Announcement

Collapse

Apologetics 301 Guidelines

If you think this is the area where you tell everyone you are sorry for eating their lunch out of the fridge, it probably isn't the place for you


This forum is open discussion between atheists and all theists to defend and debate their views on religion or non-religion. Please respect that this is a Christian-owned forum and refrain from gratuitous blasphemy. VERY wide leeway is given in range of expression and allowable behavior as compared to other areas of the forum, and moderation is not overly involved unless necessary. Please keep this in mind. Atheists who wish to interact with theists in a way that does not seek to undermine theistic faith may participate in the World Religions Department. Non-debate question and answers and mild and less confrontational discussions can take place in General Theistics.


Forum Rules: Here
See more
See less

Moral Realism?

Collapse
X
 
  • Filter
  • Time
  • Show
Clear All
new posts

  • #76
    Originally posted by Yttrium View Post
    I'm still not seeing it. Maybe I need some clear examples. Let's look at this:



    So the objective truth is... what? Someone wasn't killed? Is there some reinforcement that shows that this is a good thing?

    Let's say that Roderick knows that Irving has murdered a lot of people, and he sees every sign that Irving is going to keep murdering a lot of people. Roderick has the opportunity to kill Irving to stop him, but he doesn't, because he follows a moral of not killing people. Then Irving goes and murders a lot more people. What is the objective truth you might see in this situation? If the answer is that stuff happens, which is objectively true, then I don't see a point to moral realism.
    Well lets say that both Roderick and Irving have the same desire to live as everyone else does, the moral imperative then "thou shalt not kill" serves both their and everyone elses desire not to be killed. The moral is objective in that it serves the purpose intended, even though it is not objective unto itself. If the moral were objective unto itself, it would serve the same purpose and could also be violated as in your particular case in point. The only difference I can see between the two is in whom or in what the authority behind the moral lies. If the moral is objective unto itself, then there is no authority since a moral itself is not authoritative, which of course would leave any authority behind the law being a subjective one..

    Comment


    • #77
      Originally posted by JimL View Post
      Well lets say that both Roderick and Irving have the same desire to live as everyone else does, the moral imperative then "thou shalt not kill" serves both their and everyone elses desire not to be killed. The moral is objective in that it serves the purpose intended, even though it is not objective unto itself. If the moral were objective unto itself, it would serve the same purpose and could also be violated as in your particular case in point. The only difference I can see between the two is in whom or in what the authority behind the moral lies. If the moral is objective unto itself, then there is no authority since a moral itself is not authoritative, which of course would leave any authority behind the law being a subjective one..
      I was just wondering if there was some moral objective fact that moral realism could point to here.
      Middle-of-the-road swing voter. Feel free to sway my opinion.

      Comment


      • #78
        Originally posted by Yttrium View Post
        I was just wondering if there was some moral objective fact that moral realism could point to here.
        There are none.
        “I think God, in creating man, somewhat overestimated his ability.” ― Oscar Wilde
        “And if there were a God, I think it very unlikely that He would have such an uneasy vanity as to be offended by those who doubt His existence” ― Bertrand Russell
        “not all there” - you know who you are

        Comment


        • #79
          Originally posted by Yttrium View Post
          I was just wondering if there was some moral objective fact that moral realism could point to here.
          I think it safe to say that the objective facts are those things that the morals are intended to defend. I would think that it is an objective fact held by all that they not be murdered, robbed, raped, etc etc.

          Comment


          • #80
            Originally posted by seer View Post
            Yes. I agree that is what you believe.
            That was not the question you were asked; I did not ask you whether or not you agreed that that was what I believed. So please stop the evasive nonsense. I asked:
            Do you think the OP's definition of moral realism is correct?

            If you're answer is "Yes", then you're committed to accepting that moral realism is an objectivist position, not a subjectivist one; so you can drop your claims about moral realism being subjective.


            Feel free to answer the question directly this time, as opposed to pretending that the question was something else.
            Last edited by Jichard; 05-17-2015, 07:17 PM.
            "Instead, we argue, it is necessary to shift the debate from the subject under consideration, instead exposing to public scrutiny the tactics they [denialists] employ and identifying them publicly for what they are."

            Comment


            • #81
              Originally posted by Jichard View Post
              That was not the question you were asked; I did not ask you whether or not you agreed that that was what I believed. So please stop the evasive nonsense. I asked:
              Do you think the OP's definition of moral realism is correct?

              If you're answer is "Yes", then you're committed to accepting that moral realism is an objectivist position, not a subjectivist one; so you can drop your claims about moral realism being subjective.


              Feel free to answer the question directly this time, as opposed to pretending that the question was something else.
              Yes I agree moral realism is an objectivist position - except it is not true. OK, now answer mine - how can moral truths exist apart from minds. Be mind-independent?
              Last edited by seer; 05-17-2015, 08:19 PM.
              Atheism is the cult of death, the death of hope. The universe is doomed, you are doomed, the only thing that remains is to await your execution...

              https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jbnueb2OI4o&t=3s

              Comment


              • #82
                Originally posted by Jichard View Post
                Sorry, not interested in your goalpost moves. You were given an argument that addressed a claim you made. You've resorted to pretending that argument doesn't exist. So I'm going to repeat the argument until you have the honesty and decency to address it:
                "Some have observed in defense of Moral Rationalism, for example, that if an agent does something we consider morally wrong, then we blame (or resent) him. But blame, these philosophers claim, involves the judgment that the agent had reasons not to do what he did. Consequently blame is unwarranted when such judgments are unwarranted (Nagel 1970, Smith 1994). Therefore, since moral wrongdoing is sufficient to warrant blame, moral obligations must entail reasons (section 2.3).""
                Let's say this argument holds up. I do not know a single objective moral reason, only subjective ones, so I would appreciate it if you could list even one. Previously you wrote:

                Source: Jichard

                The general analysis: we have moral obligations because there are moral reasons for actions, developing certain character traits, and so on. That's the standard analysis: obligations arise from reasons. And moral reasons are constituted by the properties/features discussed in welfare utilitarianism (ex: effects of well-being) and virtue ethics (ex: character traits like compassion).

                © Copyright Original Source




                But as far as I can see, something like "the effects of well-being" is not a part of a objective moral reason. There is nothing about being in a state of well-being that will by itself tell you that you ought to act in such a way that you do not diminish the well-being of other people, or that you ought to act in such a way that other people's well-being is increased. Similarily, there is nothing about compassion in itself that will tell you that you ought to act compassionately. I see no objective ways to get from states such as well-being and compassion to "oughts", only subjective ones, one of which would be to appeal to someone's subjective preference that people not diminish their own well-being, or their preference that people act compassionately towards them. And even then it does not succeed in bridging the is-ought gap completely, given that someone could argue that just because they would not prefer that someone acted in a certain way towards them, or that they would prefer that people did act in certain ways towards them, it would not necessarily mean that they themselves were obligated to act in a similar way towards their peers, and there would be no way to counter that argument, apart from begging the question in favour of the contrary viewpoint that subjective preferences are sufficient to ground moral reasoning.

                To sum it up, none of the examples you gave are sufficient, either alone, or in conjuction with other facts, to ground objective reasons for acting morally, only when you add a subjective aspect to the mix do you get something that resembles morally obligatory reason. And to make matters even worse, not even this fixes the problem completely.
                ~Formerly known as Chrawnus~

                Comment


                • #83
                  Originally posted by Yttrium View Post
                  I was just wondering if there was some moral objective fact that moral realism could point to here.
                  What are you looking for? Something along the lines of 'action X is evil/good?'

                  Comment


                  • #84
                    Originally posted by seer View Post
                    Yes I agree moral realism is an objectivist position - except it is not true.
                    Then you can retract your claims about it being subjectivist.

                    OK, now answer mine - how can moral truths exist apart from minds. Be mind-independent?[/QUOTE]

                    You're committing a use-mention mistake again, and you're getting confused on what moral realism is. Moral realism is not about whether moral truths exist apart from minds, anymore than scientific realism is about whether scientific truths exist apart from minds. Please read what you quoted in your own OP:
                    "Moral Realism (or Moral Objectivism) is the meta-ethical view that there exist such things as moral facts and moral values, and that these are objective and independent of our perception of them or our beliefs, feelings or other attitudes towards them. Therefore, moral judgments describe moral facts, which are as certain in their own way as mathematical facts."

                    There's no mention in there about "moral truths exist[ing] apart from minds". That's just a strawman you made up.

                    To reiterate: Moral realism is not about whether moral truths exist apart from minds. So, what is moral realism about? It's about what sort of thing makes moral beliefs, moral statements, etc. true or false or false. That's what meant by "moral facts"; not "moral truths", but the truth-makers for moral claims. To take a non-moral example: scientific realists can point to things like "cats", as being the sort of things that make scientific claims like "cats exist" true. You'd have to be deeply confused to treat that as meaning the same thing as "the truth that cats exist must exist apart from minds". Similarly, the moral realist can point to things like character traits (as per virtue ethics), effects of welfare (as per welfare utilitarianism), etc. as being the sort of things that make moral claims true or false. You've already been given examples of such positions:
                    Originally posted by Jichard View Post
                    Feel free to familiarize yourself with normative ethical positions that are compatible with moral realism. Plenty of accounts of objective moral facts, whether from Kantianism, utilitarianism, or virtue ethics:

                    (http://www.ucs.mun.ca/~alatus/phil12...ctivism.html):

                    2. Moral Objectivism: The view that what is right or wrong doesn’t depend on what anyone thinks is right or wrong. That is, the view that the 'moral facts' are like 'physical' facts in that what the facts are does not depend on what anyone thinks they are. Objectivist theories tend to come in two sorts:
                    (i) Duty Based Theories (or Deontological Theories): Theories that claim that what determines whether an act is morally right or wrong is the kind of act it is.

                    E.g., Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) thought that all acts should be judged according to a rule he called the Categorical Imperative: "Act only according to that maxim [i.e., rule] whereby you can at the same time will that it become a universal law." That is, he thought the only kind of act one should ever commit is one that could be willed to be a universal law.

                    (ii) Consequentialist Theories (or Teleological Theories): Theories that claim that what determines whether an act is right or wrong are its consequences.

                    Utilitarianism is the best known sort of Consequentialism. Its best known defender is John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). Essentially, utilitarianism tells us that, in any situation, the right thing to do is whatever is likely to produce the most happiness overall. (The wrong thing to do is anything else.)

                    You'd have to be deeply confused to treat that as meaning the same thing as "the truth that that action is morally bad must exist apart from minds" (but knowing you, I wouldn't put such a gambit past you).
                    Last edited by Jichard; 05-22-2015, 06:39 PM.
                    "Instead, we argue, it is necessary to shift the debate from the subject under consideration, instead exposing to public scrutiny the tactics they [denialists] employ and identifying them publicly for what they are."

                    Comment


                    • #85
                      Originally posted by Jichard View Post
                      To reiterate: Moral realism is not about whether moral truths exist apart from minds. So, what is moral realism about? It's about what sort of thing makes moral beliefs, moral statements, etc. true or false or false. That's what meant by "moral facts"; not "moral truths", but the truth-makers for moral claims. To take a non-moral example: scientific realists can point to things like "cats", as being the sort of things that make scientific claims like "cats exist" true. You'd have to be deeply confused to treat that as meaning the same thing as "the truth that cats exist must exist apart from minds". Similarly, the moral realist can point to things like character traits (as per virtue ethics), effects of welfare (as per welfare utilitarianism), etc. as being the sort of things that make moral claims true or false. You've already been given examples of such positions
                      OK, if this is the case now what? I still don't see how you get to moral facts, or how those facts are not subjective. You mentioned character traits - whose character traits? Who decides what character traits are correct or desirable? Isn't that subjective?

                      And you claim to be an objectivist. We what does that mean. By definition something if objective if it exists independently of the viewer.

                      of, relating to, or being an object, phenomenon, or condition in the realm of sensible experience independent of individual thought and perceptible by all observers : having reality independent of the mind
                      Last edited by seer; 05-22-2015, 07:07 PM.
                      Atheism is the cult of death, the death of hope. The universe is doomed, you are doomed, the only thing that remains is to await your execution...

                      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jbnueb2OI4o&t=3s

                      Comment


                      • #86
                        Originally posted by seer View Post
                        OK, if this is the case now what?
                        Please stop quote-mining posts, and then saying "now what?" as if points weren't addressed.

                        I still don't see how you get to moral facts,
                        You were told how you get moral facts. You were told which features made moral claims true or false, and thus they would constitute moral facts.

                        or how those facts are not subjective.
                        Already explained to you how they weren't subjective.

                        You mentioned character traits - whose character traits?
                        If I make that statement "that person is morally bad in virtue of their character traits", it's pretty clear who's character traits are being discussed. What you did was as silly as responding to the claim that "organisms are animals in virtue of the biological traits they have" with "whose biological traits?". Please don't feign ignorance.

                        Who decides what character traits are correct or desirable?
                        Irrelevant, since it isn't up to a decision. Subjectivist that you are, you think whether claims are true or false is up to someone's decision. Seriously, seer, someone doesn't have to decide anything, in order for a claim to be true or false.

                        Isn't that subjective?
                        Not what "subjective" means in this context. We're not discussing how people come to decisions or who makes decisions; that is't what's relevant to the "objective/subjective" distinction in relation to moral realism and moral objectivism. We're discussing in virtue of what claims are true or false. What you're doing is as ridiculous as saying that biology is subjective because humans make decisions. "Subjective" in this context is not about who does or does not make decisions or how people come to make decisions. Otherwise, tell me where in the definition of moral realism it says anything about who does or does not make decisions. If you can't, then stop wasting time with your strawmen.

                        And you claim to be an objectivist. We what does that mean.

                        By definition something if objective if it exists independently of the viewer.

                        of, relating to, or being an object, phenomenon, or condition in the realm of sensible experience independent of individual thought and perceptible by all observers : having reality independent of the mind
                        Please stop being disingenuous, and actually address things that are written, instead of cutting them out of your posts so as to pretend they don't exist. Once again:
                        So, what is moral realism about? It's about what sort of thing makes moral beliefs, moral statements, etc. true or false or false. That's what meant by "moral facts"; not "moral truths", but the truth-makers for moral claims. To take a non-moral example: scientific realists can point to things like "cats", as being the sort of things that make scientific claims like "cats exist" true. You'd have to be deeply confused to treat that as meaning the same thing as "the truth that cats exist must exist apart from minds". Similarly, the moral realist can point to things like character traits (as per virtue ethics), effects of welfare (as per welfare utilitarianism), etc. as being the sort of things that make moral claims true or false. You've already been given examples of such positions:

                        (http://www.ucs.mun.ca/~alatus/phil12...ctivism.html):

                        2. Moral Objectivism: The view that what is right or wrong doesn’t depend on what anyone thinks is right or wrong. That is, the view that the 'moral facts' are like 'physical' facts in that what the facts are does not depend on what anyone thinks they are. Objectivist theories tend to come in two sorts:
                        (i) Duty Based Theories (or Deontological Theories): Theories that claim that what determines whether an act is morally right or wrong is the kind of act it is.

                        E.g., Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) thought that all acts should be judged according to a rule he called the Categorical Imperative: "Act only according to that maxim [i.e., rule] whereby you can at the same time will that it become a universal law." That is, he thought the only kind of act one should ever commit is one that could be willed to be a universal law.

                        (ii) Consequentialist Theories (or Teleological Theories): Theories that claim that what determines whether an act is right or wrong are its consequences.

                        Utilitarianism is the best known sort of Consequentialism. Its best known defender is John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). Essentially, utilitarianism tells us that, in any situation, the right thing to do is whatever is likely to produce the most happiness overall. (The wrong thing to do is anything else.)
                        Last edited by Jichard; 05-22-2015, 09:04 PM.
                        "Instead, we argue, it is necessary to shift the debate from the subject under consideration, instead exposing to public scrutiny the tactics they [denialists] employ and identifying them publicly for what they are."

                        Comment


                        • #87
                          Originally posted by Jichard View Post

                          If I make that statement "that person is morally bad in virtue of their character traits", it's pretty clear who's character traits are being discussed. What you did was as silly as responding to the claim that "organisms are animals in virtue of the biological traits they have" with "whose biological traits?". Please don't feign ignorance.

                          Irrelevant, since it isn't up to a decision. Subjectivist that you are, you think whether claims are true or false is up to someone's decision. Seriously, seer, someone doesn't have to decide anything, in order for a claim to be true or false.


                          Not what "subjective" means in this context. We're not discussing how people come to decisions or who makes decisions; that is't what's relevant to the "objective/subjective" distinction in relation to moral realism and moral objectivism. We're discussing in virtue of what claims are true or false. What you're doing is as ridiculous as saying that biology is subjective because humans make decisions. "Subjective" in this context is not about who does or does not make decisions or how people come to make decisions. Otherwise, tell me where in the definition of moral realism it says anything about who does or does not make decisions. If you can't, then stop wasting time with your strawmen.
                          No Jichard, the fact is I'm having a hard time following you. OK, so how do we decide or know if a particular moral claim is true?

                          You said this: the moral realist can point to things like character traits (as per virtue ethics), effects of welfare (as per welfare utilitarianism), etc. as being the sort of things that make moral claims true or false.

                          So how does a character trait lead to a true moral claim? Can you flesh this out, show us all how this works?
                          Atheism is the cult of death, the death of hope. The universe is doomed, you are doomed, the only thing that remains is to await your execution...

                          https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jbnueb2OI4o&t=3s

                          Comment


                          • #88
                            Originally posted by seer View Post
                            No Jichard, the fact is I'm having a hard time following you.
                            As I (and other people) have noted, you tend to conveniently not understand things when it suits your purposes.

                            OK, so how do we decide or know if a particular moral claim is true?
                            Irrelevant since that's an epistemic claims about a particular claim, and so would be an epistemological claim for normative ethics. And as you've been told over and over, moral realism is a metaphysical position in meta-ethics. Metaphysics =/= epistemology. Meta-ethics =/= normative ethics.

                            You said this: the moral realist can point to things like character traits (as per virtue ethics), effects of welfare (as per welfare utilitarianism), etc. as being the sort of things that make moral claims true or false.

                            So how does a character trait lead to a true moral claim?
                            "Sam is a morally bad person."

                            "Why?"

                            "Because Sam is callous".

                            Can you flesh this out, show us all how this works?
                            Can you please not conveniently act if you don't understand things when it suits your purposes?
                            "Instead, we argue, it is necessary to shift the debate from the subject under consideration, instead exposing to public scrutiny the tactics they [denialists] employ and identifying them publicly for what they are."

                            Comment


                            • #89
                              Originally posted by Chrawnus View Post
                              Let's say this argument holds up. I do not know a single objective moral reason, only subjective ones, so I would appreciate it if you could list even one.
                              Likely because you don't use "objective" and "subjective" in the way they're used in meta-ethics when discussing moral objectivism and moral subjectivism, much as many Young Earth creationists claim not to know of a single instance of "macroevolution" since they don't use the "macroevolution" in the way it's used in biology.

                              It's trivially easy to generate an objective moral reason, just like it's trivially easy to generate an objective scientific claim. Whether the claim is plausible or not, is another matter. Here are some rather simple examples:
                              The reason that action is morally wrong is because it harms the welfare of sentient life.


                              No, it's straight-forwardly an objective moral reason. It's objective insofar as claims regarding it are true or false in virtue of something other than a mind's views on the matter.

                              There is nothing about being in a state of well-being that will by itself tell you that you ought to act in such a way that you do not diminish the well-being of other people, or that you ought to act in such a way that other people's well-being is increased. Similarily, there is nothing about compassion in itself that will tell you that you ought to act compassionately.
                              The "state of well-being" doesn't need to "tell you" anything. You seem to be treating moral ought claims, (such as: You morally ought not rape) as commands that tell you what someone else wants you to do. They aren't that. If they were that, they would be neither true nor false.

                              I see no objective ways to get from states such as well-being and compassion to "oughts", only subjective ones, one of which would be to appeal to someone's subjective preference that people not diminish their own well-being, or their preference that people act compassionately towards them.
                              False. There's no appeal to preference here. Saying that:
                              "You morally ought not rape because it harms the welfare of sentient life"
                              is not the same thing as saying:
                              "You morally ought not rape because it you prefer not to harm the welfare of sentient life"
                              anymore than saying:
                              "That thing is H2O because it's water"
                              is the same thing as saying:
                              "That thing is H2O because you prefer it be H2O"
                              Reference X is not the same as referencing one's preferences with respect to X.

                              You also seem to be fallaciously assuming that ought-claims can only apply if you appeal to someone's preferences. That makes no sense. First, it torpedoes your own position, since if someone has a preference that goes against what God wants, then (on your view) you have no grounds for claiming they ought to do wht God wants. Second, ought claims need not make appeal to one's preferences. For example, in epistemology, what can make claims about what people ought to accept without making appeal to their preferences (for example: by noting the evidence available to them). Similarly, in science, one can note how one ought to reason about a scientific question, without making appeals to one's preference.s So it's special pleading for you to claim that ought-claims in morality, unlike in the above cases, need to make appeal to people's preferences.

                              To put it another way: you're assuming a crude, implausible version of reasons internalism.

                              And even then it does not succeed in bridging the is-ought gap completely,
                              The "is-ought" gap is largely trivial and uninteresting when it comes to whether or not moral realism is true.

                              given that someone could argue that just because they would not prefer that someone acted in a certain way towards them, or that they would prefer that people did act in certain ways towards them, it would not necessarily mean that they themselves were obligated to act in a similar way towards their peers, and there would be no way to counter that argument, apart from begging the question in favour of the contrary viewpoint that subjective preferences are sufficient to ground moral reasoning.
                              You're the only one making appeak to preferences, not me. I see no reason for appealing to someone's preferences in this context, anymore than I would see a reason for appealing to someone's preferences when figuring out what claims they ought to accept in epistemology.

                              To sum it up, none of the examples you gave are sufficient, either alone, or in conjuction with other facts, to ground objective reasons for acting morally, only when you add a subjective aspect to the mix do you get something that resembles morally obligatory reason. And to make matters even worse, not even this fixes the problem completely.
                              And you haven't shown this at all. All you've done is make incorrect assumptions that end up rebutting your own position.
                              Last edited by Jichard; 07-14-2015, 11:56 PM.
                              "Instead, we argue, it is necessary to shift the debate from the subject under consideration, instead exposing to public scrutiny the tactics they [denialists] employ and identifying them publicly for what they are."

                              Comment


                              • #90
                                Originally posted by Jichard View Post
                                Likely because you don't use "objective" and "subjective" in the way they're used in meta-ethics when discussing moral objectivism and moral subjectivism, much as many Young Earth creationists claim not to know of a single instance of "macroevolution" since they don't use the "macroevolution" in the way it's used in biology.

                                It's trivially easy to generate an objective moral reason, just like it's trivially easy to generate an objective scientific claim. Whether the claim is plausible or not, is another matter. Here are some rather simple examples:
                                The reason that action is morally wrong is because it harms the welfare of sentient life.




                                No, it's straight-forwardly an objective moral reason. It's objective insofar as claims regarding it are true or false in virtue of something other than a mind's views on the matter.



                                The "state of well-being" doesn't need to "tell you" anything. You seem to be treating moral ought claims, (such as: You morally ought not rape) as commands that tell you what someone else wants you to do. They aren't that. If they were that, they would be neither true nor false.



                                False. There's no appeal to preference here. Saying that:
                                "You morally ought not rape because it harms the welfare of sentient life"
                                is not the same thing as saying:
                                "You morally ought not rape because it you prefer not to harm the welfare of sentient life"
                                anymore than saying:
                                "That thing is H2O because it's water"
                                is the same thing as saying:
                                "That thing is H2O because you prefer it be H2O"
                                Reference X is not the same as referencing one's preferences with respect to X.

                                You also seem to be fallaciously assuming that ought-claims can only apply if you appeal to someone's preferences. That makes no sense. First, it torpedoes your own position, since if someone has a preference that goes against what God wants, then (on your view) you have no grounds for claiming they ought to do wht God wants. Second, ought claims need not make appeal to one's preferences. For example, in epistemology, what can make claims about what people ought to accept without making appeal to their preferences (for example: by noting the evidence available to them). Similarly, in science, one can note how one ought to reason about a scientific question, without making appeals to one's preference.s So it's special pleading for you to claim that ought-claims in morality, unlike in the above cases, need to make appeal to people's preferences.

                                To put it another way: you're assuming a crude, implausible version of reasons internalism.



                                The "is-ought" gap is largely trivial and uninteresting when it comes to whether or not moral realism is true.



                                You're the only one making appeak to preferences, not me. I see no reason for appealing to someone's preferences in this context, anymore than I would see a reason for appealing to someone's preferences when figuring out what claims they ought to accept in epistemology.



                                And you haven't shown this at all. All you've done is make incorrect assumptions that end up rebutting your own position.
                                The standard response to this from the objectivist is: Why is it morally wrong to harm the welfare of sentient life? Or more simply put: Why is harming morally wrong?

                                Comment

                                Related Threads

                                Collapse

                                Topics Statistics Last Post
                                Started by Starlight, 07-24-2021, 09:58 PM
                                26 responses
                                124 views
                                0 likes
                                Last Post seer
                                by seer
                                 
                                Started by seer, 07-20-2021, 12:05 PM
                                124 responses
                                562 views
                                0 likes
                                Last Post Sparko
                                by Sparko
                                 
                                Started by rogue06, 07-16-2021, 07:39 AM
                                73 responses
                                355 views
                                1 like
                                Last Post rogue06
                                by rogue06
                                 
                                Started by Mountain Man, 07-05-2021, 04:27 PM
                                74 responses
                                445 views
                                0 likes
                                Last Post Hypatia_Alexandria  
                                Started by tabibito, 06-30-2021, 02:53 AM
                                50 responses
                                328 views
                                0 likes
                                Last Post tabibito  
                                Working...
                                X