A Moral Argument Against God's Existence

[Truthseeker]

So an omnipotent God (who can do anything that's logically possible) would be able to make such people.

The God of the Bible is timeless or out of the time in the Universe. And the future of the Universe (as everyone perceives it) does exist already as far as God "sees" things. So, in a sense "such people" do exist already. I guess that's how Calvinists would reason.

[Jichard]

No, I'm not conceding that at all. I'm saying that personal experience of suffering, and an understanding of what sin actually does historically, is one of the major keys in sin proofing free beings, one of the major reasons why men will no longer sin. And that trials and tribulations are also necessary for personal moral character development.

No, they aren't logically necessary since they are would causes of a moral character, and causes do not logically necessitate their effects.

Perhaps God values character and virtue that is won through trials more than one that is merely given, with no struggle on our part. After all, what has more value, if you get an A+ after a lot of hard study and research or if you get an A+ because someone gave you the answers?

Which is akin a parent trying to justify allowing their child to suffer through a disease (without medicine) by saying I value character and virtue that is won through trials more than one that is merely given, So I'm going to let my child suffer. That's not a moral justification for permitting undeserved, involuntary suffering, especially in case where the child doesn't even develop such a character or suffers greatly and dies.

God is not just after any kind of man, but a particular kind of man.

And I could not care less what God values, unless there's some moral justification for that. You could tell me that God values that humans suffer, because God enjoys seeing suffering. Would that count as a moral justification for God allowing suffering? No.

[Jichard]

TI isn't true at all. The benefit could be for others, not necessarily for the sufferer.

TI is true.

If the suffering is only a benefit for others and not the sufferer, then God is using the person as a mere means; that is: merely as a tool. So the suffering will need to benefit the the sufferer.

[seer]

No, they aren't logically necessary since they are would causes of a moral character, and causes do not logically necessitate their effects.

What?

Which is akin a parent trying to justify allowing their child to suffer through a disease (without medicine) by saying I value character and virtue that is won through trials more than one that is merely given, So I'm going to let my child suffer. That's not a moral justification for permitting undeserved, involuntary suffering, especially in case where the child doesn't even develop such a character or suffers greatly and dies.

Sorry, again, it hinges on what kind of character God is after. The fact is you know that a character won through effort is much more valuable than one merely given. On all levels. Again whose character is more laudable - that of a student who works hard for her A+, or one who is just given the answer. And I will leave the death of the child to God since on my world that child has a future after physical death, in your world she is dust.

And I could not care less what God values, unless there's some moral justification for that. You could tell me that God values that humans suffer, because God enjoys seeing suffering. Would that count as a moral justification for God allowing suffering? No.

I gave you a reason. And on what basis could you even critique God? Base on your limited and finite understanding?

[Truthseeker]

Who is Jichard, who would be the judge of what is moral and what not--forget Jesus Christ and the Last Judgment!

[Jichard]

What?

Causal relationships are not logically necessary. So, once again, they are not logically necessary since they are causes of a moral character, and causes do not logically necessitate their effects.

Sorry, again, it hinges on what kind of character God is after.

And I already explained why I couldn't care less what God values; I'm interested in a moral justification.

The fact is you know that a character won through effort is much more valuable than one merely given. On all levels.

You're contradicting Christian theology, unless you admit that God chose to give Adam the character Adam had, even though Adam didn't earn that character through effort. And unless you admit that God's character isn't of the highest value; after all, God didn't work for it. By the way: you'll also need to drop the doctrine of original sin, since that would be an aspect of people's character, which they got through no choice of their own. You'll also need to explain why God allows for their to be psychopaths who lack empathy through no choice of their own.

It doesn't seem like your portrayal of God as valuing "a character won through effort", matches Christian theology or the real world

Again whose character is more laudable - that of a student who works hard for her A+, or one who is just given the answer.

False analogy. The comparison should not be between that of a student who works hard for her A+, or one who is just given the answer, but instead between that of a student who was undeservedly forced to suffer undeserved pain to know math, or one who knows math with such undeserved suffering. And the issue isn't who has the better character. It's instead about whether it would be morally justified for third party to allow the sufferer to go through undeserved, involuntary suffering.

And I will leave the death of the child to God since on my world that child has a future after physical death, in your world she is dust.

Rewarding a child in the afterlife isn't a justification for allowing the child to suffer, if the child's suffering was not necessary for the reward.

I gave you a reason.

You told me that God values certain things, and I explained how that's irrelevant.

And on what basis could you even critique God? Base on your limited and finite understanding?

You're resorting to skeptical theism, again, and the nonsensical special pleading that comes with it. I could just as well ask you: "And on what basis could you even judge that God is? Base[d] on your limited and finite understanding?" Skeptical theists (like you) are more than willing to use human reasoning... as long as that reasoning leads to theologically-convenient conclusions that you like. But the moment human reasoning leads to conclusion you don't like, you cast human reasoning aside, ad hoc. And that's just special pleading.

[Jichard]

Who is Jichard, who would be the judge of what is moral and what not--forget Jesus Christ and the Last Judgment!

Who is Jichard, who would be the judge of what is a primate and what not--forget Jesus Christ and the Last Judgment!

The point: a moral judgment (like a judgment regarding what is a primate) can be true or false, regardless of the person making the judgment. To say otherwise is to adopt a form of moral subjectivism.

[Quantum Weirdness]

TI is true.

If the suffering is only a benefit for others and not the sufferer, then God is using the person as a mere means; that is: merely as a tool. So the suffering will need to benefit the the sufferer.

Uhh I can point to examples where this not this case. Like:

2 Samuel 12:14-18.
14 But because by doing this you have shown utter contempt for[a] the Lord, the son born to you will die.”

15 After Nathan had gone home, the Lord struck the child that Uriah’s wife had borne to David, and he became ill. 16 David pleaded with God for the child. He fasted and spent the nights lying in sackcloth[b] on the ground. 17 The elders of his household stood beside him to get him up from the ground, but he refused, and he would not eat any food with them.

18 On the seventh day the child died. David’s attendants were afraid to tell him that the child was dead, for they thought, “While the child was still living, he wouldn’t listen to us when we spoke to him. How can we now tell him the child is dead? He may do something desperate.”



Here's Tektonics on it. http://www.tektonics.org/tsr/tsr9521.html

First, we should note fairly that the phrase regarding "enemies" is likely a later insertion; it is evidenced only in the Masoretic text. Nevertheless, David was king, and set an example for his nation. A visible judgment was required to set against any idea that others could blithely follow in David's steps in sinning.

We can hear the objection at once: "Who cares? Is God an egotist?" No, God is holy, and God is concerned that the greatest number of people will come to Him for their eternal salvation. Skeptics who tend to think only of the moment have no conception of the out working ripple effect of individual actions (or inaction). If having no effect at all meant that thousands who otherwise would have come to God and found eternal life instead went to eternal condemnation, is that worth the physical (not eternal) life of one person?

For Christians this is an easy answer: The death of one man paid for the salvation of billions. Visible judgment upon a very public offense as the means to accomplish the same, though to a lesser extent.

So no, TI isn't the case.

[Jichard]

Uhh I can point to examples where this not this case. Like:

2 Samuel 12:14-18.
14 But because by doing this you have shown utter contempt for[a] the Lord, the son born to you will die.”

15 After Nathan had gone home, the Lord struck the child that Uriah’s wife had borne to David, and he became ill. 16 David pleaded with God for the child. He fasted and spent the nights lying in sackcloth[b] on the ground. 17 The elders of his household stood beside him to get him up from the ground, but he refused, and he would not eat any food with them.

18 On the seventh day the child died. David’s attendants were afraid to tell him that the child was dead, for they thought, “While the child was still living, he wouldn’t listen to us when we spoke to him. How can we now tell him the child is dead? He may do something desperate.”

How does the case you brought up rebut what I wrote?

If God caused the child to suffer in order to benefit David and the suffering did not benefit the child, then God was using the child as mere means. And that would be morally wrong on deontological grounds (it'd be wrong for another reason on consequentialist grounds). So you would just be giving me an example of the Bible depicting God acting immorally.

If God caused the child to suffer in order to benefit David and the suffering did benefit the child, then this case isn't a counterexample to TI.

Here's Tektonics on it. http://www.tektonics.org/tsr/tsr9521.html


So no, TI isn't the case.

See above.

[Quantum Weirdness]

How does the case you brought up rebut what I wrote?

If God caused the child to suffer in order to benefit David and the suffering did not benefit the child, then God was using the child as mere means. And that would be morally wrong on deontological grounds (it'd be wrong for another reason on consequentialist grounds). So you would just be giving me an example of the Bible depicting God acting immorally.

If God caused the child to suffer in order to benefit David and the suffering did benefit the child, then this case isn't a counterexample to TI.



See above.

Huh? Why is it morally wrong? Go into more detail.

[Jichard]

Huh? Why is it morally wrong? Go into more detail.

I said why: because it involves using the child as a mere means.

[Quantum Weirdness]

The philosopher Stephen Maitzen has recently argued that the existence of ordinary moral obligations argues against the existence of God:

Paper 1: http://philosophy.acadiau.ca/tl_file...itzen_OMIA.pdf

Paper 2: http://philosophy.acadiau.ca/tl_file...aitzen_ABM.pdf

Maitzen presents and defends the the following premises from the argument (my account of these premises comes from paper 2, with the brackets {} around the page number where the premise appears):

(TI or theodical individualism) Necessarily, God permits undeserved, involuntary human suffering only if such suffering ultimately produces a net benefit for the sufferer.
{108}

1) If God exists and TI is true, then, necessarily, all undeserved, involuntary human suffering ultimately produces a net benefit for the sufferer.
{111}

2) If, necessarily, all undeserved, involuntary human suffering ultimately produces a net benefit for the sufferer, then (a) we never have a moral obligation to prevent undeserved, involuntary human suffering or (b) our moral obligation to prevent undeserved, involuntary human suffering derives entirely from God’s commands. {111}

(3) We sometimes have a moral obligation to prevent undeserved, involuntary human suffering, an obligation that does not derive entirely from God’s commands.
{114}

(4) So: It isn’t the case that, necessarily, all undeserved, involuntary human suffering ultimately produces a net benefit for the sufferer. [From (2), (3)]
{114}

(5) So: God does not exist or TI is false. [From (1), (4)]
{115}

(6) If not even God may treat human beings merely as means, then TI is true.
{116}

(7) Not even God may treat human beings merely as means.
{117}

(8) So: TI is true. [From (6), (7)]
{117}

(9) So: God does not exist. [From (5), (8)]
{117}

I think the argument is sound. Any other views?

Btw (7) is also wrong. The Pharaoh of the Exodus is a good example of God doing that. If you say this is wrong, then I would like to know why.

[Quantum Weirdness]

I said why: because it involves using the child as a mere means.

Ok and why is using a child as means wrong? If, you know, it saves many.

[Truthseeker]

I said why: because it involves using the child as a mere means.

Not sure what you mean by "as a mere means"; in any case I doubt that phrase is substantial. And would you say to the assumption that the child was taken up to heaven while still so young?

[Quantum Weirdness]

Huh. (3) may also be wrong too. If it doesn't entirely derive from God, where else does it derive from?