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Cogito ergo sum

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Argument Against Miracles

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  • #91
    Originally posted by Machinist View Post

    That's a safe assumption, but are you making an inductive inference?
    No.
    "It ain't necessarily so
    The things that you're liable
    To read in the Bible
    It ain't necessarily so
    ."

    Sportin' Life
    Porgy & Bess, DuBose Heyward, George & Ira Gershwin

    Comment


    • #92
      Originally posted by Hypatia_Alexandria View Post

      No.
      Actually yes, you made an inductive argument - but you were never strong on logical reasoning...
      Atheism is the cult of death, the death of hope. The universe is doomed, you are doomed, the only thing that remains is to await your execution...

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jbnueb2OI4o&t=3s

      Comment


      • #93
        Originally posted by seer View Post

        Actually yes, you made an inductive argument - but you were never strong on logical reasoning...


        "It ain't necessarily so
        The things that you're liable
        To read in the Bible
        It ain't necessarily so
        ."

        Sportin' Life
        Porgy & Bess, DuBose Heyward, George & Ira Gershwin

        Comment


        • #94
          Originally posted by seer View Post
          But how does he know what past experiences are? Because induction works backward as well as forward, he is assuming past uniformity of nature.
          As do we all. You can't criticize him for that without also criticizing yourself.

          And probability is merely an inference based on that assumption. If our experience can not predict future events of nature without arguing in a circle (as Hume states) how can he make a probabilistic argument if we don't have comprehensive knowledge of past events (and we don't) without also arguing in a circle?
          It's not arguing in a circle to take as a basic assumption (without trying to prove it) that induction is reliable. I think this is what Hume is doing when he refers to the solution being Custom or Habit.

          Below he explains this with regard to cause and effect, which also can't be determined logically.
          ​​​​​​
          Suppose a person, though endowed with the strongest faculties of reason and reflection, to be brought on a sudden into this world; he would, indeed, immediately observe a continual succession of objects, and one event following another; but he would not be able to discover anything farther. He would not, at first, by any reasoning, be able to reach the idea of cause and effect; since the particular powers, by which all natural operations are performed, never appear to the senses; nor is it reasonable to conclude, merely because one event, in one instance, precedes another, that therefore the one is the cause, the other the effect. Their conjunction may be arbitrary and casual. There may be no reason to infer the existence of one from the appearance of the other. And in a word, such a person, without more experience, could never employ his conjecture or reasoning concerning any matter of fact, or be assured of anything beyond what was immediately present to his memory and senses.

          Suppose, again, that he has acquired more experience, and has lived so long in the world as to have observed familiar objects or events to be constantly conjoined together; what is the consequence of this experience? He immediately infers the existence of one object from the appearance of the other. Yet he has not, by all his experience, acquired any idea or knowledge of the secret power by which the one object produces the other; nor is it, by any process of reasoning, he is engaged to draw this inference. But still he finds himself determined to draw it: And though he should be convinced that his understanding has no part in the operation, he would nevertheless continue in the same course of thinking. There is some other principle which determines him to form such a conclusion.

          This principle is Custom or Habit. For wherever the repetition of any particular act or operation produces a propensity to renew the same act or operation, without being impelled by any reasoning or process of the understanding, we always say, that this propensity is the effect of Custom. By employing that word, we pretend not to have given the ultimate reason of such a propensity. We only point out a principle of human nature, which is universally acknowledged, and which is well known by its effects. Perhaps we can push our enquiries no farther, or pretend to give the cause of this cause; but must rest contented with it as the ultimate principle, which we can assign, of all our conclusions from experience. It is sufficient satisfaction, that we can go so far, without repining at the narrowness of our faculties because they will carry us no farther. And it is certain we here advance a very intelligible proposition at least, if not a true one, when we assert that, after the constant conjunction of two objects—heat and flame, for instance, weight and solidity—we are determined by custom alone to expect the one from the appearance of the other. This hypothesis seems even the only one which explains the difficulty, why we draw, from a thousand instances, an inference which we are not able to draw from one instance, that is, in no respect, different from them. Reason is incapable of any such variation. The conclusions which it draws from considering one circle are the same which it would form upon surveying all the circles in the universe. But no man, having seen only one body move after being impelled by another, could infer that every other body will move after a like impulse. All inferences from experience, therefore, are effects of custom, not of reasoning.

          Custom, then, is the great guide of human life. It is that principle alone which renders our experience useful to us, and makes us expect, for the future, a similar train of events with those which have appeared in the past.

          Without the influence of custom, we should be entirely ignorant of every matter of fact beyond what is immediately present to the memory and senses. We should never know how to adjust means to ends, or to employ our natural powers in the production of any effect. There would be an end at once of all action, as well as of the chief part of speculation.

          (emphasis mine)

          I take the last two paragraphs to mean that we really don't have a useful alternative to assuming the reliability of induction, which is the reason I usually give for making it a basic assumption.

          Comment


          • #95
            Originally posted by Stoic View Post
            As do we all. You can't criticize him for that without also criticizing yourself.
            In what way?

            It's not arguing in a circle to take as a basic assumption (without trying to prove it) that induction is reliable. I think this is what Hume is doing when he refers to the solution being Custom or Habit.
            Circular reasoning is what Hume says induction is. But his whole argument comes down to miracles are rare therefore they probably don't exist. That does not follow...

            Below he explains this with regard to cause and effect, which also can't be determined logically.
            Years ago I read that about tens times, it seems to deal death blow to the idea of cause and effect. Or at least any logical connection.

            I take the last two paragraphs to mean that we really don't have a useful alternative to assuming the reliability of induction, which is the reason I usually give for making it a basic assumption.
            I agree with this, but then you can not then claim that miracles are improbable. There is no logical basis for the claim.
            Atheism is the cult of death, the death of hope. The universe is doomed, you are doomed, the only thing that remains is to await your execution...

            https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jbnueb2OI4o&t=3s

            Comment


            • #96
              Originally posted by Hypatia_Alexandria View Post

              Firstly we are all writing and not "speaking" and secondly nothing I wrote contained "absolutes".
              Are you absolutely sure?

              Comment


              • #97
                Originally posted by seer View Post
                In what way?
                Because you also assume the past regularity of nature. How else could there be ANY evidence for miracles?

                Circular reasoning is what Hume says induction is.
                No, Hume does not say induction itself is circular reasoning. Trying to justify induction by experience would be circular reasoning, since experience is meaningless without induction.

                For all inferences from experience suppose, as their foundation, that the future will resemble the past, and that similar powers will be conjoined with similar sensible qualities. If there be any suspicion that the course of nature may change, and that the past may be no rule for the future, all experience becomes useless, and can give rise to no inference or conclusion. It is impossible, therefore, that any arguments from experience can prove this resemblance of the past to the future; since all these arguments are founded on the supposition of that resemblance. Let the course of things be allowed hitherto ever so regular; that alone, without some new argument or inference, proves not that, for the future, it will continue so.


                But it's not necessary to prove the reliability of induction through logic, any more than it is necessary to prove the reliability of logic through logic (which is also impossible).

                But his whole argument comes down to miracles are rare therefore they probably don't exist. That does not follow...
                No, that is not his argument. If miracles were merely rare, the response to them would be, "So what? These things may be rare, but they happen. Big deal."

                Years ago I read that about tens times, it seems to deal death blow to the idea of cause and effect. Or at least any logical connection.
                Right. You can't prove cause and effect purely logically. Yet we rely on conclusions about cause and effect all the time.

                I agree with this, but then you can not then claim that miracles are improbable.
                You can always argue that miracles are not improbable, but the drawback is that you lose the ability to convince people that there is something significant about them.

                I think you want to have it both ways, with them being improbable in order to get people's attention, but not improbable when it comes to convincing people that they actually happened.

                There is no logical basis for the claim.
                There is no logical basis for any claim of cause and effect, either. So are you standing on a soap box denying every claim that something was caused by something else?

                Comment


                • #98
                  Originally posted by Stoic View Post

                  Because you also assume the past regularity of nature. How else could there be ANY evidence for miracles?


                  Trying to justify induction by experience would be circular reasoning, since experience is meaningless without induction.

                  These are two important facts it seems:

                  The past regularity of nature must be assumed in order for miracles to stand out as atypical.

                  And

                  Experience is meaningless without induction.

                  Those are true as far as I can tell.



                  What bearing do they have on the OP statement that induction is not sound reasoning against miracles?

                  Comment


                  • #99
                    Originally posted by Stoic View Post
                    Because you also assume the past regularity of nature. How else could there be ANY evidence for miracles?
                    But it is Hume who is making the claim not me. Like I said (more that once) I have no problem with induction as a method - I do have a problem with Hume's unfounded conclusions - therefore miracles are improbable.

                    No, Hume does not say induction itself is circular reasoning. Trying to justify induction by experience would be circular reasoning, since experience is meaningless without induction.

                    For all inferences from experience suppose, as their foundation, that the future will resemble the past, and that similar powers will be conjoined with similar sensible qualities. If there be any suspicion that the course of nature may change, and that the past may be no rule for the future, all experience becomes useless, and can give rise to no inference or conclusion. It is impossible, therefore, that any arguments from experience can prove this resemblance of the past to the future; since all these arguments are founded on the supposition of that resemblance. Let the course of things be allowed hitherto ever so regular; that alone, without some new argument or inference, proves not that, for the future, it will continue so.
                    I don't see the distinction you are making, for instance assuming that the future will look like that past is question begging, by definition.

                    No, that is not his argument. If miracles were merely rare, the response to them would be, "So what? These things may be rare, but they happen. Big deal."
                    Actually that is exactly what it is. We don't not see miracles in common experience, therefore...


                    You can always argue that miracles are not improbable, but the drawback is that you lose the ability to convince people that there is something significant about them.
                    I'm not trying to convince any one, my point is Hume's argument hold no water...


                    Atheism is the cult of death, the death of hope. The universe is doomed, you are doomed, the only thing that remains is to await your execution...

                    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jbnueb2OI4o&t=3s

                    Comment


                    • Originally posted by seer View Post
                      But it is Hume who is making the claim not me. Like I said (more that once) I have no problem with induction as a method - I do have a problem with Hume's unfounded conclusions - therefore miracles are improbable.
                      IOW, you only have a problem with induction when it leads to conclusions you don't like.

                      Otherwise, you should attack his argument, and not his use of induction, which you allegedly don't have a problem with.

                      I don't see the distinction you are making, for instance assuming that the future will look like that past is question begging, by definition.
                      You don't seem to understand the definition of begging the question.

                      It would only be begging the question if one assumed that the future will look like the past in order to prove that the future will look like the past. Hume is not trying to prove that the future will look like the past, so his assumption that the future will look like the past (an assumption which we all share) is not begging the question.

                      Actually that is exactly what it is. We don't not see miracles in common experience, therefore...
                      No, it's that we never see the laws of nature violated, otherwise we wouldn't consider them laws of nature. And we test them all the time. Basically every scientific prediction assumes that one or more of the laws of nature will not be violated. If the laws of nature were violated even a tiny percentage of the time, it would show up in scientific results.

                      Witnesses, OTOH, are very regularly mistaken, or deceived, or untruthful.

                      If you ever have to choose between believing that the laws of nature were actually violated, or that the claim that they were violated is false, the latter is far more probable.

                      I'm not trying to convince any one, my point is Hume's argument hold no water...
                      Then address his argument, and not his assumption of the reliability of induction, which we all share.

                      Comment


                      • Originally posted by Machinist View Post

                        These are two important facts it seems:

                        The past regularity of nature must be assumed in order for miracles to stand out as atypical.

                        And

                        Experience is meaningless without induction.

                        Those are true as far as I can tell.



                        What bearing do they have on the OP statement that induction is not sound reasoning against miracles?
                        What reason is that that we should accept the validity of induction for everything except reasoning about miracles?

                        Comment


                        • Originally posted by Stoic View Post
                          IOW, you only have a problem with induction when it leads to conclusions you don't like.

                          Otherwise, you should attack his argument, and not his use of induction, which you allegedly don't have a problem with.


                          You don't seem to understand the definition of begging the question.

                          It would only be begging the question if one assumed that the future will look like the past in order to prove that the future will look like the past. Hume is not trying to prove that the future will look like the past, so his assumption that the future will look like the past (an assumption which we all share) is not begging the question.


                          No, it's that we never see the laws of nature violated, otherwise we wouldn't consider them laws of nature. And we test them all the time. Basically every scientific prediction assumes that one or more of the laws of nature will not be violated. If the laws of nature were violated even a tiny percentage of the time, it would show up in scientific results.

                          Witnesses, OTOH, are very regularly mistaken, or deceived, or untruthful.

                          If you ever have to choose between believing that the laws of nature were actually violated, or that the claim that they were violated is false, the latter is far more probable.


                          Then address his argument, and not his assumption of the reliability of induction, which we all share.
                          Let's go back to the claim:

                          “A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined."

                          1. How has experience established these laws, without begging the question?

                          2. How is that proof against against miracles?

                          3. Claiming that the past has always resembled the present, or that historical experiences offer comprehensive understanding of said laws, is begging the question by your definition.
                          Atheism is the cult of death, the death of hope. The universe is doomed, you are doomed, the only thing that remains is to await your execution...

                          https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jbnueb2OI4o&t=3s

                          Comment


                          • Originally posted by Stoic View Post

                            What reason is that that we should accept the validity of induction for everything except reasoning about miracles?
                            Has this whole thing escaped you? Hume is making an inductive argument and then claims that it it is proof against miracles. And Stoic as you know using an inductive argument to claim a proof is not sound...
                            Atheism is the cult of death, the death of hope. The universe is doomed, you are doomed, the only thing that remains is to await your execution...

                            https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jbnueb2OI4o&t=3s

                            Comment


                            • Originally posted by seer View Post

                              Has this whole thing escaped you? Hume is making an inductive argument and then claims that it it is proof against miracles. And Stoic as you know using an inductive argument to claim a proof is not sound...
                              Is it possible that he had in mind a different meaning for "proof" than you are using?

                              Comment


                              • Originally posted by seer View Post

                                Let's go back to the claim:

                                “A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined."

                                1. How has experience established these laws, without begging the question?
                                They have been established by the fact that we've never seen them violated.

                                2. How is that proof against against miracles?
                                Though experience be our only guide in reasoning concerning matters of fact; it must be acknowledged, that this guide is not altogether infallible, but in some cases is apt to lead us into errors. One, who in our climate, should expect better weather in any week of June than in one of December, would reason justly, and conformably to experience; but it is certain, that he may happen, in the event, to find himself mistaken. However, we may observe, that, in such a case, he would have no cause to complain of experience; because it commonly informs us beforehand of the uncertainty, by that contrariety of events, which we may learn from a diligent observation. All effects follow not with like certainty from their supposed causes. Some events are found, in all countries and all ages, to have been constantly conjoined together: Others are found to have been more variable, and sometimes to disappoint our expectations; so that, in our reasonings concerning matter of fact, there are all imaginable degrees of assurance, from the highest certainty to the lowest species of moral evidence.

                                A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence. In such conclusions as are founded on an infallible experience, he expects the event with the last degree of assurance, and regards his past experience as a full proof of the future existence of that event. In other cases, he proceeds with more caution: He weighs the opposite experiments: He considers which side is supported by the greater number of experiments: to that side he inclines, with doubt and hesitation; and when at last he fixes his judgement, the evidence exceeds not what we properly call probability. All probability, then, supposes an opposition of experiments and observations, where the one side is found to overbalance the other, and to produce a degree of evidence, proportioned to the superiority. A hundred instances or experiments on one side, and fifty on another, afford a doubtful expectation of any event; though a hundred uniform experiments, with only one that is contradictory, reasonably beget a pretty strong degree of assurance. In all cases, we must balance the opposite experiments, where they are opposite, and deduct the smaller number from the greater, in order to know the exact force of the superior evidence.


                                Basically, we have reason to have much more confidence in the inviolability of the laws of nature than in the accuracy of any testimony.

                                3. Claiming that the past has always resembled the present, or that historical experiences offer comprehensive understanding of said laws, is begging the question by your definition.
                                How so?

                                Comment

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