Argument Against Miracles

[Hypatia_Alexandria]

So why would I believe someone if he told me that a miracle had occurred?

You beat me to it.

[Hypatia_Alexandria]

A violation of known natural laws.

And what independent and attested evidence can you produce that demonstrates natural laws have been violated?

[seer]

And what independent and attested evidence can you produce that demonstrates natural laws have been violated?

What independent and attested evidence can you produce that demonstrates natural laws have never been violated?

[Stoic]

Why wouldn't you? Especially if it was a trusted sober minded friend? In any case you would need a rational reason to object, what would that reason be?

The plain consequence is (and it is a general maxim worthy of our attention), 'That no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavours to establish; and even in that case there is a mutual destruction of arguments, and the superior only gives us an assurance suitable to that degree of force, which remains, after deducting the inferior.' When anyone tells me, that he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with myself, whether it be more probable, that this person should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact, which he relates, should really have happened. I weigh the one miracle against the other; and according to the superiority, which I discover, I pronounce my decision, and always reject the greater miracle. If the falsehood of his testimony would be more miraculous, than the event which he relates; then, and not till then, can he pretend to command my belief or opinion.

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If a trusted sober minded friend relates to me an experience which involves a violation of the laws of nature, I have to ask myself which is more miraculous: that my friend has been deceived or been mistaken; that I have been mistaken in deeming him either trustworthy or sober minded; or that the laws of nature have actually been violated.

It should hardly be surprising that I would always find the last option to be the most miraculous, and therefore the least reasonable to believe.

[seer]

'That no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavours to establish;[/B] and even in that case there is a mutual destruction of arguments, and the superior only gives us an assurance suitable to that degree of force, which remains, after deducting the inferior.' When anyone tells me, that he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with myself, whether it be more probable, that this person should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact, which he relates, should really have happened. I weigh the one miracle against the other; and according to the superiority, which I discover, I pronounce my decision, and always reject the greater miracle. If the falsehood of his testimony would be more miraculous, than the event which he relates; then, and not till then, can he pretend to command my belief or opinion.
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This is an assertion based on personal opinion, it certainly is not based on logic:

For instance:

I immediately consider with myself, whether it be more probable...

How does the author even to begin to assign probability? Based on what? How does one calculate?

[Stoic]

This is an assertion based on personal opinion, it certainly is not based on logic:

For instance:



How does the author even to begin to assign probability? Based on what? How does one calculate?

Are you suggesting that it's not possible to calculate probabilities? Or are you just wondering what method Hume uses, because you think you might have a better one?

In any case, he gives his reasoning here:

Though experience be our only guide in reasoning concerning matters of fact; it must be acknowledged, that this guide is not altogether infallible, but in some cases is apt to lead us into errors. One, who in our climate, should expect better weather in any week of June than in one of December, would reason justly, and conformably to experience; but it is certain, that he may happen, in the event, to find himself mistaken. However, we may observe, that, in such a case, he would have no cause to complain of experience; because it commonly informs us beforehand of the uncertainty, by that contrariety of events, which we may learn from a diligent observation. All effects follow not with like certainty from their supposed causes. Some events are found, in all countries and all ages, to have been constantly conjoined together: Others are found to have been more variable, and sometimes to disappoint our expectations; so that, in our reasonings concerning matter of fact, there are all imaginable degrees of assurance, from the highest certainty to the lowest species of moral evidence.

A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence. In such conclusions as are founded on an infallible experience, he expects the event with the last degree of assurance, and regards his past experience as a full proof of the future existence of that event. In other cases, he proceeds with more caution: He weighs the opposite experiments: He considers which side is supported by the greater number of experiments: to that side he inclines, with doubt and hesitation; and when at last he fixes his judgement, the evidence exceeds not what we properly call probability. All probability, then, supposes an opposition of experiments and observations, where the one side is found to overbalance the other, and to produce a degree of evidence, proportioned to the superiority. A hundred instances or experiments on one side, and fifty on another, afford a doubtful expectation of any event; though a hundred uniform experiments, with only one that is contradictory, reasonably beget a pretty strong degree of assurance. In all cases, we must balance the opposite experiments, where they are opposite, and deduct the smaller number from the greater, in order to know the exact force of the superior evidence.

[seer]

A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence. In such conclusions as are founded on an infallible experience, he expects the event with the last degree of assurance, and regards his past experience as a full proof of the future existence of that event.

You are making the point in the OP:

1. Experience is not infallible.

2. Past experience is not proof of the future existence of a particular event.

First formulated by David Hume, the problem of induction questions our reasons for believing that the future will resemble the past, or more broadly it questions predictions about unobserved things based on previous observations. This inference from the observed to the unobserved is known as "inductive inferences", and Hume, while acknowledging that everyone does and must make such inferences, argued that there is no non-circular way to justify them.

Not only doesn't past experience give proof of similar future experiences, to make the leap one must argue in a circle. So the whole probability argument is based on inductive reasoning that begs the question.

[Stoic]

You are making the point in the OP:

1. Experience is not infallible.

2. Past experience is not proof of the future existence of a particular event.



Not only doesn't past experience give proof of similar future experiences, to make the leap one must argue in a circle. So the whole probability argument is based on inductive reasoning that begs the question.

So you aren't really arguing against Hume.

“A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined."

An argument from experience is not infallible (as Hume has stated), but we generally accept them.

[seer]

So you aren't really arguing against Hume.

“A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined."

An argument from experience is not infallible (as Hume has stated), but we generally accept them.

No Hume is arguing against Hume! The argument from experience is based on induction, it is circular, or question begging.

Look at the contradiction in what you quoted above:

a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws

An argument from experience is not infallible

If experience is fallible, it is not unalterable.

[Hypatia_Alexandria]

What independent and attested evidence can you produce that demonstrates natural laws have never been violated?

I am not the individual alleging that miracles which violate the natural laws can take place.

[seer]

I am not the individual alleging that miracles which violate the natural laws can take place.

I made no such claim. The point of this thread is Hume's irrational argument against miracles.

[Hypatia_Alexandria]

I made no such claim.

I think walking on water or bringing back someone from the dead would be a violation of natural law as WE understand them. There may be higher physical laws or principles that could be employed to override said laws as we understand them. But that in a sense would still be a miracle to us.

We also have to consider those alleged miracles within their contemporary socio-religious context.

[seer]

We also have to consider those alleged miracles within their contemporary socio-religious context.

I was responding to Faber's point about miracles, I wasn't arguing for the reality of miracles. The point of this thread is to demonstrate that there are no good empirical or logical arguments against the possibility of miracles. And I'm not sure what you mean by contemporary socio-religious context - I doubt that most religionists of that time would have accepted the idea of a man walking on water. It would have shocked them as much as it does us.

[Machinist]

The point of this thread is to demonstrate that there are no good empirical or logical arguments against the possibility of miracles.

Inductive arguments are the only option. One can only argue inductively against the possibility of miracles.

That's already been stated, I know...I'm only putting into different words to build further understanding for myself.

[Machinist]

It seems like you could argue that the validity and soundness of deductive arguments, even, can only be supported by inductive arguments...e.g. Deductive arguments have always been sound, thus they always will be.

That doesn't work though does it? I can't put it into words right now, but that just wrong.