The Gettier Problem and epistomology

[shunyadragon]

Philosophers who believe that Gettier-style arguments pose a substantial problem for the tripartite theory of knowledge vastly outnumber those who do not. In this series, I’m going to throw my lot in with the latter group and argue that Gettier arguments do not present substantial counterexamples to the justified true belief theory of knowledge as commonly construed. I will argue that while Gettier arguments do surface some problems in epistemology, they do not undermine JTB. Specifically, I will argue that JTB describes the justification of beliefs while Gettier arguments merely show the limitations of language that reference beliefs. I will argue that most Gettier-style counterexamples fail to make a distinction between a proposition (or a statement that exemplifies a proposition) and beliefs about or of propositions.

This is sort of a learning thread for me to understand the Gettier Problem and the claim of Tripartite theory of knowledge (JTB - Justification, Truth and Belief.). The above is the beginning of a rather lengthy argument for the conditional acceptance of some arguments for some cases for knowledge based on JTB. I think a great deal of Plantinga's arguments are based on JTB, which I have never at this point accept as an adequate justification for knowledge, therefore Justified True Belief. I have up to now consider the Justification for True Belief as portrayed by Plantinga too subjective to be consistently applied as a basis of consistent knowledge.

[Carrikature]

This is sort of a learning thread for me to understand the Gettier Problem and the claim of Tripartite theory of knowledge (JTB - Justification, Truth and Belief.). The above is the beginning of a rather lengthy argument for the conditional acceptance of some arguments for some cases for knowledge based on JTB. I think a great deal of Plantinga's arguments are based on JTB, which I have never at this point accept as an adequate justification for knowledge, therefore Justified True Belief. I have up to now consider the Justification for True Belief as portrayed by Plantinga too subjective to be consistently applied as a basis of consistent knowledge.

Just for reference:

Source: The Tripartite Analysis of Knowledge

S knows that p iff

(i) p is true;
(ii) S believes that p;
(iii) S is justified in believing that p.

© Copyright Original Source

The first two are generally beyond debate. The third is quite the opposite. What counts as justification? If you have what normally counts as justification, but it's wrong, then what? Is it still knowledge? These last two questions are the root of Gettier Problems.

[Paprika]

Platinga doesn't believe that traditional JTB suffices due to Gettier-style problems, and therefore developed his theory of warrant.

[shunyadragon]

Platinga doesn't believe that traditional JTB suffices due to Gettier-style problems, and therefore developed his theory of warrant.

I consider the Theory of Warrant also still weak, because of the subjective nature of religious belief. In other words I do not think he gets around the problem. In relation to this I will look more closely again as to the nature of his 'Theory of Warrant,' because it has been a while. I believe it remains a version of JTB.

I looked again and find this to be problematic 'Virtue Epistomology' is too vague to justify a specific claim. This could be used to justify any one of many conflicting beliefs.

Plantinga's theory of warrant

Alvin Plantinga offers another theory of knowledge closely related to virtue epistemology. According to him, knowledge is warranted if one's intellectual faculties are operating as they are designed to. That is, knowledge is valid if it is obtained through the correct operation of the faculties of the intellect which are designed to have an inherent ability, because they are designed that way, to capture and produce true beliefs.

Potential advantages of virtue epistemology

Some varieties of virtue epistemology that contain normative elements, such as virtue responsibilism, can provide a unified framework of normativity and value. Others, such as Sosa's account, can circumvent Cartesian skepticism with the necessity of externalism interacting with internalism. In this same vein, and because of the inherent flexibility and social nature of some of types of virtue epistemology, social conditioning and influence can be understood within an epistemological framework and explored. This flexibility and connection between internal and external makes virtue epistemology more accessible

[shunyadragon]

Just for reference:

Source: The Tripartite Analysis of Knowledge

S knows that p iff

(i) p is true;
(ii) S believes that p;
(iii) S is justified in believing that p.

© Copyright Original Source

The first two are generally beyond debate. The third is quite the opposite. What counts as justification? If you have what normally counts as justification, but it's wrong, then what? Is it still knowledge? These last two questions are the root of Gettier Problems.

I believe (i) p is true. is dependent on: What is the basis for claiming p is true?

[Carrikature]

I believe (i) p is true. is dependent on: What is the basis for claiming p is true?

That's a misunderstanding of its treatment, then. Either p is true or it isn't. If you want to look at basis, that's a discussion of (iii).

[shunyadragon]

That's a misunderstanding of its treatment, then. Either p is true or it isn't. If you want to look at basis, that's a discussion of (iii).

Please explain, if (I) p is true, and (iii) S is justified believing in p. How does (iii) justified questioning whether p is true or not?

[Carrikature]

Please explain, if (I) p is true, and (iii) S is justified believing in p. How does (iii) justified questioning whether p is true or not?

It might help to start with an example. In order to have knowledge of gravity (p), gravity must actually exist as a force (i). The person in question (S) has to believe that gravity exists (ii), and they have to believe it in a way that is justified (iii). For gravity, justification could be something akin to repeated observations that what goes up comes back down.

Part (i) is simply saying that it's impossible to know something that is false. Knowledge can only refer to true statements. Part (ii) says that a person must actually believe (i) in order for it to count as knowledge. If a person doesn't believe (i), they don't have knowledge. Part (iii) says that a person must have justification for their belief (read: logically valid reasoning which leads to the given conclusion). The problem is that 'logically valid' doesn't imply soundness. It's perfectly possible for the premises to be false, the reasoning valid, and the conclusion true. Gettier's question, then, is essentially "Can a true conclusion reached by valid reasoning based on false premises count as knowledge?" Most people say that it does not count, but as yet no one has come up with a foolproof way of redefining knowledge.

[Paprika]

I consider the Theory of Warrant also still weak, because of the subjective nature of religious belief.

Have you actually read any of his works on warrant? Warrant doesn't have any explicit theological basis. It has, however, a strongly teleological bent.

[shunyadragon]

Have you actually read any of his works on warrant? Warrant doesn't have any explicit theological basis. It has, however, a strongly teleological bent.

Yes I have. There is a nebulous difference between 'explicit theological basis and strong teleological bent. The teleological argument for design is a very poor argument for the existence of God. As far as I know the Theory of Warrant is only used to deal with theological belief. You may help with a better explanation of the Theory of Warrant and 'strong teleological bent.'

[Paprika]

As far as I know the Theory of Warrant is only used to deal with theological belief.

Now really, it is funny to see you expose your ignorance for all to see, but you should really go do the research.

[seer]

Now really, it is funny to see you expose your ignorance for all to see, but you should really go do the research.

Well it wouldn't be the first time...

[shunyadragon]

Now really, it is funny to see you expose your ignorance for all to see, but you should really go do the research.

OK, please give a references where it is used outside theological claims of the nature of belief and knowledge. Citations please. I said, 'As far as I know.' I can find no references that indicate the Theory of Warrant is referred to outside the justification of a belief system as Plantinga proposed it.

[Paprika]

OK, please give a references where it is used outside theological claims of the nature of belief and knowledge. Citations please.

Firstly, the teleological nature of Plantinga's warrant system is not necessarily religious. As he says in Warrant and Proper Function, "We are accustomed to hearing about biological functions for various bodily organs. The heart, the kidneys, and the pituitary gland, we're told have functions--things that they are, in this sense supposed to do.." In the work Plantinga goes on to discuss epistemological topics from the perspective of his warrant system, such as the problem of other minds (chapter 4), [sense] perception (chapter 5), a priori knowledge (chapter 6), the problem of induction (chapter 7) and so on.

These are hardly religious but classic philosophical problems and issues.

[Carrikature]

Have you actually read any of his works on warrant? Warrant doesn't have any explicit theological basis. It has, however, a strongly teleological bent.

I have to admit curiosity regarding how teleology exists without theology. How is that things have final causes without something giving that cause to them?