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A Moral Argument Against God's Existence

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  • #91
    Originally posted by seer View Post
    Of course I took advantage of regression, what would you have me do accept it on your authority - I mean really - some "philosophers claim?"
    I expect you to actually engage with the reasoning/arguments presented, as opposed to doing what you've doing: pretending they don't exist or brushing them aside out-of-hand without addressing them

    This still is no more an assertion, with no basis in fact or reality.
    It's an argument you refuse to address because you find it inconvenient for you apologetic goals.

    It is not true
    You haven't shown this.

    nor can you show it to be true.
    It's easy to pretend that, seer, when you go out of your way to ignore or evade any arguments/reasoning that leads to conclusions inconvenient for your apologetic goals.

    It is a fiction, the very thing you chided us for.
    And now you're projecting, attributing claims to me which I never made.

    Of course your moral theory is meaningless, since we are ultimately meaningless.
    You didn't address my rebuttal at all:
    Ethical theories make statements with semantic content, and thus they have meaning on my worldview. Something doesn't need to be eternal to have meaning. What you wrote is, once again, as impossible as saying that Cell Theory is meaningless unless God exists. That's absurd since Cell Theory has meaning, insofar as it makes claims (with semantic content, where those claims address certain questions/issues.

    No, I'm speaking of subjective in that it is mind dependent. And which moral theory to accept is certainly subjective.
    Incorrect. What I told you was:
    In meta-ethics, when discussing moral objectivism/moral subjectivism, the term "subjective" deals with the truth-conditions for moral statements, moral beliefs, etc. (or in virtue or what moral statements, moral beliefs, etc. are true or false), not how one comes to reach those moral statements, moral beliefs, etc.

    The issue isn't whether the theory is mind-dependent, seer. It's instead whether the things in virtue of which the theory's statements are truth or false, are mind-dependent. Or more precisely: whether the statement/theory is true or false in virtue of attitudes/opinions. So, you again committed a use/mention mistake, confusing the statement/theory to that which the statement/theory refers.

    So you invent a moral theory, that has no basis in fact or reality, and call it objective. I see that is how the game is played.
    So you ask why divine command theory is a form of moral subjectivism, and when that's explained to you, you dodge, evade, quote-mine, misrepresent, etc. to avoid admitting your question was answered. I see that is how your sad apologetic game is played.

    Divine command theory is a form of moral subjectivism. You've been shown this, and explained to you why that is. Deal with it, without the nonsense tactics from you that I noted above. So if, in the future, you act like it hasn't been explained to you why divine command theory is a form of moral subjectivism, then I'll take you to be acting in bad faith.
    Last edited by Jichard; 04-23-2015, 08:10 PM.
    "Instead, we argue, it is necessary to shift the debate from the subject under consideration, instead exposing to public scrutiny the tactics they [denialists] employ and identifying them publicly for what they are."

    Comment


    • #92
      Simple question for you, as a mark of intellectual honesty.

      Is the following true?:
      Saying we have moral obligations because God says so is a form of divine command theory (DCT). DCT is a form of moral subjectivism. So saying we have moral obligations because God says so is a form of moral subjectivism.

      If not, then why not.
      "Instead, we argue, it is necessary to shift the debate from the subject under consideration, instead exposing to public scrutiny the tactics they [denialists] employ and identifying them publicly for what they are."

      Comment


      • #93
        Ok.
        Regarding P2,

        Why cant moral obligations derive from God's nature as opposed to his commandments?
        -The universe begins to look more like a great thought than a great machine.
        Sir James Jeans

        -This most beautiful system (The Universe) could only proceed from the dominion of an intelligent and powerful Being.All variety of created objects which represent order and Life in the Universe could happen only by the willful reasoning of its original Creator, whom I call the Lord God.
        Sir Isaac Newton

        Comment


        • #94
          Originally posted by Jichard View Post
          Simple question for you, as a mark of intellectual honesty.

          Is the following true?:
          Saying we have moral obligations because God says so is a form of divine command theory (DCT). DCT is a form of moral subjectivism. So saying we have moral obligations because God says so is a form of moral subjectivism.
          I think that seers argument is that DCT may make morality subjective from Gods perspective, but from our perspective morality would be objective in that from our point of view morality comes from God. The problem with that line of reasoning though is that even if morals come from God, then morals are not objective in and of themselves, they are subject to God, which I think is the argument that you are making and seer is not understanding. Of course seer could argue that Gods moral subjectivity is fixed and determined by his nature, but that would leave God as being a fixed and determined thing as well, which would pretty much negate the very idea that people have of God. I'm not sure seer wants to go there.

          Comment


          • #95
            Originally posted by JimL View Post
            I think that seers argument is that DCT may make morality subjective from Gods perspective, but from our perspective morality would be objective in that from our point of view morality comes from God. The problem with that line of reasoning though is that even if morals come from God, then morals are not objective in and of themselves, they are subject to God, which I think is the argument that you are making and seer is not understanding. Of course seer could argue that Gods moral subjectivity is fixed and determined by his nature, but that would leave God as being a fixed and determined thing as well, which would pretty much negate the very idea that people have of God. I'm not sure seer wants to go there.
            But that would result in a problem for seer. On the standard accounts of "subjective" or "objective" used to define "moral subjectivism" and "moral objectivism", it wouldn't make sense to talk about about something being objective from one of view and subjective from another point of view. Instead, they would be objective simpliciter or subjective simpliciter. To put it another way: if it's mind-dependent, then it's mind-dependent from any view-point. For example, the statement "Jichard dislikes cake" would be subjectively true simpliciter, since it's true or false in virtue on my attitude. That would be the case from my perspective, God's perspective, or anyone else's perspective. Similarly, "God commands X" would be subjectively true simpliciter because it's true or false depending in virtue of God's expressed attitude. And that would be the case from my perspective, God's perspective, or anyone else's perspective.
            "Instead, we argue, it is necessary to shift the debate from the subject under consideration, instead exposing to public scrutiny the tactics they [denialists] employ and identifying them publicly for what they are."

            Comment


            • #96
              Originally posted by shunyadragon View Post
              I believe the argument is sound for the Christian view of God, but I do not believe it is sound for all views of God, particularly the Baha'i view of an apophatic God where physical suffering is not considered in the same way as Traditional Christianity
              I don't know enough about the Baha'i faith to critique it or meaningfully comment on it. Sorry.
              "Instead, we argue, it is necessary to shift the debate from the subject under consideration, instead exposing to public scrutiny the tactics they [denialists] employ and identifying them publicly for what they are."

              Comment


              • #97
                Originally posted by Jichard View Post
                Then you were wrong in claiming that all plausible theistic views are committed to that.
                I do not believe that just because people hold to a certain view, or even a majority holds to it, that it somehow becomes plausible. Humans are perfectly capable of holding implausible views.

                Originally posted by Jichard View Post
                The point isn't to show they are correct. It's to show that you're wrong when you claim that all plausible theistic views have to hold that claim. And it shows that, quite clearly. You're erroneously assuming that since you hold a particular theistic position, all plausible theistic positions hold to that as well. And I showed that to be otherwise.
                No, you didn't. You claimed that some theists holds that there are moral obligations that do not stem from God, but you haven't even backed up that claim yet, you've only asserted it. But even if you'd be correct it wouldn't matter, for the reason I provided above.

                Originally posted by Jichard View Post
                Which is just you're way of saying I'm not going to bother to address it. It's a common internet apologist tactic. If someone supports claim X with reasoning Y, then just label Y "unjustified assumptions" or the like. And if they then justify Y with reasoning Z, then just label Z "unjustified assumptions" or the like. That way, no matter what's said, you can cast it aside without addressing it. That's called taking advantage of the problem of the regress, and is a cop-out.
                No, it's called refusing to take on the burden of proof when your opponent hasn't shouldered his, and it's a perfectly legitimate debating tactic. As the passage you cited stands, without the surrounding context, it's just a bunch of unsubstantiated assertions, and I'm not obligated to defend my point against something like that.

                Originally posted by Jichard View Post
                If you're unable to address the point, just say so.


                Come back when you have some real evidence/arguments that "on a plausible reading of the Jewish Old Testament, God is not the source of all moral obligations. Instead, God serves as an epistemic guide for morality.".

                Originally posted by Jichard View Post
                Strawman. That wasn't the argument. The argument actually was:
                "If that's just your definition of God, as opposed to how God must be defined, then your previous claims about "any plausible worldview that involves theism" hold now water. Theists who define God differently that you don't have to hold to your claims."

                Even other theists with plausible worldviews disagree with you, then you're wrong when you claim that every theist with a plausible worldview has to agree to your claims.
                See above regarding my point that people are perfectly capable of believing implausible things. Of course theists who define God differently than me don't have to hold to my claims, but that doesn't change anything regarding whether or not what they hold to is plausible or not. A propositions plausibility doesn't change based on whether or not someone holds to that proposition.


                Originally posted by Jichard View Post
                No, you were more than happy to say that all theists (that is, all people with a theistic worldview) have to hold to the concept of God that you do:

                And I showed that was wrong, by listing mentioning theists with a theistic worldview where you claims don't apply.

                By the way, later on in your post, you claim that if someone doesn't define God in just the way you do, you're unable to recognize it as God. Which contradicts what you just wrote above.
                Again, just because someone holds to a certain view doesn't make that view plausible.

                And it's funny that you accuse me of strawmanning your argument and then you falsely accuse me of claiming that if someone doesn't define God in exactly the way I do I can't recognize it as God. Not only did you falsely accuse me of strawmanning your argument, when I was perfectly aware of what it was from the start, you ended up strawmanning me because apparently you're not capable of reading what your opponent is actually claiming.

                I'll deal with your misrepresentation below.

                Originally posted by Jichard View Post
                Fallacious argument from consequence.

                I'd rather hold to positions that are true, as opposed to one's that appeal to positive consequences I might like. After all, though some people might like to hold to the idea that we live in a happy, wonderful world with no undeserved suffering, that doesn't mean that idea is true. Same for the ideas you might like to hold to.
                It would be fallacious if I was actually arguing for the truth of a position based on it's consequences. But I was not. I was simply stating that it does not make any difference what so ever on an atheistic worldview whether morality is subjective or objective,
                as opposed to a theistic worldview, where questions of morality are actually consequental.

                Originally posted by Jichard View Post
                Argument from consequence.

                A moral theory does not need to bring about all the positive consequences you might want, in order for that moral theory to be accurate. What I'm interested is what's true, not comforting fictions.
                You really like spotting fallacies where none exist, don't you? But just to address your point, it's not only that moral realism doesn't bring about any positive consequences on an atheistic worldview, it's that when it comes to consequences moral realism is completely indistinguishable from moral subjectivism. On atheistic moral realism there are no consequences what so ever that do not already exist on atheistic moral subjectivism.

                Originally posted by Jichard View Post
                And I rebutted your reasons for disagreeing.

                Feel free to state a semantic interpretation of "has" on which that is not the case, and show that case applied to "X has a moral obligation". [Hint: treating "has" as meaning something like "possessing/owning" won't work]. I'll go with the standard interpretation in the literature.
                I believe that properties cannot exist independently of their particulars. I also believe that moral obligations not only can exist independently of any subjects to which they apply, but that they in fact do, which means that the statement "X has a moral obligation" is not a statement about property.

                Originally posted by Jichard View Post
                Because you wrote:as if discussing of properties being greater (or lesser) than their particulars, is even applicable or makes sense. My point was that it makes no sense. It's akin to talking about blue being more square than red or the number five being faster than the number 6. So even if properties were to "exist independently of the stuff to which they're properties", that wouldn't make properties greater than their particulars, since the whole notion of properties being "greater" or "lesser" than particulars is gibberish.
                Yeah, continue harping on a point that your opponent has explicitly denied that he even made in the first point.

                Since you seem incapable of getting my point I'll try and explain it more thoroughly for you. My point is that on any view where properties have no existence independently of their particulars it does not make any sense to ask the question whether or not properties are lesser or greater than their particulars, but at the same time I recognize that some people might believe that properties themselves are things which have existence independently of the particulars to which they apply, and in that case you could make a case that if properties are more fundamental than their particulars it could be argued that they are greater than their particulars. On such a view asking whether or not properties are greater or lesser than their particulars makes perfect sense.

                Originally posted by Jichard View Post
                Same equivocation on "authority" which I addressed in the previous post. "Authority" in a meta-ethical context isn't about an authority figure or being in some position of power, but instead about normative moral reasons.
                There's no equivocation what so ever. Me denying that any notion of moral authority has any relevance outside of an inter-personal context isn't equivocating. I might be wrong, and it wouldn't be the first time, but it's not equivocating. I'll be as explicit as possible:

                I deny that there exists normative moral reasons apart from a personal authoritative moral source, or that even the possibility exist.


                Originally posted by Jichard View Post
                And I still can't make heads-or-tails of why you apply notions like "greater" to properties. That's not the relevant relation; instantiation or exemplification is.
                *Explicitly denies that he applies notions like "greater" to properties, get's accused of applying notions of "greater" to properties".


                Originally posted by Jichard View Post
                It rebuts your grounds for denying that it is.
                It shows that I was wrong in claiming that moral obligations are not properties because they're not intrinsic to the person who has them, but it does not show that moral obligations therefore are properties.

                Originally posted by Jichard View Post
                Which doesn't address my point that "it makes no sense to claim that Bob's moral obligation to do X existed before Bob existed."
                Except I do not think that moral obligations are things which apply to individual people in the same sense that properties do. I think moral obligations are best described something like "If a morally aware subject is in a specific situation X he ought to do Y". In other words, the moral obligation to do Y if you're in situation Y existed before Bob existed.

                Originally posted by Jichard View Post
                No, we don't. "being human" is a biological property that one has in virtue of membership in a certain species. Children can have it and fetuses can have it. Now, fetuses don't have moral obligations, so being human isn't the grounds of having moral obligations.
                Right, I'll just amend my statement then. Morally aware humans have moral obligations on account of being morally aware.

                Originally posted by Jichard View Post
                Which doesn't help your case at all. Even if groups of humans can have collective moral obligations, that doesn't show that the moral obligations exist before the group does. To put it another way, take the schema:
                X has a moral obligation
                I'm pointing out that the obligation does not exist until X does. You have moved to plugging in a group (humanity) in for X. So in order to rebut my point, you'd need to show that humanity had a moral obligation before humanity existed. But you haven't shown this. What you've instead claimed is that the group (humanity) has a moral obligation before a particular member (Bob) of that group existed. And that doesn't rebut my point.

                Furthermore, you're equivocating on "humanity" between a grouping of humans that does not contain Bob (call this "H1") vs. a grouping that contains Bob (call this "H2"). Pointing out that H1 has a moral obligation does not show that Bob has a moral obligation, since Bob is not apart of H1. Now, H1 transitions into H2 once Bob becomes a member of humanity. So at that point, you might claim that Bob has a moral obligation if H2 has a moral obligation. But that wouldn't rebut my point, since Bob existence would still be needed for him to have a moral obligation.
                My belief is that statements of moral obligations are statements like "If a morally aware subject/group of subjects is/are in a specific situation X, he/she/it/they ought to do Y". The aforementioned statement is completely coherent and understandable even if it was the case that no morally aware subject or group of subject (such as humanity) existed at all. On this view moral obligations exist independently of the subjects to which they apply.

                Originally posted by Jichard View Post
                I can note that you are equivocating on what the term "authority" means in meta-ethical context, by showing the difference between what you mean by "authority" and what the term means in a meta-ethical context. Which I did.
                And I'm saying that notions of normative reasons outside of the context of an authority figure are gibberish.

                And that's implausible. For example, epistemic reasons are a standard example of normative reasons that exist without need for coming from an authority figure. Same for reasons of self-interest.


                Originally posted by Jichard View Post
                Which displays just how flawed your position is. On that position, we'd have a normative moral reason to follow the commands a vicious, psychopathic deity that commanded we rape, as long as we're that deity's creations and we're living in a world that deity created. You've basically fallen back to an implausible might makes right position, where if one is powerful enough to create the world and it's contents, then what one says is right. And that's wildly implausible.
                No it's not. You just don't like the consequences of my view. But the fact that a view has certain consequences does not impact the truthfulness of that view in any way, as you yourself claimed earlier.

                Originally posted by Jichard View Post
                Furthermore, you've fallen afoul of the standard wrong kind of reasons objection: you've appealed to the wrong kind of consideration in trying to account for moral reasons. It'd be akin to an ethical egoist trying to account for moral reasons through appeal to reason of self-interest. The ethical egoist's project fails, since moral reasons are not the same type of reasons as reasons of self-interest. For example, moral reasons are very often other-regarding and external in the sense of not being about the fulfillment of one's personal goals, desires, etc. In much the same way, your account fails as an account of moral reasons; you're considerations are of a different type from moral reasons. Your considerations focus on obeying a powerful authority figure, as opposed to consideration for other's.
                Moral reasons are often other-regarding and external in the sense of not being about the fulfillment of one's personal goals, desires, etc. precisely because God's has decreed that it moral reasons are other-regarding and external in the sense of not being about the fulfillment of one's personal goals, desires, etc. If it was the case that God had decreed that moral reasons were self-regarding and internal in the sense of being about the fulfillment of one's personal goals, desires, etc your moral sensibilities would reflect that.

                Originally posted by Jichard View Post
                Which is false. For example, I have an epistemic normative reason to believe that evolution occurs, since I have abundant evidence of evolution. That reason doesn't depend on any authority figure telling me about that evidence. If I'd discovered the evidence on my own, for example, I'd still have an epistemic reason to believe that evolution occurs. And since "authority" in an epistemic context is also about reasons, then this illustrates how authority doesn't depend on some authority figure.
                Epistemic reasons are different from moral reasons, but even so epistemic reasons are not normative. On a naturalistic worldview if I'm not interested in knowing the truth I have no reason to believe in X even if there is an abundant amount of strong evidence in favor of X. Evidence in favor of X is only normative to me if I subjectively decide that questions of truthfulness are important to me. In the same way on a naturalistic worldview moral reasons are only normative (in a subjective sense) to me if I decide that question of morality are important to me.

                Originally posted by Jichard View Post
                Which doesn't nothing to rebut my point that your God is what God is position is a vacuous tautology, regardless of what God is.
                Except it's not. The original claim was that what is good is derived from God's nature, and that claim isn't vacuous because if that's true it follows that the more we would know about God's nature, the more we would know about what the term good means when applied to God. And the more we know about what good means when applied to God, the more we would know why the moral obligations that stem from God are the way they are.

                Originally posted by Jichard View Post
                A theist can define God differently, and still count as a theist. For example, open theists who think God does not know the future.

                And didn't you just say you don't think theists have to hold to your conception of God? Yet here you are, saying they must.
                Open theists do not necessarily deny that God is not omniscient. I know atleast one open theists who believe that God is omniscient, but that God still does not know the future, simply because the future isn't an objectively existing facet of reality that can be known. On that view it's not the case that the future exists, and God simply does not know it, but rather that the future does not yet exist, and therefore isn't even knowable, even by an omniscient being.

                And I've never claimed that theists have to hold to the exact same concept of God as I do. The things I listed above were some basic attributes of God that are necessary, but that doesn't mean that someone couldn't believe additional things about God that I didn't list above. For example, Jews and Muslims believe that God is unitarian, while I believe God is trinitarian, but I would still recognize their description as being about a theistic god, I just wouldn't recognize it as accurately reflecting Who God fully is. Similarily, if a theist described an entity that included all the attributes mentioned above, but denied that all moral obligations have their source in this entity I would recognize that they would be speaking about God, but I would still think that they are wrong in claiming that there could exist moral obligations apart from God. However, if someone described an entity that was not omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent, immaterial and personal I would not think that they were describing a theistic god.
                ~Formerly known as Chrawnus~

                Comment


                • #98
                  Originally posted by Quantum Weirdness View Post
                  Ok.
                  Regarding P2,

                  Why cant moral obligations derive from God's nature as opposed to his commandments?
                  I don't think it's plausible for moral obligations to derive from God's nature. Let me explain why.

                  The nature N of X is specified by giving the conditions jointly necessary and sufficient for being X. For example, the nature of "being a bachelor" is specified by "being unmarried and being male". So God's nature would be specified by listing the conditions jointly necessary and sufficient for being God. For instance, some Christians state God's nature as something like: "being omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, a deity, ...". So in stating God's nature, one would state the essential properties of being God.

                  The problem is stating the attributes of God's tells one next to nothing about what a human is obligated to do. For example, suppose that one states that God is essentially loving, such that it's apart of God's nature to be loving. That tells me about God, not about the actions I'm obligated to do. So to claim that God's nature accounts for a moral obligation to do X, one needs to actually establish a plausible connection between God and X. And the standard routes for doing that are fraught with problems. Take the following as an example:
                  God is loving, so humans are obligated to be loving

                  Here are some of the problems with this (these problems can be generalized to statements of the form "God is X, so humans are obligated to be X"):
                  First, since when is one morally obligated to be like God? For example, God is omnipotent, but that doesn't mean I'm morally obligated to be omnipotent. So why are matters different in the moral case? Without further explanation, it's just special pleading to say one is obligated to be like God is some ways and not others.

                  Second, this account is needlessly complicated and misses the point: one can simply say that one is obligated to act that way, since that's the loving way to act. Mentioning that "God is loving" adds a needless complication to the account, and misdirects the focus away from what's relevant (being loving) to something irrelevant (doing something for the sake of imitation).
                  To put it another way: God is loving, so you are obligated to be loving only has any plausibility due to the connection between being loving and one's moral obligations, not because God happens to have a loving nature or some connection between being loving and God's nature. It's not God's nature that accounts for moral obligations, but instead the property (in this case: being loving) that one included in one's account of God's nature. And just because one includes Z1 in one's specification of God's nature (ex: Z1 + Z2 + Z3 + Z3) doesn't mean that whatever depends on Z1 also depends on God's nature (that is: the entire set from Z1 + Z2 + Z3 + Z3).

                  Third, it runs into a modified Euthyphro dilemma:
                  Is God's nature obligation-providing because it includes being loving? Or is being loving obligation-providing because it is apart of God's nature?
                  If it's the former (which seems to be the more plausible of the options), then God's existence isn't required here. After all, love can exist even if God does not (ex: loving humans in a reality without a God), and thus this grounds of moral obligation would exist even if God does not.
                  If it's the latter, then the standard arbitrariness objections apply: any old property could count as obligation providing, just because God nature happens to include that property. So if God's nature had happened to turn out to include psychopathy, then one would be morally obligated to be psychopathic. And that's wildly implausible.

                  Fourth, the claim makes God's existence unneeded for moral obligations. To see why, note that one can specify X's nature, even if X does not exist. For example, I can specify the nature of being a married bachelor. Thus, deriving Y from X's nature is compatible with X not existing. This is just special case of deriving something from truths regarding non-existent occurrences. This is commonly done in science, philosophy, everyday life, etc. for dispositional properties. For example, a piece of glass can have the dispositional property of "being fragile" in virtue of the fact that "the glass would shatter under such-and-such conditions C", even if those conditions never actually occur. This sort of account can, and has, been extended to meta-ethics / moral philosophy. For example, one could hold that "having a moral obligation to K" can be accounted for in terms of the fact that "an ideal observer would advise that one do K". Pointing out that the ideal observer does not exist no more undercuts this account than pointing out that conditions C don't occur undercuts the above account of fragility.
                  Now, this can be applied to the above moral statement by stating it as something like:
                  God would have been loving, so humans are obligated to be loving
                  After all, stating God's nature doesn't commit one to God actually exists (as I explained above); just what God would have been like if God had existed. But just as in the case of conditions C with fragility, God would not need to exist for the obligations to hold. So God would not need to exist for moral obligations to be accounted for in terms of God's nature in this way.
                  "Instead, we argue, it is necessary to shift the debate from the subject under consideration, instead exposing to public scrutiny the tactics they [denialists] employ and identifying them publicly for what they are."

                  Comment


                  • #99
                    Originally posted by Chrawnus View Post
                    I do not believe that just because people hold to a certain view, or even a majority holds to it, that it somehow becomes plausible. Humans are perfectly capable of holding implausible views.
                    And you just said, by fiat, which theistic views count as plausible or not, even though the theistic position you hold is just a wildly implausible of might makes right. That's nowhere near as plausible as the position held by Morriston or Swinburne.

                    No, you didn't. You claimed that some theists holds that there are moral obligations that do not stem from God, but you haven't even backed up that claim yet, you've only asserted it.
                    No, I gave you examples, at which point you whined about name-dropping.

                    But even if you'd be correct it wouldn't matter, for the reason I provided above.
                    And your point fails for the reason I noted above.

                    No, it's called refusing to take on the burden of proof when your opponent hasn't shouldered his, and it's a perfectly legitimate debating tactic.
                    No, it isn't that. I discharged my burden of proof when I supported my claim. What you did wasn't refusing to take the burden of proof. What you did was just discard what was written, out of hand, without addressing it. And you discarded it because it led to conclusions you didn't like. So really, you just refused to engage with the evidence.

                    As the passage you cited stands, without the surrounding context, it's just a bunch of unsubstantiated assertions, and I'm not obligated to defend my point against something like that.
                    Same old tactic. You'll just label whatever is provided as "unsubstantiated assertions", without bothering to address it. That's how you're playing the game, and that's how you avoid addressing any evidence provided. And even I cited the other passages in support of those claims, you'd just call those passages "unsupported assertions" as well. Because that's the game you're playing. You're just moving the goalposts.

                    You were already given them, with a summary. In fact, you had it quoted to and had the relevant paper linked for you.
                    http://www.hts.org.za/index.php/HTS/...ewFile/160/237

                    See above regarding my point that people are perfectly capable of believing implausible things. Of course theists who define God differently than me don't have to hold to my claims, but that doesn't change anything regarding whether or not what they hold to is plausible or not. A propositions plausibility doesn't change based on whether or not someone holds to that proposition.

                    Again, just because someone holds to a certain view doesn't make that view plausible.
                    Addressed above.

                    And it's funny that you accuse me of strawmanning your argument and then you falsely accuse me of claiming that if someone doesn't define God in exactly the way I do I can't recognize it as God. Not only did you falsely accuse me of strawmanning your argument, when I was perfectly aware of what it was from the start, you ended up strawmanning me because apparently you're not capable of reading what your opponent is actually claiming.
                    You said:

                    So yes, you did claim that, thus excluding theists who don't define God as being omniscient or omnipotent.

                    It would be fallacious if I was actually arguing for the truth of a position based on it's consequences. But I was not. I was simply stating that it does not make any difference what so ever on an atheistic worldview whether morality is subjective or objective,
                    as opposed to a theistic worldview, where questions of morality are actually consequental.
                    Which is a red herring, since it has not bearing on the truth of the matter.

                    And please stop fallacious sliding from does not make an eternal difference to does not make a difference. It's the same sort of mistake William Lane Craig makes, and which Shelly Kagan dealt with. And of course it makes a difference, unless you think truth/falsity isn't a difference.

                    You really like spotting fallacies where none exist, don't you? But just to address your point, it's not only that moral realism doesn't bring about any positive consequences on an atheistic worldview, it's that when it comes to consequences moral realism is completely indistinguishable from moral subjectivism. On atheistic moral realism there are no consequences what so ever that do not already exist on atheistic moral subjectivism.
                    Which is a red herring, since it has not bearing on the truth of the matter.

                    And what you wrote is as irrelevant as saying:
                    On mathematical theorem X there are no consequences what so ever that do not already exist on mathematical theorem Y
                    as if that has any bearing on the truth or falsity of one theorem vs. another.

                    I believe that properties cannot exist independently of their particulars. I also believe that moral obligations not only can exist independently of any subjects to which they apply, but that they in fact do, which means that the statement "X has a moral obligation" is not a statement about property.
                    And I've detailed the mistakes in your reasoning there. It's based on your nonsensical application of notions like "greater" to properties.

                    Yeah, continue harping on a point that your opponent has explicitly denied that he even made in the first point.
                    I think you're still missing the point.

                    Take the statement:
                    A1 : The number 5 cannot be faster than the number 7, unless you think 5 is smaller than 7.
                    and:
                    A2 : The number 5 cannot be larger than the number 7, unless you think 5 is smaller than 7.

                    A2 is false. But it's at least somewhat sensible; I can understand what's being said. In contrast, A1 is gibberish since "faster" is not a notion that sensibly applies to relationships between numbers. A1 commits a category error, while A2 does not. That's the point I'm making to you. I'm not just claiming that your statement:
                    "Properties are things that are intrinsic to that beings nature, and so they cannot be greater than that being, unless you think properties exists independently of the stuff to which they're properties."
                    is false (like A1). I'm saying it's gibberish since "greater" (and "lesser") is not a notion that sensibly applies to the relationships between properties and particulars. So I take your whole discussion there to make no sense.

                    Since you seem incapable of getting my point I'll try and explain it more thoroughly for you. My point is that on any view where properties have no existence independently of their particulars it does not make any sense to ask the question whether or not properties are lesser or greater than their particulars, but at the same time I recognize that some people might believe that properties themselves are things which have existence independently of the particulars to which they apply, and in that case you could make a case that if properties are more fundamental than their particulars it could be argued that they are greater than their particulars. On such a view asking whether or not properties are greater or lesser than their particulars makes perfect sense.
                    Speaking of properties are greater or lesser than their particulars, makes no sense on any view. It's nonsensical and founded on a category error. I've repeatedly asked you to provide an sensible account of "greatness" on which this applies, and you've provided none.

                    By the way: just because something is more fundamental than something else, doesn't make it greater. For example, my atoms are more fundamental constituents than I am doesn't somehow make them greater than me. Parts aren't somehow necessarily greater than the whole. You just seem to be using the notion of "greatness" willy-nilly, using it to entail whatever is convenient for you at the moment (whether it's being the grounds of moral obligation, or being more fundamental, or whatever).

                    There's no equivocation what so ever. Me denying that any notion of moral authority has any relevance outside of an inter-personal context isn't equivocating. I might be wrong, and it wouldn't be the first time, but it's not equivocating. I'll be as explicit as possible:

                    I deny that there exists normative moral reasons apart from a personal authoritative moral source, or that even the possibility exist.
                    Yes, it is equivocating since you're introducing (by definition) a new sense of "authority" and then acting as if that's equivalent to the sense of "authority" used in meta-ethics. It's akin to a creationist defining "scientific theory" as "educated guess", denying that there are any scientific theories apart from educated guesses, and then claiming that this shows that they haven't equivocated on the term "scientific theory". But of course the creationist equivocated. They equivocated between the notion of "scientific theory" used in science and the creationist's own notion of scientific theory. Just because this equivocation occurs via a definition doesn't make it any less of an equivocation. Same for your claim.

                    *Explicitly denies that he applies notions like "greater" to properties, get's accused of applying notions of "greater" to properties".
                    *Explicitly applies notions like "greater" in nonsensical ways, and fails to offer an account of "greatness" when asked to*

                    It shows that I was wrong in claiming that moral obligations are not properties because they're not intrinsic to the person who has them, but it does not show that moral obligations therefore are properties.
                    Once again, it undermines the reasoning for your claim. Which was the point.

                    Except I do not think that moral obligations are things which apply to individual people in the same sense that properties do. I think moral obligations are best described something like "If a morally aware subject is in a specific situation X he ought to do Y". In other words, the moral obligation to do Y if you're in situation Y existed before Bob existed.
                    I undermined your grounds for thinking that that moral obligations are not properties that apply to individuals.

                    And what was written can easily be re-stated as:
                    "If a morally aware subject is in a specific situation X he is morally obligated to do Y"
                    Same form as standard "he is ...", where the "..." states a property. For example: "he is colored purple". Still waiting for your non-special-pleading grounds for treating those cases differently.

                    Right, I'll just amend my statement then. Morally aware humans have moral obligations on account of being morally aware.
                    And yet you don't accept that God has moral obligations? Are you denying that God is morally aware? Or is this just special pleading where you (once again), apply different claims to God than for other's?

                    Given what you wrote, what stops one from simply saying:
                    Morally aware deities have moral obligations on account of being morally aware.

                    My belief is that statements of moral obligations are statements like "If a morally aware subject/group of subjects is/are in a specific situation X, he/she/it/they ought to do Y". The aforementioned statement is completely coherent and understandable even if it was the case that no morally aware subject or group of subject (such as humanity) existed at all. On this view moral obligations exist independently of the subjects to which they apply
                    .

                    For the statement to make sense "even if it was the case that no morally aware subject or group of subject (such as humanity) existed at all", then the statement would need to be rendered counterfactually, as opposed to being about things that actually exist. So the statement should have been instead phrased as:
                    "If a morally aware subject/group of subjects were in a specific situation X, he/she/it/they ought to do Y"
                    But framing the sentence counterfactually doesn't show that moral obligations can exist even if the people they apply to don't. For example, I could just as easily note that the following claim makes sense, even if it was the case that no bachelors (and unmarried males) existed at all:
                    "If a male were an unmarried male, that male would be a bachelor"
                    That doesn't change the fact that bachelorhood exists only if there are males around to have the property of being a bachelor.

                    Here's another way of looking at it: the consequent of your statement will need to be rendered as a truth-apt claim. One can then ask who that claim is about. Is the "he/she/it/they" at the actual world (so the consequent is about an actual person) or at a non-actual possible world (so the consequent is about a non-actualized person)? In either case, the consequent will be about a person and the obligation had by that person at that world where they exist (or would have existed, had they existed). So you still wouldn't haven't gotten out of the having the obligation exist alongside the person that has the obligation, whether it be an actual person in an actual world with an actual obligation or a counterfactual person in a counterfactual world with a counterfactual obligation.

                    And I'm saying that notions of normative reasons outside of the context of an authority figure are gibberish.
                    And that's implausible. For example, epistemic reasons are a standard example of normative reasons that exist without need for coming from an authority figure. Same for reasons of self-interest.

                    No it's not. You just don't like the consequences of my view. But the fact that a view has certain consequences does not impact the truthfulness of that view in any way, as you yourself claimed earlier.
                    My objection isn't that the consequences of your position are negative. It's that the consequences of your position are wildly implausible. I freely admit that something can be negative and plausible (ex: some people go through undeserved, involuntary suffering), or positive and implausible (ex: no one goes through undeserved, involuntary suffering). It just so happens that your position has implications that are about both negative and implausible, since on your position this follows:
                    We'd have a normative moral reason to follow the commands a vicious, psychopathic deity that commanded we rape, as long as we're that deity's creations and we're living in a world that deity created.
                    That's just might makes right nonsense, where morality reduces to doing whatever the mighty figure says, if that might figure was powerful enough to create one and the world one lives in. If you can see how that's implausible, then I doubt you could be argued out of much. You'd be committed to your position, come Hell or high water.

                    Moral reasons are often other-regarding and external in the sense of not being about the fulfillment of one's personal goals, desires, etc. precisely because God's has decreed that it moral reasons are other-regarding and external in the sense of not being about the fulfillment of one's personal goals, desires, etc.
                    Doing something for X because you think God commanded is God-regarding, not X-regarding. You've substituted other-regarding (in the sense of the people who's one's actions, behavior, etc. benefit, harm, etc.) reasons with God-regarding obedience.

                    And it's not up to God doesn't decree metaphysically necessary truths, anymore that it's up to God to decree that "2 + 2 = 4". It is what it is, regardless of whether God is around to say anything or not. Unless you're denying that the relevant moral truths are metaphysically necessary?

                    If it was the case that God had decreed that moral reasons were self-regarding and internal in the sense of being about the fulfillment of one's personal goals, desires, etc your moral sensibilities would reflect that.
                    Unless you're resorting to moral subjectivism (in the form of a sensibility theory), pointing out that our moral sensibilities would have been different has no bearing on the truth or falsity of moral claims (such as claims regarding moral obligations). It'd be akin to pointing out that God could have made u with different capacities for forming mathematical judgments, as if that has any bearing on which mathematical statements were actually true. Just because God might have the power to manipulate humans into false mathematical and moral beliefs, doesn't mean that God somehow changes which mathematical and moral beliefs are true or false.

                    Epistemic reasons are different from moral reasons,
                    You made a claim about normative reasons. And since epistemic reasons are a type of normative reasons, I can cite them in rebutting your claim about normative reasons.

                    but even so epistemic reasons are not normative.
                    They are normative, since they admit of success and failure, and one can make genuine mistakes regarding them.

                    On a naturalistic worldview if I'm not interested in knowing the truth I have no reason to believe in X even if there is an abundant amount of strong evidence in favor of X. Evidence in favor of X is only normative to me if I subjectively decide that questions of truthfulness are important to me. In the same way on a naturalistic worldview moral reasons are only normative (in a subjective sense) to me if I decide that question of morality are important to me.
                    What you just mentioned above isn't some commitment of naturalism. It's instead a variety of reasons internalism. And naturalists don't have to be reasons internalist, let alone do atheists have to be reasons internalist (hint: "not a theist" =/= "a naturalist"). They can be reasons externalists. And on reasons externalism for epistemic reasons, one can have an epistemic reason to believe X, even if one has no interest in believing true claims. For example, the reason can arise from (or be constituted by) the relevant evidence, as opposed to one's interest. You've provided no argument for thinking that naturalism entails otherwise. Really, how does the fact that "only natural things have, and do, exist" imply that "one can have epistemic reasons only if those reasons square with what one is interested in"?

                    Except it's not. The original claim was that what is good is derived from God's nature, and that claim isn't vacuous because if that's true it follows that the more we would know about God's nature, the more we would know about what the term good means when applied to God. And the more we know about what good means when applied to God, the more we would know why the moral obligations that stem from God are the way they are.
                    The claim is vacuous because you go on to define good in terms of what God is, leading to the claim that "God is what God is". Learning more about what God is does not change the fact that the claim is vacuous. For example, suppose I define "slok" as being what Nimrod said slok is, where Nimrod defines "slok" as being whatever Sarah is. I then go around claiming that Sarah is slok. My position is vacuous, and amount to saying that "Sarah is what Sarah is". Even if I find out more info about Sarah, that still doesn't change the fact that my claim is still an utterly vacuous "Sarah is what Sarah is", a claim which would be true regardless of how Sarah is. The claim only tells me something trivial I could know without having any known or investigated Sarah.

                    And your claim really was that God is what God is:
                    Originally posted by Chrawnus View Post
                    Originally posted by Jichard
                    I doubt you're saying anything beyond an empty tautology like "God is what God is".
                    It is basically what I'm saying, but I deny that it is an empty tautology. "Good" should IMO be defined so that it corresponds to what the Bible tells goodness is, and what the Bible tells us is good is derived from God's nature.
                    And sorry, but that is an empty tautology. Any statement of the form "X is what X is" amounts to an empty tautology. One can know it's true without any substantive investigation or any deep conceptual analysis or any metaphysical reflection.

                    Open theists do not necessarily deny that God is not omniscient. I know atleast one open theists who believe that God is omniscient, but that God still does not know the future, simply because the future isn't an objectively existing facet of reality that can be known. On that view it's not the case that the future exists, and God simply does not know it, but rather that the future does not yet exist, and therefore isn't even knowable, even by an omniscient being.
                    And I know open theists (or people who claim to be open theists) who deny omniscience.

                    And I've never claimed that theists have to hold to the exact same concept of God as I do.
                    You said:

                    That rules out open theists who don't think God is omniscient. It also rules out polytheists (and henotheism and monolatrists) who don't think any deities are omnipotent or omniscience. Not to mention

                    The things I listed above were some basic attributes of God that are necessary, but that doesn't mean that someone couldn't believe additional things about God that I didn't list above. For example, Jews and Muslims believe that God is unitarian, while I believe God is trinitarian, but I would still recognize their description as being about a theistic god, I just wouldn't recognize it as accurately reflecting Who God fully is. Similarily, if a theist described an entity that included all the attributes mentioned above, but denied that all moral obligations have their source in this entity I would recognize that they would be speaking about God, but I would still think that they are wrong in claiming that there could exist moral obligations apart from God.
                    So you'd recognize as "God" a dystheist's God, such as a dystheist who believes that God is evil? Or maybe you define God as include just the attribute you find positive?

                    The issue wasn't that you said that they couldn't list additional features, but that you said that they had to hold to specific features you listed as apart of your conception of God ("omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence, being immaterial and personal"), otherwise you wouldn't recognize their notion as being that of God. Hence my example of open theists.

                    However, if someone described an entity that was not omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent, immaterial and personal I would not think that they were describing a theistic god.
                    Which is what I said you were doing.
                    Last edited by Jichard; 04-24-2015, 02:09 AM.
                    "Instead, we argue, it is necessary to shift the debate from the subject under consideration, instead exposing to public scrutiny the tactics they [denialists] employ and identifying them publicly for what they are."

                    Comment


                    • Originally posted by Jichard View Post
                      But that would result in a problem for seer. On the standard accounts of "subjective" or "objective" used to define "moral subjectivism" and "moral objectivism", it wouldn't make sense to talk about about something being objective from one of view and subjective from another point of view. Instead, they would be objective simpliciter or subjective simpliciter. To put it another way: if it's mind-dependent, then it's mind-dependent from any view-point. For example, the statement "Jichard dislikes cake" would be subjectively true simpliciter, since it's true or false in virtue on my attitude. That would be the case from my perspective, God's perspective, or anyone else's perspective. Similarly, "God commands X" would be subjectively true simpliciter because it's true or false depending in virtue of God's expressed attitude. And that would be the case from my perspective, God's perspective, or anyone else's perspective.
                      I understand your point, but if God and morality are one and the same thing, in other words if morality is fixed and determined, then morals from our perspective would be objective regardless of whether they are said to be objectified in a God or objective in themselves. The mere fact that morality is fixed and determined, unchanging and unchangeable, is what makes morality objective to us. But again the problem with that is that it negates the very idea of God itself. God would be fixed and determined as well, he would be subject to his own nature, he would be considered good only because he has no power to do otherwise, which in turn would make of him mindless, powerless, and determined by his own nature, and that would do away with the very idea of God and DCT itself.

                      Comment


                      • Originally posted by Jichard View Post
                        I expect you to actually engage with the reasoning/arguments presented, as opposed to doing what you've doing: pretending they don't exist or brushing them aside out-of-hand without addressing them.
                        Jicard, perhaps I'm just not understanding you. I really just want a direct answer in your own words, because I must be missing something. Again, you said that moral obligations are accounted for in terms of moral reasons. OK, fine - but what is the logical connection - how do moral reasons necessarily lead to moral obligations. I REALLY don't see the connection. I'm not trying to be a hard a.. here.



                        You didn't address my rebuttal at all:
                        Ethical theories make statements with semantic content, and thus they have meaning on my worldview. Something doesn't need to be eternal to have meaning. What you wrote is, once again, as impossible as saying that Cell Theory is meaningless unless God exists. That's absurd since Cell Theory has meaning, insofar as it makes claims (with semantic content, where those claims address certain questions/issues.
                        Well of course they have subjective meaning in your your worldview. The question is do you have meaning?



                        So you ask why divine command theory is a form of moral subjectivism, and when that's explained to you, you dodge, evade, quote-mine, misrepresent, etc. to avoid admitting your question was answered. I see that is how your sad apologetic game is played.

                        Divine command theory is a form of moral subjectivism. You've been shown this, and explained to you why that is. Deal with it, without the nonsense tactics from you that I noted above. So if, in the future, you act like it hasn't been explained to you why divine command theory is a form of moral subjectivism, then I'll take you to be acting in bad faith.
                        I would really like a real would example of moral objectivism. For instance here is a definition I found: The view that what is right or wrong doesn’t depend on what anyone thinks is right or wrong. That is, the view that the 'moral facts' are like 'physical' facts in that what the facts are does not depend on what anyone thinks they are.

                        Can you give me an example of a moral fact? And tell me how it is not dependent on what a man thinks?
                        Atheism is the cult of death, the death of hope. The universe is doomed, you are doomed, the only thing that remains is to await your execution...

                        https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jbnueb2OI4o&t=3s

                        Comment


                        • Originally posted by Jichard View Post
                          (TI or theodical individualism) Necessarily, God permits undeserved, involuntary human suffering only if such suffering ultimately produces a net benefit for the sufferer.
                          {108}

                          1) If God exists and TI is true, then, necessarily, all undeserved, involuntary human suffering ultimately produces a net benefit for the sufferer.
                          {111}

                          2) If, necessarily, all undeserved, involuntary human suffering ultimately produces a net benefit for the sufferer, then (a) we never have a moral obligation to prevent undeserved, involuntary human suffering or (b) our moral obligation to prevent undeserved, involuntary human suffering derives entirely from God’s commands. {111}

                          (3) We sometimes have a moral obligation to prevent undeserved, involuntary human suffering, an obligation that does not derive entirely from God’s commands.
                          {114}
                          I'm very late to this party! I've skimmed this thread, so I don't think my question below has been asked -- apologies if it has.

                          Can you give me an example of (3)? I would think that our moral obligations come from God. What is an example of an obligation that does not derive entirely from God's commands?

                          Comment


                          • Originally posted by GakuseiDon View Post
                            I'm very late to this party! I've skimmed this thread, so I don't think my question below has been asked -- apologies if it has.

                            Can you give me an example of (3)?
                            Any moral obligation people actually have. For example: the moral obligation not to rape people for the lulz. It's irrelevant what God has to command on the matter. If God commanded tomorrow that I go out and rape women for the lulz, it'd still be morally wrong for me to do so. Morality doesn't amount to blind obedience to whatever some authority figure commands.

                            I would think that our moral obligations come from God.
                            Which would be a form of moral subjectivism.

                            What is an example of an obligation that does not derive entirely from God's commands?
                            Any moral obligation people actually have. For example: the moral obligation not to rape people for the lulz.

                            What's under consideration here is ordinary moral obligation (or the moral obligations or ordinary morality). Those aren't dependent on God's commands, as Maitzen notes:
                            "In any case, however, Jordan is correct that ordinary morality sometime expects us to prevent undeserved, involuntary human suffering and not simply because we’re commanded to do so. The very basic commitments of what I’m calling “ordinary morality” are shared by theistic and non-theistic cultures alike. Ordinary morality doesn’t presuppose the existence of divine commands because it doesn’t presuppose the existence of God."

                            If resorts to saying that moral obligations only derive from God's commands, then one has forfeited ordinary morality in favor of a subjectivist position. And that's Maitzen point: one ends up having to forfeit ordinary morality (and it's obligations) to maintain one's position on God's existence.
                            "Instead, we argue, it is necessary to shift the debate from the subject under consideration, instead exposing to public scrutiny the tactics they [denialists] employ and identifying them publicly for what they are."

                            Comment


                            • Originally posted by Jichard View Post
                              Any moral obligation people actually have. For example: the moral obligation not to rape people for the lulz. It's irrelevant what God has to command on the matter. If God commanded tomorrow that I go out and rape women for the lulz, it'd still be morally wrong for me to do so. Morality doesn't amount to blind obedience to whatever some authority figure commands.
                              There it is finally! So why are we morally obligation not to rape? Because you say so? Are you not now making yourself the authority figure?
                              Atheism is the cult of death, the death of hope. The universe is doomed, you are doomed, the only thing that remains is to await your execution...

                              https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jbnueb2OI4o&t=3s

                              Comment


                              • Originally posted by seer View Post
                                There it is finally! So why are we morally obligation not to rape? Because you say so?
                                This was already addressed repeatedly. For example:
                                Originally posted by Jichard View Post
                                The general analysis: we have moral obligations because there are moral reasons for actions, developing certain character traits, and so on. That's the standard analysis: obligations arise from reasons. And moral reasons are constituted by the properties/features discussed in welfare utilitarianism (ex: effects of well-being) and virtue ethics (ex: character traits like compassion).
                                It says quite a lot about you, seer, that you choose to pretend otherwise.

                                Are you not now making yourself the authority figure?
                                Same old equivocation on "authority":
                                Originally posted by Jichard View Post
                                In a meta-ethical context, authority here is usually cashed out in terms of normative reasons, not because some great authority figure said something. So [..] moral reasons would account for why one has moral obligations.

                                [...]

                                "Authority" in a meta-ethical context is not about authority figures, or who's the greatest, or who's most powerful, or... That would be a subjectivist notion of authority, where authority is about the say-so of some powerful figure. Instead, "authority" in a meta-ethical context is about normative moral reasons. And those don't require an authority figure.

                                So, really, you're equivocating on the term "authority" between your subjectivist usage of the term, and the usage relevant to meta-ethics.
                                "Instead, we argue, it is necessary to shift the debate from the subject under consideration, instead exposing to public scrutiny the tactics they [denialists] employ and identifying them publicly for what they are."

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