is just a bog of atoms. If on the other hand it is the body that through the brain experiences these sensations, then a distinct and immaterial mind would be superfluous.
      We're discussing how to prove existence and/or correlation, yes? The mind isn't in question because we're immediately aware of it, and likewise with thoughts and sensations if we accept the premise that they're also contained in the mind.

      I agree that the assertion of a distinct and immaterial mind, given Dualism, is superfluous.

      If you take away its existence, then it doesn't exist. Not sure what your point is here Volt.
      That there's no reason to say that anything beyond perception exists, as far as experienced reality is concerned. There is no static, independent, "material" substance to reality. If Dualism and/or Materialism is correct, then perception is just our model of this material reality in the brain, and there must be a way to define that reality aside from what makes up our perceptions. Otherwise, it seems that the concept of a wholly independent "material reality" is completely empty, meaningless.

      Well then you must be refering to a mind that differs from the traditional meaning of mind. You'll have to explain how a thought becomes a reality independent of its thinker.
      By interaction with (or being inside of) another mind.

      Agreed. But that seems to be in contradiction to your interpretation of wave function collapse.
      How so? I was under the impression that the wave function exists, and our observation alters it. Not that observation creates the wave function from nothing, and then molds it into particles.

      Apparently collapses is also an interpretation. The data only shows that the observation and the collapse occur in cunjuction. From that perspective one could just as reasonably suggest that the collapse causes the observation.
      Sure. The critical difference lies in what we bring to the table in favor of this or that interpretation.

      But that is not the argument as far as QM goes. In order to have direct contact with something that something has to already be there . QM's suggests that observation is the cause of the objects being there. Again the object, and the observation of the object occur together, not as a result of the ones interaction with the other, because neither exists until both exist.
      Not sure I follow. The wave function itself doesn't exist until observed, or it doesn't exist in the form of on object, i.e. particles, until observed?

      Partly?
      We don't have absolute free will, in the sense that I can make any random choice, or think in any way, that I wish. The manner in which the mind itself thinks is constrained, or acts by certain rules. Intuition, instinct, the process of forming concepts and making inferences, etc, and that's just for the healthy mind. There's the fact that if the brain gets a lesion, say, in the left hemisphere, symbolic language is suddenly out of reach, though not language in terms of metaphor, humor, and transmission of emotions by body language and intonation (music).

      How so? You have no direct information about your environment. If you open your eyes you have direct information about the world around you, close them and you have only a fuzzy notion of what it looks like.
      Perhaps we should further define this example. If I had no access whatsoever to sight, sound, smell, taste, and touch--no sensory perception at all--then I wouldn't be in contact with reality, no. I would only have access to the partial reconstruction of reality as created by my mind, i.e. dreams or daydreams.

      Sorry, wish I had more time. I'll try to get back to it.
      Looking forward to it.

      Comment


      • Originally posted by Volt View Post
        Never heard that line of reasoning before. Seems consistent, certainly, and it re-introduces absolute determinism.

        I can only think of two criticisms:

        1. First, (in a gross oversimplification) we can think of the human mind as an information processor, in which it receives data--whether actively or passively--and produces a response. This process only works so far as there is still data to be processed, i.e. unknown data. As soon as the human mind knows everything, we can predict that it would become inactive, inert. Now, the omniscient, omnipotent God-mind must think in a different way from human minds because of this. Since God is omniscient by definition, he already knows everything, and in order to also satisfy the definition of being a mind that created our external reality, he must think in some manner. It's an apparent contradiction (God must think, but can't) until we consider perception: it's constantly changing, i.e. there is a "time flow."

        My point is this: Idealism's God-mind doesn't, can't, think like a human mind, in which total control is exerted whenever possible over our thoughts to make a conclusion or response. It must maintain our external reality--all those ideas--somehow, but not by arriving at only one possible conclusion like a typical information processor within time. The best description I can propose of the way this God-mind thinks is "time" itself: keeping all the ideas of reality within a restricting framework of physical laws, ideas to be tweaked and tampered with by human minds that come into contact with them.
        This is quite a difficult web to untangle but I think you are missing the point that from the idealistic monism perpective the human mind doesn't think at all if it is itself the thought of an all encompassing mind. No matter how you define the thinking process of the all encompassing mind the objects of its thought have no control over themselves because the reality they exist in, or are a part of, is another mind.
        2. "We are nothing but a dream." If I understand your argument correctly, you're equating human minds to a set of ideas, i.e. a dream? That's equating an inert vs an active substance, like saying that a pianist is himself the notes played on the piano. Now, if the pianist is indistinguishable from the notes, the equation is sound. But the fact that I can create of my own will--lucid dreams, daydreams, conscious thought process that can be interrupted or altered at any time--suggests that "I" am distinguishable. Your argument relies on the premise that a mind can only create an inert object. That's certainly true for a human mind. But for a God-mind, that we infer has created and/or maintains all reality as we know it? I don't see any reason to dismiss the possibility. Also, there seem to be at least two reasons to make this possibility a probability: a) "I" am distinguishable from inert thoughts, and b) by definition, God doesn't think as the human mind does, and therefore isn't bound by the same rules as the human mind. Thoughts?
        No, I think that, from the Idealistic monism perspective, it would be more appropriate to say that the pianist and the notes being played are indistinguishable from the all encompassing mind that they are a part of. Remember that from this perspective the all encompassing mind is all of reality and so nothing could be distinguishable from it. I think you are confusing Idealist monism and materialistic monism. In the former the human mind would not be independent of the external reality which is the all encompassing mind that is thinking it. In the latter only is the human mind a mind unto itself.


        You do, as far as the inert "external reality." There is some wiggle room in whether one mind can be created by and/or exist "inside" another, simply because there isn't enough information. Just because all we know of inert reality exists inside our mind, doesn't necessarily imply that minds themselves are dependent on another for existence.
        Well, it does though if both the human mind and the reality seemingly external to it are both objects of one and the same all encompassing mind.


        Agreed. My argument is that there is an alternative.
        I guess. I'm just not following exactly what your alternative is. I know, idealistic monism. But how you solve the problem of internal representation of external reality by that I'm not grasping.


        If we end up concluding that Idealistic Monism is equivalent to Solipsism, I'll happily flip sides.
        Could you define solipsism the way that you understand it and explain in what sense it differs from Idealistic monism?


        I'll admit that I've heard objections to Idealism in the form of, "then everything is an illusion!!" before, but not with a line of logic that justifies the claim like yours. It certainly has me up against the wall. That said, the brain is...well, first of all, I dislike categorizing anything of reality as mere data, in the strict sense of the word. So far as I know, there are two kinds of knowledge:

        1. "Knowing" in terms of repeatable data, such as the color of your eyes, hair, etc. Similarities of perception wherein the context is meaningless, because all these parts of data about the person is a partial reconstruction, at best.

        2. Sensory information as a whole, such as a person. For example, you can describe someone as "fiery" or "meek," in addition to all the data of their physical appearance. But it's never enough to capture everything that this person is; at some point in the description, there is nothing more to say than, "you just have to meet them to know them." Art in general falls into this category, and music is an example of pure knowledge in this sense--it exists as relative differences which must be experienced; it doesn't reconstruct or symbolize emotional meaning so much as carry it over directly, as a whole into our minds.

        The brain is fascinating because it can be reconstructed in discrete parts--Broca's area, etc--as data, but has a huge depth of interaction with the latter form of knowledge, altering a person's personality if different parts of the brain are disturbed.

        Bah, sorry, rambling. The point is, there isn't a white and black categorization of inert vs active, mind vs matter. They are effectively, inseparably intertwined, and we can only analytically distinguish them. The brain is a perfect example of this interconnected nature of reality.
        Not sure how any of this answers to my objection Volt.


        I follow your logic, and it follows from Idealism's premises, but I suspect that it's too much black and white, so to speak. Consider your own mind: you have a will, and different instincts. Run or fight, and judgment to war between the two. Ditto if we consider interaction between 2+ minds: there is a war of wills over control of the shared idea, regardless of its origin. Origin doesn't necessarily imply total, perpetual control, does it?
        It does if there is only one all encompassing mind.


        Working on it, see above. To be quite honest, I've never encountered your particular objection before, so I may have to take a break and get back to you later, if only to mull it over and do some more digging. You may just be right about it.
        Okay. Appreciate it, i am not exactly up to date on the definitions of all these terms myself.


        Sounds like the best description we have so far. I'll have to remember it.
        Okay.


        I know the feeling.
        Yeah, just not enough time in the waking day.
        ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Second Post~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~



        That there's no reason to say that anything beyond perception exists, as far as experienced reality is concerned. There is no static, independent, "material" substance to reality. If Dualism and/or Materialism is correct, then perception is just our model of this material reality in the brain, and there must be a way to define that reality aside from what makes up our perceptions. Otherwise, it seems that the concept of a wholly independent "material reality" is completely empty, meaningless.
        When you look at the external world it is modeled, repesented somehow in your brain, you percieve it. If you close your eyes you no longer percieve it, therefore it not only exists in your mind as a model, it exists externally and independently from your mind as well.


        By interaction with (or being inside of) another mind.
        No, I mean the existence of a thought itself as an object, being independent of a mind, any mind.


        How so? I was under the impression that the wave function exists, and our observation alters it. Not that observation creates the wave function from nothing, and then molds it into particles.
        That is not my understanding, or way of thinking about it. The world exists, the wave function is merely a discription of the present state of affairs of the universe and the determined direction of its future. We are included in the wave function so that both our observation of an event and the event itself occur in unison. In other words we don't collapse the wave function by observing an event, it just seems that way because both our observation of the event and the event itself are determined to occur in unison. The wave function does define many other future possibilities other than the one that we observe which is why it is defined as a wave, but those other possiblities all occur in a determined fashion as well within other universes. In other words the wave function is a wave because all of the possibilities within it are descriptions of the present state of affairs and the determined direction of the futures of all possible universes within the multiverse. We only observe one of them, the one relevent to our own universe. I believe this interpretation to be true because it is logical, and because the other interpretation, i.e. our observation being the cause of the future is not logical.


        Sure. The critical difference lies in what we bring to the table in favor of this or that interpretation.


        Not sure I follow. The wave function itself doesn't exist until observed, or it doesn't exist in the form of on object, i.e. particles, until observed?
        The universe exists, the wave function defines the present state of the universe as well as how its present state determines its future state. If the wave function were descriptive of just our universe alone then there would be only one possible determined future within the wave function, but because it is descriptive of the entire Cosmos or multiverse there are multiple possible futures defined in the wave function, only one of which relate to our universe.


        Perhaps we should further define this example. If I had no access whatsoever to sight, sound, smell, taste, and touch--no sensory perception at all--then I wouldn't be in contact with reality, no. I would only have access to the partial reconstruction of reality as created by my mind, i.e. dreams or daydreams.
        Right, the internal model that you have of the external reality is not a direct representation of that external reality otherwise when you close your eyes the exact representation that you had when your eyes were opened should still exist internally. So what you are percieving has to exist externally, independently of your mind.


        Looking forward to it.
        Okay.
        Last edited by JimL; 04-13-2014, 12:33 AM.

        Comment


        • Originally posted by JimL View Post
          This is quite a difficult web to untangle but I think you are missing the point that from the idealistic monism perpective the human mind doesn't think at all if it is itself the thought of an all encompassing mind. No matter how you define the thinking process of the all encompassing mind the objects of its thought have no control over themselves because the reality they exist in, or are a part of, is another mind.
          As I can best summarize your argument:

          1. According to Idealism, all that can possibly exist in any mind is inert thoughts.
          2. In order for a consistent external reality to exist, all the inert "thoughts" that it consists of must be within a God-mind.
          3. Human minds are part of that external reality.
          4. Because human minds are contained within the God-mind, they are also, by definition derived from statement #1, a collection of inert thoughts.
          5. As nothing more than a collection of thoughts, human minds have no will to speak of, nor any creative ability.

          I think I understand. My point in discussing the nature of a "God-mind" is that you argument depends on two assumptions: 1. that only inert ideas can be contained within a mind, and 2. that they must be under our complete control by virtue of being "inside" your mind.

          I take issue with both assumptions. Given Idealism's premises as stated in that syllogism I linked you to, we simply don't have the absolute knowledge to make that leap. Recall that we begin with Cogito ergo sum. From there, we can infer those two points above, certainly, but certain experiences can be taken as evidence to reject them as well, in addition to the very premises of Idealism.

          Take the example of a dream, since that's the best analogy we have for Idealism. Do you ever view characters in your dreams? Do they think for themselves? Their thoughts are your thoughts of course, they think through you, but does that mean you're necessarily able to control what they think? Have you ever been able to completely, or even partially, control that aspect of your dream(s)?

          I haven't.

          Would a God-mind know exactly what we're thinking and likely what we're going to think next? Of course. We think by relating ourselves to reality, to the God-mind's thoughts. We literally think via him/it. Does that mean "our" thoughts are indistinguishable from reality? For example, are our instincts (something clearly not of our own conscious creation), indistinguishable from our thoughts? I don't believe so, and I can provide an argument for that if you need to be convinced of it.

          No, I think that, from the Idealistic monism perspective, it would be more appropriate to say that the pianist and the notes being played are indistinguishable from the all encompassing mind that they are a part of. Remember that from this perspective the all encompassing mind is all of reality and so nothing could be distinguishable from it. I think you are confusing Idealist monism and materialistic monism. In the former the human mind would not be independent of the external reality which is the all encompassing mind that is thinking it. In the latter only is the human mind a mind unto itself.
          I think you're skipping a step in our debate. It's not first a matter of absolute freedom vs absolute predeterminism, so much as whether the two positions are irrevocably at odds. Personally, I'm a compatibilist, for the reasons explained above after the first quote. We live through another mind, and doing so limits us, but that doesn't necessarily prevent the shaking of our collective fist at the sky, so to speak. The mind inevitably isn't just something that you can reduce to an information-processor--a set of data--hence self-awareness, etc. We (humans) tend to make thing abstract, pull things out of reality, so to speak, and set them in a static place. So with many descriptions of the mind. One mind, all the rest simple, controlled thoughts, yes? But there's the unconscious, memories and an emotional basis to practically everything we do and are; even our use of language that has produced the supposedly sterile, completely static sciences. Philosophizing necessarily abstracts us from reality in order to get anywhere, but we inevitably need to refer back to reality in order to make it meaningful. That's why I object at the cut-and-dry assumptions at the basis of your argument--it doesn't seem to mesh when referring back.

          Btw, how can you say that the mind is literally "unto itself," given Materialism? Can't there be no (practical) distinction between body and mind?

          Well, it does though if both the human mind and the reality seemingly external to it are both objects of one and the same all encompassing mind.
          Addressed above, where I tried to put your argument into numbered statements.

          I guess. I'm just not following exactly what your alternative is. I know, idealistic monism. But how you solve the problem of internal representation of external reality by that I'm not grasping.
          By asserting that internal representation = external reality, or rather that there is no external reality outside or beyond that which is "internally" experienced. There's no transformation of substance from thought to "physical matter" that's suspect.

          Could you define solipsism the way that you understand it and explain in what sense it differs from Idealistic monism?
          The philosophy that since you can't resolve the gap between internal representation and external reality to any reliable degree, there's two choices:

          1. There's an external reality, but it could all easily be a hoax. So practically speaking, you live as if it's all not to be taken seriously. I've met a Solipsist or two like this, who tell me in a perfectly serious tone that their wife is a figment of their imagination, but since it's all in their head anyway, they might as well live with the figment that cooks breakfast for them.

          2. There's no external reality, and your own mind makes it all up. Eat, drink, and be merry; it's all in your head anyway!

          Not sure how any of this answers to my objection Volt.
          It was (mostly) a tangent that I didn't bother to delete. That said, it does relate to my explanations above, regarding compatibility of the God-mind's omniscience and a degree of human free will.

          It does if there is only one all encompassing mind.
          Only given the premises of your argument as I've stated it above.

          When you look at the external world it is modeled, represented somehow in your brain, you perceive it. If you close your eyes you no longer perceive it, therefore it not only exists in your mind as a model, it exists externally and independently from your mind as well.
          The premise of Dualism and (technically) Materialism, yes. But the premise in itself doesn't prove that anything exists beyond perception. That a world beyond our mind exists is evident, but it is just as easily explained by a God-mind maintaining all perceptions. So why prefer the explanation of Materialism over that of a God-mind? I prefer the latter, first and foremost, because I don't see any way to make sense of something that can exist beyond perception. We might round it up as part of a self-consistent explanation of reality, but self-consistency isn't equivalent to evidence.

          No, I mean the existence of a thought itself as an object, being independent of a mind, any mind.
          A thought, being inert, can't exist independently of a mind. E.g., a color.

          That is not my understanding, or way of thinking about it. The world exists, the wave function is merely a discription of the present state of affairs of the universe and the determined direction of its future. We are included in the wave function so that both our observation of an event and the event itself occur in unison. In other words we don't collapse the wave function by observing an event, it just seems that way because both our observation of the event and the event itself are determined to occur in unison. The wave function does define many other future possibilities other than the one that we observe which is why it is defined as a wave, but those other possiblities all occur in a determined fashion as well within other universes. In other words the wave function is a wave because all of the possibilities within it are descriptions of the present state of affairs and the determined direction of the futures of all possible universes within the multiverse. We only observe one of them, the one relevent to our own universe. I believe this interpretation to be true because it is logical, and because the other interpretation, i.e. our observation being the cause of the future is not logical.
          When you say logical, you mean self-consistent? And thank you for the explanation.

          The universe exists, the wave function defines the present state of the universe as well as how its present state determines its future state. If the wave function were descriptive of just our universe alone then there would be only one possible determined future within the wave function, but because it is descriptive of the entire Cosmos or multiverse there are multiple possible futures defined in the wave function, only one of which relate to our universe.
          So you're saying that there's not just one actual universe, but an infinite number of actual universes, as many as there are possible universes? I could swear that violates an infinite regression somewhere...

          Right, the internal model that you have of the external reality is not a direct representation of that external reality otherwise when you close your eyes the exact representation that you had when your eyes were opened should still exist internally. So what you are percieving has to exist externally, independently of your mind.
          I'll happily agree that you can distinguish between dream and sensory perception, but that doesn't prove your assertion that something exists besides those two things. So far as I'm concerned, sensory perception is reality in and of itself, with a dream being the partial copy of reality. Just because reality is independent of my mind doesn't prove that it is independent of any mind.

          Comment


          • Originally posted by Volt View Post
            As I can best summarize your argument:

            1. According to Idealism, all that can possibly exist in any mind is inert thoughts.
            2. In order for a consistent external reality to exist, all the inert "thoughts" that it consists of must be within a God-mind.
            3. Human minds are part of that external reality.
            4. Because human minds are contained within the God-mind, they are also, by definition derived from statement #1, a collection of inert thoughts.
            5. As nothing more than a collection of thoughts, human minds have no will to speak of, nor any creative ability.

            I think I understand. My point in discussing the nature of a "God-mind" is that you argument depends on two assumptions: 1. that only inert ideas can be contained within a mind, and 2. that they must be under our complete control by virtue of being "inside" your mind.

            I take issue with both assumptions. Given Idealism's premises as stated in that syllogism I linked you to, we simply don't have the absolute knowledge to make that leap. Recall that we begin with Cogito ergo sum. From there, we can infer those two points above, certainly, but certain experiences can be taken as evidence to reject them as well, in addition to the very premises of Idealism.

            Take the example of a dream, since that's the best analogy we have for Idealism. Do you ever view characters in your dreams? Do they think for themselves? Their thoughts are your thoughts of course, they think through you, but does that mean you're necessarily able to control what they think? Have you ever been able to completely, or even partially, control that aspect of your dream(s)?
            Because the mind is not always in control of its own thoughts, aka the dream state, does not mean that the phantasms within the dream are in control of themselves. A phantasm within the all encompassing mind would still be determined by the all incompassing mind. The reason for this being that the phantasm is not a mind, and it has no mind, it is the imagination of the all encompassing mind. Why would you thing that a phantasm, an imagined thing within a mind, had a mind of its own?


            Would a God-mind know exactly what we're thinking and likely what we're going to think next? Of course. We think by relating ourselves to reality, to the God-mind's thoughts. We literally think via him/it. Does that mean "our" thoughts are indistinguishable from reality? For example, are our instincts (something clearly not of our own conscious creation), indistinguishable from our thoughts? I don't believe so, and I can provide an argument for that if you need to be convinced of it.
            If you are a phantasm, then you are not a mind unto yourself, you are the imagination of another mind, so you are not thinking via the all encompassing mind, you are the thought of the all encompassing mind. But please provide your evidence to the contrary.


            I think you're skipping a step in our debate. It's not first a matter of absolute freedom vs absolute predeterminism, so much as whether the two positions are irrevocably at odds. Personally, I'm a compatibilist, for the reasons explained above after the first quote. We live through another mind, and doing so limits us, but that doesn't necessarily prevent the shaking of our collective fist at the sky, so to speak. The mind inevitably isn't just something that you can reduce to an information-processor--a set of data--hence self-awareness, etc. We (humans) tend to make thing abstract, pull things out of reality, so to speak, and set them in a static place. So with many descriptions of the mind. One mind, all the rest simple, controlled thoughts, yes? But there's the unconscious, memories and an emotional basis to practically everything we do and are; even our use of language that has produced the supposedly sterile, completely static sciences. Philosophizing necessarily abstracts us from reality in order to get anywhere, but we inevitably need to refer back to reality in order to make it meaningful. That's why I object at the cut-and-dry assumptions at the basis of your argument--it doesn't seem to mesh when referring back.
            What is in question is the notion that as a phantasm within a mind, you, as a phantasm, would have a mind and thoughts of your own at all.
            Btw, how can you say that the mind is literally "unto itself," given Materialism? Can't there be no (practical) distinction between body and mind?
            Because in materialistic monism, the external reality that we are a part of and exist within is not itself a mind.


            Addressed above, where I tried to put your argument into numbered statements.
            You merely asserted it, you did not explain how a phantasm, the imagination of an all encompassing mind, has a mind of its own.


            By asserting that internal representation = external reality, or rather that there is no external reality outside or beyond that which is "internally" experienced. There's no transformation of substance from thought to "physical matter" that's suspect.
            But I already showed that internal representation does not = external reality, that it is only a representation, a model of sorts. If it were no external reality, then you wouldn't have to open your eyes in order to see it.


            The philosophy that since you can't resolve the gap between internal representation and external reality to any reliable degree, there's two choices:

            1. There's an external reality, but it could all easily be a hoax. So practically speaking, you live as if it's all not to be taken seriously. I've met a Solipsist or two like this, who tell me in a perfectly serious tone that their wife is a figment of their imagination, but since it's all in their head anyway, they might as well live with the figment that cooks breakfast for them.

            2. There's no external reality, and your own mind makes it all up. Eat, drink, and be merry; it's all in your head anyway!
            Thats only one alternative, not two. A hoax is no different than it being all made up. Solipsism, the way I understand it would correlate with your discription above as well as with your understanding of Idealistic monism accept that it wouldn't be yourself that existed it would be the all encompassing self that exists with you being a mere thought within it.


            It was (mostly) a tangent that I didn't bother to delete. That said, it does relate to my explanations above, regarding compatibility of the God-mind's omniscience and a degree of human free will.
            You need to explain clearly and logically in what sense a phantasm within another mind can have a mind of its own with free will.


            Only given the premises of your argument as I've stated it above.
            Which you have yet to explain away.


            The premise of Dualism and (technically) Materialism, yes. But the premise in itself doesn't prove that anything exists beyond perception. That a world beyond our mind exists is evident, but it is just as easily explained by a God-mind maintaining all perceptions. So why prefer the explanation of Materialism over that of a God-mind? I prefer the latter, first and foremost, because I don't see any way to make sense of something that can exist beyond perception. We might round it up as part of a self-consistent explanation of reality, but self-consistency isn't equivalent to evidence.
            And again, if you are the product of an all encompassing mind, then you are just a dream, an imagination within that mind and not a mind unto yourself. You can't be both the product of a mind, a dream, a phantasm, a thought, as well as a mind unto yourself.


            A thought, being inert, can't exist independently of a mind.
            Exactly, and neither can the phantasm of a mind think or act as if it were a mind unto itself.


            When you say logical, you mean self-consistent? And thank you for the explanation.
            You're welcome.


            So you're saying that there's not just one actual universe, but an infinite number of actual universes, as many as there are possible universes? I could swear that violates an infinite regression somewhere...
            Everything, including the notion of God/creation violates an infinite regression in so far as we don't yet understand it. But inflation as well as the Schrodinger equation predicts a multiverse, a Greater Cosmos that continues to spawn pocket universes eternally into the future.


            I'll happily agree that you can distinguish between dream and sensory perception, but that doesn't prove your assertion that something exists besides those two things. So far as I'm concerned, sensory perception is reality in and of itself, with a dream being the partial copy of reality. Just because reality is independent of my mind doesn't prove that it is independent of any mind.
            Okay, but the internal model of the external reality, the representation thereof, is dependent upon that external reality and not vice versa. If you close your eyes, the model, in all its fullness, disappears.
            Last edited by JimL; 04-20-2014, 10:57 AM.

            Comment


            • Originally posted by JimL View Post
              Because the mind is not always in control of its own thoughts, aka the dream state, does not mean that the phantasms within the dream are in control of themselves. A phantasm within the all encompassing mind would still be determined by the all incompassing mind. The reason for this being that the phantasm is not a mind, and it has no mind, it is the imagination of the all encompassing mind. Why would you thing that a phantasm, an imagined thing within a mind, had a mind of its own?
              Because it doesn't necessarily follow, given experience. When we speak of "thoughts," we are generally referring to a specific sort of thought: sensory perception, e.g. colors. Those are certainly inert, and we have no reason to believe otherwise. But characters, minds, what we're currently describing as phantasms? Those are supposedly in a different category; they appear to have their own will. If that is wholly an illusion, then it should be deductively clear from our premise. However, I don't see such an airtight case.

              Back to an analogy. Since we've now established that Idealism entails our existence through a God-mind's own thoughts, our best comparison--I would think--is a character that exists immediately inside a human mind, like a character in an author's book or movie script. Take an easy example: Luke Skywalker, as conceived by George Lucas.

              Luke as a character is created by and thinks through Lucas. He doesn't have a will entirely his own; it must exist through Lucas' own. But that doesn't mean he has no will whatsoever. Lucas has immediate access to all of Luke's thoughts, everything he "is," yet we can say that the character of George Lucas is distinct from the character of Luke Skywalker. Moreover, characters can have effects on one another, e.g. Luke convincing Han that the Rebellion wasn't suicide, and a mind is defined by its ability to manipulate other thoughts. So we can say that a character may be a thought of some kind, but not inert. But even with that, we can argue:

              If you are a phantasm, then you are not a mind unto yourself, you are the imagination of another mind, so you are not thinking via the all encompassing mind, you are the thought of the all encompassing mind. But please provide your evidence to the contrary.
              ^ i.e., we can argue that Luke still remains a puppet on Lucas' strings. So what can be strictly asserted from the fact that Luke is thought(s)? Only that Luke does nothing unless Lucas wills it. Yet, does it follow that Luke cannot have done otherwise? There is a difference between "can" and "do," after all.

              For instance, could Luke have accepted Vader's proposition to kill the Emperor and become a Sith? Certainly he considers, talks and struggles about it, so we may be inclined to say "yes." But eventually he decides not to. Why? Well, because Lucas willed it, of course. (You can't have Evil win, after all!!) But we can also say because Luke willed it.

              Put in formal statements:

              1. Lucas willed Luke not to become a Sith
              2. If Lucas willed Luke not to, then he does not.

              Therefore,

              3. Luke doesn't become a Sith.

              We're left only with the deductive conclusion that Luke, a phantasm, does not; it doesn't necessarily follow that he could not.

              At this point, perhaps a dissection of the context for "could" is in order.

              -------------------

              #1 Lucas willed that Luke remain pure (in more ways than one), and Luke can't do (i.e. will) anything about Lucas' willing him to stay pure.
              #2 If Lucas wills that Luke remain pure, then he does remain pure, and Luke can't do anything about Lucas' willing him to stay pure, and then remaining pure.

              Therefore,

              #3 Luke does remain pure, and there isn't anything he can do about the fact that he remains pure.

              (#3 is equivalent to "Luke could not do anything about remaining pure.")

              -------------------

              The above is a refutation of my distinction between "could" and "would." According to the conclusion, Luke both cannot and does not do anything but remain pure. But I would like to raise an objection in regard to the premises.

              Now, #2 I can agree with. If Lucas wills it, Luke does it and there's nothing he can do about it.

              #1 is another matter. Put a different way: is there really nothing Luke can do about whether Lucas wills him to remain pure? That's an open question, and by being so it throws the conclusion into doubt. It throws Idealism's Absolute Predetermination into doubt.

              What is in question is the notion that as a phantasm within a mind, you, as a phantasm, would have a mind and thoughts of your own at all.
              Of course the thoughts aren't wholly "your own," they (and you) are almost all conceived by the God-mind! The loophole is that minds aren't inert, and we can't prove that the God-mind in question is incapable of conceiving "living" thoughts. Remember, the only real distinction we have between mind (what we might sloppily call "living thought") and inert thought is that the former can manipulate the latter. Otherwise, there's no difference in substance that we know of.

              Because in materialistic monism, the external reality that we are a part of and exist within is not itself a mind.
              Noted. I happen to a Panentheist regarding the matter, myself.

              You merely asserted it, you did not explain how a phantasm, the imagination of an all encompassing mind, has a mind of its own.
              See above. Also, consider the times that you argue with yourself, or certain people who have multiple identities. Is the argument, or are the identities, any less real?

              But I already showed that internal representation does not = external reality, that it is only a representation, a model of sorts. If it were no external reality, then you wouldn't have to open your eyes in order to see it.
              I'm not arguing that there's no external reality, only that the external reality is immediate. You seem to be arguing that because we can conceive of a partial representation of the gestalt of sensory perception, sensory perception itself is equivalent to that representation. Perhaps that's the presumed case for Materialistic Monism, but not for Idealism.

              Or in other words, you're saying that imagination/memories are a partial reconstruction, a representation, of yet another representation: sensory perception. You're assuming that the gestalt of sensory perception is itself an image of external reality. My argument is that sensory perception is external reality. Proving that memory is not dependent on an external reality does not prove that sensory perception is not dependent/equivalent to external reality.

              Thats only one alternative, not two. A hoax is no different than it being all made up. Solipsism, the way I understand it would correlate with your discription above as well as with your understanding of Idealistic monism except that it wouldn't be yourself that existed it would be the all encompassing self that exists with you being a mere thought within it.
              Correct. The God-mind is all we can infer exists, at least as far as we human mind are concerned. Any speculation beyond that would be useless and/or meaningless.

              You need to explain clearly and logically in what sense a phantasm within another mind can have a mind of its own with free will.
              See above. I'll try to explain further if you find it unsatisfactory.

              Which you have yet to explain away.
              Working on it.

              And again, if you are the product of an all encompassing mind, then you are just a dream, an imagination within that mind and not a mind unto yourself. You can't be both the product of a mind, a dream, a phantasm, a thought, as well as a mind unto yourself.
              ...no? See above.

              Exactly, and neither can the phantasm of a mind think or act as if it were a mind unto itself.
              I think I set myself up for this one with a sloppy definition of thought vs mind. Note, this conclusion is only valid if you're working off the absolute definition of a thought, e.g. a color, being inert. However, there's more kinds of "thoughts" than just things like color. I've hopefully cleared up the differences and similarities between thought and mind above.

              Everything, including the notion of God/creation violates an infinite regression in so far as we don't yet understand it. But inflation as well as the Schrodinger equation predicts a multiverse, a Greater Cosmos that continues to spawn pocket universes eternally into the future.
              ....I believe you're going beyond my pay grade. Noted, and if I have the time I'll look it up later.

              Okay, but the internal model of the external reality, the representation thereof, is dependent upon that external reality and not vice versa. If you close your eyes, the model, in all its fullness, disappears.
              ...your point? Perhaps if you stated your argument in a formal chain of assertions, I would be able to make better sense of it.

              According to Idealism, sensory perception is dependent on consciousness, yes. External reality as a set of thoughts, including sensations, continues to exist without you. Sensory perception is not itself a model of external reality, so much as direct contact with that reality. The sensation of touching a desk isn't just a matter of getting a transformed electrical signal that adds to a representation of the desk; it is the desk. The desk literally exists only as a set of sensations--rough, certain size, shape, etc. Those sensations are maintained by another mind until you care to interact with them.

              Again, what I take issue with in your interpretation is that you insist all sensation is only a model. If color, size, weight, taste and smell are all just part of an imagined model of the desk, than what is the desk in reality?

              Or in other words, what does it really consist of beyond/below/through all the sensations? Because, recall, the sensations are nothing more than a model. Something must cause those sensations--what is it?
              Last edited by Volt; 04-30-2014, 07:32 PM.

              Comment


              • Originally posted by Volt View Post
                Because it doesn't necessarily follow, given experience. When we speak of "thoughts," we are generally referring to a specific sort of thought: sensory perception, e.g. colors. Those are certainly inert, and we have no reason to believe otherwise. But characters, minds, what we're currently describing as phantasms? Those are supposedly in a different category; they appear to have their own will. If that is wholly an illusion, then it should be deductively clear from our premise. However, I don't see such an airtight case.

                Back to an analogy. Since we've now established that Idealism entails our existence through a God-mind's own thoughts, our best comparison--I would think--is a character that exists immediately inside a human mind, like a character in an author's book or movie script. Take an easy example: Luke Skywalker, as conceived by George Lucas.

                Luke as a character is created by and thinks through Lucas. He doesn't have a will entirely his own; it must exist through Lucas' own. But that doesn't mean he has no will whatsoever. Lucas has immediate access to all of Luke's thoughts, everything he "is," yet we can say that the character of George Lucas is distinct from the character of Luke Skywalker. Moreover, characters can have effects on one another, e.g. Luke convincing Han that the Rebellion wasn't suicide, and a mind is defined by its ability to manipulate other thoughts. So we can say that a character may be a thought of some kind, but not inert. But even with that, we can argue:



                ^ i.e., we can argue that Luke still remains a puppet on Lucas' strings. So what can be strictly asserted from the fact that Luke is thought(s)? Only that Luke does nothing unless Lucas wills it. Yet, does it follow that Luke cannot have done otherwise? There is a difference between "can" and "do," after all.

                For instance, could Luke have accepted Vader's proposition to kill the Emperor and become a Sith? Certainly he considers, talks and struggles about it, so we may be inclined to say "yes." But eventually he decides not to. Why? Well, because Lucas willed it, of course. (You can't have Evil win, after all!!) But we can also say because Luke willed it.

                Put in formal statements:

                1. Lucas willed Luke not to become a Sith
                2. If Lucas willed Luke not to, then he does not.

                Therefore,

                3. Luke doesn't become a Sith.

                We're left only with the deductive conclusion that Luke, a phantasm, does not; it doesn't necessarily follow that he could not.

                At this point, perhaps a dissection of the context for "could" is in order.

                -------------------

                #1 Lucas willed that Luke remain pure (in more ways than one), and Luke can't do (i.e. will) anything about Lucas' willing him to stay pure.
                #2 If Lucas wills that Luke remain pure, then he does remain pure, and Luke can't do anything about Lucas' willing him to stay pure, and then remaining pure.

                Therefore,

                #3 Luke does remain pure, and there isn't anything he can do about the fact that he remains pure.

                (#3 is equivalent to "Luke could not do anything about remaining pure.")

                -------------------

                The above is a refutation of my distinction between "could" and "would." According to the conclusion, Luke both cannot and does not do anything but remain pure. But I would like to raise an objection in regard to the premises.

                Now, #2 I can agree with. If Lucas wills it, Luke does it and there's nothing he can do about it.

                #1 is another matter. Put a different way: is there really nothing Luke can do about whether Lucas wills him to remain pure? That's an open question, and by being so it throws the conclusion into doubt. It throws Idealism's Absolute Predetermination into doubt.



                Of course the thoughts aren't wholly "your own," they (and you) are almost all conceived by the God-mind! The loophole is that minds aren't inert, and we can't prove that the God-mind in question is incapable of conceiving "living" thoughts. Remember, the only real distinction we have between mind (what we might sloppily call "living thought") and inert thought is that the former can manipulate the latter. Otherwise, there's no difference in substance that we know of.



                Noted. I happen to a Panentheist regarding the matter, myself.



                See above. Also, consider the times that you argue with yourself, or certain people who have multiple identities. Is the argument, or are the identities, any less real?



                I'm not arguing that there's no external reality, only that the external reality is immediate. You seem to be arguing that because we can conceive of a partial representation of the gestalt of sensory perception, sensory perception itself is equivalent to that representation. Perhaps that's the presumed case for Materialistic Monism, but not for Idealism.

                Or in other words, you're saying that imagination/memories are a partial reconstruction, a representation, of yet another representation: sensory perception. You're assuming that the gestalt of sensory perception is itself an image of external reality. My argument is that sensory perception is external reality. Proving that memory is not dependent on an external reality does not prove that sensory perception is not dependent/equivalent to external reality.



                Correct. The God-mind is all we can infer exists, at least as far as we human mind are concerned. Any speculation beyond that would be useless and/or meaningless.



                See above. I'll try to explain further if you find it unsatisfactory.



                Working on it.



                ...no? See above.



                I think I set myself up for this one with a sloppy definition of thought vs mind. Note, this conclusion is only valid if you're working off the absolute definition of a thought, e.g. a color, being inert. However, there's more kinds of "thoughts" than just things like color. I've hopefully cleared up the differences and similarities between thought and mind above.



                ....I believe you're going beyond my pay grade. Noted, and if I have the time I'll look it up later.



                ...your point? Perhaps if you stated your argument in a formal chain of assertions, I would be able to make better sense of it.

                According to Idealism, sensory perception is dependent on consciousness, yes. External reality as a set of thoughts, including sensations, continues to exist without you. Sensory perception is not itself a model of external reality, so much as direct contact with that reality. The sensation of touching a desk isn't just a matter of getting a transformed electrical signal that adds to a representation of the desk; it is the desk. The desk literally exists only as a set of sensations--rough, certain size, shape, etc. Those sensations are maintained by another mind until you care to interact with them.

                Again, what I take issue with in your interpretation is that you insist all sensation is only a model. If color, size, weight, taste and smell are all just part of an imagined model of the desk, than what is the desk in reality?

                Or in other words, what does it really consist of beyond/below/through all the sensations? Because, recall, the sensations are nothing more than a model. Something must cause those sensations--what is it?
                All very interesting Volt...
                Atheism is the cult of death, the death of hope. The universe is doomed, you are doomed, the only thing that remains is to await your execution...

                https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jbnueb2OI4o&t=3s

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