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A Moral Argument Against God's Existence

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  • #46
    God is not a moral being and therefore has no moral obligations. Saying that some actions of God are morally right, or wrong are therefore nonsensical.

    That's not to say that God isn't good, but that's a whole nother notion than saying that God is moral.

    Comment


    • #47
      Originally posted by Chrawnus View Post
      God is not a moral being and therefore has no moral obligations.
      I'm uncertain I understand. Anyway, here's a thought. Might it not be better to go the other way: "God has no moral obligations; He is not a moral being like we are supposed to be, though He is the highest good."
      The greater number of laws . . . , the more thieves . . . there will be. ---- Lao-Tzu

      [T]he truth I’m after and the truth never harmed anyone. What harms us is to persist in self-deceit and ignorance -— Marcus Aurelius, Meditations

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      • #48
        Originally posted by Truthseeker View Post
        I'm uncertain I understand.
        Morality is a question about oughts (i.e we ought to do good, and we ought to avoid evil). To claim that God should do, or shouldn't do something is the same as setting some standard of morality above God, which would be nonsensical.

        Comment


        • #49
          Originally posted by Chrawnus View Post
          God is not a moral being and therefore has no moral obligations.
          First, if God is not a moral being, then God is not morally anything. Not morally perfect, etc. Just utterly amoral. And that contradicts with how mainstream Christianity presents God, since mainstream Christianity holds that God is morally perfect.

          Second, God does has moral obligations, on any plausible, objectivist account of moral obligations. For example, on deontology, God has moral obligations based on not treating agents as mere means.

          Saying that some actions of God are morally right, or wrong are therefore nonsensical.
          Don't see how it's nonsensical, unless one presumes a trite, subjectivist form of divine command theory.

          That's not to say that God isn't good, but that's a whole nother notion than saying that God is moral.
          Morally good.
          "Instead, we argue, it is necessary to shift the debate from the subject under consideration, instead exposing to public scrutiny the tactics they [denialists] employ and identifying them publicly for what they are."

          Comment


          • #50
            Originally posted by Quantum Weirdness View Post
            Btw (7) is also wrong. The Pharaoh of the Exodus is a good example of God doing that.
            Then God did something morally wrong. Again.

            If you say this is wrong, then I would like to know why.
            Again, already did: using an agent as a mere means is morally wrong on Kantian deontology, since it goes against practical reason (in virtue of it not being treated as a universal maxim).
            "Instead, we argue, it is necessary to shift the debate from the subject under consideration, instead exposing to public scrutiny the tactics they [denialists] employ and identifying them publicly for what they are."

            Comment


            • #51
              Originally posted by Quantum Weirdness View Post
              Huh. (3) may also be wrong too. If it doesn't entirely derive from God, where else does it derive from?
              There are plenty of moral objectivist accounts of moral obligations, including consequentialist varieties, deontological varieties, and virtue ethical varieties, where these accounts don't depend on God existing.

              Only moral subjectivists (in the form of divine command theorists) think moral obligations must derive from God's commands. So if you think 3 is wrong, then you've resorted to moral subjectivism in order to avoid the argument. You've reduced morality down to following orders.
              Last edited by Jichard; 04-10-2015, 03:09 AM.
              "Instead, we argue, it is necessary to shift the debate from the subject under consideration, instead exposing to public scrutiny the tactics they [denialists] employ and identifying them publicly for what they are."

              Comment


              • #52
                Originally posted by Quantum Weirdness View Post
                Ok and why is using a child as means wrong?
                If you can't see why it's morally wrong to use a child as a mere tool for the benefit of others, without considering the well-being of the child... please tell me you're just feigning ignorance for the sake of your pet theology. Otherwise...

                In any event, the Kantian response is that it goes against practical reason because it cannot be universalized as a maxim.

                If, you know, it saves many.
                You've resorted t oconsequentialism, which I've already dealt with:
                "Furthermore your response sounds somewhat utilitarian or consequentialist, where you're saying that the undeserved, involuntary suffering is justified because of the consequences for other people. I find that fairly ironic, given how many Christians object to consequentialism. In any event, this consequentialist route would work only if God had no better way of getting these consequences, other than undeserved, involuntary suffering. And I see no reason to think that's the case. After all, an omnipotent God has quite a number of different means for achieving these consequences. And one can be helpful and empathetic (i.e. have these as character traits) even if these dispositions are never occurrent since there's no suffering individual in need of them, since dispositions can exist even if they aren't occurrent. Additionally, the consequentialist route would work only if on balance the negative consequences for the sufferer were outweighed by the positive consequences for other individuals. And that does not seem to be the case, since there are plenty of plausible cases of very negative, undeserved, involuntary suffering, where this is not outweighed by greater positive consequences for other's. This includes cases where people suffer alone, forgotten by others."
                "Instead, we argue, it is necessary to shift the debate from the subject under consideration, instead exposing to public scrutiny the tactics they [denialists] employ and identifying them publicly for what they are."

                Comment


                • #53
                  Originally posted by Jichard View Post
                  If you can't see why it's morally wrong to use a child as a mere tool for the benefit of others, without considering the well-being of the child... please tell me you're just feigning ignorance for the sake of your pet theology. Otherwise...
                  Why is it morally wrong Jichard? Are you just going to appeal to our western sensibilities? Do you actually have something more?
                  Atheism is the cult of death, the death of hope. The universe is doomed, you are doomed, the only thing that remains is to await your execution...

                  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jbnueb2OI4o&t=3s

                  Comment


                  • #54
                    Originally posted by Jichard View Post
                    First, if God is not a moral being, then God is not morally anything. Not morally perfect, etc. Just utterly amoral. And that contradicts with how mainstream Christianity presents God, since mainstream Christianity holds that God is morally perfect.


                    Originally posted by Jichard View Post
                    Second, God does has moral obligations, on any plausible, objectivist account of moral obligations. For example, on deontology, God has moral obligations based on not treating agents as mere means.
                    No he doesn't. On any plausible worldview that involves theism, God is the source of all moral obligations. On any theistic worldview worth it's salt there are no moral obligations over and above God Himself.

                    Originally posted by Jichard View Post
                    Don't see how it's nonsensical, unless one presumes a trite, subjectivist form of divine command theory.
                    It's nonsensical no matter what type of morality you presume. As a maximally great being God is necessarily unbound by any moral obligations. If God has moral obligations then these obligations are greater than Him, which would be nonsensical.

                    Originally posted by Jichard View Post
                    Morally good.
                    Nope. You don't get to define what I mean when I say God is good.

                    Comment


                    • #55
                      Originally posted by Chrawnus View Post
                      So you didn't address that.

                      No he doesn't. On any plausible worldview that involves theism, God is the source of all moral obligations. On any theistic worldview worth it's salt there are no moral obligations over and above God Himself.
                      That's incorrect.

                      First, there are plenty of Christian philosophers who admit that God's existence isn't required for human to have moral obligations, since humans can have moral obligations in virtue of things that aren't God. These include Wes Morriston and Richard Swinburne.

                      Second, there are plenty of other philosophers who acknolwedge the existence of deities (and thus theism), without thinking that moral obligations require God. For example: Plato (or at least Plato's portrayal of Socrates).

                      Third, on a plausible reading of the Jewish Old Testament, God is not the source of all moral obligations. Instead, God serves as an epistemic guide for morality.

                      It's nonsensical no matter what type of morality you presume. As a maximally great being God is necessarily unbound by any moral obligations.
                      First, God does not need to be defined as a maximally great being.

                      Second, just because one defines as being as maximally great, does not imply that that being has no moral obligations. For example, nowhere in Plantinga's definition of maximal greatness is not having moral obligations mentioned or implied.

                      Third, maximally great beings don't get to change metaphysically necessary truths. Now, as even philosophers like Richard Swinburne admit, some moral statements (including some moral statements regarding moral obligations) are metaphysically necessary truths, and thus not up to God. God is no more than source of those truths than God is the source of the truth at "2 + 2 = 4".

                      If God has moral obligations then these obligations are greater than Him, which would be nonsensical.
                      Not really. So many theists who go with this greater being theology, have an incoherent or nonsensical idea of what "greater" means. Just because "X has Y" doesn't mean that "Y is greater than X". For example, I have the property of "being human". That doesn't somehow mean that that property is greater than me.

                      Here's an idea: actually define what you mean by "greater".

                      You don't get to define what I mean when I say God is good.
                      I doubt you're saying anything beyond an empty tautology like "God is what God is".
                      "Instead, we argue, it is necessary to shift the debate from the subject under consideration, instead exposing to public scrutiny the tactics they [denialists] employ and identifying them publicly for what they are."

                      Comment


                      • #56
                        Originally posted by Jichard View Post
                        So you didn't address that.
                        Address what? Me shrugging it of as unimportant is me addressing it.

                        Originally posted by Jichard View Post
                        That's incorrect.

                        First, there are plenty of Christian philosophers who admit that God's existence isn't required for human to have moral obligations, since humans can have moral obligations in virtue of things that aren't God. These include Wes Morriston and Richard Swinburne.

                        Second, there are plenty of other philosophers who acknolwedge the existence of deities (and thus theism), without thinking that moral obligations require God. For example: Plato (or at least Plato's portrayal of Socrates).
                        Instead of name-dropping, how about you provide some instances of these moral obligations that are in virtue of things that aren't God.

                        Originally posted by Jichard View Post
                        Third, on a plausible reading of the Jewish Old Testament, God is not the source of all moral obligations. Instead, God serves as an epistemic guide for morality.
                        If we grant for the sake of the argument that God is not described in the OT as the source of all moral obligations, it does not necessarily follow that therefore the OT holds the position that God is not the source of all moral obligations.


                        Originally posted by Jichard View Post
                        First, God does not need to be defined as a maximally great being.

                        Second, just because one defines as being as maximally great, does not imply that that being has no moral obligations. For example, nowhere in Plantinga's definition of maximal greatness is not having moral obligations mentioned or implied.

                        Third, maximally great beings don't get to change metaphysically necessary truths. Now, as even philosophers like Richard Swinburne admit, some moral statements (including some moral statements regarding moral obligations) are metaphysically necessary truths, and thus not up to God. God is no more than source of those truths than God is the source of the truth at "2 + 2 = 4".
                        God does not need to be defined as a maximally great being, but I happen to think that God is maximally great. I also happen to think that unless a being is the source of every possible moral obligation, it follows that that being is not maximally great. IOW, being the source of all moral obligations is something I consider to be a necessary attribute of a maximally great being, regardless of what Plantinga may or may not think. If God is not the source of all moral obligations then it follows that a theoretical being that has all the attributes that God has + the attribute of being the source of all moral obligations is greater than God, which would make that being greater than God, and therefore itself God.

                        Which logically means that I do not believe that there are moral obligations that are metaphysically necessary truths independent of the existence of God.

                        Originally posted by Jichard View Post
                        Not really. So many theists who go with this greater being theology, have an incoherent or nonsensical idea of what "greater" means. Just because "X has Y" doesn't mean that "Y is greater than X". For example, I have the property of "being human". That doesn't somehow mean that that property is greater than me.

                        Here's an idea: actually define what you mean by "greater".
                        First of all, properties are not the same as obligations, so you're comparing apples and oranges. The statement "God has moral obligations" is manifestly different from the statement "Jichard has the property of being human". Properties are things that are intrinsic to that beings nature, and so they cannot be greater than that being, unless you think properties exists independently of the stuff to which they're properties.

                        Moral obligations on the other hands, exists outside, and independently of the entities that they bind, and these moral obligations are authoritative to the beings to which they apply. In that sense they would be greater than God because they, or the source from which they derive, would be an authority over and above God. But since God is the highest possible authority, it follows that this position is nonsensical.


                        Originally posted by Jichard View Post
                        I doubt you're saying anything beyond an empty tautology like "God is what God is".
                        It is basically what I'm saying, but I deny that it is an empty tautology. "Good" should IMO be defined so that it corresponds to what the Bible tells goodness is, and what the Bible tells us is good is derived from God's nature.

                        Comment


                        • #57
                          Originally posted by Jichard View Post

                          First, there are plenty of Christian philosophers who admit that God's existence isn't required for human to have moral obligations, since humans can have moral obligations in virtue of things that aren't God. These include Wes Morriston and Richard Swinburne.
                          OK, how about you Jichard, in your godless universe, tell us why we have moral obligations?
                          Atheism is the cult of death, the death of hope. The universe is doomed, you are doomed, the only thing that remains is to await your execution...

                          https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jbnueb2OI4o&t=3s

                          Comment


                          • #58
                            Originally posted by Yttrium View Post
                            I see suffering as an inevitable aspect of free will. Suffering and enjoyment are flip sides of the same coin. You can't really have one without the other. They contrast and help define each other. To prevent suffering, God would have to prevent free will, which kind of defeats the purpose of having humans around. By allowing humans to have free will, humans gain the ability to recognize both enjoyment and suffering.
                            Can you expand on this idea that you have to have suffering to have enjoyment.

                            Is it enough that someone somewhere is suffering, or do we each have to experience some suffering to be capable of experiencing some enjoyment? If the latter, which came first? By this I mean that we start having experienced neither. It would then seem as though we cannot experience suffering without experiencing joy first, but we cannot experience joy without first experiencing suffering.

                            I see them rather differently. I think we have a neutral state, neither joyful nor suffering. We can define both joyful and suffering from this neutral state, without having to reference the other (and indeed dictionaries manage to accomplish this).

                            You mention the afterlife. I appreciate you are not religious, but in the Christian view heaven is a place with no suffering. How can that be, if enjoyment requires suffering? Or is that the purpose of hell? Those suffering in hell are the fuel, as it were, for the enjoyment of those in heaven.

                            Why do you suppose we need free will to recognise suffering and enjoyment?
                            My Blog: http://oncreationism.blogspot.co.uk/

                            Comment


                            • #59
                              Originally posted by Jichard View Post
                              The philosopher Stephen Maitzen has recently argued that the existence of ordinary moral obligations argues against the existence of God:

                              Maitzen presents and defends the the following premises from the argument (my account of these premises comes from paper 2, with the brackets {} around the page number where the premise appears):

                              (TI or theodical individualism) Necessarily, God permits undeserved, involuntary human suffering only if such suffering ultimately produces a net benefit for the sufferer.
                              {108}

                              1) If God exists and TI is true, then, necessarily, all undeserved, involuntary human suffering ultimately produces a net benefit for the sufferer.
                              {111}

                              2) If, necessarily, all undeserved, involuntary human suffering ultimately produces a net benefit for the sufferer, then (a) we never have a moral obligation to prevent undeserved, involuntary human suffering or (b) our moral obligation to prevent undeserved, involuntary human suffering derives entirely from God’s commands. {111}

                              (3) We sometimes have a moral obligation to prevent undeserved, involuntary human suffering, an obligation that does not derive entirely from God’s commands.
                              {114}

                              (4) So: It isn’t the case that, necessarily, all undeserved, involuntary human suffering ultimately produces a net benefit for the sufferer. [From (2), (3)]
                              {114}

                              (5) So: God does not exist or TI is false. [From (1), (4)]
                              {115}

                              (6) If not even God may treat human beings merely as means, then TI is true.
                              {116}

                              (7) Not even God may treat human beings merely as means.
                              {117}

                              (8) So: TI is true. [From (6), (7)]
                              {117}

                              (9) So: God does not exist. [From (5), (8)]
                              {117}


                              I think the argument is sound. Any other views?
                              This is a pretty interesting argument, here's my opinion:

                              I feel that #3 assumes that sometimes an individual's response to unjust harm (basically evil) isn't connected to God's command/wish. In other words, it sort of tries to suppose that God sometimes does not want the individual to prevent the undeserved punishment, basically evoking the Euthyphro dilemma. However, whether directly (a command, Biblical verse, etc) or indirectly (conscience, etc), God always commands this.

                              This is illustrated a bit better by the fact that #3's wording seems to suggest that "sometimes" a person has a moral obligation to prevent suffering, whereas by definition we always have a moral obligation. By separating the person's moral obligation from God's command, you create this problem (or suggest that theism creates it), but one has to recognize that the person's moral obligation and God's command are always the same (again Euthyphro dilemma).

                              Therefore #4 does not follow. I feel like it plays with the concept of command a bit vaguely. Let me know where I made a mistake. Also, interesting stuff, do you have any more? I found a similar situation with Geoffrey Boyd's, The Six Ways of Atheism, though I barely had time to glance at more than a few pages.

                              Additional comment: I have an interesting observation: If true, #5 doesn't even really need much of a follow up to disprove the existence of God, at least a wholly benevolent (and thus holy) one. If #5 is true then, the only way God could exist is if TI is false. If TI is false, then God sometimes allows evil for no reason.
                              Last edited by Cornelius; 04-14-2015, 05:02 AM.

                              Comment


                              • #60
                                Originally posted by Cornelius View Post
                                Additional comment: I have an interesting observation: If true, #5 doesn't even really need much of a follow up to disprove the existence of God, at least a wholly benevolent (and thus holy) one. If #5 is true then, the only way God could exist is if TI is false. If TI is false, then God sometimes allows evil for no reason.
                                Uh, no. If TI is false it does not necessarily follow that God sometimes allows evil for no reason. If it is not true that involuntary human suffering necessarily produces a net benefit for the sufferer then it does not follow from that that God couldn't have other reasons for allowing undeserved, involuntary suffering.

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