Atheism And Moral Progress

[JimL]

Jim, if there is no ultimate justice, or universal reckoning if you will, why would it be rational to deny your selfish desires or wishes?

Because living together in peace and harmony rather than everyone seeking their own selfish desires is ultimately in your own best interests as well as societies as a whole. People realized that long before attributing social behavior, right and wrong, good and evil, to a moral authoritative source.

[seer]

Because living together in peace and harmony rather than everyone seeking their own selfish desires is ultimately in your own best interests as well as societies as a whole. People realized that long before attributing social behavior, right and wrong, good and evil, to a moral authoritative source.

And what does that matter to the Communist, Nazi or Hutu?

[JimL]

And what does that matter to the Communist, Nazi or Hutu?

The same as it matters to everyone else which is why we live in moral based societies.

[seer]

The same as it matters to everyone else which is why we live in moral based societies.

Did it matter to the Communist, Nazi or Hutu?

[carpedm9587]

You haven't investigated many ways my argument can make sense then, only the ways you would prefer it to make sense.

This doesn't merit further response.

This is a bunch of simplisitic hooey. It applies to all sentience. All sentient beings value things. Heliotropic plants 'value' sunlight, but they are not moral. The things you say are so general that they have no application to morality. We're interested in differentiating factors. What differentiates beings capable of morality from bacteria and grubworms and lice?

So this is my bad. I have been using the term "sentience" when I should more properly be using the term "sapience." And I disagree with your example. A plant does not "value" sublight. It benefits from sunlight, but it lacks the sapience to make a value judgement about light. Categorization is a by-product of sapience, and moral assessments are nothing more than another form of categorization: dividing actions into "ought" and "ought not."

And none of those things are consciously the subjects of subjective individual choice or preference. Does anyone ever choose freedom?

I disagree...and yes...we do.

One would already have to be free in order to choose freedom.

So the slave born into slavery is unable to choose freedom and seek to escape? This makes no sense to me.

Or love?

Of course I choose "love." Love is a choice I make every single day. But it is not necessarily freedom or love that I am choosing when I am making a moral assessment - it is the actions that promote/nurture/defend/sustain freedom or love.

These are basic human needs. They're not subjective any more than breathing is, even though in some cases people deny themselves these things, just as people can deny themselves their next breath. Subjective choice and preference only enters in the planning and fufillment of secondary and tertiary desires about how to fulfill these core needs. So it's hard to see how the "valuing/cherishing" (to use your fetish phrase) of core values is subjective at all.

Jim...if my life is a constant array of pain...I may cease to value life. If I am a fearful person, or have been incarcerated for most of my life, I may prefer the protection of incarceration to the experience of freedom. Of COURSE we choose these things.

"Killing an innocent person is wrong" would be what some consider an objective moral truth.

I don't think you can make the case that "killing an innocent person is wrong" is an objective moral truth, but you are welcome to try. Why is "killing an innocent person" objectively wrong?

The ostensible existence of free will would be a "fact of the matter."

The freedom to choose is a necessary component of morality in any model, Jim. It is not unique the either the subjective or objective worldview. If you cannot make moral choices and act on them, then you are not a moral agent.

[seer]

I don't think you can make the case that "killing an innocent person is wrong" is an objective moral truth, but you are welcome to try. Why is "killing an innocent person" objectively wrong?

I think, after all the verbiage, it comes down to this. I would too like to see Jim make the argument. I tried to get Charles to focus on something like this, no luck.

[Jim B.]

Jim, if there is no ultimate justice, or universal reckoning if you will, why would it be rational to deny your selfish desires or wishes?

Because there's something in the act itself that makes it right, or wrong. God could not create His own character ab nihilo. God's goodness was always already inscribed in His character because it was good. He could not create his own goodness because that would have called for Him to already be good.

It sounds like you're similar to Carp, an ethical subjectivist, except that in your case, the subjectivism is God's.

[seer]

Because there's something in the act itself that makes it right, or wrong. God could not create His own character ab nihilo. God's goodness was always already inscribed in His character because it was good. He could not create his own goodness because that would have called for Him to already be good.

I agree with that, and that then God is the source for objective (or universal) moral and duties.

It sounds like you're similar to Carp, an ethical subjectivist, except that in your case, the subjectivism is God's.

Well yes God's moral law is subjective to Him (objective to humankind), but grounded in His immutable moral character. Which makes it universal and authoritative. But again why would it be rational to deny your selfish desires or wishes with objective morality?

[carpedm9587]

No. Metaphysics is one area where there are possible facts of the matter. We just don't know for sure, but there can still be constructive disagreement nonetheless. So you're wrong.

It appears we'll have to agree to disagree. I believe you are wrong (for the reasons I have already cited), and you believe I am, and there does not appear to be a resolution.

No. Wrong again. It is more complex than that. Many species are sentient and need to categorize in the face of the ability to act and choose but are not moral unless you redefine "moral" by special pleading and question-begging to fit your definition.

See my response in the previous post - especially with regards to sentience vs. sapience.

So here you are equivocating on the meaning of the word "subjective" again. I can't believe we're going to go through this again. Do you remember the definition we agreed to? The subject of choice or preference by one individual person? On this definition, it wold make no difference if the source of the opinion were the art community or the mouth of God. It still would not depend upon the choice or preference of one individual person, in this case, ME, in this analogy.

Subjective: based on or influenced by personal feelings, tastes, or opinions.

Morality is subjective by this definition, as previously noted. When you have a lot of people agreeing on a particular moral principle, it is subjective to the individuals, and inter-subjective to the group. It does not magically become "objective."

Objective: not influenced by personal feelings or opinions in considering and representing facts.

The fact that a collection of people come to a common, subjectively derived, conclusion does not make that conclusion "objective" in the proper sense.

Or if you want to look at it differently, your moral framework is an objective truth to me, but a subjective one to you. But a communal norm is not so clean, because I am PART of the collective that derives the communal norm. If enough of "me" change, the norm will disappear. Hence the term "intersubjective." Language is likewise "intersubjective." Appealing to the fact that a community can come to an agreement on subjectively derived moral or artistic norms does not magically make them "objective truths."

Because there's this ethical theory you might have heard about called "ethical subjectivism" which states that moral truth just is what the individual's moral beliefs are. There is no corresponding "aesthetic subjectivism" theory. In any case, that's not what we're talking about here.

My position is, and has been, that individuals derive moral principles and the moral principle derived by an individual will be perceived as a moral truth to that individual. There is no "objective" moral truth to which all "ought" to align that anyone has ever shown.

I can and have pointed out why it's ridiculous, such as the fallibility argument.

Which I refuted, outlining multiple ways in which the subjectivist can be "fallible."

I have used the truth normative and the moral disagreement arguments which in all honesty you have badly misunderstood.

I have outlined how "normative" is either being used circularly (i.e., defined so as to exclude subjectivism) or how it applies to a subjectivist model.

I have used the argument from reason. I've argued for why core values are reason-based and why they are not subjective.

This one I do not recall.

I've beaten you seven ways from Friday. I'm just on here for amusement. You just don't know enough to lay down. That's okay, though. Keeps me out of trouble on a Saturday night.

That tells me a good deal about you. I'm frankly surprised.

And none of this has one whit to do with the fallibility argument. Nothing. Nada. You still have not given me what I asked for, which is a terse definition of subjectivism such that it would answer the fallibility argument. I take your failure to do so as an admission that the argument goes through.

See above.

No, once again, it's not about it not being objective. It's about it being fallible. It's about the logical consequences of your own words, in which you conceded that it was possible for subjectivists to be wrong in their moral assessments. It has to do with the logical entailments of your own words. Game over. What do you want to talk about next?

Jim, I'm really not all that interested in how many times you declare "victory." I'm interested in the arguments and their consequences. If you want/need to win, by all means declare the win and go find something else to do. However, until you provide an argument that does not assume its own conclusions, my beliefs will not likely change. ANd I have already shown multiple ways that a subjectivist can be fallible in their moral framework.

Why do you put "wrong" in scare quotes, when you mean just plain wrong?

I'm not sure what "scare quotes" are. The quotes, in this context, are simply emphasizing a word you used. "Wrong" is a word that has shifting applications in the subjectivist realm. I was attempting to emphasize that I was using the word as (I think) you were using it.

And again, how can subjectivism accomodate being wrong? If you were wrong, there's some other standard for truth than your moral beliefs, opinions, feelings, or tastes at a certain time.

At this point, I've repeated this several times. I don't think repeating it again will help. I'm going to let my previous responses stand.

How do you know for sure?

Because a) that is my interior experience and b) in 3 decades no one has ever shown it to be otherwise. That's about as "sure" as I can get. I'm not big on "absolute knowledge" and I am always open to the possibility I am wrong. However, someone has to show me that I actually am before my mind will change.

Who are you to tell us what the answer to questions depends on?

I am telling you how I believe morality works in the human species (or any sapient species). It is how I will continue to believe it works until someone gives me just cause to think differently.

Okay. Here's the problem. Subjectivism is defined as the ethical theory that moral truth is what an individual's beliefs and desires are at a certain time. It is not the theory that ethical truth is what an individual 'values and cherishes.' Those can never be timed. Propositional states can be timed. I believed that X at time T. What are the things that I truly value? Is it a neat quantifiable list? Is it a list of things that I have chosen? How could such a question be answered? The timing is important because morality has to do with actions. What did I believe/desire when I did X? the motivational connection is much more direct at the time or just before the action occurs or during deliberation. [B]So if I believe X is morally permissible at time t, and I perform X, on subjectivism, it is permissible.

I am beginning to get an inkling of where our problem sits. You appear to be locked into a specific definition of "moral subjectivism" and are assessing everything I say in the light of that definition. In all honesty, I don't give a fig what everyone else defines "moral subjectivism" to be - so maybe we just need to shift the language to avoid this confusion. Let me start by outlining how "Michel's Subjective Theory of Moralism" aligns with the definition you've put forward above.

"Subjectivism is defined as the ethical theory that moral truth is what an individual's beliefs and desires are at a certain time." - I mostly align with this. The individual derives their own moral framework and it is rooted in things they subjectively arrive at. That moral framework can and does change over time, so the framework is "true" for that individual at a specific moment in their life.

"It is not the theory that ethical truth is what an individual 'values and cherishes.'" - if you want to chat with me, I suggest you get used to adding it to your understanding of what I am proposing. Individuals do not just form moral frameworks in a vacuum. We form moral frameworks to serve a very specific purpose: to protect/nurture/enhance/promote the things we move dearly value/cherish. That has been part of my definition of moral subjectivism from the outset. If you're going to discuss with me, it might be a good idea to pay attention to what I am arguing, and not what you think I should be arguing.

"Those can never be timed. Propositional states can be timed. I believed that X at time T." - So this seems to contradict itself. What I value/cherish is valued/cherished for a particular period in my life. It may be my entire life, or it may be a short period. During that period, it will govern my moral principles.

"What are the things that I truly value?" - that is a question each person must answer for themselves.

"Is it a neat quantifiable list?" - why does this matter? For some it may be, for others it may not.

"Is it a list of things that I have chosen?" Ppssibly. It may include things I have explicitly chosen, things I was raised to value/cherish, things I reasoned to valuing/cherishing. As noted several times, there are many ways something ay get onto our list of "things I value/cherish." And the list may change in membership and relative importance over the course of our lives.

"How could such a question be answered?" - if I seek to answer it, self-reflection and conversation.

"The timing is important because morality has to do with actions. What did I believe/desire when I did X?" - Not sure why this is important to you. How I made my choice when I made it will be driven by my valuing/cherishing at that time (consciously or not). How I evaluate it from a future vantage point will be based on what I value/cherish then. An act I see as moral today I may come to see as immoral tomorrow.

"the motivational connection is much more direct at the time or just before the action occurs or during deliberation." - not sure what this means.

"So if I believe X is morally permissible at time t, and I perform X, on subjectivism, it is permissible." - Yes - it is, as evaluated by that person at that time based on their concurrent valuing/cherishing. It may be assessed differently from a future vantage point. Clearly another person may evaluate it very differently.

More question-begging. It can't be objective because then it wouldn't be subjective.

Actually - no. I have outlined the parallelism with the painter analogy that you introduced. It is not "not objective because then it wouldn't be subjective," rather it is subjective because if how our moral reasoning proceeds AND no one has ever shown a rational basis for the claim "morality is objectively rooted." Moral subjectivism, as I have put it forward, perfectly accounts for how morality unfolds around us every day. If you think otherwise, then make an equally strong case for moral objectivism. I have issued this challenge multiple times: show ONE moral principle that can be shown to be "objectively true" without any recourse to subjective roots.

Are the two things linked for you? That is, the denial of gods and the denial of objective morality? I see no necessary linkage.

No - they are not linked. As I have noted to Seer on multiple occasions, even if he could show that his god did exist, all he would have shown is another sapient being capable of moralizing. God's moral principles would not be "objectively true" in any way that is different from how your moral principles are objectively true to me. And there is no mechanism for showing how the moral principles of one sapient being are somehow binding on another sapient being.

How does the empiricist get to general inductive truths without any reference to subjectively derived individual observations?

Logic, reason, transitivity, induction, deduction, intuition, observation,...

I'm not asking for a generic response, Jim. I'm asking you to choose a moral principle and trace the argument in a fashion that demonstrates the "objective truth" of the proposition. I have asked for this many, many times now. As with Seer, I don't get an answer. Pick a moral truth you believe is an objective moral truth - and then make the argument for it. Demonstrate it to be truly, objectively true (or false).

[seer]

I'm not asking for a generic response, Jim. I'm asking you to choose a moral principle and trace the argument in a fashion that demonstrates the "objective truth" of the proposition. I have asked for this many, many times now. As with Seer, I don't get an answer. Pick a moral truth you believe is an objective moral truth - and then make the argument for it. Demonstrate it to be truly, objectively true (or false).

At this point I think we can dispense with everything else, this is the crux of the matter.

[carpedm9587]

Kant's "Categorical Imperative" is, he wrote, a proposition that expresses an unconditional moral imperative binding in all circumstances and not dependent on a person's inclinations and purposes. He expressed it this way: "Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law." I don't accept Kant's version of it, because obviously our moral duties sometimes clash and we sometimes have to lexically order our duties. W.D. ROss came up with the idea of "Prima Facie Duties" which means that we have certain moral obligations but that they are not always absolutely binding in cases where they're superseded by other duties. So I may have to lie in order to prevent the Jewish family from being murdered. My lying doesn't mean, according to Ross, that my duty not to lie disappears, but that it is temporarily overridden by the greater duty to not let innocents be murdered.

I agree with your assessment of Kant. I am unfamiliar with Ross, but generally agree with what you have posted here - and see no conflict between this and the moral subjectivism I have outlined. "Prima Facie" in this context, to me, simply refers to those moral precepts that we were raised with and tend to accept without question. Indeed, some people ever even spend time thinking about what valuing/cherishing lies beneath these moral precepts - they just accept them and move on.

We've already been over the distinction between 'communication' and 'language." Once again, lying is linguistic in nature; it is not endemic to communication generally. It's propositional in nature.

When the alcoholic who is regularly attending AA meetings brings home alcohol and hides it, then sneaks off to take drinks and uses mints to disguise his breath, he is lying. We can lie with a nod, a headshake, or any of a variety of body gestures that are not linguistic in nature. You keep wanting to force this square peg into a round hole - and I keep showing you how it doesn't fit. I'm not sure what else there is to say.

How I make the 'leap' is by Kant's Categorical Imperative. If everyone were to lie, it would unmake language, making language and discourse, and therefore morality and civilization themselves, impossible.

It would not make language impossible, Jim. Language would continue to be and the words would continue to mean what they mean. Communication, however, would be impossible - and with it would go society. Language would be unaltered and undamaged. Communication and trust would fail and, with it, society. That is basically what I have been saying from the outset.

It wold make the possibility of its own denial impossible. I could not will that lying could become a universal law. It would be an absurdity that would negate itself out of existence in short order. What makes anything immoral, such as in your system? Why does violating valuing/cherishing make something immoral? In this system, it's based in something that would literally undo itself, something real, beyond just feelings and opinions.

You just pointed out the flaw in Kant's Categorical Imperative, and now you are using it to defend your position? That's not a very strong position. I would argue it also begs the question - because it begins by assuming an objective basis for morality - which you have not shown.

The artwork you mention is not an example of something violating its own intrinsic logic. In your example, the artist is merely using a hammer and destroying an automobile. S/he is not destroying the grounds of possibility for what s/he is doing. A crude analogy for what I'm talking about would be if artists started committing suicide en masse. If enough of them did it, there would be no more art or even the possibility of art.

It is indeed a crude example - and I don't see how it makes your case. Even if I accept most of what you posted, there is no logical conflict in there being no art, or possibility of art. Likewise, if everyone lies, language is not impinged, as noted above. Communication/trust/society are compromised. If I value these things, then I will see lying as an immoral act. If I do not value these things, or value something even more, then I will have no moral principle against lying - or I will have a weaker one. This is a principle Trump lives by: he values "the win" and "money" above society and relationship and community. Ergo, in his moral framework, lying is perfectly permissible if it gets you money or helps you win in a conflict situation.

Aside from the "prima facie" amendment, I think Kant's formulation can still be used. What would I be willing to do that I would be willing to make a universal law? What would I will that an Ideal Desirer would will, not that I personally or subjectively want? As imperfectly and incompletely as I can know these things, they are a way for me to potentially subject my willings to a public realm of discourse and beyond my own private desires and valuings.

Again, there is no conflict between these observations and subjective morality as I have outlined it. It is a simple fact of human society (maybe one of your "facts of the matter?") that what we value/cherish is more likely to be protected/nurtured/enhanced if the people around us value/cherish similarly and therefore have a similar moral framework. Therein lies the drive for "universality" and the recognition of the principle we call "the golden rule." The golden rule is not a moral principle per se, but rather a guideline for forming moral principles in the context of a society that is rooted in the dynamics of a society. Again, if the individual does not value the society, they will probably reject this principle.

See above.

Yeah - I don't think "above" makes your case. It is perfectly consistent with moral subjectivity - so does not establish that morality must be (or is) objective.

The problem with all of this of course is that it tells us nothing about the society/community I happen to be a part of.

Why does it need to?

What if my society/community is Nazi Germany?

What if it is?

It depends on trust.

Yes. All societies/communities are built on trust. I'm sure that most of the Nazis had a moral prohibition against lying for that reason.

Sometimes trust NEEDS to be eroded. Sometimes trust is a dangerous toxic thing. I believe that trust in some things is bad.

Again - it is all rooted in what we value/cherish. If the society/community we are a member of is toxic (to us) and we seek to subvert it, then we will not value that society and our moral prohibition against lying will weaken or disappear, at least in that context.

And life-- at what cost, and what kind of life?

Depends on the individual. That why you see moral prohibitions against suicide weakening when a person's quality of life deteriorates. At some point, when life because chronically unpleasant and/or painful, the value/cherishing placed on "happiness" begins to take precedent, and the prohibition against ending ones own life will weaken.

If you could be "happy" in Walden 2, would that be desirable?

I am not familiar enough with the story to form an opinion, never having read the book.

All of these things are complex and context-dependent. they don't yield to easy answers or to slogans. I recommend you take a look at the work of John Rawls, if you haven't already.

I haven't. I'll add him to my retirement reading list!

[carpedm9587]

At this point I think we can dispense with everything else, this is the crux of the matter.

You are also welcome to try. I'll respond if you're on new territory and not sliding back into your more typical forms of trolling.

[seer]

You are also welcome to try. I'll respond if you're on new territory and not sliding back into your more typical forms of trolling.

So now I'm a troll. We are not off to a good start. In any case I have been trying to get Charles to give a straight answer too. There was another moral realist here a few years back, a real crabby fellow - I could not make sense of his argument either. Maybe Jim can enlighten us.

[Adrift]

Well yes God's moral law is subjective to Him (objective to humankind), but grounded in His immutable moral character.

I think this is something we've gone around on a bit. How can moral law be subjective to God if it is grounded in his own immutable moral and perfect character? For you to say that God's moral law is subjective to him seems awfully close to agreeing with that horn of Euthyphro's Dilemma that says the good is good because God wills it.

[seer]

I think this is something we've gone around on a bit. How can moral law be subjective to God if it is grounded in his own immutable moral and perfect character? For you to say that God's moral law is subjective to him seems awfully close to agreeing with that horn of Euthyphro's Dilemma that says the good is good because God wills it.

Except the Euthyphro's Dilemma would not account for an immutable moral character. But God is the subject, His moral law, is well, His. I don't see a way around it.