The Gettier Problem and epistomology

[Paprika]

I have to admit curiosity regarding how teleology exists without theology. How is that things have final causes without something giving that cause to them?

Hmm, my usage of 'teleological' may have been a bit inaccurate. See my post above. Plantinga builds on the assumption that a mind has some proper functions, analogous to the functions of biological organs.

[Carrikature]

Hmm, my usage of 'teleological' may have been a bit inaccurate. See my post above. Plantinga builds on the assumption that a mind has some proper functions, analogous to the functions of biological organs.

I'm not sure it is inaccurate, actually. A proper function indicates there's a right and a wrong way to do it. How could that be, unless something set the 'right way'?

*will be reading WCB*

[shunyadragon]

Hmm, my usage of 'teleological' may have been a bit inaccurate. See my post above. Plantinga builds on the assumption that a mind has some proper functions, analogous to the functions of biological organs.

Plantinga uses the Teleological Argument specifically in an attempt to disprove the possibility of Natural Evolution, arguing for the necessity of 'Intelligent Design. If not arguing for God, maybe aliens are responsible? Plantinga's arguments come primarily from Thomas Aquina's 'Five Arguments for the existence of God. Have you read Plantinga's arguments????

A teleological or physico-theological argument, also known as an argument from design, or from intelligent design, is an argument for the existence of God, or more generally of some kind of intelligent agent of creation, based upon proposed empirical evidence of human-like design or purpose in nature.[1] The argument goes back to Greek philosophy but is today central to the creationist religious concepts of creation science and intelligent design which are presented as alternative scientific explanations in opposition to evolution theory.

[Paprika]

Plantinga uses the Teleological Argument specifically in an attempt to disprove the possibility of Natural Evolution, arguing for the necessity of 'Intelligent Design. If not arguing for God, maybe aliens are responsible? Plantinga's arguments come primarily from Thomas Aquina's 'Five Arguments for the existence of God.

Yes, but he's not using that teleological argument to support his warrant system. He uses a an analogy from biology as an axiom: biological structures such as organs have functions, so similarly our minds are likely to have some functions. What then are the mind's functions, and what is their relation to knowledge?

[Paprika]

For those interested in Plantinga's work on warrant, I recommend reading his Warranted Christian Belief. Based on his previous two works on warrant, he tackes the issue of whether some Christian beliefs are warranted.

You can read it online or download it here for free.

[shunyadragon]

Plantinga epistemology -As far as I can see, and checking other references, his arguments for 'Theory of Warrant,' properly basic, and 'proper functionalism' are applied only to theistic arguments. Please reference alternatives, and avoid meaningless ridicule.

Plantinga's contributions to epistemology include an argument which he dubs "Reformed epistemology". According to Reformed epistemology, belief in God can be rational and justified even without arguments or evidence for the existence of God. More specifically, Plantinga argues that belief in God is properly basic, and due to a religious externalist epistemology, he claims belief in God could be justified independently of evidence. His externalist epistemology, called "Proper functionalism", is a form of epistemological reliabilism.[38]

Plantinga discusses his view of Reformed epistemology and Proper functionalism in a three-volume series. In the first book of the trilogy, Warrant: The Current Debate, Plantinga introduces, analyzes, and criticizes 20th-century developments in analytic epistemology, particularly the works of Chisholm, BonJour, Alston, Goldman, and others.[39][40] In the book, Plantinga argues specifically that the theories of what he calls “warrant”- what many others have called justification- put forth by these epistemologists have systematically failed to capture in full what is required for knowledge.[41]

In the second book, Warrant and Proper Function, he introduces the notion of warrant as an alternative to justification and discusses topics like self-knowledge, memories, perception, and probability.[42] Plantinga's "proper function" account argues that as a necessary condition of having warrant, one's "belief-forming and belief-maintaining apparatus of powers" are functioning properly—"working the way it ought to work".[43] Plantinga explains his argument for proper function with reference to a "design plan", as well as an environment in which one's cognitive equipment is optimal for use. Plantinga asserts that the design plan does not require a designer: "it is perhaps possible that evolution (undirected by God or anyone else) has somehow furnished us with our design plans",[44] but the paradigm case of a design plan is like a technological product designed by a human being (like a radio or a wheel). Ultimately, Plantinga argues that epistemological naturalism- i.e. epistemology that holds that warrant is dependent on natural faculties - is best supported by supernaturalist metaphysics - in this case the belief in a creator God or designer who has laid out a design plan that includes cognitive faculties conducive to attaining knowledge.[45]

According to Plantinga, a belief, B, is warranted if:


(1) the cognitive faculties involved in the production of B are functioning properly…; (2) your cognitive environment is sufficiently similar to the one for which your cognitive faculties are designed; (3) … the design plan governing the production of the belief in question involves, as purpose or function, the production of true beliefs…; and (4) the design plan is a good one: that is, there is a high statistical or objective probability that a belief produced in accordance with the relevant segment of the design plan in that sort of environment is true.

[Outis]

The Gettier problems are simple to resolve. In each case, the "justification" of the belief is in error. The belief is not justified, it simply seems to be, due to an artifact of the situations as described.

Quoting one example from Wikipedia:

Smith has applied for a job, but, it is claimed, has a justified belief that "Jones will get the job". He also has a justified belief that "Jones has 10 coins in his pocket". Smith therefore (justifiably) concludes (by the rule of the transitivity of identity) that "the man who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket".

In fact, Jones does not get the job. Instead, Smith does. However, as it happens, Smith (unknowingly and by sheer chance) also had 10 coins in his pocket. So his belief that "the man who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket" was justified and true. But it does not appear to be knowledge.

Gettier never provided an explanation as to why Smith's belief that "Jones will get the job" was justified. Obviously, if Jones didn't get the job, it was not. Smith then uses this unjustified belief to extrapolate other information. He was technically correct only in the sense of a broken clock being technically correct twice a day.

Because Smith's belief that "Jones will get the job" was not accurate, any correct assumption based on that belief is not "knowledge"--it's simply an artifact of Smith's error.

[Outis]

Firstly, the teleological nature of Plantinga's warrant system is not necessarily religious. As he says in Warrant and Proper Function, "We are accustomed to hearing about biological functions for various bodily organs. The heart, the kidneys, and the pituitary gland, we're told have functions--things that they are, in this sense supposed to do.." In the work Plantinga goes on to discuss epistemological topics from the perspective of his warrant system, such as the problem of other minds (chapter 4), [sense] perception (chapter 5), a priori knowledge (chapter 6), the problem of induction (chapter 7) and so on.

These are hardly religious but classic philosophical problems and issues.

This is not a case of teleology: this is a case of functionality. Teleology is the study of design, purpose, and intent: contra Aristotle, you cannot have intent without having (in Aristotle's words) "an agent deliberating." This is avoided today in science, because science is not competent to evaluate the question. There may or may not be a God ... I don't know. But science is not the tool to use to decide the question.

Plantinga is either unaware of this, or refuses to accept it, but by invoking teleology into the argument, he is indeed "frontloading" his assumptions.

[Carrikature]

The Gettier problems are simple to resolve. In each case, the "justification" of the belief is in error. The belief is not justified, it simply seems to be, due to an artifact of the situations as described.

Quoting one example from Wikipedia:




Gettier never provided an explanation as to why Smith's belief that "Jones will get the job" was justified. Obviously, if Jones didn't get the job, it was not. Smith then uses this unjustified belief to extrapolate other information. He was technically correct only in the sense of a broken clock being technically correct twice a day.

Because Smith's belief that "Jones will get the job" was not accurate, any correct assumption based on that belief is not "knowledge"--it's simply an artifact of Smith's error.

If they're so simple to resolve, why is it that 50 years later epistemologists are still trying to do so? I admit that the particular example is a bad one, but there are sufficient alternative examples to still establish Gettier's point.

[Outis]

If they're so simple to resolve, why is it that 50 years later epistemologists are still trying to do so? I admit that the particular example is a bad one, but there are sufficient alternative examples to still establish Gettier's point.

Because my solution undermines the theory of justification. If something can seem to be justified, but is actually in error, justification is an uncertain standard.

My "solution" actually reintroduces problems that the theory of justification had already solved ... I'm of the opinion that the "solution" provided by the Theory of Justification was actually a false lead (more accurately, it's not universally applicable and is subject to messy errors).

[shunyadragon]

Because my solution undermines the theory of justification. If something can seem to be justified, but is actually in error, justification is an uncertain standard.

My "solution" actually reintroduces problems that the theory of justification had already solved ... I'm of the opinion that the "solution" provided by the Theory of Justification was actually a false lead (more accurately, it's not universally applicable and is subject to messy errors).

Good response. I still consider the problems of Theory of Warrant will be similar and must face the Gettier Problem as does Tripartite theory of knowledge (JTB).

[Paprika]

Plantinga epistemology -As far as I can see, and checking other references, his arguments for 'Theory of Warrant,' properly basic, and 'proper functionalism' are applied only to theistic arguments. Please reference alternatives, and avoid meaningless ridicule.

LOL Wikipedia. I've already shown that in one of his works Plantinga applies his warrant theory to classic philosophical problems. Stop being dense.

[Paprika]

The Gettier problems are simple to resolve. In each case, the "justification" of the belief is in error. The belief is not justified, it simply seems to be, due to an artifact of the situations as described.

Quoting one example from Wikipedia:




Gettier never provided an explanation as to why Smith's belief that "Jones will get the job" was justified. Obviously, if Jones didn't get the job, it was not. Smith then uses this unjustified belief to extrapolate other information. He was technically correct only in the sense of a broken clock being technically correct twice a day.

Because Smith's belief that "Jones will get the job" was not accurate, any correct assumption based on that belief is not "knowledge"--it's simply an artifact of Smith's error.

LOL Wikipedia. It's not a matter of just resolving one Gettier problem, but resolving all of the different types of Gettier problems.

[Paprika]

This is not a case of teleology: this is a case of functionality. Teleology is the study of design, purpose, and intent: contra Aristotle, you cannot have intent without having (in Aristotle's words) "an agent deliberating." This is avoided today in science, because science is not competent to evaluate the question. There may or may not be a God ... I don't know. But science is not the tool to use to decide the question.

Plantinga is either unaware of this, or refuses to accept it, but by invoking teleology into the argument, he is indeed "frontloading" his assumptions.

I don't recall Plantinga ever calling his warrant theory teleological, only myself, and I later conceded that it may have been an inaccurate description. He invokes "function" analagous to the "function" biologists assign to various biological structures.

[Paprika]

Good response. I still consider the problems of Theory of Warrant will be similar and must face the Gettier Problem.

Right. Do demonstrate it; I would love to see it.