A Moral Argument Against God's Existence

[seer]

And suffering is not an inevitable aspect of free will. After all, one can have free agents who always choose to do good things that never cause involuntary, undeserved suffering for other people. The standard example of this is heaven. Anyway, I've always found it confusing why some people think free will necessitates evil or suffering. That makes no sense, since free will only requires that one has the ability to do evil or cause suffering, not that one actually does that [to put it another way: people are confusing a disposition with an occurent state). To give a non-moral example: I am free with respect to marrying a man, since I have the ability to do so and could do so if I wanted to. However, I won't ever marry a man since I have no interest in doing so. Similarly, God could have created agents with free will, who God knew would never choose to do evil and who God knew would never choose to cause involuntary, undeserved suffering in other's (unless you go with something like open theism).

Well, no. First, it is not primarily about always doing good, though that would naturally follow. The freedom that God gave us was the freedom to love - the Law contains two great principles - to love God with all your heart, and to love your neighbor as yourself. Violations of either imperative is what leads to eventual suffering. So could God have created us in a way that we would always choose to love Him and our neighbor with out significantly curtailing freedom of the will - doubtful. At bottom, if we could only choose to love, that is no choice at all, and if love is not voluntary is it really love - again doubtful. And remember even in Heaven one third of the Angels rebelled, and there was war: And there was war in heaven, Michael and his angels waging war with the dragon. The dragon and his angels waged war, and they were not strong enough, and there was no longer a place found for them in heaven

[Jichard]

Well, no. First, it is not primarily about always doing good, though that would naturally follow. The freedom that God gave us was the freedom to love - the Law contains two great principles - to love God with all your heart, and to love your neighbor as yourself. Violations of either imperative is what leads to eventual suffering.

Suffering occurs regardless of whether or not humans are loving. For example, there was plenty of non-human animal suffering, long before humans ever existed.

So could God have created us in a way that we would always choose to love Him and our neighbor with out significantly curtailing freedom of the will - doubtful.

Not all that doubtful. It's logically possible since there's no contradiction within it. And it's metaphysically possible, since it's logically possible under full information regarding the natures of the entities in question (i.e. compatible with conceptual truths and true identity claims under full information, as per Swinburne's account of metaphysical modality). Since an omnipotent God is defined as being able to do anything logically possible (though some theists have retreated to defining God as being able to do anything metaphysically possible), then God should be able to make such agents.

At bottom, if we could only choose to love, that is no choice at all, and if love is not voluntary is it really love - again doubtful.

Again, God could have made agents who could have chosen not to love God, even though as a matter of fact God knows they actually will always choose to have loved him. Free will doesn't imply that God cannot predict what one is going to do [so yes, I take free will to be compatible with divine foreknowledge]. And having a disposition that allows that you could do something, doesn't mean that you will ever actually do that thing (as my example of gay marriage illustrated).

And remember even in Heaven one third of the Angels rebelled, and there was war: [I][COLOR="#FF0000"]And there was war in heaven, Michael and his angels waging war with the dragon. The dragon and his angels waged war, and they were not strong enough, and there was no longer a place found for them in heaven

OK... how is that relevant?

[Jichard]

Not about the aspect of free will that I described.

I disagree, given that he wrote:

"We human beings possess libertarian—or contracausal— freedom, a capacity so valuable that it justifies God’s taking the risk that we’ll misuse it to cause horrific suffering in innocent non-volunteers and also justifies God’s choice not to interfere with such misuse on countless occasions. On this view, God may justly allow David to be burned alive merely as the price of his father’s exercise of such freedom (120)."

These agents can nevertheless understand the concepts of both suffering and enjoyment, and will inevitably experience both at points in their lives.

Not really. Just because one understands a concept doesn't mean one will experience the state to which that concept refers. For example, I understand the concept of "childbirth", but I'm never going to experience it.

Furthermore, it's not inevitable that one will experience both enjoyment and suffering as I explained:

"Enjoyment is it's own distinct mental state, and can occur even if one has never experienced the mental state known as suffering. For example, suppose that a child first becomes conscious at time t1. If the child experiences suffering at time t1, then that suffering still counts as suffering, even though the child has not had the chance to experience enjoyment yet."

They're contrasts. You don't recognize one without the other.

Which doesn't show that one needs to exist for the other to exist. One can understand the concept of something, even if that thing does not exist. To give an example: suppose a corin is understood as "a mammal that is not a centaur". Therefore a corin is understood and recognized as being a contrast to a centuar. Does that mean that cenaturs need to exist for corins to exist? Nope. It just means that one needs to understand the concept of a centaur, in order to understand the concept of a corin.

So even if the concept of enjoyment was understood as a contrast to the concept of suffering (and vice versa), that would not show that suffering needs to exist for enjoyment to exist (and vice versa). To say otherwise is to conflate concepts with the things to which those concepts refer.

There's no such thing as experiencing nothing but suffering, because any improvement will be relative enjoyment.

That would be assuming that "less enjoyment = suffering" and "less suffering = enjoyment". I don't see how that's the case. For example, I might enjoy eating two bagels less than eating just one scone. So suppose I eat two bagels after eating one scone. Am I suffering? No. It's not like I'm having any discomfort or a negative emotional response. To give a numerical analogy: suffering and enjoyment aren't just defined in terms of decreases or increases, respectively. They're instead defined in terms of negative or positive values, respectively. So, for instance, moving from 5 to 3 would not count as suffering, since neither number is negative. Instead, one would need to do something like moving from 5 to -1.

You can't spend all your life in joy, because any reduction in that joy will be relative suffering.

Christians would disagree, insofar as they think there's eternal joy in heaven. And I'm not sure how your conclusion follows: why can't someone spend their entire life in joy, with no reduction at all? They can still do plenty of different things, while having the same level of joy.

Wealthy people can suffer in conditions that impoverished people would cherish.

Which only shows that different people have different experiences in similar circumstances, not that "less enjoyment = suffering" and "less suffering = enjoyment".

Let's just go with something more basic then. There is no inherent requirement for the suffering to produce a benefit for the sufferer.

Maitzen argues for such a requirement.

To put it simply: if there is not such a requirement, then God is allowing the suffering for some other reason or for no reason. If God is allowing it for no reason, then that's arbitrary, callous disregard on God's part. If God is allowing the suffering for some other reason (such as helping others), then God is using the sufferer as a mere means, since God is using the person's suffering without a concern for how the suffering benefits the person suffering.

As I said, the suffering would be insignificant to an eternal afterlife. In that case, the opening statement doesn't hold up, and the logic fails before it starts.

That objection is addressed on pages 122-123 of paper 1.

If the suffering is irrelevant to an eternal afterlife, then what's God's justification for allowing the suffering? Pointing out that the afterlife swamps what happens in this life, does not offer a justification for what God allows in this life. If anything, the question becomes why God even bothers allowing something you think is that insignificant. In fact, you'd be contradicting Christian theology, insofar as Christians think what goes on in this life (including in terms of suffering) is significant to, and relevant to, what happens in an eternal afterlife.

Furthermore, you already seem to be conceding that the suffering is producing a net benefit for the sufferer; it's just that the benefit comes in the afterlife, and it vastly outweighs anything that happens in this life.. And that already fits with what Maitzen said, as I noted in the previous post.

[Yttrium]

I disagree, given that he wrote:

I still don't see how that relates to what I was saying about the contrasts of suffering and enjoyment.

Not really. Just because one understands a concept doesn't mean one will experience the state to which that concept refers. For example, I understand the concept of "childbirth", but I'm never going to experience it.

And yet you will still experience both enjoyment and suffering in your life. Funny how that works. As for assigning arbitrary numbers to levels of enjoyment/suffering, well, there is no absolute scales. They're arbitrary and relative. I can see that we're just going to go around in circles with this. I'll just skip over the rest, since we're making the point much more complex than it needs to be.

If the suffering is irrelevant to an eternal afterlife, then what's God's justification for allowing the suffering? Pointing out that the afterlife swamps what happens in this life, does not offer a justification for what God allows in this life.

The justification is allowing free will, so that we can recognize the concepts of enjoyment and suffering, and their contrast, in the first place. Even ignoring that (since you don't accept that argument), no justification is necessary, simply because the suffering would be swamped by the afterlife.

[seer]

Suffering occurs regardless of whether or not humans are loving. For example, there was plenty of non-human animal suffering, long before humans ever existed.

Yes, a good but separate discussion.

Not all that doubtful. It's logically possible since there's no contradiction within it. And it's metaphysically possible, since it's logically possible under full information regarding the natures of the entities in question (i.e. compatible with conceptual truths and true identity claims under full information, as per Swinburne's account of metaphysical modality). Since an omnipotent God is defined as being able to do anything logically possible (though some theists have retreated to defining God as being able to do anything metaphysically possible), then God should be able to make such agents.


Again, God could have made agents who could have chosen not to love God, even though as a matter of fact God knows they actually will always choose to have loved him. Free will doesn't imply that God cannot predict what one is going to do [so yes, I take free will to be compatible with divine foreknowledge]. And having a disposition that allows that you could do something, doesn't mean that you will ever actually do that thing (as my example of gay marriage illustrated).

Again, I have no idea if God could have done such a thing. If voluntary love or faith is the highest good, then creating beings that in essence, could not have done otherwise, doesn't seem like a real possibility. And not only love for God but love for our fellow man. Each and every diverse personality that we would meet. Besides Yttrium made a valid point, to quote Paul;"For I reckon that the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared with the glory which shall be revealed in us.” And there is also a logical possibility that God has a morally justified reason or reasons for allowing temporal suffering that we do not know about.

OK... how is that relevant?

Because you said: And suffering is not an inevitable aspect of free will. After all, one can have free agents who always choose to do good things that never cause involuntary, undeserved suffering for other people. The standard example of this is heaven.

[Jichard]

I still don't see how that relates to what I was saying about the contrasts of suffering and enjoyment.

OK.

It relates because you said suffering is an inevitable aspect of free will, which is the point Maitzen is addressing.

And yet you will still experience both enjoyment and suffering in your life. Funny how that works.

Just because I will experience both enjoyment and suffering in my life, that doesn't that suffering is necessary for enjoyment or vice versa, anymore than the fact I will eat both meat and vegetables in my life, implies that eating meat is necessary for eating vegetables or vice versa.

And I already provided a scenario is which there is suffering without enjoyment:

"For example, suppose that a child first becomes conscious at time t1. If the child experiences suffering at time t1, then that suffering still counts as suffering, even though the child has not had the chance to experience enjoyment yet."

As for assigning arbitrary numbers to levels of enjoyment/suffering, well, there is no absolute scales. They're arbitrary and relative.

I only need the scale have to higher and lower values, where some values are negative and some are positive. So, for example, a scale with a "0" as a baseline, with values relatively higher than 0 and values relatively lower than 0. And that's what we have. The "0" baseline would be a mental state without enjoyment or suffering (ex: apathy or disinterest in anything or dreamless sleep or...).

I can see that we're just going to go around in circles with this. I'll just skip over the rest, since we're making the point much more complex than it needs to be.

OK.

The justification is allowing free will, so that we can recognize the concepts of enjoyment and suffering, and their contrast, in the first place.

Even ignoring that (since you don't accept that argument), no justification is necessary, simply because the suffering would be swamped by the afterlife.

And Maitzen would argue against that, as per pages 122-123 of paper 1. I summarized a portion of his reply to you in the previous post, along with my own rebuttal. To re-state it:

There still needs to be a justification for allowing the suffering, where that justification provides a meaning for the suffering. Otherwise, God would be allowing for pointless, undeserved, involuntary suffering, which is not what a morally perfect, tri-omni deity would allow for. To allow for suffering with no justification/reason, is the very definition of arbitrary.

To put it another way: suppose Bob let's Sam you get stabbed. And Sam asks Bob why Bob let that happen. If Bob then tells Sam that many other better things will happen to Sam (such as Sam being cured of cancer), then Bob hasn't addresses the question at all. He's just introduced a red herring. Now, if Bob had instead said that Sam's being stabbed was necessary for Sam to be cured of cancer, then Bob would have answered Sam's question: he would have provided a justification for allowing the suffering.

By the way: Inuyasha is nonsense. Trigun is where it's at.

[Jichard]

Suffering occurs regardless of whether or not humans are loving. For example, there was plenty of non-human animal suffering, long before humans ever existed.

Yes, a good but separate discussion.

Not really separate, since you wrote:

"The freedom that God gave us was the freedom to love - the Law contains two great principles - to love God with all your heart, and to love your neighbor as yourself. Violations of either imperative is what leads to eventual suffering (emphasis added)."

What you wrote above is technically incorrect, since suffering occurs regardless of whether humans exist, and thus regardless of whether humans violate either imperative.

Again, I have no idea if God could have done such a thing. If voluntary love or faith is the highest good, then creating beings that in essence, could not have done otherwise, doesn't seem like a real possibility. And not only love for God but love for our fellow man. Each and every diverse personality that we would meet. Besides Yttrium made a valid point, to quote Paul;"For I reckon that the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared with the glory which shall be revealed in us.”

I addressed Yttrium's point.

And there is also a logical possibility that God has a morally justified reason or reasons for allowing temporal suffering that we do not know about.

That's opting for skeptical theism, which Maitzen has ripped to shreds in his published work. If anything, his argument from the OP springs largely from his work dismantling skeptical theism. Here are just some of the problems with skeptical theism:

it does away with moral obligations

it results in moral skepticism

it (if applied in in epistemically consistent manner) results in a more general skepticism

In any event, if one goes the Kantian route [given the Kantian's conceptual analysis of moral concepts), then it's not logically possible for God to have a morally justified reason or reasons for allowing temporal suffering, unless allowing that suffering involves treating the sufferer as an end in themselves; i.e. unless the suffering is of a net benefit to the sufferer. And that gels quite nicely with Maitzen's argument. If one goes the consequentialist route, then my other reply applies:

"Furthermore your response sounds somewhat utilitarian or consequentialist, where you're saying that the undeserved, involuntary suffering is justified because of the consequences for other people. I find that fairly ironic, given how many Christians object to consequentialism. In any event, this consequentialist route would work only if God had no better way of getting these consequences, other than undeserved, involuntary suffering. And I see no reason to think that's the case. After all, an omnipotent God has quite a number of different means for achieving these consequences. And one can be helpful and empathetic (i.e. have these as character traits) even if these dispositions are never occurrent since there's no suffering individual in need of them, since dispositions can exist even if they aren't occurrent. Additionally, the consequentialist route would work only if on balance the negative consequences for the sufferer were outweighed by the positive consequences for other individuals. And that does not seem to be the case, since there are plenty of plausible cases of very negative, undeserved, involuntary suffering, where this is not outweighed by greater positive consequences for other's. This includes cases where people suffer alone, forgotten by others."

Because you said: And suffering is not an inevitable aspect of free will. After all, one can have free agents who always choose to do good things that never cause involuntary, undeserved suffering for other people. The standard example of this is heaven.

Don't Christians think that humans who go heaven after death, will always choose to do good things while in Heaven, and they will not choose to cause involuntary, undeserved suffering for other people? If not, then I guess those Christians think they'll be suffering in heaven after Judgment.

[seer]

Don't Christians think that humans who go heaven after death, will always choose to do good things while in Heaven, and they will not choose to cause involuntary, undeserved suffering for other people? If not, then I guess those Christians think they'll be suffering in heaven after Judgment.

That is correct because the blessed and saved will have the knowledge, through personal experience, and through clear understanding of history, of what sin and rebellion does to man. The contrast with the new Heavens and Earth, where peace and genuine love reign, will be an eternal ensign and warning. No rational being will be desirous of the old world. And we will act from good moral character. Not a character foisted on us by Divine mandate, but one that is won, in concert with the Spirit of God, through actual trials and tribulations.

[Yttrium]

And Maitzen would argue against that, as per pages 122-123 of paper 1.

Frankly, Maitzen's argument about that makes my head hurt a bit. I'll just concede on that, and rely on my justification. I also note that my justification is not one that Christians would normally use. So there's that.

By the way: Inuyasha is nonsense. Trigun is where it's at.

I am forced to agree with this conclusion, despite having all of the Inu Yasha manga and videos.


I have another issue I'd like to bring up. It seems to me that Maitzen is only arguing against God being a moral one, of the Christianity/Judaism/Islam style. There could be a supreme being, a creator of the universe, God, who does not fit in with the logic. One that does not fit in with the holy texts. For example, God might not be aware of humans at all. The universe might be a larger project, with humans produced as a side effect. Or God might be aware of humans, but might not get involved with our problems, having other things to do. Or God might be immoral by our standards, and doesn't care about the suffering, or enjoys it. Disproving a moral version of God doesn't by itself disprove the existence of God.

[Jichard]

That is correct because the blessed and saved will have the knowledge, through personal experience, and through clear understanding of history, of what sin and rebellion does to man. The contrast with the new Heavens and Earth, where peace and genuine love reign, will be an eternal ensign and warning. No rational being will be desirous of the old world. And we will act from good moral character. Not a character foisted on us by Divine mandate, but one that is won, in concert with the Spirit of God, through actual trials and tribulations.

That leaves you with a problem, if you agree that the "personal experience, [...] clear understanding of history, [...] actual trials and tribulations" are apart of the cause for people choosing to do good things while in Heaven, and such that those people will not choose to cause involuntary, undeserved suffering for other people. After all, causes do not logically necessitate their effects, as philosophers have known since at least Hume. Nor are causes metaphysically necessary for their effects.

So in making your causal claim, you'd be implicitly conceding that it is logically possible for there to be people who choose to do good things while in Heaven, such that those people will not choose to cause involuntary, undeserved suffering for other people, even without those people going through "personal experience, [...] clear understanding of history, [...] actual trials and tribulations". So an omnipotent God (who can do anything that's logically possible) would be able to make such people.

[Truthseeker]

Jichard, did Hume say that "causes do not logically necessitate their effects" or words to that effect? If so, where?

[Jichard]

Jichard, did Hume say that "causes do not logically necessitate their effects" or words to that effect? If so, where?

The distinction between matters of fact and relations of ideas (where logical necessitation is involved in the former, or the latter) in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. That's one of the reasons why the problem of induction even comes up.

[Quantum Weirdness]

The philosopher Stephen Maitzen has recently argued that the existence of ordinary moral obligations argues against the existence of God:

Paper 1: http://philosophy.acadiau.ca/tl_file...itzen_OMIA.pdf

Paper 2: http://philosophy.acadiau.ca/tl_file...aitzen_ABM.pdf

Maitzen presents and defends the the following premises from the argument (my account of these premises comes from paper 2, with the brackets {} around the page number where the premise appears):

(TI or theodical individualism) Necessarily, God permits undeserved, involuntary human suffering only if such suffering ultimately produces a net benefit for the sufferer.
{108}

1) If God exists and TI is true, then, necessarily, all undeserved, involuntary human suffering ultimately produces a net benefit for the sufferer.
{111}

2) If, necessarily, all undeserved, involuntary human suffering ultimately produces a net benefit for the sufferer, then (a) we never have a moral obligation to prevent undeserved, involuntary human suffering or (b) our moral obligation to prevent undeserved, involuntary human suffering derives entirely from God’s commands. {111}

(3) We sometimes have a moral obligation to prevent undeserved, involuntary human suffering, an obligation that does not derive entirely from God’s commands.
{114}

(4) So: It isn’t the case that, necessarily, all undeserved, involuntary human suffering ultimately produces a net benefit for the sufferer. [From (2), (3)]
{114}

(5) So: God does not exist or TI is false. [From (1), (4)]
{115}

(6) If not even God may treat human beings merely as means, then TI is true.
{116}

(7) Not even God may treat human beings merely as means.
{117}

(8) So: TI is true. [From (6), (7)]
{117}

(9) So: God does not exist. [From (5), (8)]
{117}

I think the argument is sound. Any other views?

TI isn't true at all. The benefit could be for others, not necessarily for the sufferer.

[seer]

That leaves you with a problem, if you agree that the "personal experience, [...] clear understanding of history, [...] actual trials and tribulations" are apart of the cause for people choosing to do good things while in Heaven, and such that those people will not choose to cause involuntary, undeserved suffering for other people. After all, causes do not logically necessitate their effects, as philosophers have known since at least Hume. Nor are causes metaphysically necessary for their effects.

So in making your causal claim, you'd be implicitly conceding that it is logically possible for there to be people who choose to do good things while in Heaven, such that those people will not choose to cause involuntary, undeserved suffering for other people, even without those people going through "personal experience, [...] clear understanding of history, [...] actual trials and tribulations". So an omnipotent God (who can do anything that's logically possible) would be able to make such people.

No, I'm not conceding that at all. I'm saying that personal experience of suffering, and an understanding of what sin actually does historically, is one of the major keys in sin proofing free beings, one of the major reasons why men will no longer sin. And that trials and tribulations are also necessary for personal moral character development. Perhaps God values character and virtue that is won through trials more than one that is merely given, with no struggle on our part. After all, what has more value, if you get an A+ after a lot of hard study and research or if you get an A+ because someone gave you the answers? God is not just after any kind of man, but a particular kind of man.

BTW:http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/sh...l=1#post182489

[Truthseeker]

(where logical necessitation is involved in the former, or the latter)

The former or the latter? I do not follow.