An objection to the notion God's commands determines moral obligations

[Jichard]

Yet he is not arguing for it in this paper; he has provided no refutation of Craig's defense.

You pretended Morriston didn't defend the objection, even though Morriston clearly defended the objection against Craig's response:

"Many questions remain. Could God have failed to command generosity? Could generosity have failed to be a duty? Just what degree of generosity is required? And why did God choose to require just that degree of generosity rather than some other? If there is no reason, then at least a limited version of the arbitrariness objection might still get a bit of traction. It isn’t at all clear to me how Craig would deal with these issues."

There's no problem with me citing Morriston's paper with regards to an objection he defends.

'questions remain' isn't a defense.

He pointed out problems with Craig's defense, by pointing out issues Craig's defense needs to address, but which it does not address.

You utter fraud. DE (and others) were commenting that Morriston appeared not to even understand DCT at all because you made it seem like he was using the arbitrariness objection in the original post.

No, this was DE's actual claim:

"The author also doesn't seem to understand Divine Command theory since he assumes axiomatic morals which is the exact opposite of Divine Command (that morals are not axiomatic but derived from the will of God)."

Try to accurately represent what people write.

You disagreed, claiming that Morriston "understands divine command theory quite well".

What I disagreed with in that claim was the idea that Morriston did not understand DCT well. And I clearly stated my actual grounds for that disagreement (which you conveniently left out in your quote-mine):

"Not really. Wes Morriston understands divine command theory quite well. Hence him being one of the leading contemporary Christian critics of it. And one doesn't need to accept all the assumptions of a position in order to critique and understand a position. For example: I don't have to assume that every aspect of Young Earth creationism is true, in order to critique or understand Young Earth creationism.

What you've basically done is assume that Morristion doesn't understand DCT... because Morriston won't assume that the central assumption of DCT is true, but isntead argues against it. That's like saying that I don't understand Young earth creationism because I won't assume that the central claim of Young Earth creationism is true, but instead argue against it."

[Jichard]

He didn't, dumbass. He only noted some question raised by Craig's account:

He pointed out problems with Craig's defense, by pointing out issues Craig's defense needs to address, but which it does not address.

Many questions remain. Could God have failed to command generosity? Could generosity have failed to be a duty? Just what degree of generosity is
required? And why did God choose to require just that degree of generosity rather than some other? If there is no reason, then at least a limited version of the arbitrariness objection might still get a bit of traction

Morriston doesn't even state that the limited version might gain traction unconditionally, only if there is no reason for God to require some degree of a quality rather than an other.

And if there was a reason, then the other horn of the objection would apply.

A mere (partial) description of an alternative does not form an objection, and no amount of your nonsense will make it so.

Providing a more plausible view is an objection. Just like one can object to Young Earth creationism by providing a more plausible evolutionary account. If two positions P1 and P2 are incompatible and one gives grounds for thinking P2 is more likely to be true than P1, then that counts as an objection to P1. So one can provide an objection to DCT by providing an alternative view that less needlessly complicated and more plausible.

[Paprika]

You pretended Morriston didn't defend the objection, even though Morriston clearly defended the objection against Craig's response:

"Many questions remain. Could God have failed to command generosity? Could generosity have failed to be a duty? Just what degree of generosity is required? And why did God choose to require just that degree of generosity rather than some other? If there is no reason, then at least a limited version of the arbitrariness objection might still get a bit of traction. It isn’t at all clear to me how Craig would deal with these issues."

That's not a defense of the objection. As above, noting questions raised by Craig's argument is not a defense.

There's no problem with me citing Morriston's paper with regards to an objection he defends.

Liar. He does not defend it at all.

He pointed out problems with Craig's defense, by pointing out issues Craig's defense needs to address, but which it does not address.

That is not defending the objection, merely noting that Craig's case needs to be more fleshed out.

No, this was DE's actual claim:

"The author also doesn't seem to understand Divine Command theory since he assumes axiomatic morals which is the exact opposite of Divine Command (that morals are not axiomatic but derived from the will of God)."

Try to accurately represent what people write.

I represented it perfectly.

What I disagreed with in that claim was the idea that Morriston did not understand DCT well. An I clearly stated my actual grounds for that disagreement (which you conveniently left out in your quote-mine):

DE made his claim that the author doesn't understand DCT because you represented Morriston as arguing for the arbitrariness objection. You doubled-down by trying to bank on Morriston's authority to push an argument that Morriston did not even argue for in the paper .

[Paprika]

He pointed out problems with Craig's defense, by pointing out issues Craig's defense needs to address, but which it does not address.

That is not defending the objection, merely noting that Craig's case needs to be more fleshed out.

And if there was a reason, then the other horn of the objection would apply.

You can't even read.

If there is no reason, then at least a limited version of the arbitrariness objection might still get a bit of traction

Providing a more plausible view is an objection. Just like one can object to Young Earth creationism by providing a more plausible evolutionary account. If two positions P1 and P2 are incompatible and one gives grounds for thinking P2 is more likely to be true than P1, then that counts as an objection to P1. So one can provide an objection to DCT by providing an alternative view that less needlessly complicated and more plausible.

A mere partial description of an alternative does not constitute an objection.

[Jichard]

That is not defending the objection, merely noting that Craig's case needs to be more fleshed out.

He pointed out problems with Craig's defense, by pointing out issues Craig's defense needs to address, but which it does not address. That's defending the objection against Craig's defense.

You can't even read.

If there is no reason, then at least a limited version of the arbitrariness objection might still get a bit of traction

"If X, then Y" does not imply "If not-X, then not-Y", Paprika.

So, as I said, if there was a reason, then the other horn of the objection would apply.

A mere partial description of an alternative does not constitute an objection.

Providing a more plausible view is an objection. Just like one can object to Young Earth creationism by providing a more plausible evolutionary account. If two positions P1 and P2 are incompatible and one gives grounds for thinking P2 is more likely to be true than P1, then that counts as an objection to P1. So one can provide an objection to DCT by providing an alternative view that less needlessly complicated and more plausible.

[Paprika]

He pointed out problems with Craig's defense, by pointing out issues Craig's defense needs to address, but which it does not address. That's defending the objection against Craig's defense.

It's pointing out that Craig's account constructed to avoid the objection raises some questions not addressed. That is not defending the objection, just as me pointing out a hole in X's argument in a discussion between X and Y isn't necessarily defending Y's side.

"If X, then Y" does not imply "If not-X, then not-Y", Paprika.

Ah, I thought you were speaking for Morriston again. My mistake.

So, as I said, if there was a reason, then the other horn of the objection would apply.

Says you, not Morriston.

Providing a more plausible view is an objection. Just like one can object to Young Earth creationism by providing a more plausible evolutionary account. If two positions P1 and P2 are incompatible and one gives grounds for thinking P2 is more likely to be true than P1, then that counts as an objection to P1. So one can provide an objection to DCT by providing an alternative view that less needlessly complicated and more plausible.

A mere partial description of an alternative does not constitute an objection.

[Jichard]

That's not a defense of the objection. As above, noting questions raised by Craig's argument is not a defense.


Liar. He does not defend it at all.


That is not defending the objection, merely noting that Craig's case needs to be more fleshed out.

He pointed out problems with Craig's defense to the objection, by pointing out issues Craig's defense needs to address, but which it does not address. In that way, he defends the objection against Craig.

I represented it perfectly.

DE made his claim that the author doesn't understand DCT because you represented Morriston as arguing for the arbitrariness objection.

These are not the same:

"The author also doesn't seem to understand Divine Command theory since he assumes axiomatic morals which is the exact opposite of Divine Command (that morals are not axiomatic but derived from the will of God)."

"Morriston appeared not to even understand DCT at all because you made it seem like he was using the arbitrariness objection in the original post."

You doubled-down by trying to bank on Morriston's authority to push an argument that Morriston did not even argue for in the paper .

This is what I actually wrote:

"Not really. Wes Morriston understands divine command theory quite well. Hence him being one of the leading contemporary Christian critics of it. And one doesn't need to accept all the assumptions of a position in order to critique and understand a position. For example: I don't have to assume that every aspect of Young Earth creationism is true, in order to critique or understand Young Earth creationism.

What you've basically done is assume that Morristion doesn't understand DCT... because Morriston won't assume that the central assumption of DCT is true, but isntead argues against it. That's like saying that I don't understand Young earth creationism because I won't assume that the central claim of Young Earth creationism is true, but instead argue against it."

It does not match what you claim I said.

[Paprika]

"If X, then Y" does not imply "If not-X, then not-Y", Paprika.

So I've not read correctly while accusing you of that. Shame on me.

Ah well, if all victories were perfect it would be hard to be humble.

[Paprika]

He pointed out problems with Craig's defense to the objection, by pointing out issues Craig's defense needs to address, but which it does not address. In that way, he defends the objection against Craig.

It's pointing out that Craig's account constructed to avoid the objection raises some questions not addressed. That is not defending the objection, just as me pointing out a hole in X's argument in a discussion between X and Y isn't necessarily defending Y's side.

These are not the same:

Yes, not the exact same wording, but the description is completely accurate.

It does not match what you claim I said.

Ditto.

[GakuseiDon]

Feel free to state a reason that would be "grounded in God's knowledge and goodness".

Reasons related to being loving, being just

If you mentions reasons related to being loving, being just, promoting the welfare of sentient life, and so on, then those need not be grounded in God's nature / goodness. After all, those are features non-God things can have. Just because one lists some feature F in one's specification of God's nature, that does not mean that things grounded in F must be grounded in God's nature.

Well, I agree. An atheist can propose those things are grounded elsewhere, or not grounded at all. A pantheist can propose that the Universe is God, so those things reside in the universe. But why is that relevant? For the Christian God, His nature is given as omniscient, omnibenevolent, etc. From His nature comes His commandments.

And here's a longer explanation of why the "God's nature" reply doesn't work:

The nature N of X is specified by giving the conditions jointly necessary and sufficient for being X. For example, the nature of "being a bachelor" is specified by "being unmarried and being male". So God's nature would be specified by listing the conditions jointly necessary and sufficient for being God. For instance, some Christians state God's nature as something like: "being omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, a deity, ...". So in stating God's nature, one would state the essential properties of being God.

The problem is stating the attributes of God's tells one next to nothing about what one has moral to do, to be like, etc.. For example, suppose that one states that God is essentially loving, such that it's apart of God's nature to be loving. That tells me about God, not what moral reasons there are.

This is a non sequitur. What is being argued here? Even if true, it doesn't matter that God's attributes tell one next to nothing about what one has moral to do, if the question is whether God's commands determines moral obligations. Jichard, how is the above related to the thread subject?

So to claim that God's nature accounts for the moral reasons for some act X, one needs to actually establish a plausible connection between God and X. And the standard routes for doing that are fraught with problems. Take the following as an example:

God is loving, so there is a moral reason to be loving

Here are some of the problems with this (these problems can be generalized to statements of the form "God is Y, so there is a moral reason to be Y"):

First, since when is there a moral reason to be like God? For example, God is omnipotent, but that doesn't mean there's a moral reason to be omnipotent. So why are matters different in the moral case? Without further explanation, it's just special pleading to say there is a moral reason to be like God is some ways and not others.

Oh, c'mon. I'm sorry, that is just silly. Jichard, surely even you must have qualms about what that guy is arguing in this case?

Second, this account is needlessly complicated and misses the point: one can simply something like there is a moral reason to do that act, since that's the loving way to act. Mentioning that "God is loving" adds a needless complication to the account, and misdirects the focus away from what's relevant (being loving) to something irrelevant (doing something for the sake of imitation).
To put it another way: God is loving, so there is a moral reason to be Y only has any plausibility due to the connection between being loving and moral reasons, not because God happens to have a loving nature or because of some connection between being loving and God's nature. It's not God's nature that accounts for moral reasons, but instead the property (in this case: being loving) that one included in one's account of God's nature. And just because one includes Z1 in one's specification of God's nature (ex: Z1 + Z2 + Z3 + Z3) doesn't mean that whatever depends on Z1 also depends on God's nature (that is: the entire set from Z1 + Z2 + Z3 + Z3).

I agree. An atheist can propose "there is a moral reason to do that act, since that's the loving way to act". And good for them! BUT, unless we are arguing for the existence of God through the existence of loving acts, why does this matter? Again, Jichard, what is being argued here? How does the above relate to the thread topic?

Third, it runs into a modified Euthyphro dilemma:

Is God's nature moral-reason-providing because it includes being loving? Or is being loving moral-reason-providing because it is apart of God's nature?

If it's the former (which seems to be the more plausible of the options), then God's existence isn't required here. After all, love can exist even if God does not (ex: loving humans in a reality without a God), and thus this grounds of moral reasons would exist even if God does not exist.
If it's the latter, then the standard arbitrariness objections apply: any old property could count as moral-reason-providing, just because God nature happens to include that property. So if God's nature had happened to turn out to include psychopathy, then one would have a moral reason to be psychopathic. And that's wildly implausible.

But I agree! "If God's nature had happened to turn out to include psychopathy, then one would have a moral reason to be psychopathic." That might well be true -- assuming we are talking about an all-loving Christian God who is also psychopathic. But I think it would be logically difficult to argue that an all-loving God can also have a psychopathic nature, so I'm not overly worried by this. And if the guy is proposing that the Christian God is not all-loving, then he is talking about the wrong God.

Now, this can be applied to the above moral statement by stating it as something like:

God would have been loving, so there is a moral reason to be loving

After all, stating God's nature doesn't commit one to saying God actually exists (as I explained above); just what God would have been like if God had existed. But just as in the case of conditions C with fragility, God would not need to exist for moral reasons to exist. So God would not need to exist for moral reasons to be accounted for in terms of God's nature in this way.

Nothing wrong with this, except once again it appears to be irrelevant to the thread subject.