Is everything part of God's plan?

[Joel]

Hm, it seems your views undermine the traditional cosmological and moral arguments for God's existence.

How so?

The argument from sense of morality is undermined if we start to suppose that such senses are simply biases from culture.
The cosmological argument is undermined by doubting the idea of unmoved mover (or uncaused cause).

I suspect our views of mechanical causality are similar.

I'm not sure. You seem to doubt the necessity of uncaused cause.

My view of volitional causality is similar to my view of mechanical causality, in that the inputs explain the output. Your view of volitional causality introduces another level of black box mystery in the form of an LFW which cannot be observed or explained, but which only functions as a "fudge factor" whose perceived need is to prop up a particular explanation of moral accountability which the Bible does not endorse.

As I've said before, that is not the order of my reasoning. My belief in LFW is prior to my beliefs about its relationship to morality.
And I have considered that mechanical causality might not exist at all. Perhaps the only efficient cause that exists is LFW. Perhaps a cue ball does not move the 8-ball, but that in each such instance, God wills that the 8-ball moves. It might turn out that our perception of physical laws is only an observation of patterns in God's will, and thus an abstraction.

Whereas in your reductionism, everything is reduced to mechanical causality.

But whether it was God or Braniac doing it to P, in either case it would be God hold P accountable (or not). If God has the freedom you claim, then surely He can find P just as accountable if Braniac does it to P.

We are not in a position to hold God accountable for anything; see Job. We know that God holds men accountable for their actions, and that should suffice as a Christian defense of the existence of accountability. No tenuous black-box LFW constructions necessary.

Again, it has nothing to do with holding God accountable, but with holding P accountable (or not).
Again, no one is denying that God holds men accountable.
It seems you keep using these red herrings to dodge the question. In your view if Braniac (or a mad scientist) were to harden P's heart so as to result in P doing some sin, is P morally accountable for that sin?

[RBerman]

The argument from sense of morality is undermined if we start to suppose that such senses are simply biases from culture.
The cosmological argument is undermined by doubting the idea of unmoved mover (or uncaused cause).

As I understand it, the "argument from sense of morality" is that the very fact that we have a sense of morality is what points to a moral Creator. The content of that morality is secondary. Some cultures think ritual genital mutilation is moral; the fact that we disagree with them is not a strike against the concept of morality itself; rather, it's further evidence that we think morality has meaning and is worth debating.

I'm not sure. You seem to doubt the necessity of uncaused cause.

With respect to human volition, that is true. I have not denied that God is an uncaused cause; I have however said that such terminology, like all our terminology about God, may be an inadequate grasping at his greater reality.

As I've said before, that is not the order of my reasoning. My belief in LFW is prior to my beliefs about its relationship to morality.
And I have considered that mechanical causality might not exist at all. Perhaps the only efficient cause that exists is LFW. Perhaps a cue ball does not move the 8-ball, but that in each such instance, God wills that the 8-ball moves. It might turn out that our perception of physical laws is only an observation of patterns in God's will, and thus an abstraction. Whereas in your reductionism, everything is reduced to mechanical causality.

What you suggest about mechanical causality is interesting, and may indeed be true. It begs the question to label my view with the pejorative of "reductionism." My view is simpler since it lacks the black box of LFW, but that doesn't make it wrong. I simply want more evidence for such a mysterious entity, of which Scripture is silent, than your vague internal impression that it exists but cannot be understood.

Again, it has nothing to do with holding God accountable, but with holding P accountable (or not). Again, no one is denying that God holds men accountable. It seems you keep using these red herrings to dodge the question. In your view if Braniac (or a mad scientist) were to harden P's heart so as to result in P doing some sin, is P morally accountable for that sin?

I am addressing this Braniac question in the other thread as well; see my comments there. Mind you, we put people in prison even though their terrible upbringing is what gave them the means, motive, and opportunity to commit the crime. However, someone who is mad has lost the ability to act according to his desires, and we put him in treatment instead.

[Joel]

As I understand it, the "argument from sense of morality" is that the very fact that we have a sense of morality is what points to a moral Creator. The content of that morality is secondary. Some cultures think ritual genital mutilation is moral; the fact that we disagree with them is not a strike against the concept of morality itself; rather, it's further evidence that we think morality has meaning and is worth debating.

Yes, that.

With respect to human volition, that is true. I have not denied that God is an uncaused cause; I have however said that such terminology, like all our terminology about God, may be an inadequate grasping at his greater reality.

Probably inadequate. But I think we can say God is at least an uncaused causer. The point being that it doesn't imply purposelessness (or randomness).

My view is simpler since it lacks the black box of LFW, but that doesn't make it wrong.

And I could also say that the LFW-only view is at least as simple because it lacks the black box of mechanical causality.
Mechanical causality is at least as "mysterious", "vague", and "not understood".

Mind you, we put people in prison even though their terrible upbringing is what gave them the means, motive, and opportunity to commit the crime.

Because we think they have free will and were not determined by their upbringing as an excuse. Though people certainly do make such arguments: that he shouldn't be punished; it's not his fault, because he couldn't do otherwise because of his upbringing, or because of his genetics. In fact, if it is determined that it was due entirely to a genetic chemical imbalance or some such thing (and thus not his fault), then a person can be acquitted.

However, someone who is mad has lost the ability to act according to his desires, and we put him in treatment instead.

I'm not an expert on insanity, but I strongly suspect that a madman always does what he desires.

[RBerman]

Yes, that.

Then, in the context of our discussion about whether a certain thing is moral, it's not clear to me how my claim that LFW seems unnecessary for morality is some kind of crypto-argument against the existence of morality itself. It's simply a different grounding for morality than you have proposed, not a denial of the concept of morality which would entail a refutation of the moral argument for the existence of God.

Probably inadequate. But I think we can say God is at least an uncaused causer. The point being that it doesn't imply purposelessness (or randomness).

Perhaps. I'm not prepared to extrapolate from our guess about what it means for God to be an uncaused causer, to what it would mean for man. Again, the creature/Creator distinction.

And I could also say that the LFW-only view is at least as simple because it lacks the black box of mechanical causality.

Does it lack mechanical causation? The universe in which LFW exists for human choices also includes mechanical causation in many other situations, doesn't it? You're really posing the existence of the same causation in which I believe; you just have another kind of causation that you think applies in other settings.

Mind you, we put people in prison even though their terrible upbringing is what gave them the means, motive, and opportunity to commit the crime.

Because we think they have free will and were not determined by their upbringing as an excuse. Though people certainly do make such arguments: that he shouldn't be punished; it's not his fault, because he couldn't do otherwise because of his upbringing, or because of his genetics. In fact, if it is determined that it was due entirely to a genetic chemical imbalance or some such thing (and thus not his fault), then a person can be acquitted. I'm not an expert on insanity, but I strongly suspect that a madman always does what he desires.

I've never heard the "genetic chemical imbalance" defense. I have heard the "insanity" defense which posits that the person was not acting rationally, and I would consider rationality to be necessary for the proper function of the "choosing according to your nature" process. But at any rate, our human justice systems are designed for humans to implement. We can't read minds, and we don't know everything, so we have an elaborate system which imperfectly attempts to assign culpability according to the best information we do have. God doesn't work like that. He is the perfect judge, and when he tells us the basis of his judgment, we need not extrapolate beyond that based on the added criteria that we a creatures would need in order to feel like we were rendering a just judgment.

[Joel]

Then, in the context of our discussion about whether a certain thing is moral, it's not clear to me how my claim that LFW seems unnecessary for morality is some kind of crypto-argument against the existence of morality itself. It's simply a different grounding for morality than you have proposed, not a denial of the concept of morality which would entail a refutation of the moral argument for the existence of God.

I think you've misunderstood me. I'm saying that you are denying reliability of our "inside knowledge" about man. Thus you don't merely remove the basis for our natural recognition of the existence LFW, you likewise remove the basis for other things, like our natural recognition of the existence of morality.

Perhaps. I'm not prepared to extrapolate from our guess about what it means for God to be an uncaused causer, to what it would mean for man. Again, the creature/Creator distinction.

That's fine, you can say, "I don't know." Either way, your argument is defeated. That is, you cannot say "uncaused cause" implies "purposeless".

And I could also say that the LFW-only view is at least as simple because it lacks the black box of mechanical causality.

Does it lack mechanical causation? The universe in which LFW exists for human choices also includes mechanical causation in many other situations, doesn't it? You're really posing the existence of the same causation in which I believe; you just have another kind of causation that you think applies in other settings.

The LFW-only view by definition includes only LFW, as I have previously described.
I'm not insisting on that view. But it is a possibility.

I would consider rationality to be necessary for the proper function of the "choosing according to your nature" process.

Why? What if it is your nature to choose irrationally?

[RBerman]

I think you've misunderstood me. I'm saying that you are denying reliability of our "inside knowledge" about man. Thus you don't merely remove the basis for our natural recognition of the existence LFW, you likewise remove the basis for other things, like our natural recognition of the existence of morality.

I have not denied the reliability of all "inside knowledge" about man. But you and I disagree about what we think that inside knowledge is, so you asserting what you think it is constitutes no proof that you are correct, any more than my counter-assertion does for me.

That's fine, you can say, "I don't know." Either way, your argument is defeated. That is, you cannot say "uncaused cause" implies "purposeless".

My claim is more modest than to attempt to prove a negative, a notoriously difficult task. My claim is that I see no reason to think that, where men are concerned, an uncaused cause should be considered purposeful. By your account, an uncaused cause is motivated neither by the nature of the chooser nor the circumstances in which he finds himself. In order to say that it's not random, you assert the existence of a mysterious fudge factor of LFW, based on your inner conviction that LFW must exist in order for moral accountability to exist.

The LFW-only view by definition includes only LFW, as I have previously described. I'm not insisting on that view. But it is a possibility.

I'm not interested in discussing a hypothetical world in which LFW is the only cause that exists for things and is thus somehow responsible for gravity, electromagnetic radiation, etc.

What if it is your nature to choose irrationally?

Insanity/irrationality is the improper function of the choosing mechanism. What God thinks of it, he hasn't told us, as far as I know.

[Joel]

I have not denied the reliability of all "inside knowledge" about man.

You cast serious doubt upon it when you dismissed it as likely being merely bias cultivated by one's culture. Your cultural relativism argument may be applied to one's sense of the existence of morality just as easily.

My claim is more modest than to attempt to prove a negative, a notoriously difficult task. My claim is that I see no reason to think that, where men are concerned, an uncaused cause should be considered purposeful.

And I see no reason to think that purposeful (and conscious, rational, etc.) beings acting as uncaused causes wouldn't act purposefully. (Especially when God gives an example that it is possible. And if man can act in any way as uncaused causers, it would be because God extends that capacity to them.)

Remember that your reason for making your claim is in order to show that LFW is nonsensical and thus not even worth discussing. Thus you'd need a much stronger argument than you've given.

By your account, an uncaused cause is motivated neither by the nature of the chooser nor the circumstances in which he finds himself.

I haven't said a person is acting disinterestedly. Of course a person feels various desires. Of course these pull at him. I'm just suggesting that they don't necessarily and completely determine the action. On the other hand he does act with a motive in the sense of a goal/purpose, that is as a final cause, which we have noted is different from an efficient cause.

In order to say that it's not random, you assert the existence of a mysterious fudge factor of LFW.

No, to say it's not random, I allow for the possibility of final cause, which is not the same thing as efficient cause.

I'm not interested in discussing a hypothetical world in which LFW is the only cause that exists for things and is thus somehow responsible for gravity, electromagnetic radiation, etc.

It might be the actual world. (I.e., that masses and charges accelerate towards each other because God wills it)

Insanity/irrationality is the improper function of the choosing mechanism.

But it is still the choosing mechanism (as you have described it), improper or not.


I'd still like you to give a clear answer to the question: If Braniac (or mad scientist) were to alter Bob's desires in order to determine Bob's motions, would Bob be morally accountable for those motions?

[RBerman]

You cast serious doubt upon it when you dismissed it as likely being merely bias cultivated by one's culture. Your cultural relativism argument may be applied to one's sense of the existence of morality just as easily.

Any argument based on "I just feel it to be so" is only as good as the consensus of those who feel that way. Mormons feel a "burning in their bosom" that the Book of Mormon is true, but such an argument doesn't go far with us. If two people agree on the existence of an innate concept of morality, then they are in a position to argue that God is the reason for that sense of morality. It is not necessary for their ideas about what morality consists of, or why it exists, to agree.

And I see no reason to think that purposeful (and conscious, rational, etc.) beings acting as uncaused causes wouldn't act purposefully. (Especially when God gives an example that it is possible. And if man can act in any way as uncaused causers, it would be because God extends that capacity to them.)

Certainly any capacity men have is from God. I'm not willing to argue about the workings of the mind of man based on the unknown (and probably incomprehensible) workings of the mind of God.

Remember that your reason for making your claim is in order to show that LFW is nonsensical and thus not even worth discussing. Thus you'd need a much stronger argument than you've given.

I do not feel compelled to argue until you agree that my argument is stronger than yours. But it is true that from my perspective, your argument for LFW seems to boil down to, "LFW needs to exist, based on my unprovable bias that it is the ground of moral accountability. I cannot explain how it functions, except that it differs from the nature of the man and the circumstances in which he finds himself."

No, to say it's not random, I allow for the possibility of final cause, which is not the same thing as efficient cause.

The existence of a final cause does not prevent the efficient cause from being random, does it? Only one step in a causal chain need be random in order that the overall outcome of that chain be random.

It might be the actual world. (I.e., that masses and charges accelerate towards each other because God wills it)

Is that view incompatible with mechanistic causation, or is it a way of saying that God is the ultimate cause even of mechanistic causation? I would think the latter.

But it is still the choosing mechanism (as you have described it), improper or not.

Is it? I just said that insanity (by definition, that is) consists of not choosing according to one's nature. You may wish to define insanity as a nature that one can have, but then we would be using different definitions.

I'd still like you to give a clear answer to the question: If Braniac (or mad scientist) were to alter Bob's desires in order to determine Bob's motions, would Bob be morally accountable for those motions?

It depends. Is Braniac altering Bob's very nature, so that Bob freely wants different things than he used to want? Or is Braniac just temporarily overriding Bob's nature with his (Braniac's) own nature?

[Joel]

from my perspective, your argument for LFW seems to boil down to, "LFW needs to exist, based on my unprovable bias that it is the ground of moral accountability. I cannot explain how it functions, except that it differs from the nature of the man and the circumstances in which he finds himself."

First of all, I was clear from the beginning that it was never my purpose to argue for or against LFW. You keep trying to move the discussion to that topic. The point of the other thread is to argue whether or not it is necessary for moral accountability. If I thought no argument could help on that topic, I wouldn't have started the thread.

Secondly, as I've said repeatedly, an lack of mine to explain how it functions is no greater than our lack of ability to explain how mechanical determinism functions (supposing that it ever exists).

Thirdly, I've never said it differs from the nature of man. On the contrary, I have said that it (if it exists) is part of man's nature--one of man's faculties.

The existence of a final cause does not prevent the efficient cause from being random, does it?

Yes, that's what I've been saying. The moral objection to man's actions being random is that his actions would be without purpose. So yes, the existence of purpose does eliminate the objection. What objection would remain?

It might be the actual world. (I.e., that masses and charges accelerate towards each other because God wills it)

Is that view incompatible with mechanistic causation, or is it a way of saying that God is the ultimate cause even of mechanistic causation? I would think the latter.

The difference I am making is such as the following:
1) Mechanistic causation: The cue ball strikes the 8-ball, and the cue ball by its own power, causes the 8-ball to move.
2) LFW causation: The cue ball strikes the 8-ball, and God by His power causes the 8-ball to move (and causes the cue ball to change course) because He wills it. And not because the cue ball was sufficient in itself to move the cue ball.

In the case of (1) it still could be said that God is the ultimate cause because He is the First mover, say because he was the one who started the cue ball moving in the first place. The distinction between the two is whether God is only the First mover, or if He is also the Mover at every step along the (seemingly deterministic) chain. If it's the latter, then our perception of mechanistic causation is really just an observation of patterns/regularity in God's will.

The deist view is an extreme case of (1), where God is only the First mover: created the universe, wound it up like a clock, and then let go, with the universe running independently on its own steam.

Is it? I just said that insanity (by definition, that is) consists of not choosing according to one's nature. You may wish to define insanity as a nature that one
can have, but then we would be using different definitions.

How so? Cows have a nature, worms have a nature, rocks have a nature. Man has a fallen nature. Adam pre-Fall had an unfallen nature. I don't see how you can say that something has a nature only if it is rational.

It depends. Is Braniac altering Bob's very nature, so that Bob freely wants different things than he used to want? Or is Braniac just temporarily overriding Bob's nature with his (Braniac's) own nature?

Is there a difference? In the former, Braniac is altering (temporarily or otherwise) Bob's nature according to what Braniac wants--thus overriding Bob's nature as it existed to begin with, according to Braniac's will. Does that help you answer my question? (Also I'd object to your use of the word "freely". Surely if Braniac is altering Bob's nature, in order to cause it to be the case that Bob wants X, it would seem that Bob wants it because of Braniac's deeds, and not "freely". All we could say is that Bob wants it. Even if you want to use some other definition of "freely", it's not clear to me what distinction the qualifier "freely" would add to the statement. What distinction, in your view, would you make between "Bob wants X" and "Bob freely wants X"?)


Here's a separate, additional question I'd like you to answer: What if another human, let's call him Charlie, manipulates Bob by dropping some drugs into Bob's drink, in order to alter Bob's movements, according to Charlie's desires. Is Bob in that case morally accountable for Bob's movements?

[dacristoy]

Here's a separate, additional question I'd like you to answer: What if another human, let's call him Charlie, manipulates Bob by dropping some drugs into Bob's drink, in order to alter Bob's movements, according to Charlie's desires. Is Bob in that case morally accountable for Bob's movements?

Yes, I believe so. Because Charlie acted immorally in depriving Bob of his free will to act separate and independent of Charlies immoral act; he must bear responsibility for the consequences of his actions...

[Joel]

Yes, I believe so. Because Charlie acted immorally in depriving Bob of his free will to act separate and independent of Charlies immoral act; he must bear responsibility for the consequences of his actions...

Wait, what? I think we agree that Charlie is morally accountable for the results. Are you saying that Bob also is accountable and it's because Bob is deprived of free will? This is a surprising answer. Explain more?

[RBerman]

First of all, I was clear from the beginning that it was never my purpose to argue for or against LFW. You keep trying to move the discussion to that topic. The point of the other thread is to argue whether or not it is necessary for moral accountability. If I thought no argument could help on that topic, I wouldn't have started the thread.

Secondly, as I've said repeatedly, an lack of mine to explain how it functions is no greater than our lack of ability to explain how mechanical determinism functions (supposing that it ever exists).

Thirdly, I've never said it differs from the nature of man. On the contrary, I have said that it (if it exists) is part of man's nature--one of man's faculties.

First, if all you wanted to know in this thread is whether everything is "part of God's plan," then a Christian's only answer can be, "Yes, in the sense that for each thing that has happened, at the very least God has chosen to allow it to be so, and to account for it within the scope of every thing else that happens." The only other option is, "No, some things take God by surprise, before he has a chance to render a judgment on whether he should allow them to happen or not."

Second, the "problem" of mechanical causation (e.g. Why do some things cause other things to happen?) is a mystery in every model of reality, whereas the additional problem of LFW is a problem in your model, but not mine. To whatever extent your theory ("masses and charges accelerate towards each other because God wills it") is true in your model, it could be equally true in mine, still leaving you with LFW as one more unexplained element in your system than mine has. That which you called "LFW causation" can operate on a different level of causation than mechanical causation and thus supplements it rather than replacing it.

Yes, that's what I've been saying. The moral objection to man's actions being random is that his actions would be without purpose. So yes, the existence of purpose does eliminate the objection. What objection would remain?

When the man's purpose (based on his nature and situation) are inadequate to explain his behavior, there remains an additional "x-factor" which explains why he did the thing he did. To say that one can have a purpose unrelated to one's situation and one's nature seems problematic.

How so? Cows have a nature, worms have a nature, rocks have a nature. Man has a fallen nature. Adam pre-Fall had an unfallen nature. I don't see how you can say that something has a nature only if it is rational.

We (or at least I) have been using "nature" not in the general sense of properties possessed by anything that exists, but particularly the things within a man which generate his desires, which his rational capacity then processes in the act of choosing. Obviously his rational capacity (or lack thereof) too is part of his "nature" broadly defined in the sense that cows and worms and rocks have a nature, but I was speaking of nature in a more circumscribed sense.

Is there a difference? In the former, Braniac is altering (temporarily or otherwise) Bob's nature according to what Braniac wants--thus overriding Bob's nature as it existed to begin with, according to Braniac's will. Does that help you answer my question? (Also I'd object to your use of the word "freely". Surely if Braniac is altering Bob's nature, in order to cause it to be the case that Bob wants X, it would seem that Bob wants it because of Braniac's deeds, and not "freely". All we could say is that Bob wants it. Even if you want to use some other definition of "freely", it's not clear to me what distinction the qualifier "freely" would add to the statement. What distinction, in your view, would you make between "Bob wants X" and "Bob freely wants X"?)

As I mentioned when you first brought up the amusing Braniac analogy, Superman is often shown fighting against Braniac's mental control. Superman's own nature would result in different choices, were not Braniac bypassing it, so that Superman is not actually making any choices but is being controlled against his own will rather than through it.

Here's a separate, additional question I'd like you to answer: What if another human, let's call him Charlie, manipulates Bob by dropping some drugs into Bob's drink, in order to alter Bob's movements, according to Charlie's desires. Is Bob in that case morally accountable for Bob's movements?

The distinction between this and your Braniac question is unclear to me; perhaps this is the method by which Braniac controls Bob's behavior in the previous question. So my answer is the same.

[dacristoy]

Wait, what? I think we agree that Charlie is morally accountable for the results. Are you saying that Bob also is accountable and it's because Bob is deprived of free will? This is a surprising answer. Explain more?

My purpose was to lock in Charlie as being morally accountable for Bob's actions. Did not intend to address Bob's accountability...

[Joel]

First, if all you wanted to know in this thread is whether everything is "part of God's plan," then a Christian's only answer can be, "Yes, in the sense that for each thing that has happened, at the very least God has chosen to allow it to be so, and to account for it within the scope of every thing else that happens." The only other option is, "No, some things take God by surprise, before he has a chance to render a judgment on whether he should allow them to happen or not."

But that's not what my friend meant. He was asking if everything is part of God's plan in the sense of God causing everything, like a giant puppet show.

Second, the "problem" of mechanical causation (e.g. Why do some things cause other things to happen?) is a mystery in every model of reality,

Not in the LFW model I presented.

That which you called "LFW causation" can operate on a different level of causation than mechanical causation and thus supplements it rather than replacing it.

huh?

When the man's purpose (based on his nature and situation) are inadequate to explain his behavior, there remains an additional "x-factor" which explains why he did the thing he did. To say that one can have a purpose unrelated to one's situation and one's nature seems problematic.

It seems you are here only complaining that final cause is not efficient cause. Yes, they are not the same. It is true that pointing out the final cause is not a pointing out of an efficient cause. But it is final cause (or lack thereof) that determines whether something is purposeless.

On the other hand, if you are insisting that everything have an efficient cause, then you end up with infinite regress.

And I would not say that one's purpose is unrelated to one's situation and one's nature.

As I mentioned when you first brought up the amusing Braniac analogy, Superman is often shown fighting against Braniac's mental control.

And I said that's not what I intend. I'm talking about Braniac causing Bob to want whatever it is that Braniac wants Bob to want. Bob is probably unaware of this manipulation even taking place.

So please answer the question again taking that into account.

[RBerman]

But that's not what my friend meant. He was asking if everything is part of God's plan in the sense of God causing everything, like a giant puppet show.

Then the answer is, "People are not puppets, so no."

Not in the LFW model I presented.

It's the same in my system, except without the constraint of describing God's will as LFW.

It seems you are here only complaining that final cause is not efficient cause. Yes, they are not the same. It is true that pointing out the final cause is not a pointing out of an efficient cause. But it is final cause (or lack thereof) that determines whether something is purposeless. On the other hand, if you are insisting that everything have an efficient cause, then you end up with infinite regress. And I would not say that one's purpose is unrelated to one's situation and one's nature.

The regress is not infinite; ultimately God is at the back of everything, as the Creator. Even if LFW were true, God is still ultimately responsible for making the person who used LFW. Also, it is not obvious to me that "final cause was not random" is sufficient to say that the overall event was not random, nor that "LFW is not random" is supported by anything except your need for it to be true.

And I said that's not what I intend. I'm talking about Braniac causing Bob to want whatever it is that Braniac wants Bob to want. Bob is probably unaware of this manipulation even taking place. So please answer the question again taking that into account.

We are going in circles now; I already answered that question by saying that it mattered whether you're saying that Braniac has altered Bob's nature, so that he has a nature that wants different things than he used to want.