Are Thoughts Causal?

[Jim B.]

Could be worse - we could be having a TAG argument...

I give up. What does TAG stand for?

[JonathanL]

I give up. What does TAG stand for?

Googling "TAG argument" returns search results like "Transcendental Argument for God", so I'm guessing that's what he's referring to.

[Tassman]

Could be worse - we could be having a TAG argument...

They're not unknown in these forums.

[Tassman]

That is the point we are debating, remember? You have to establish that fact with actual reasons for believing it is so beyond your repeated stipulation that it is so.

Not so. What YOU “have to establish with actual reasons” is your claim that consciousness is more than just the physical activity of the brain. The cognitive sciences are certainly doing their research on the assumption that consciousness is a direct consequence of the physical activity of the brain.

I am using the word "physical" in the sense of "can be exhaustively understood in terms of structure and function."

IOW, what most of us would refer to as the real material world as opposed to the “immaterial” world that you posit “may or may not be” true.

The actual arguments I've put up have been about why conscious experiences are NOT reducible to physical concepts. They are NOT ABOUT what consciousness is.No one knows for sure what consciousness is

So, you’ re saying that you don’t know what ‘consciousness is, but you do know that, whatever it is, it’s NOT reducible to physical concepts. I see.

the practice of physical science is logically compatible with the holding of metaphysical commitments OTHER THAN metaphysical naturalism.

Yet the history of science has seen the steady replacement of the paranormal and the supernatural with the normal and the natural.

being a theist IS NOT LOGICALLY INCOMPATIBLE WITH BEING A PRACTICING SCIENTIST.

But only 17% of the population says it has no religious affiliation compared to 48% of scientists that say that - so metaphysical naturalism seems to be quite influential among "practicing scientists". .

[Jim B.]

Not so. What YOU “have to establish with actual reasons” is your claim that consciousness is more than just the physical activity of the brain. The cognitive sciences are certainly doing their research on the assumption that consciousness is a direct consequence of the physical activity of the brain.

Once again, that's not what the issue is. If you'd ever take the time and effort to actually learn about the issue you're supposedly debating, you might know that.

IOW, what most of us would refer to as the real material world as opposed to the “immaterial” world that you posit “may or may not be” true.

Again, it depends on how we understand 'material.' It cannot refer strictly to 'matter' however that is understood since energy, processes, events, potentiality and theoretical constructs would also be considered within the realm of scientific investigation. Again, these questions are not nearly as simple as instrumental observation matters like you would make them.

As I've said, thoughts and ideas are immaterial in some respects for the reasons I've cited. Rational discourse itself, including science and what we are engaging in on this message board, implicitly assume these truths, which you've never responded to.

So, you’ re saying that you don’t know what ‘consciousness is, but you do know that, whatever it is, it’s NOT reducible to physical concepts. I see.

No one knows what consciousness actually is. Just because no one knows what X is, it doesn;t follow that no one can confidently say what X is NOT. That's silly. No one can say for sure what the "meaning of life" is or even if there is such a thing, but we can confidently say that it is NOT counting the blades of grass on one's lawn.

Yet the history of science has seen the steady replacement of the paranormal and the supernatural with the normal and the natural.

I wholeheartedly agree! And I wholeheartedly believe you are not intellectually up to this discussion!

But only 17% of the population says it has no religious affiliation compared to 48% of scientists that say that - so metaphysical naturalism seems to be quite influential among "practicing scientists". .

Not the point at all. My point is that metaphysical naturalism is not required for the practice of science.
If that were not the case, no theist could consistently be a practicing scientist, which is absurd.

[Tassman]

Once again, that's not what the issue is.

That's precisely what the issue is. If you want to say that consciousness is more than the physical activity of the brain you need to come up with more than metaphysical ideas as to why. You need to demonstrate that your speculative notions can be can be tested and shown to be factual. Whereas your stuff is purely subjective – based upon on personal opinion and ‘feelings’ and academic arguments.

thoughts and ideas are immaterial in some respects for the reasons I've cited. Rational discourse itself, including science and what we are engaging in on this message board, implicitly assume these truths,

In what “respect” are our “thoughts and ideas” immaterial”? They may well have the illusion of being “immaterial in some respects” but there is no good reason to think they actually are. Quite the reverse. All indications are that when our material bodies stop functioning our thoughts and ideas stop too.

No one knows what consciousness actually is. it doesn't follow that no one can confidently say what X is NOT.

Yet it is YOU “confidently” saying that ‘consciousness’ is “NOT” solely dependent upon the physical activity of the brain - when all indications are that it is.

[Jim B.]

That's precisely what the issue is. If you want to say that consciousness is more than the physical activity of the brain you need to come up with more than metaphysical ideas as to why. You need to demonstrate that your speculative notions can be can be tested and shown to be factual. Whereas your stuff is purely subjective – based upon on personal opinion and ‘feelings’ and academic arguments.

You keep thinking I'm making a positive case for substance dualism, for a 'ghost in the machine' for which the empirical evidence happens to be lacking. That's not my argument at all. I'm saying that conscious experiences don't reduce to physical concepts, so that this irreducibility would be perfectly compatible with all present and future empirical evidence about the brain and nervous system. The question occurs prior to the collecting of empirical evidence. It turns on the weighing and evaluating of the evidence, on the conceptual taxonomy that this evidence should be placed within. You argue simply from the authority of science without giving any actual reasons for why this authority should be invoked in this particular instance.

The empirical evidence is one thing. The meaning of it is what is at issue. Even the scientific reductionists, the ones who agree with you, agree that this is the issue; it's not merely a matter of collecting more data.

In what “respect” are our “thoughts and ideas” immaterial”? They may well have the illusion of being “immaterial in some respects” but there is no good reason to think they actually are. Quite the reverse. All indications are that when our material bodies stop functioning our thoughts and ideas stop too.

For the reasons I've given I think three times now. A thought can exist as a neuronal event and it can exist as content. They can be distinct levels of description. If you and I can think the same thought at the same time, then it can't just be that we are having similar neuronal events. "1+1=2" for mathematics to be possible cannot be just similar neuronal events as far as their content. Your thought and my thought must share an abstract form that the neuronal events instantiate. Discourse would not be possible if the thoughts we are expressing were just material objects. In some sense, for discourse and abstract communication to be possible, thoughts and ideas must exist in some sense as abstract linguistic forms.

Also, thoughts and ideas can be 'right' and 'wrong', 'justified' or 'unjustified,' which material objects cannot be. And there is no reason to be a 'human chauvinist' and believe that thoughts and ideas can occur in no other physical medium than the human brain, considering the advances in AI and the high probability of intelligent life elsewhere in the universe.

Yet it is YOU “confidently” saying that ‘consciousness’ is “NOT” solely dependent upon the physical activity of the brain - when all indications are that it is.

See above. Or don't. What's the point. You'll keep repeating the same dogmatic two or three scientistic points regardless of what I say...

[Tassman]

The empirical evidence is one thing. The meaning of it is what is at issue. Even the scientific reductionists, the ones who agree with you, agree that this is the issue; it's not merely a matter of collecting more data.

"The empirical evidence" is what’s required to ascertain what consciousness is and how it functions – and this is what I’m arguing. The “meaning of it” is quite a different question.

thoughts and ideas can be 'right' and 'wrong', 'justified' or 'unjustified,' which material objects cannot be.

You are confusing and conflating conscious value judgments with the physical nature of the material brain and its correlate of consciousness. There is no consciousness, nor value judgments nor intellect without the physical activity of the brain. Without it there can be no processing of sensory and motor information nor consciousness and no ability to consider ourselves in relation to the outside world.

And there is no reason to be a 'human chauvinist' and believe that thoughts and ideas can occur in no other physical medium than the human brain, considering the advances in AI and the high probability of intelligent life elsewhere in the universe.

I have never argued that “thoughts and ideas can occur in no other physical medium than the human brain”. But they cannot occur without a physical medium of some sort. As for “AI and the high probability of intelligent life elsewhere in the universe” I totally agree that this is more likely than not.

[Jim B.]

"The empirical evidence" is what’s required to ascertain what consciousness is and how it functions – and this is what I’m arguing. The “meaning of it” is quite a different question.

No, the "meaning of it" is what a scientific investigation is "about". You're speaking as a technician, not a scientist. Science is about what investigations "mean". True science is an intrinsically philosophical activity.

You are confusing and conflating conscious value judgments with the physical nature of the material brain and its correlate of consciousness. There is no consciousness, nor value judgments nor intellect without the physical activity of the brain. Without it there can be no processing of sensory and motor information nor consciousness and no ability to consider ourselves in relation to the outside world.

You are confusing, once again, necessary with sufficient conditions. Even if what you are saying were true, that has no bearing whatsoever on anything I wrote.

I have never argued that “thoughts and ideas can occur in no other physical medium than the human brain”. But they cannot occur without a physical medium of some sort. As for “AI and the high probability of intelligent life elsewhere in the universe” I totally agree that this is more likely than not.

But then if the same idea can occur in different physical mediums, then that idea cannot be a physical object.

[Jim B.]

Why do conscious experiences not seem to fit the standard pattern of scientific reduction? Let's take the example of the color red.

When we look and see some objects as appearing 'red' to us, physicists and other scientists will take that subjective appearance as a starting point to find out what is really causing that subjective appearance. Their aim is to use the appearance as an initial clue in the process of discovering the underlying physical mechanism causing humans to experience 'redness.' They want to find out how the world 'really is' behind the "veil of appearances". They discover that our sensation of redness corresponds to ~700-635 nm of photon emission in the visible spectrum. This is what actually causes humans to experience normal sensations of redness. Once this truth is discovered, science can dispense with the appearance of redness. Science was interested in the appearance only to the extent that it helped lead them to the physical 'reality' causing those appearances.

The problem arises with the conscious experience of red which is essentially an appearance. Neuroscientists can investigate what is causing that appearance, but this investigation does away with the appearance itself, which is what the experience essentially is. If object X is essentially Y, and if you have to eliminate Y in order to subject X to Z method of investigation, then Z is not really investigating X. It is investigating Z's reduced version of X. Scientists cannot dispense with the appearance of redness like they do in other investigations when the appearance itself is the object to be investigated. The physical mechanism behind the appearance does not matter in the same way as in other standard scientific investigations. The standard pattern of scientific reduction is a marvelous intellectual tool but it would be the height of hubris to assume that it should be a universally applicable tool.

[Tassman]

No, the "meaning of it" is what a scientific investigation is "about". True science is an intrinsically philosophical activity.

“True science” is the systematic study of the natural world through observation, empirical experiment and testable predictions about the universe.

You are confusing, once again, necessary with sufficient conditions. Even if what you are saying were true, that has no bearing whatsoever on anything I wrote.

The confusion is yours not mine. There can be no “sufficient condition” without the “necessary” physical activity of the brain – or its material equivalent as in the example of AI etc.

But then if the same idea can occur in different physical mediums, then that idea cannot be a physical object.

This erroneously suggests that an “idea” is sufficient in and of itself. It is not. It is consequent on the physical medium; if there is no physical medium there is no “idea”.

[Jim B.]

“True science” is the systematic study of the natural world through observation, empirical experiment and testable predictions about the universe.

"True science" is primarily theoretical, not primarily instrumental or operational. You're talking as a technician, not a scientist. You're referring to the technique of science, not whya particular investigation would be pursued in the first place within a given context.

The confusion is yours not mine. There can be no “sufficient condition” without the “necessary” physical activity of the brain – or its material equivalent as in the example of AI etc.

Yes, there has to be a material support to realize the thought, as in a brain, but that does not mean that the thought is entirely IDENTICAL to the brain. If a brain and a computer can instantiate identical thought T, then T cannot be entirely IDENTICAL to either brain or computer or any other material object. T must, in some sense, be an abstract object that can be instantiated in various material mediums.

This erroneously suggests that an “idea” is sufficient in and of itself. It is not. It is consequent on the physical medium; if there is no physical medium there is no “idea”.

No, it does not suggest that at all. An idea is not necessarily causally sufficient unto itself. You're making the same "substance dualism" mistake I've pointed out numerous times before. Even if an idea is physically dependent upon a material substrate, that does not establish that the idea is identical to that substrate. You're confusing causal and ontological dependence.

[Tassman]

"True science" is primarily theoretical, not primarily instrumental or operational. You're talking as a technician, not a scientist. You're referring to the technique of science, not whya particular investigation would be pursued in the first place within a given context.

Not so. True science is “the intellectual and practical activity encompassing the systematic study of the structure and behavior of the physical and natural world through observation and experiment”. – Oxford definition.

Yes, there has to be a material support to realize the thought, as in a brain,

More than that. There has to be a material support for the thought to exist at all. Unless you are suggesting that “thoughts” float around independently.

Even if an idea is physically dependent upon a material substrate, that does not establish that the idea is identical to that substrate.

If there is no physical medium there is no “idea”. Your subjective musings about an “idea” being separate from the physical brain is unsupported by evidence.

[Jim B.]

Not so. True science is “the intellectual and practical activity encompassing the systematic study of the structure and behavior of the physical and natural world through observation and experiment”. – Oxford definition.

It might help to learn about science beyond a single-sentence dictionary definition. But even within the open-ended parameters of this definition, one might discern that science is an intellectual as much as a practical endeavor, and that for a study to be systematic, there must be some theoretical underpinning to what is to be investigated. One has to have an idea of what one is studying and why, within a system of concepts. Humans are fundamentally linguistic animals; they do not and cannot observe the world as a tabula rasa.

More than that. There has to be a material support for the thought to exist at all. Unless you are suggesting that “thoughts” float around independently.

Even if that is true, that has no bearing on what I'm saying. I just don't think you're absorbing what I'm writing.

If there is no physical medium there is no “idea”. Your subjective musings about an “idea” being separate from the physical brain is unsupported by evidence.

Again, not my point. If X can be embodied in various physical mediums, then X cannot be identical to any physical medium. X must be an abstract form. Think of a melody M; it can be realized on a piano, a trumpet, human voice, etc,. M cannot be a physical object because it's not identical to any of its physical realizations. M is an abstract form.

[Tassman]

science is an intellectual as much as a practical endeavor, and that for a study to be systematic, there must be some theoretical underpinning to what is to be investigated.

Of course, science requires theoretical underpinning. But what distinguishes it from philosophy is its ability to systematically study the structure and behavior of the physical and natural world through observation and experiment.

If X can be embodied in various physical mediums, then X cannot be identical to any physical medium. X must be an abstract form.

“X” (a thought) cannot be embodied in any physical medium (a physical brain) if it doesn’t exist. And “a thought” can only exist as a consequence of the “physical medium” of the material brain.

Think of a melody M; it can be realized on a piano, a trumpet, human voice, etc,. M cannot be a physical object because it's not identical to any of its physical realizations. M is an abstract form.

A melody does not exist in and of itself as an abstract entity. It is the consequence of physical composition and performance. It is “music” only because the physical brain has evolved to perceive structure, logic, and patterns.