Moral Realism?

[JimL]

Yes or no Jichard, does moral realism claim that there are moral facts and that these facts are true?

Yes and no. Morals do not exist in themselves, but relative to minds they are factual truths.

[Jichard]

Why won't you answer the question?

Please stop lying. I've answered this question for you multiple times (ex: here). The answer is: moral realism is a position in meta-ethics, not normative ethics, and thus it's silly to ask it to address positions in normative ethics.

I've told you this before. You even pretended to be aware of this. But here you are, dishonestly pretending that this hasn't been explained to you. And I'm tired of that dishonesty. That's why I'm asking you this question, a question you keep dishonestly dodging:
Is moral realism a meta-ethical position, or is it a position in normative ethics?

But I did read this:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Normative_ethics



So like normative ethics, moral realism deals with moral facts that are prescriptive.

Once again, please stop dishonestly quote-mining things on topics you don't understand. It makes you look silly, especially when after you made the stupid claim that meta-ethics and normative ethics are meaningless.

Is moral realism a meta-ethical position, or is it a position in normative ethics?

It doesn't matter since both are meaningless.

It takes a truly foolish person to claim that normative ethics and meta-ethics are meaningless... an then turn around and quote-mine a source that states what normative ethics and meta-ethics mean.


So, once again: Is moral realism a meta-ethical position, or is it a position in normative ethics?

[seer]

I asked you this question first: Is moral realism a meta-ethical position, or is it a position in normative ethics? You've dishonestly avoided addressing it.

So you can stop your usual dishonesty, and honestly answer, for a change. For a supposed Christian, you're quite the disingenuous person.

Why won't you answer the question? But I did read this:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Normative_ethics

Normative ethics is the study of ethical action. It is the branch of philosophical ethics that investigates the set of questions that arise when considering how one ought to act, morally speaking. Normative ethics is distinct from meta-ethics because it examines standards for the rightness and wrongness of actions, while meta-ethics studies the meaning of moral language and the metaphysics of moral facts. Normative ethics is also distinct from descriptive ethics, as the latter is an empirical investigation of people’s moral beliefs. To put it another way, descriptive ethics would be concerned with determining what proportion of people believe that killing is always wrong, while normative ethics is concerned with whether it is correct to hold such a belief. Hence, normative ethics is sometimes called prescriptive, rather than descriptive. However, on certain versions of the meta-ethical view called moral realism, moral facts are both descriptive and prescriptive at the same time.

So like normative ethics, moral realism deals with moral facts that are prescriptive.

[Jichard]

You mean ethical questions that meaningless, purposeless creatures have?

Please stop fabricating false claims and pretending I've agreed to them. It's a dishonest thing you continually do.

What I actually wrote was this:

Because they answer ethical questions. How many times does this need to be explained to you, before you stop being dishonest and address it?

Same old mistakes you've been corrected on time and time again. Basically, you're committing the fallacy of appeal to consequences, and lying by pretending that moral realism does not answer meta-ethical questions. And you'll keep on dishonestly reapeating these no matter how many times it's pointed out, because you have no interest in engaging in serious discussion or sticking to true claims. Instead, you'll just repeat whatever false claims you deem necessary for your pet position.

Anyway, once again:

"You've repeatedly gone on about whether or not moral realism is useful, and I've repeatedly told you that that's a fallacious appeal to consequence, since moral realism doesn't need to be useful in order to be true. Furthermore, I explained to you how moral realism was useful, insofar as it answers meta-ethical questions."

And please stop making daft statements. Semantic content (i.e. "meaning") doesn't require a deity to exist. What you're writing is as silly as saying Cell Theory only has meaning if God exists.

Tell me when you have the integrity to address it. Because, really, I don't think you have a honest bone in your body, at this point. That's one reason why you continually lie about what other peope say, to avoid addressing what they actually said.

[Jichard]

Yes or no Jichard, does moral realism claim that there are moral facts and that these facts are true?

I asked you this question first: Is moral realism a meta-ethical position, or is it a position in normative ethics? You've dishonestly avoided addressing it.

So you can stop your usual dishonesty, and honestly answer, for a change. For a supposed Christian, you're quite the disingenuous person.

[seer]

Is moral realism a meta-ethical position, or is it a position in normative ethics?

Feel free to finally honestly answer that question. You've been asked it so many times, they it's stunning how you dishonestly evade it.

Yes or no Jichard, does moral realism claim that there are moral facts and that these facts are true?

[seer]

Because they answer ethical questions. How many times does this need to be explained to you, before you stop being dishonest and address it?

You mean ethical questions that meaningless, purposeless creatures have? Sounds important.

[Jichard]

Are you daft?

I'm not you.

How can your ethical theories be meaningful when the very creatures they apply to are meaningless specks, on a meaningless planet, in a meaningless universe.

Because they answer ethical questions. How many times does this need to be explained to you, before you stop being dishonest and address it?

Same old mistakes you've been corrected on time and time again. Basically, you're committing the fallacy of appeal to consequences, and lying by pretending that moral realism does not answer meta-ethical questions. And you'll keep on dishonestly reapeating these no matter how many times it's pointed out, because you have no interest in engaging in serious discussion or sticking to true claims. Instead, you'll just repeat whatever false claims you deem necessary for your pet position.

Anyway, once again:

"You've repeatedly gone on about whether or not moral realism is useful, and I've repeatedly told you that that's a fallacious appeal to consequence, since moral realism doesn't need to be useful in order to be true. Furthermore, I explained to you how moral realism was useful, insofar as it answers meta-ethical questions."

And please stop making daft statements. Semantic content (i.e. "meaning") doesn't require a deity to exist. What you're writing is as silly as saying Cell Theory only has meaning if God exists.

[Jichard]

Since moral realism claims that there are moral facts and that these facts are true, why it wrong to ask what these facts are, why are they true, and how you come know them.

Is moral realism a meta-ethical position, or is it a position in normative ethics?

Feel free to finally honestly answer that question. You've been asked it so many times, they it's stunning how you dishonestly evade it.

[seer]

Again, please stop fabricating false claims, just because you're not honest enough to address what was written.

Are you daft? How can your ethical theories be meaningful when the very creatures they apply to are meaningless specks, on a meaningless planet, in a meaningless universe.

[seer]

And I know you have no understanding of what you quote-mined, since what you quotes hinges on the distinction between normative ethics and meta-ethics, a distinction you don't understand and think is meaningless. Hence your inability to honestly answer the following question:

"Is moral realism a meta-ethical position, or is it a position in normative ethics?"

Taken at face value, the claim that Nigel has a moral obligation to keep his promise, like the claim that Nyx is a black cat, purports to report a fact and is true if things are as the claim purports. Moral realists are those who think that, in these respects, things should be taken at face value—moral claims do purport to report facts and are true if they get the facts right. Moreover, they hold, at least some moral claims actually are true. That much is the common and more or less defining ground of moral realism (although some accounts of moral realism see it as involving additional commitments, say to the independence of the moral facts from human thought and practice, or to those facts being objective in some specified way).

Since moral realism claims that there are moral facts and that these facts are true, why it wrong to ask what these facts are, why are they true, and how you come know them.

[Jichard]

How does that answer my point that your ethical musings are as meaningless and purposeless as humanity is in your godless universe.

Again, please stop fabricating false claims, just because you're not honest enough to address what was written.

And if moral realism isn't useful then what good is it?

It was already explained to you how moral realism was useful, and how you're committing the fallacy of appeal to consequences:

Same old mistakes you've been corrected on time and time again. Basically, you're committing the fallacy of appeal to consequences, and lying by pretending that moral realism does not answer meta-ethical questions. And you'll keep on dishonestly reapeating these no matter how many times it's pointed out, because you have no interest in engaging in serious discussion or sticking to true claims. Instead, you'll just repeat whatever false claims you deem necessary for your pet position.

Anyway, once again:

"You've repeatedly gone on about whether or not moral realism is useful, and I've repeatedly told you that that's a fallacious appeal to consequence, since moral realism doesn't need to be useful in order to be true. Furthermore, I explained to you how moral realism was useful, insofar as it answers meta-ethical questions."

Why do you dishonestly keep pretending otherwise? Why do you lie so much? I mean that. It's rare to encounter someone online who is as dishonest as you, whie still claiming (or pretending) to be Christian. It's as if (when it comes to stuff that's inconvenient for your religious ideology), you refuse to reason in an honest manner.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-realism/

Stop quote-mining sources you don't understand. It makes you look silly.

And I know you have no understanding of what you quote-mined, since what you quotes hinges on the distinction between normative ethics and meta-ethics, a distinction you don't understand and think is meaningless. Hence your inability to honestly answer the following question:

"Is moral realism a meta-ethical position, or is it a position in normative ethics?"

[seer]

We only have knowledge of a godless universe. The notion of a god-made universe is a failed hypothesis, there’s no substantive evidence of such a universe. And ethical considerations are derivatives of self-preservation and procreation in every case and are a consequence of natural selection. We know we have ethical systems, we don’t know whether we gave gods...we probably don't

Failed hypothesis Tass? Like your multiverse theories that have no substantial evidence? Beside, God is not a hypothesis, He is a Person.

[seer]

Already addressed your nonsensical claims:

Same old mistakes you've been corrected on time and time again. Basically, you're committing the fallacy of appeal to consequences, and lying by pretending that moral realism does not answer meta-ethical questions. And you'll keep on dishonestly reapeating these no matter how many times it's pointed out, because you have no interest in engaging in serious discussion or sticking to true claims. Instead, you'll just repeat whatever false claims you deem necessary for your pet position.

Anyway, once again:

"You've repeatedly gone on about whether or not moral realism is useful, and I've repeatedly told you that that's a fallacious appeal to consequence, since moral realism doesn't need to be useful in order to be true. Furthermore, I explained to you how moral realism was useful, insofar as it answers meta-ethical questions."

How does that answer my point that your ethical musings are as meaningless and purposeless as humanity is in your godless universe. And if moral realism isn't useful then what good is it?

It is worth noting that, while moral realists are united in their cognitivism and in their rejection of error theories, they disagree among themselves not only about which moral claims are actually true but about what it is about the world that makes those claims true. Moral realism is not a particular substantive moral view nor does it carry a distinctive metaphysical commitment over and above the commitment that comes with thinking moral claims can be true or false and some are true. Still, much of the debate about moral realism revolves around either what it takes for claims to be true or false at all (with some arguing that moral claims do not have what it takes) or what it would take specifically for moral claims to be true (with some arguing that moral claims would require something the world does not provide).

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-realism/

[Jichard]

That wasn't a false claim, your ethical musings are as meaningless and purposeless as humanity is in your godless universe. How could it be otherwise?

Already addressed your nonsensical claims:

Same old mistakes you've been corrected on time and time again. Basically, you're committing the fallacy of appeal to consequences, and lying by pretending that moral realism does not answer meta-ethical questions. And you'll keep on dishonestly reapeating these no matter how many times it's pointed out, because you have no interest in engaging in serious discussion or sticking to true claims. Instead, you'll just repeat whatever false claims you deem necessary for your pet position.

Anyway, once again:

"You've repeatedly gone on about whether or not moral realism is useful, and I've repeatedly told you that that's a fallacious appeal to consequence, since moral realism doesn't need to be useful in order to be true. Furthermore, I explained to you how moral realism was useful, insofar as it answers meta-ethical questions."

Tell me when you have the intellectual honesty to deal with the response. Because you currently seem to lack it.