Joseph Ratzinger observes that in many erstwhile democratic systems, there are key, central antidemocratic elements, often referred to as rights. Now it may be that the majority of a society agrees on all the rights it legally recognises at certain instances of time, but the point of these rights - or at least one point of them - is to restrict the power of the majority, whether directly exerted through referendums or indirectly through elected representatives to change the law; vox populi is not vox Dei.
I believe that this observation is uncontroversial. The issue that it raises, however, is: what should these rights be? Are they merely subjective, decided by whoever is in power, or are they normative, at least in part? If normative, that is, grounded in some real objective moral standards, how are they to be determined in pluralistic contexts where there are differing norms?
I believe that this observation is uncontroversial. The issue that it raises, however, is: what should these rights be? Are they merely subjective, decided by whoever is in power, or are they normative, at least in part? If normative, that is, grounded in some real objective moral standards, how are they to be determined in pluralistic contexts where there are differing norms?
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