On Moral Realism

[shunyadragon]

Source: https://sites.lsa.umich.edu/mitani/wp-content/uploads/sites/152/2014/08/mitani_et_al_2002ahttps://sites.lsa.umich.edu/mitani/wp-content/uploads/sites/152/2014/08/mitani_et_al_2002a.pdf

Recent Developments in the Study of Wild Chimpanzee Behavior JOHN C. MITANI, DAVID P. WATTS, AND MARTIN N. MULLER Two generations of researchers have followed Goodall and Nishida into the field. As a result, chimpanzees are now one of the best and most widely studied of nonhuman primates. Long-term field research has been conducted at six sites by several researchers spanning 42 years (Fig. 1). Shorter field studies have also been carried out in some areas.9–11 With this extensive body of research, one might think that we have learned everything about the behavior of these apes in nature. But this is not the case. In fact, we are entering a new and extremely exciting era in the study of wild chimpanzee behavior. The purpose of this review is to highlight some intriguing findings that have emerged through recent study. We focus specifically on results from our own field research conducted in the Kibale National Park, Uganda, giving special emphasis to five areas: social organization, genetics and behavior, hunting and meat-eating, inter-group relationships, and behavioral endocrinology. Our treatment is selective, and we explicitly avoid comment on interpopulation variation in behavior as it relates to the question of chimpanzee cultures. Excellent reviews of this topic, of central concern to anthropologists, can be found elsewhere.12–14 SOCIAL ORGANIZATION No single issue in the study of wild chimpanzee behavior has seen more debate than the nature of their social system. We now know that chimpanzees live in a “fission-fusion” society. Individuals form socially and geographically circumscribed “unitgroups” or “communities,” within which they associate in temporary subgroups or “parties” that vary in size, composition, and duration. Males are philopatric, whereas females typically disperse. This seemingly clear-cut picture of chimpanzee society did not emerge easily. Given the fluid nature of chimpanzee society, it took exceedingly long for field observers to discern regularities in grouping, dispersal, associations, and range use. Kortlandt15 was the first to report temporary associations among wild chimpanzees based on early observations in the Belgian Congo. Here he described groups of 1–30 individuals that either contained members of both sexes or consisted of “nursery” groups of females and their young. Kortlandt was prescient in his descriptions of the temporary and fluid nature of chimpanzee aggregations and laid the groundwork for further study. Subsequent reports by GoodJohn C. Mitani is in the Department of Anthropology at the University of Michigan. His research involves studies of primate behavioral ecology and vocal communication. He has conducted fieldwork on all five species of living apes, including gibbons and orangutans in Indonesia, gorillas in Rwanda, bonobos in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and chimpanzees in Tanzania and Uganda. Along with David Watts, he currently co-directs the Ngogo chimpanzee project, Kibale National Park, Uganda. David Watts received his BA from the University of Pennsylvania and his MA and PhD in Anthropology from the University of Chicago. He is currently a Professor of Anthropology at Yale. He has done fieldwork on white-faced capuchin monkeys in Panama and, for many years, on the social behavior and ecology of mountain gorillas in Rwanda. He also served as Director of the Karisoke Research Centre in Rwanda for two years. Since 1993, he has been conducting research on the behavior and ecology of chimpanzees at Ngogo, in Kibale National Park, Uganda, in collaboration with Dr. John Mitani and Dr. Jeremiah Lwanga. Martin N. Muller has studied chimpanzees in Tanzania and Uganda. He recently completed his dissertation, “Endocrine Aspects of Aggression and Dominance in Chimpanzees of the Kibale Forest,” for the Department of Anthropology, University of Southern California. He is currently a postdoctoral fellow at Harvard University, where he continues his research on the behavior of wild chimpanzees. Key words: chimpanzees, behavioral ecology, Pan troglodytes Evolutionary Anthropology 11:9–25 (2002) Chimpanzees have always been of special interest to anthropologists. As our closest living relatives,1–3 they provide the standard against which to assess human uniqueness and information regarding the changes that must have occurred during the course of human evolution. Given these circumstances, it is not surprising that chimpanzees have been studied intensively in the wild. Jane Goodall4,5 initiated the first long-term field study of chimpanzee behavior at the Gombe National Park, Tanzania. Her observations of tool manufacture and use, hunting, and meat-eating forever changed the way we define humans. Field research on chimpanzee behavior by Toshisada Nishida and colleagues6 at the nearby Mahale Mountains National Park has had an equally significant impact. It was Nishida7,8 who first provided a comprehensive picture of the chimpanzee social system, including group structure and dispersal. Evolutionary Anthropology 9 all16 and the Reynolds17 tended to blur distinctions between communities. After five years of field observations at Gombe, Gooodall16 wrote: “Since chimpanzee groups in the reserve freely unite from time to time without signs of aggression, they cannot be divided into separate communities. It seems likely that only a geographic barrier would constitute a limiting factor on the size of a community, although individuals living at opposite ends of the range might never come into contact.” Nishida7 altered this picture by defining the social group of wild chimpanzees at Mahale. In contrast to Goodall and the Reynolds, Nishida emphasized the stable nature of chimpanzee communities. Although he never recorded all community members together at a single place and time, his longitudinal observations of association between individuals revealed an unambiguous social network and structure (Fig. 2). From these observations, Nishida7 concluded that, “The chimpanzees live a clear-cut social unit which consists of adult males, adult females, and immature animals.” Subsequent field work indicated that chimpanzee communities are not closed. While males typically spend their entire lives in their natal communities, females commonly transfer to neighboring ones during adolescence.8,18,19 While effectively laying to rest persistent questions regarding the existence of chimpanzee communities, Nishida7 simultaneously described sex differences in association. He noted that males associated more frequently with each other than females did with other females. From this he concluded that strong bonds form between males and that males compose the core of chimpanzee society. Subsequent field research at Gombe,20,21 Mahale,22,23 and the Kanyawara study area of Kibale National Park, Uganda,24 validated and expanded Nishida’s picture of chimpanzee society. Male chimpanzees in these populations are more gregarious and distribute their activities more widely and evenly over their territories than do females. Goodall25 aptly summarized the standard picture of chimpanzee society to emerge from these studies: “The most deep-seated principles underlying chimpanzee community structure are those concerned with sex differences in sociability and in the choice of companions. Males are more gregarious than females and prefer each other’s company, except when females are in oestrus. Females are less sociable and spend most of their time with their own offspring— except when cycling, at which time they become very sociable.”

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[shunyadragon]

No reading comprehension issue on my part. More like a flag.

Selective flag waving is not a response to the post.

[Diogenes]

Selective flag waving is not a response to the post.

Neither is posting a general search query or just posting articles without commentary.

[shunyadragon]

Source: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3215880/#:~:text=He%20argues%20that%20chimpanzees%20are,Princeton%20in%202003%20(2006).

Biol Philos. 2011; 26(6): 891–904.
Published online 2011 Jun 17. doi: 10.1007/s10539-011-9283-1
PMCID: PMC3215880
PMID: 22162898Moral ape philosophy

Jelle de Boer^1,2
Author information Article notes Copyright and License information Disclaimer
Go to:Abstract


Our closest relative the chimpanzee seems to display proto-moral behavior. Some scholars emphasize the similarities between humans and chimpanzees, others some key differences. This paper aims is to formulate a set of intermediate conditions between a sometimes helpful chimpanzee and moral man. I specify these intermediate conditions as requirements for the chimpanzees, and for each requirement I take on a verificationist stance and ask what the empirical conditions that satisfy it would be. I ask what would plausibly count as the behavioral correlate of each requirement, when implemented. I take a philosophical look at morality using the chimpanzees as a prism. We will talk of propositional attitudes, rationality and reason in relation to the chimps. By means of the chimps I intend to arrive at a notion of objective morality as conceived from a first person point of view in terms of propositional attitudes and reasons.

Keywords: Chimpanzees, Morality, Frans de Waal, Creature construction
Go to:Introduction


Old chimpanzee Peony shuffles towards a climbing frame in the outdoor enclosure to join several conspecifics on top, but the climbing is too difficult on this cold day. Her arthritis is acting up. Then an unrelated female moves behind her, puts both hands on Peony’s behind, and pushes her with some effort. So Peony gets where she wants to be.

In another enclosure we see Krom pulling a rubber tire with water in it, but he doesn’t seem to understand that he should first release the tire from the other six tires that hang in front of it. Then, after 10 min when Krom gives up, and walks away, Jakie approaches the tires. He removes the six tires one by one, grabs the tire Krom liked, and brings it to him, carefully, without losing water.

It can also be observed among chimpanzees that a dominant individual shares food with a lower ranking individual, one he could easily rebuff.

Primatologist Frans de Waal collects such altruistic ape casuistry (1996, 1997, 2007). He argues that chimpanzees are capable of empathy. They regularly help and console each other. Empathy, help, and consolation are the ‘building blocks’ of morality, as he called it in his 1996 book Good Natured, and on which he elaborated in his Tanner Lectures on Human Values at Princeton in 2003 (2006). De Waal firmly puts himself in the Humean tradition, with its emphasis on empathy concerning morality and its naturalist method.

Nevertheless, the chimpanzee is still quite removed from moral man. De Waal highlights interesting similarities but there are also important differences. One can have various doubts about the moral quality of chimpanzee cooperative behavior. Do the chimps know, for example, what they are doing when they help a conspecific? Are they in the relevant way aware of their good deeds? Doesn’t their friendliness come too easily, at too little cost? Are their motives in order, don’t they really cooperate or help to collect some future gain later on?¹

The topic of this paper is to formulate a set of rationality requirements going from the sometimes-helpful chimpanzee towards moral man. I sympathize with De Waal’s project, I’ll do this in naturalistic fashion. I’m taking my cue from Bennett’s (1964) essay Rationality, which worked from dancing bees to what Bennett found to be the important characteristics of language. We know that bees can tell each other where to find food, through certain bodily movements that indicate distance and angle to the sun. It nonetheless seems exaggerated to say they have a language. Bennett’s question was what more is needed, in terms of extra rationality specifications, to make a fictional linguistic bee from an actual honey-bee. Likewise, my challenge is to think up a rational development from Pan troglodytes to Homo sapiens, while looking at moral behavior.

Surely, there is no unique best way to do this, since many requirements could be conceived. Nor is there a pre-established method for comparing different sets. But plausibility should at least derive from the requirements themselves, in as much as they should be self-evident or else argued for, and of course the requirements should be well connected.

In other words, this paper is engaged in what Paul Grice has called ‘creature construction’. “The method which I should like to apply,” Grice said, “is to construct (in imagination, of course) according to certain principles of construction, a type of creature, or rather a sequence of types of creature, to serve as a model (or models) for actual creatures.”² By means of this sequence Grice wanted to rethink the basics of psychology (judging and willing). We will be concerned with some basics of morality.

So the aim of the paper is specifying a set of intermediate conditions between helpful chimp and moral man. I specify these conditions as requirements for the chimpanzees, and for each requirement I take on a verificationist stance and ask what the empirical conditions that satisfy it would be. I ask what would plausibly count as the behavioral correlate of each requirement, when implemented. Not anything goes, of course; as Grice said, we had “better keep a close eye on the actual world in order to stay within the bounds of the possible.”³ We should stay as closely as possible to what actual chimpanzees have to offer, so we will regularly check with the empirical literature.

I do not focus on selection pressures as a biologist would do, or on cognitive powers as a comparative psychologist would. Instead we will talk of propositional attitudes, rationality, reasons. I propose to take a philosophical look at morality using the chimps as a prism. I will stop when we have reached a seemingly good measure of objectivity from the first person point of view.⁴

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[shunyadragon]

We have been through this a number of times before. I can continue posting research as long as you like and in as many threads that come up down the road. This research article goes into what is fundamentally common between chip and human morality and what is lacking in chip behavior.

Source: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fsoc.2018.00017/full

Evolutionary Origins of Morality: Insights From Non-human Primates

Judith M. Burkart^*, and Carel P. van Schaik
The aim of this contribution is to explore the origins of moral behavior and its underlying moral preferences and intuitions from an evolutionary perspective. Such a perspective encompasses both the ultimate, adaptive function of morality in our own species, as well as the phylogenetic distribution of morality and its key elements across primates. First, with regard to the ultimate function, we argue that human moral preferences are best construed as adaptations to the affordances of the fundamentally interdependent hunter-gatherer lifestyle of our hominin ancestors. Second, with regard to the phylogenetic origin, we show that even though full-blown human morality is unique to humans, several of its key elements are not. Furthermore, a review of evidence from non-human primates regarding prosocial concern, conformity, and the potential presence of universal, biologically anchored and arbitrary cultural norms shows that these elements of morality are not distributed evenly across primate species. This suggests that they have evolved along separate evolutionary trajectories. In particular, the element of prosocial concern most likely evolved in the context of shared infant care, which can be found in humans and some New World monkeys. Strikingly, many if not all of the elements of morality found in non-human primates are only evident in individualistic or dyadic contexts, but not as third-party reactions by truly uninvolved bystanders. We discuss several potential explanations for the unique presence of a systematic third-party perspective in humans, but focus particularly on mentalizing ability and language. Whereas both play an important role in present day, full-blown human morality, it appears unlikely that they played a causal role for the original emergence of morality. Rather, we suggest that the most plausible scenario to date is that human morality emerged because our hominin ancestors, equipped on the one hand with large and powerful brains inherited from their ape-like ancestor, and on the other hand with strong prosocial concern as a result of cooperative breeding, could evolve into an ever more interdependent social niche.

Introduction


Contemplation of law as a natural social phenomenon quickly reveals that it cannot be reduced to purely rational processes and explicit reasoning. It is fundamentally built on (albeit not identical with) our sense for morality, the propensity to differentiate actions, decisions, and intentions between those that are proper and right and those that are improper or wrong (Long and Sedley, 1987). This evaluation can be the result of deliberation, but also of automatic proximate mechanisms such as intuitions that are expressed by a variety of moral emotions, motivations, and preferences which often have a high-urgency feel (Weaver et al., 2014).

Social scientists have traditionally considered morality as a recent, purely cultural innovation, seemingly necessary to keep our otherwise brutish nature under control (e.g., reviewed in Long and Sedley, 1987; de Waal, 2006; Haidt, 2013). In support of this conjecture, what is considered moral in a given culture or society, or what the corresponding systems of laws prescribe, can indeed be quite variable. However, despite this variability in the content of what counts as moral among cultures, there are also elements that seem universal, both with regard to the proximate mechanisms that regulate moral behavior and the content of moral norms. For instance, Barrett et al. (2016) found that across societies, including small-scale societies, humans take an agent's reason for action into account for moral judgments, but they also found independent variation when looking at specific contents, e.g., harm vs. theft, or in how the content influences the role of intentionality. Furthermore, even if conformist transmission could in principle stabilize a variety of behaviors and norms (Chudek and Henrich, 2011), there appears strong canalization in that some kinds of content (such as for instance not to harm others, or engage in parental investment) are more readily considered moral than others (van Schaik, 2016).

Ubiquitous key elements of human morality discussed in this paper are prosocial concern and conformity, as well as the moral contents of doing good, not harming others, and avoiding inequity and incest (van Schaik, 2016). Importantly, these elements are not only expressed when the individual is personally involved, i.e., in individualistic or dyadic contexts, but also in the absence of personal involvement, i.e., in third-party contexts. For instance, moral behavior not only includes the urge to conform to the rules and norms of one's own community, but also evokes strong feelings that others ought to do so as well. The universal presence of these elements of morality across human societies suggests there is an evolved core to morality, which should therefore be amenable to a functional and comparative evolutionary analysis sensu Tinbergen (Tinbergen, 1963; Bateson and Laland, 2013).

Such an evolutionary analysis claims that whenever universal, proximate mechanisms have evolved, they must have done so to fulfill a specific adaptive function. In the first section of this contribution we will argue that the adaptive function of our evolved morality was to enable the highly interdependent life-style of Pleistocene hunter-gathers.

An evolutionary analysis of human morality also includes the examination of its phylogenetic origin, to which we will turn in the second section. Whereas full-blown human morality, which includes explicit moral reasoning and evaluation, may well be unique to humans, some of its elements or building blocks are not, and we can use data from non-human primates to trace the evolutionary history of each of them separately. An obvious first, and very popular, step is to look at the great apes, and in particular the chimpanzees and bonobos (e.g., de Waal, 2006), to investigate the possible presence of a specific building block in our closest relatives. However, a broader and more informative comparative approach consists in mapping the presence or absence of each of these building blocks or traits in a broader set of species, to then test which factor best predicts this pattern of distribution (MacLean, 2016). If the specific case of humans fits such an identified pattern, this allows us to identify the evolutionary context of the emergence of this trait. This approach thus ideally allows not only to identify that a trait is or is not unique to humans, but also why it is present in a given set of species, including humans.
Hunter-Gatherers: The Evolutionary Context of the Emergence of Human Morality


As a species, humans have spent 95% of their evolutionary past as Pleistocene hunter-gatherers (Hill et al., 2011). Even though we cannot travel back in time and observe how these people lived, the few remaining hunter-gatherer societies across the globe allow us a glimpse into our evolutionary past, by providing useful models for the reconstruction of ancestral selection pressures. Intriguingly, despite often considerable geographical distance and principled variation, these societies are rather homogeneous (Marlowe, 2005), and the communalities between them therefore are likely representative for the evolutionary context in which human sociality in general, and thus morality, has evolved.

Nomadic hunter-gatherers live in highly interdependent, egalitarian societies (Marlowe, 2005). Even though some individuals can be more influential than others, major decisions are usually made collectively. In fact, if some individual tries to rise to a leader position through coercive leadership in order to dominate the rest of the group, the majority will try to prevent this (Boehm, 2012). Hunter-gatherers form socially recognized pair bonds (i.e., marriages), and show a marked sexual division of labor: women gather and men hunt cooperatively, fish, or collect honey (Marlowe, 2007). The foraging niche is skill-intensive and often requires intense cooperation. The skills are socially transmitted and shaped by cumulative cultural evolution (Dean et al., 2014; Hill et al., 2014), and it takes women until their mid-twenties, and men even longer, to become fully efficient foragers. The social structure and networks of hunter-gatherers in fact appears to optimize efficient transmission of cultural knowledge. Either sex may disperse, but adult brothers and sisters often co-reside. Most individuals in the group are unrelated, and strong ties with non-kin play an important role for the spread of skills and knowledge (Hill et al., 2011; Migliano et al., 2017).

Hunter-gatherer lives are characterized by high levels of interdependence in almost all contexts and at different time-scales. Food sharing is vital, at the time scale of days (hunters, but also foragers, may return empty-handed), weeks to months (in case of sickness or injury), and years to decades (families with growing children do not produce enough and rely on younger and older camp members: Sugiyama and Chacon, 2005; Kaplan et al., 2009; Hill et al., 2011). Gathered food is generally shared within families, but honey and meat, in particular from large animals, which are hunted cooperatively, are shared with all other families in a camp (Wood and Marlowe, 2013). In general, food is shared with those who are needy, but also preferentially with those who have shared in the past. It is thus crucial that someone build a good reputation and support others without being solicited, to ensure receiving support when needy themselves. A good reputation is thus vital, because sooner or later this need will arrive. Men can gain status by being generous (Gurven et al., 2000; Marlowe, 2010), and by participating in coordinated collective action, as during warfare, cooperative hunting, gathering, or moving camp.

Not only subsistence and foraging activities are fundamentally cooperative, but also child rearing. For a mother, it is almost impossible to rear a child successfully by herself, and she receives ample support from others, in particular fathers, grandmothers and older siblings, but also from other camp members (Hrdy, 2009). In fact, humans qualify as cooperative breeders, a reproductive system also known in several other animals, such as many bird species, but also wolves, or callitrichid monkeys. In all these species, including humans (Sear and Mace, 2008), parents obtain a significant amount of help in rearing their offspring, and both growth and survival of the offspring depends on the availability of helpers. Cooperative breeding typically evolves when conditions are harsh, which makes it increasingly difficult for mothers to raise their offspring alone (Burkart et al., 2017b). When our hominin ancestors moved into the savanna, food was more often dispersed and hidden underground than before. This required not only more cooperation during foraging and more elaborate food processing techniques (e.g., cooking: Wrangham, 2009), but also made it more difficult for mothers to rear their offspring independently. This is in strong contrast to all the other great apes, where mothers raise their offspring independently and are well able to do so. Furthermore, large brains require large amounts of energy, in particular during ontogeny (Kuzawa et al., 2014). It is thus parsimonious to assume that our ancestors had already started to engage in systematic allomaternal care rather early since otherwise the evolution of our big brains would not have been possible (Isler and van Schaik, 2012).

Human morality can be understood as a straight-forward adaptation to this hunter-gatherer life-style, in that it enables and stabilizes interdependence (see also van Schaik et al., 2014). According to this hypothesis, one key element of morality, a prosocial predisposition, is crucial to maintain food sharing with immatures and adults. Having a good reputation serves as insurance to being cared for when in need, and also for being chosen as a mate or cooperation partner. A strong concern for one's reputation, including reputation management, thus ensues. The second element, an urge to conform, is crucial in a niche where coordinated or synchronized action is vital for survival. In addition, the urge to conform serves to acquire the many complex skills that make up our ecological niche via social learning. When skills and knowledge are opaque, i.e., when it is not obvious how separate steps involved in an activity lead to an overall goal, trustful copying even of seemingly useless elements is mandatory (Henrich and Broesch, 2011; Dean et al., 2014).

The ultimate function of human morality and its key elements can thus readily be understood as an adaptation to the hunter-gatherer lifestyle. But are these elements unique to humans, or can some of them, or perhaps their precursors, also be found in other primates, and if so, why? These questions are important because a better understanding of the phylogenetic origins of elements of morality in non-human species can help evaluate the functional hypothesis that human morality has evolved to solve problems inherent to a fundamentally interdependent lifestyle.
Evolutionary Origins of the Building Blocks of Morality


Building blocks of morality include both mechanisms and contents. For clarity, we discuss them separately (mechanisms: section Prosocial Concern, and section Conformity; contents: section Social Norms I: Universal, Biologically Anchored Contents, and section Social Norms II: Arbitrary, Culturally Variable Norms). However, links between them exist and will be addressed in the corresponding sections. An important issue for full-blown morality that applies to all building blocks is whether they are expressed in individualistic or dyadic contexts only, or whether they are also present in third-party contexts. For instance, can a prosocial concern in a given species be found between an actor and a recipient only, or do non-involved third parties (i.e., non-involved bystanders) also evaluate the prosocial interaction between an actor and a recipient as morally appropriate? This third-party perspective is an overarching hallmark of human morality in general and we will therefore also focus on this particular aspect when reviewing the evidence from non-human animals.
Prosocial Concern


One key element of human morality is prosocial concern, i.e., a concern not only with one's own but also with others' well-being, also referred to as other-regarding preferences by behavioral economists (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003). In the primatological literature, it is often referred to as proactive prosociality, to stress that the corresponding behaviors, such as for instance food sharing, are not the result of solicitation by recipients, begging, or even harassment, but that they are initiated spontaneously by the actor without triggering by other individuals (Jaeggi et al., 2010).

Over the last decade, proactive prosociality has been extensively studied in a number of primate species. Early studies found it was absent in chimpanzees, who are independent breeders, but present in the small marmoset monkeys, who like humans, are cooperative breeders (Cronin, 2012; Marshall-Pescini et al., 2016). Importantly, even though the evolution of cooperative breeding is based on inclusive fitness benefits (Burkart et al., 2017b), kin selection and relatedness per se cannot explain why some primates show proactive prosociality but others don't. First, marmosets can show proactive prosociality toward non-related group members as well, and even strangers who are potential group members (Burkart et al., 2007). Second, highly related mother-offspring dyads in independently breeding primates, including chimpanzees (Ueno and Matsuzawa, 2004), fail to show proactive prosociality.

Later prosociality studies produced more mixed results, also because different methodologies make it difficult to compare between studies and species (Burkart and Rueth, 2013). A large comparative study therefore compared proactive prosociality across 15 primate species, using exactly the same methodology and thus providing directly comparable data. Phylogenetic analyses revealed that the extent of allomaternal care, (i.e., the amount of help that mothers receive from others when rearing infants, with cooperative breeding found in the higher range of values) is indeed the best predictor for proactive prosociality in a group service paradigm, whereas brain size or other socio-ecological factors cannot explain a significant amount of inter-specific variation (Burkart et al., 2014).

Accordingly, chimpanzees, our closest relatives, scored low on prosociality. Nevertheless, their score was not zero, which corresponds to reports of occasional targeted helping in this species (Warneken and Tomasello, 2015; but see Tennie et al., 2016), as well as occasional food sharing or alerting others of danger. In addition to prosociality, targeted helping also has an important cognitive component, which is particularly strong in the large-brained apes (Burkart et al., 2017a). A highly relevant test case are bonobos, for which evidence for proactive prosociality is quite mixed (Tan and Hare, 2013; Tan et al., 2015, 2017), but who unfortunately were not in the cross-species sample of the group service study.

In sum, among primates, proactive prosociality increases with the amount of allomaternal care found in a species and culminates in cooperative breeders. Since humans also qualify as cooperative breeders, it is most parsimonious to conclude that our prosociality is simply the result of cooperative breeding too, i.e., that the same regularity applies to non-human and human primates alike (Burkart et al., 2014).

So far, primate proactive prosociality has mostly been studied from the dyadic perspective. However, in humans, it also encompasses the third-party context. Social evaluation studies address whether subjects, after observing how target individuals interact with others, avoid antisocial target individuals (and thus show a negativity bias) or prefer prosocial and cooperative target individuals (positivity bias). For instance, babies already have a preference for agents who help, rather than hinder others (Hamlin et al., 2007). Such studies are also increasingly done with non-human animals, as reviewed in . For instance, in a study modeled after Hamlin et al. (2007), bonobos unexpectedly showed a preference for hinderers, rather than helpers (Krupenye and Hare, 2018). point out that there are still considerable conceptual and procedural issues in animal social evaluation studies, in particular to clearly demonstrate positivity biases. Negativity biases may be taxonomically far more widespread than positivity biases, since the need to avoid harm is universal whereas the need to cooperate is less common. Evidence for positivity biases (which correspond to the third-party perspective on prosociality) appears present too in several non-human primate species but is more elusive due to methodological issues, including the use of humans rather than conspecifics as target individuals (see ).

An important aspect of human prosociality directly follows from the fact that we evaluate people based on their prosocial behavior toward others. When deciding whether to behave prosocially or not, we are highly sensitive to a potential audience. We thus strongly care not only about to what extent others behave prosocially, but also about whether others perceive us as prosocial and thus reliable partners (Goffman, 1959). In dictator games, which are used by behavioral economists to quantify other-regarding preferences, humans typically contribute a non-zero amount of money even if they could keep this money for themselves without any negative consequences, consistent with proactive other-regarding preferences (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003). However, when the same game is played and stylized eye-cues are added on the answer sheet, these “watching eyes” elicit increased prosocial donations in such games, which reflects our strong concern for reputation (Nettle et al., 2013b). In corresponding experiments with chimpanzees, the same effect was not found, and the authors concluded that the extreme human sensitivity to cues of potential conspecific observation appears absent in chimpanzees (Nettle et al., 2013a, see also Engelmann et al., 2012).

These findings suggest that chimpanzees are perhaps not the best species to look for such effects. Rather, these effects would arguably be most likely in habitually prosocial species, such as the cooperatively breeding marmoset monkeys. We therefore studied audience effects on prosocial behavior in this species in a naturalistic context, i.e., proactive food sharing with immatures (). Marmosets live in family groups, and all members contribute to infant rearing. When the infants are small, they are carried by all group members, and in big and well-established groups they sometimes are only handed back to the mother for breastfeeding. When the infants are older and ingest solid food, all group members share food with the immatures. This food sharing can take the form of proactive food sharing, i.e., food is offered to the immatures without previous begging, even when immatures are not even aware that a valuable food item has been found. To test for an audience effect on proactive food sharing, we quantified food sharing by helpers with immatures, either when they were alone with the offspring in a separate room or when the rest of the family was present. If they were sharing food to increase their reputation of being a good helper, one would expect them to share more when an audience was present than when they were alone with the offspring. The marmosets were sensitive to the audience, but in the opposite direction than expected: they showed more proactive food sharing in the absence of an audience. This effect is in fact consistent with the well-established bystander apathy () or diffusion of responsibility (Bierhoff, 2017) effect in humans. Thus, the marmosets perhaps shared more because they felt more “responsible” to fulfill the immatures' needs when no one else was around, but in any case, these results show that they did not take advantage of this situation to engage in reputation management.

To summarize, a genuine proactive prosocial concern is not unique to humans but we also see it in other primates, in particular in those who like humans engage in cooperative breeding. Nevertheless, to date there is no solid evidence that primates would take into account whether others behave prosocially or not. Thus, a third-party perspective on prosociality appears largely lacking in primates.

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[shunyadragon]

Neither is posting a general search query or just posting articles without commentary.

The articles have explanations that stand on their own. Your failure to respond is silence in response to research article with objective evidence.

You did respond but with a snide superficial Dodge.

[Diogenes]

The articles have explanations that stand on their own. Your failure to respond is silence in response to research article with objective evidence.

You did respond but with a snide superficial Dodge.

To quote the rules:

Debates (points for your position) made via weblink are not allowed. Weblinks may be used when a substantive summary of the point being made is posted on the board with a link given for further information regarding your position. Remember responsive arguments are to be as personal as possible, not "cut and paste" dueling articles. This can be avoided by giving one's personal analysis along with an article, or just quoting the specifically relevant portions and showing relevance

Nothing that you've posted has even touched on moral realism, at best, you've posted on descriptive moral reasoning. If you wish to say there are no ontologically independent moral properties that give rise to the good and have motivational force but rather merely certain behaviors that may be pragmatically beneficial, that's certainly a point you could articulate. If you wish to say that moral realism is better characterised in some other way besides ontologically independent moral properties that give rise to the good and have motivational force, that's also a point you could articulate. But you have done nothing of the sort.

As far as my view of Singer, utilitarianism, as with any form of consequentialism, will necessarily give rise to utility monsters wherein any horror could be justified by the ends. For instance, Iceland has accomplished something that Hitler could only have dreamed by virtually eliminating Downs from the country.

[shunyadragon]

To quote the rules:

Debates (points for your position) made via weblink are not allowed. Weblinks may be used when a substantive summary of the point being made is posted on the board with a link given for further information regarding your position. Remember responsive arguments are to be as personal as possible, not "cut and paste" dueling articles. This can be avoided by giving one's personal analysis along with an article, or just quoting the specifically relevant portions and showing relevance

Nothing that you've posted has even touched on moral realism, at best, you've posted on descriptive moral reasoning. If you wish to say there are no ontologically independent moral properties that give rise to the good and have motivational force but rather merely certain behaviors that may be pragmatically beneficial, that's certainly a point you could articulate. If you wish to say that moral realism is better characterised in some other way besides ontologically independent moral properties that give rise to the good and have motivational force, that's also a point you could articulate. But you have done nothing of the sort.

As far as my view of Singer, utilitarianism, as with any form of consequentialism, will necessarily give rise to utility monsters wherein any horror could be justified by the ends. For instance, Iceland has accomplished something that Hitler could only have dreamed by virtually eliminating Downs from the country.

Singer is not the whole story. Singer is only one of the scientists and philosophers cited in the article. I posted other research on the natural evolution of behavior, morals and ethics.

Nothing I posted did I intend to refer to Moral Realism. My argument is that the objective evolutionary processes explain the morals, ethics and rules of law. As before I consider Moral Realism a meaningless philosophy that can only refer to itself to justify itself without supporting evidence. The evolution of morals, ethics and rule of law have an objective foundation in science just as all the sciences of evolution.

[shunyadragon]

Again my argument was previously stated. "The natural objective of evolution of morals and ethics, and the rule of law with the purpose of survival of the species to maintain cooperation and stability of human cultures." I could care less about moral realism, because it does not explain anything concerning the objective origin of morals, ethics and rule of law.

[shunyadragon]

The following is a more complete interesting definition of Moral or Ethical Realism.

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_realism

Moral realism (also ethical realism) is the position that ethical sentences express propositions that refer to objective features of the world (that is, features independent of subjective opinion), some of which may be true to the extent that they report those features accurately. This makes moral realism a non-nihilist form of ethical cognitivism (which accepts that ethical sentences express propositions and can therefore be evaluated as true or false) with an ontological orientation, standing in opposition to all forms of moral anti-realism^[1] and moral skepticism, including ethical subjectivism (which denies that moral propositions refer to objective facts), error theory (which denies that any moral propositions are true); and non-cognitivism (which denies that moral sentences express propositions at all). Within moral realism, the two main subdivisions are ethical naturalism and ethical non-naturalism.^[2]

Many philosophers claim that moral realism may be dated back at least to Plato as a philosophical doctrine,^[3] and that it is a fully defensible form of moral doctrine.^[4] A survey from 2009 involving 3,226 respondents^[5] found that 56% of philosophers accept or lean towards moral realism (28%: anti-realism; 16%: other).^[6] Another study in 2020 found 62.1% accept or lean towards realism.^[7] Some notable examples of robust moral realists include David Brink,^[8]John McDowell, Peter Railton,^[9]Geoffrey Sayre-McCord,^[10]Michael Smith, Terence Cuneo,^[11]Russ Shafer-Landau,^[12]G. E. Moore,^[13]John Finnis, Richard Boyd, Nicholas Sturgeon,^[14]Thomas Nagel, Derek Parfit and Peter Singer. Norman Geras has argued that Karl Marx was a moral realist.^[15] Moral realism has been studied in the various philosophical and practical applications.^[16]

© Copyright Original Source

^{The problems become very apparent, this and other related philosophies is the argument is an attempt to circular to justify itself and compare itself to other philosophies without outside objective evidence followed by a poll of philosophers, This is avery subjective justification of philosophy.}

[Diogenes]

Nothing I posted did I intend to refer to Moral Realism.

So you admit you have reading comprehension regarding the thread topic. Thank you.

[shunyadragon]

So you admit you have reading comprehension regarding the thread topic. Thank you.

In response to Moral Realism I posted #235 and made my view clear.

No, my reading comprehension is fine, I stated my view of Moral Realism with references and you have failed to respond. Moral Realism does not give evidence for wht it claims. I am arguing for science, in particular the sciences of evolution, and provided references which you have not responded to. Silence . . .

The thread topic is 'On Moral Realism,' and I am arguing against Moral Realism and that is right on topic.

[Machinist]

"15 Examples of Moral Relativism

• Eating Pork. In Judaism, there is a rule against eating any animal that does not have split hooves and/or does not chew their cud. ...
• Tardiness. ...
• Veganism. ...
• Repaying Credit Card Bills. ...
• Tax Avoidance. ...
• Conspicuous Consumption. ...
• Tipping the Server. ...
• Believing in the Wrong God."

Could we add murder or genocide to this list? Why or why not?

[seer]

This is a website with a number of research articles on primate morality and the evolution of morals and ethics.

So? Chimps rape, and regularly steal from each other ( the more you steal the higher status BTW), war and slaughter each other. Are Chimps violating a moral code when they do? No. And again, you are reading human ethics back into instinctive behavior.

Male Sexual Aggression: What Chimps Can Reveal About People

https://www.livescience.com/48743-ag...duce-more.html

A Chimp’s Guide to Stealing Food

https://projectchimps.org/a_chimps_g...stealing_food/


Does Chimp Warfare Explain Our Sense of Good and Evil?

https://www.theatlantic.com/technolo...nd-evil/58643/

[seer]

Again my argument was previously stated. "The natural objective of evolution of morals and ethics, and the rule of law with the purpose of survival of the species to maintain cooperation and stability of human cultures." I could care less about moral realism, because it does not explain anything concerning the objective origin of morals, ethics and rule of law.

Good grief! Again! The evolutionary process does not care for or aim for our stability or survival. There is NO natural objective...