An objection to the notion God's commands determines moral obligations

[Jichard]

So, Jichard, I went to read the paper in detail:


You do realise, I hope, that this 'arbitrariness objection' isn't what Morrison is arguing in the paper at all?

Actually, it is. Just because he mentions other objections in the paper, doesn't mean Morriston doesn't defend the objection. In fact, he explicitly defends it when he addresses Craig's responses to it. You left that out in your quote-mine:

"Many questions remain. Could God have failed to command generosity ? Could generosity have failed to be a duty ? Just what degree of generosity is
required? And why did God choose to require just that degree of generosity rather than some other? If there is no reason, then at least a limited version of the arbitrariness objection might still get a bit of traction. It isn’t at all clear to me how Craig would deal with these issues."

But I have other fish to fry, and I am going to assume, at least for the sake of argument, that Craig has qualified the divine command theory sufficiently to immunize it against the arbitrariness objection.

Assuming something for the sake of argument, doesn't actually mean you think it's true. That's especially the case when one has argued against the very thing one is assuming, which is what Morriston did.

And this isn't even an objection.

Yes it is. It objects to DCT by providing an alternative view that less needlessly complicated and more plausible.

Do you actually know what Morrison is arguing?

Yes, since I've read the paper. That's why I didn't fall for your usual tactic of quote-mining.

[seer]

Whether or not it makes accurate claims regarding moral properties, and the states of affairs that instantiate them.

What moral properties? Where do these moral properties exist? Beside in your subjective mind?

[Paprika]

Actually, it is. Just because he mentions other objections in the paper, doesn't mean Morriston doesn't defend the objection. ...
Assuming something for the sake of argument, doesn't actually mean you think it's true. That's especially the case when one has argued against the very thing one is assuming, which is what Morriston did.

Clearly you didn't read carefully, as usual:

You do realise, I hope, that this 'arbitrariness objection' isn't what Morrison is arguing in the paper at all?

Yes it is. It objects to DCT by providing an alternative view that less needlessly complicated and more plausible.

Providing an alternative view is not an objection.

Yes, since I've read the paper. That's why I didn't fall for your usual tactic of quote-mining.

[Jichard]

Clearly not. You've strongly implied that Morriston is arguing for the arbitrariness objection quoted in your OP when he doesn't.

What I did was state an objection that Morriston mentioned in a paper, an objection Morriston doubt that Craig has a clear way of addressing. Just because Morriston assumes for the sake of argument that Craig has a way to address the argument, doesn't change the fact that Morriston pointed out problems in the way Craig goes about addressing it.

This has been explained to you, given you tendency to quote-mine.

What kind of stunt do you think you're pulling here?

That's nice

[Jichard]

Clearly you didn't read carefully, as usual:

Why did you leave this out of your quote-mine of the paper?:

"Many questions remain. Could God have failed to command generosity ? Could generosity have failed to be a duty ? Just what degree of generosity is required? And why did God choose to require just that degree of generosity rather than some other? If there is no reason, then at least a limited version of the arbitrariness objection might still get a bit of traction. It isn’t at all clear to me how Craig would deal with these issues."

Providing an alternative view is not an objection.

Providing a more plausible view is an objection. Just like one can object to Young Earth creationism by providing a more plausible evolutionary account.

This objects to DCT by providing an alternative view that less needlessly complicated and more plausible.

[Paprika]

Jichard was quote mining? Say it ain't so Joe!

What the author did was to explain a common objection, the arbitrariness objection, and how Craig defends against it. The author says that he thinks that the Craig's defense isn't completely sound but accepts it for the sake of argument since he wants to pursue another line of argumentation in this paper and not the arbitrariness objection.

Jichard, idiotic as usual, quotes the arbitrariness objection and presents it as though Morriston is arguing for it, and tries to throw the weight of Morriston's authority behind the objection ("Wes Morriston understands divine command theory quite well. Hence him being one of the leading contemporary Christian critics of it")

[Paprika]

Why did you leave this out of your quote-mine of the paper?:

"Many questions remain. Could God have failed to command generosity ? Could generosity have failed to be a duty ? Just what degree of generosity is required? And why did God choose to require just that degree of generosity rather than some other? If there is no reason, then at least a limited version of the arbitrariness objection might still get a bit of traction. It isn’t at all clear to me how Craig would deal with these issues."

Where the hell do you get from "a limited version of the arbitrariness objection might still get a bit of traction" that Morriston is arguing for the soundness of that objection? He clearly isn't, and chooses to attack Craig's argument from another angle.

Providing a more plausible view is an objection.

Describing an alternative does not consist an objection.

[Jichard]

What the author did was to explain a common objection, the arbitrariness objection, and how Craig defends against it. The author says that he thinks that the Craig's defense isn't completely sound but accepts it for the sake of argument since he wants to pursue another line of argumentation in this paper and not the arbitrariness objection.

Ah, so now you admit that Morriston doesn't think Craig response to the arbitrariness objection works.

So, why did you leave this out of your quote-mine:

Why did you leave this out of your quote-mine of the paper?:

"Many questions remain. Could God have failed to command generosity ? Could generosity have failed to be a duty ? Just what degree of generosity is required? And why did God choose to require just that degree of generosity rather than some other? If there is no reason, then at least a limited version of the arbitrariness objection might still get a bit of traction. It isn’t at all clear to me how Craig would deal with these issues."

Jichard, idiotic as usual, quotes the arbitrariness objection and presents it as though Morriston is arguing for it,

You mean, how he defended it against Craig's response, in the section of the post that you left out, in your quote-mine?

"Many questions remain. Could God have failed to command generosity ? Could generosity have failed to be a duty ? Just what degree of generosity is required? And why did God choose to require just that degree of generosity rather than some other? If there is no reason, then at least a limited version of the arbitrariness objection might still get a bit of traction. It isn’t at all clear to me how Craig would deal with these issues."

and tries to throw the weight of Morriston's authority behind the objection ("Wes Morriston understands divine command theory quite well. Hence him being one of the leading contemporary Christian critics of it")

Where in what you quoted did I mention the arbitrariness objection? Oh wait, I didn't. I mentioned Morriston understand DCT and being a critic of it. Please don't lie about what other's say.

[Jichard]

Where the hell do you get from "a limited version of the arbitrariness objection might still get a bit of traction" that Morriston is arguing for the soundness of that objection? He clearly isn't, and chooses to attack Craig's argument from another angle.

Why did you leave this out of your quote-mine of the paper?:

"Many questions remain. Could God have failed to command generosity? Could generosity have failed to be a duty? Just what degree of generosity is required? And why did God choose to require just that degree of generosity rather than some other? If there is no reason, then at least a limited version of the arbitrariness objection might still get a bit of traction. It isn’t at all clear to me how Craig would deal with these issues."

Feel free to answer the question, this time.

Describing an alternative does not consist and objection.

Feel free to address what was written:

Providing a more plausible view is an objection. Just like one can object to Young Earth creationism by providing a more plausible evolutionary account. This objects to DCT by providing an alternative view that less needlessly complicated and more plausible.

[Paprika]

Ah, so now you admit that Morriston doesn't think Craig response to the arbitrariness objection works.

Yet he is not arguing for it in this paper; he has provided no refutation of Craig's defense.

So, why did you leave this out of your quote-mine:

"Many questions remain. Could God have failed to command generosity ? Could generosity have failed to be a duty ? Just what degree of generosity is required? And why did God choose to require just that degree of generosity rather than some other? If there is no reason, then at least a limited version of the arbitrariness objection might still get a bit of traction. It isn’t at all clear to me how Craig would deal with these issues."

[/INDENT]

You mean, how he defended it against Craig's response, in the section of the post that you left out, in your quote-mine?

'questions remain' isn't a defense.

Where in what you quoted did I mention the arbitrariness objection? Oh wait, I didn't. I mentioned Morriston understand DCT and being a critic of it. Please don't lie about what other's say.

You utter fraud. DE (and others) were commenting that Morriston appeared not to even understand DCT at all because you made it seem like he was using the arbitrariness objection in the original post. You disagreed, claiming that Morriston "understands divine command theory quite well".

[Jichard]

Agreed, every Christian needs to do the 'whitewashed tomb'-style condemnation at least once in his life, and preferably more often.

That's nice.

Not really. Morrison's argument really is much better than your previous argument from incredulity.

Your usual misrepresentations.

And what else is εὐδαιμονία but flourishing according to Design?

Look before you leap, child.

Aristotle's notion made no mention of flourishing with reference to design by a divinity, nor does the modern, naturalistic neo-Aristotlean notion. Here's an explanation at your level: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/#2

Try actually reading Nicomachean Ethics.

Not sure why you agree that your incomprehension is nice, but I've not come to expect rationality from you.

That's nice.

[Paprika]

Why did you leave this out of your quote-mine of the paper?:

"Many questions remain. Could God have failed to command generosity? Could generosity have failed to be a duty? Just what degree of generosity is required? And why did God choose to require just that degree of generosity rather than some other? If there is no reason, then at least a limited version of the arbitrariness objection might still get a bit of traction. It isn’t at all clear to me how Craig would deal with these issues."

I left it out because it was pretty clear that despite the author's doubts about the defense he was not formulating any argument against it.

Feel free to address what was written:

Providing a more plausible view is an objection. Just like one can object to Young Earth creationism by providing a more plausible evolutionary account. This objects to DCT by providing an alternative view that less needlessly complicated and more plausible.

Dumbass, what you quoted in the OP merely describes an alternative. It does not form an objection.

[Paprika]

Aristotle's notion made no mention of flourishing with reference to design by a divinity, nor does the modern, naturalistic neo-Aristotlean notion. Here's an explanation at your level: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/#2

Try actually reading Nicomachean Ethics.

Idiot. I hold to neither of those notions, but you were dumb enough to assume that I did.

[Jichard]

I left it out because it was pretty clear that despite the author's doubts about the defense he was not formulating any argument against it.

You pretended Morriston didn't defend the objection, even though Morriston clearly defended the objection against Craig's response:

"Many questions remain. Could God have failed to command generosity? Could generosity have failed to be a duty? Just what degree of generosity is required? And why did God choose to require just that degree of generosity rather than some other? If there is no reason, then at least a limited version of the arbitrariness objection might still get a bit of traction. It isn’t at all clear to me how Craig would deal with these issues."

There's no problem with me citing Morriston's paper with regards to an objection he defends.

Dumbass, what you quoted in the OP merely describes an alternative. It does not form an objection.

Providing a more plausible view is an objection. Just like one can object to Young Earth creationism by providing a more plausible evolutionary account. If two positions P1 and P2 are incompatible and one gives grounds for thinking P2 is more likely to be true than P1, then that counts as an objection to P1. So one can provide an objection to DCT by providing an alternative view that less needlessly complicated and more plausible.

[Paprika]

You pretended Morriston didn't defend the objection, eve though Morriston clearly defended the objection against Craig's response.

He didn't, dumbass. He only noted some question raised by Craig's account:

Many questions remain. Could God have failed to command generosity? Could generosity have failed to be a duty? Just what degree of generosity is
required? And why did God choose to require just that degree of generosity rather than some other? If there is no reason, then at least a limited version of the arbitrariness objection might still get a bit of traction

Morriston doesn't even state that the limited version might gain traction unconditionally, only if there is no reason for God to require some degree of a quality rather than an other.

Providing a more plausible view is an objection. Just like one can object to Young Earth creationism by providing a more plausible evolutionary account. If two positions P1 and P2 are incompatible and one gives grounds for thinking P2 is more likely to be true than P1, then that counts as an objection to P1. So one can provide an objection to DCT by providing an alternative view that less needlessly complicated and more plausible.

A mere (partial) description of an alternative does not form an objection, and no amount of your nonsense will make it so.