Dear seer,
Sincerely,
An honest person
You're lying. That is not what the link says. You are, once again, misrepresenting and quote-mining sources that you don't understand.
The source notes that people once thought this, in large part, due to Moore's open question argument (OQA):
What you left out (in your usual dishonesty) and what I already knew, was that naturalists already have a response to that point, and have had it for at least 30 years. In fact, they have multiple responses. But the most standard one is to note that one can have a naturalistic reduction (via a synthetic identity, or a supervenience relationship) without needing a semantic reduction. The source in question notes as much. For example:
Why did you leave that out of your quote-mine, seer?
Why do you constantly misrepresent sources on topics you don't understand, simply to preserve your pet theological position? You've done this time and time again.
First, you really don't understand what Moore is saying at all. He's not just claiming that moral realism is incomptable with naturalism. He's saying moral realism is incompatible with any position that identifies moral properties with any other kind of property. That includes your position, seer. For example, Moore would deny goodness can be identified with God's nature, God's commands, and so on. So if you tried to offer the following as of what is morally good:
Second, Moore is wrong and I explained to you above one reason why Moore is wrong. So it's irrelevant whether or not Moore disagrees with me; you might as well try to object to evolutionary biology by pointing out that some person from the early 20th century disagreed with evolution. As you've been told before, your arguments from disagreement are fallacious.
Third, many theists (such as William Lane Craig and Alston) object to Moore's argument on the same grounds that moral naturalists do: that one can have metaphysical reductions without semantic reductions. In fact, those theists (with the exception of Putnam) lifted those defenses from moral naturalists like Boyd, when they applied those defenses to meta-ethics. These theists did this since (unlike you, seer) they actually bothered to understand Moore's argument and realize that Moore's argument (if it worked) would rebut any theological attempt to identify moral properties with aspects of God.
Now, please try to display the intellectual honesty (which I suspect you don't have) and address the questions above. And also, please avoid misrepresenting/quote-mining sources that you don't really understand. People won't fall for your bluff, and you likely will get caught.
You did not honestly address the questions you were asked. Please address them:
Is moral realism a meta-ethical position, or is it a position in normative ethics?
Was Moore a moral realist?
Is the open question argument an objection to moral realism?
Was Moore a moral realist?
Is the open question argument an objection to moral realism?
Sincerely,
An honest person
Originally posted by seer
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The source notes that people once thought this, in large part, due to Moore's open question argument (OQA):
"Moral realists, in contrast, are standardly seen as unable to sustain their accounts without appealing, in the end, to putative facts that fly in the face of naturalism. This standard view can be traced to a powerful and influential argument offered by G.E. Moore (1903)."
What you left out (in your usual dishonesty) and what I already knew, was that naturalists already have a response to that point, and have had it for at least 30 years. In fact, they have multiple responses. But the most standard one is to note that one can have a naturalistic reduction (via a synthetic identity, or a supervenience relationship) without needing a semantic reduction. The source in question notes as much. For example:
"For a long time, people thought that Moore’s Open Question Argument (as it has come to be called) established that no version of moral naturalism was defensible. However, recent developments in the philosophy of language and metaphysics have raised concerns about Moore’s argument. Of special concern is the fact that the argument seems to rule out inappropriately the possibility of establishing—on grounds other than semantic analysis—that two terms actually refer to the same property, substance, or entity."
Why did you leave that out of your quote-mine, seer?
Why do you constantly misrepresent sources on topics you don't understand, simply to preserve your pet theological position? You've done this time and time again.
And against the possible justifications Moore would say: Against every one, he maintain, a single line of argument was decisive. For in each case, whatever naturalistic definition of moral terms was on offer, it always made sense to ask, of things that had the naturalistic property in question, whether those things were (really) good.
So Moore is saying that moral realism is not compatible with naturalism. Correct?
So Moore is saying that moral realism is not compatible with naturalism. Correct?
"What is morally good is what accords with God's nature"
Moore would reject that definition. He would note that (to use your disingenuous quote-mine):it always made sense to ask, of things that had the divine property in question, whether those things were (really) good. For Moore, you simply cannot have moral properties be identical to other properties, whether those are natural properties or divine properties. Second, Moore is wrong and I explained to you above one reason why Moore is wrong. So it's irrelevant whether or not Moore disagrees with me; you might as well try to object to evolutionary biology by pointing out that some person from the early 20th century disagreed with evolution. As you've been told before, your arguments from disagreement are fallacious.
Third, many theists (such as William Lane Craig and Alston) object to Moore's argument on the same grounds that moral naturalists do: that one can have metaphysical reductions without semantic reductions. In fact, those theists (with the exception of Putnam) lifted those defenses from moral naturalists like Boyd, when they applied those defenses to meta-ethics. These theists did this since (unlike you, seer) they actually bothered to understand Moore's argument and realize that Moore's argument (if it worked) would rebut any theological attempt to identify moral properties with aspects of God.
Now, please try to display the intellectual honesty (which I suspect you don't have) and address the questions above. And also, please avoid misrepresenting/quote-mining sources that you don't really understand. People won't fall for your bluff, and you likely will get caught.
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