The Inner Life: Beyond Science?

[seer]

Pure conjecture! There is no good reason to think “there are features of our experienced reality that can't (even in principle) be explained under materialism”.

Sure there is, and though he is an atheist, Sam Harris said exactly that about consciousness.

[Yttrium]

Perhaps what Seer is driving at is the idea that there are features of our experienced reality that can't (even in principle) be explained under materialism. If this is the case, then it is a problem for materialism because it claims that reality is purely material (and thus potentially fully explainable in those terms).

True. But how would we determine what we can't ever explain under materialism?

[MaxVel]

True. But how would we determine what we can't ever explain under materialism?

Well, in Nagel's famous essay (which seer cited) he says:

We may call this the subjective character of experience. It is not captured by any of the familiar, recently devised reductive analyses of the mental, for all of them are logically compatible with its absence. It is not analyzable in terms of any explanatory system of functional states, or intentional states, since these could be ascribed to robots or automata that behaved like people though they experienced nothing.2 It is not analyzable in terms of the causal role of experiences in relation to typical human behavior—for similar reasons. 3

I do not deny that conscious mental states and events cause behavior, nor that they may be given functional characterizations. I deny only that this kind of thing exhausts their analysis. Any reductionist program has to be based on an analysis of what is to be reduced. If the analysis leaves something out, the
problem will be falsely posed. It is useless to base the defense of materialism on any analysis of mental phenomena that fails to deal explicitly with their subjective character. For there is no reason to suppose that a reduction which seems plausible when no attempt is made to account for consciousness can be
extended to include consciousness. With out some idea, therefore, of what the subjective character of experience is, we cannot know what is required of physicalist theory.

So he's arguing that there aspects of reality - subjective experiences, what it is like to be a bat, to see red, etc - that cannot be captured by any reduction to a physical, objective point of view.

Feser argues in his book, Scholastic Metaphysics, that science wonderfully describes quantitative aspects of our world, but (in order to be effective as a method) ignores the qualitative aspects. He goes on to say (p.15) "The problem is that this method entails that the mind itself cannot be treated as part of the material world, given how mind and matter are characterized by the method. If mater, including the matter of the brain, is essentially devoid of qualitative features, and mind is essentially defined by its possession of qualitative features, then the mind cannot be material."

[firstfloor]

... then the mind cannot be material."

The mind is a process. Processes can be studied scientifically. Although we modern human minds have discovered (quite recently) where we are located physically (in the brain) that knowledge is not apparent ab initio to the brain itself. The mind does not say, for example, that I wish to remember x and therefore I will store x at location y. All the workings of the mind and even the site itself are hidden. This is why the mind/body relationship is so difficult to comprehend.

[shunyadragon]

Perhaps what Seer is driving at is the idea that there are features of our experienced reality that can't (even in principle) be explained under materialism. If this is the case, then it is a problem for materialism because it claims that reality is purely material (and thus potentially fully explainable in those terms).

This is likely what seer is proposing, but unfortunately it is an unwarranted conclusion. The objective observable aspects of the mind cannot be concluded that it only represents the soul. The claim of materialism that reality is purely material is also an unwarranted conclusion. The science of Methodological Naturalism is neutral to either claim. Yes, science is perfectly able to explain the material relationship between the mind and the brain. The soul can very well possess all the attributes of the mind, and not be the mind.

I consider it a problem when theists take a combative negative position science to justify when science cannot deal with the spiritual nature of our existence either way

[Yttrium]

So he's arguing that there aspects of reality - subjective experiences, what it is like to be a bat, to see red, etc - that cannot be captured by any reduction to a physical, objective point of view.

I would say that it simply remains to be seen whether we can scientifically study such experiences.

[seer]

I would say that it simply remains to be seen whether we can scientifically study such experiences.

How could you, or science, know, even in principle, what it is like for me to feel pain, sorrow or joy?

[MaxVel]

This is likely what seer is proposing, but unfortunately it is an unwarranted conclusion. The objective observable aspects of the mind cannot be concluded that it only represents the soul. The claim of materialism that reality is purely material is also an unwarranted conclusion. The science of Methodological Naturalism is neutral to either claim. Yes, science is perfectly able to explain the material relationship between the mind and the brain. The soul can very well possess all the attributes of the mind, and not be the mind.

I consider it a problem when theists take a combative negative position science to justify when science cannot deal with the spiritual nature of our existence either way

Please quote me accurately and cease mis-representing my position.


Or you could just stop posting stream-of-incoherence stuff that doesn't really address what I'm actually saying.

[seer]

Or you could just stop posting stream-of-incoherence stuff that doesn't really address what I'm actually saying.

Can a leopard change his spots? This is why many of us have put him on ignore.

[MaxVel]

I would say that it simply remains to be seen whether we can scientifically study such experiences.

You could say that, but then you'd be simply ignoring the force of the objection to materialism - namely, that it seems that science (as currently conceived of by materialists) can't study certain things that we experience, because they are defined as not being real features of the world.

[lilpixieofterror]

Can a leopard change his spots? This is why many of us have put him on ignore.

I personally find it amusing to watch a person, who claims to be a theist, argue and talk just like an atheist.

[seer]

I personally find it amusing to watch a person, who claims to be a theist, argue and talk just like an atheist.

That is true, I don't think I have ever seen him take the side of the theist. Shuny, considers himself a man of science - though he probably only took some courses at his local community college. So he craves the applause of those more scientific than himself to fill up what is lacking in himself.

[shunyadragon]

Please quote me accurately and cease mis-representing my position.

Or you could just stop posting stream-of-incoherence stuff that doesn't really address what I'm actually saying.

I will consider this a non-answer since I was commenting on seer's proposal, not yours. Seer considers the mind the soul, and in some cases beyond the reach of science. At present there is no reason science cannot explain the workings of the mind in relationship to the brain. They are doing very well with present technology.

[pancreasman]

There is no doubt the problem of subjective conscious experience is a hard one. Mind you, we haven't been working on it all that long. Neuroscientists have made great discoveries in how memory and perception work. We understand the chemical nature of the emotional life.

In general, of course there may exist phenomena that are beyond the scope of science to explain. However history is one long testimony to insoluble problems being solved in the next generation. If I was betting man I'd say the odds are pretty much stacked in favour of science going on past experience.

To say that science WILL NOT explain something is to make an assertion which is in itself unprovable, which is kind of ironic when you think about it.

[seer]

There is no doubt the problem of subjective conscious experience is a hard one. Mind you, we haven't been working on it all that long. Neuroscientists have made great discoveries in how memory and perception work. We understand the chemical nature of the emotional life.

In general, of course there may exist phenomena that are beyond the scope of science to explain. However history is one long testimony to insoluble problems being solved in the next generation. If I was betting man I'd say the odds are pretty much stacked in favour of science going on past experience.

To say that science WILL NOT explain something is to make an assertion which is in itself unprovable, which is kind of ironic when you think about it.

There are good reason to suggest that this problem is beyond science. For instance look at what you said - yes we do understand the chemical nature underpinning emotions, but how does that tell you or science how I personally experience pain or joy or suffering? There simply seems to be no jumping off point for science to begin with. Here is a short interesting talk by Chalmers.

http://www.ted.com/talks/david_chalm..._consciousness