Abortion and Feminism split from "Look at me" thread

[seer]

Or we could name this thread "Why Do Liberals Hate Babies So Much?"

[Leonhard]

An anti abortion thread is a good thread.

Agreed.

[Sam]

An unborn child is a human being. What other kind of being could it be? And person hood is a completely arbitrary designation, not worthy of serious debate.

Unless you want to accept the assertion that you have "zero moral ground" to complain about objectification or victimization because you accept or advocate the slaughter of pigs, cows, cephalopods or other animals for food, a definition of personhood is neither arbitrary nor unworthy of serious debate.

[Spartacus]

Sorry Leonhard, I'm tried of playing nice with feminists.

When have you ever?

[seer]

When have you ever?

A long time ago.

[seer]

Unless you want to accept the assertion that you have "zero moral ground" to complain about objectification or victimization because you accept or advocate the slaughter of pigs, cows, cephalopods or other animals for food, a definition of personhood is neither arbitrary nor unworthy of serious debate.

Nonsense - animals are not human beings created in the image of God. Killing an animal is not murder. And person hood as defining characteristic is pure • Edited by a Moderator •.

[Sam]

Nonsense - animals are not human beings created in the image of God. Killing an animal is not murder. And person hood as defining characteristic is pure • Edited by a Moderator •

You claimed that "personhood" was an arbitrary distinction. If so, then "personhood" can be arbitrarily defined so as to include animals. Are you arguing that the definition of personhood is arbitrary or are you arguing that it cannot be so defined so as to include animals?

If you agree that the definition of personhood is not arbitrary then you concede that a discussion of the definition of personhood is both worthy of debate and fundamental to argument for or against abortion.

[seer]

You claimed that "personhood" was an arbitrary distinction. If so, then "personhood" can be arbitrarily defined so as to include animals. Are you arguing that the definition of personhood is arbitrary or are you arguing that it cannot be so defined so as to include animals?

I didn't suggest that it was so arbitrary that it could include rocks. Sine we are defining human beings, or attempting to define human beings, that is where the argument lies.

If you agree that the definition of personhood is not arbitrary then you concede that a discussion of the definition of personhood is both worthy of debate and fundamental to argument for or against abortion.

No, I don't agree at all. Look at the quote - who is correct? Which definition is correct? How do we know which definition is correct? So don't tell me this is not arbitrary - it clearly is.

Western philosophy

In philosophy, the word "person" may refer to various concepts. According to the "naturalist" epistemological tradition, from Descartes through Locke and Hume, the term may designate any human (or non-human) agent which: (1) possesses continuous consciousness over time; and (2) who is therefore capable of framing representations about the world, formulating plans and acting on them.[7]

According to Charles Taylor, the problem with the naturalist view is that it depends solely on a "performance criterion" to determine what is an agent. Thus, other things (e.g. machines or animals) that exhibit "similarly complex adaptive behaviour" could not be distinguished from persons. Instead, Taylor proposes a significance-based view of personhood:

What is crucial about agents is that things matter to them. We thus cannot simply identify agents by a performance criterion, nor assimilate animals to machines... [likewise] there are matters of significance for human beings which are peculiarly human, and have no analogue with animals.
—[8]

Others, such as American Philosopher Francis J. Beckwith, argue that personhood is not linked to function at all, but rather that it is the underlying personal unity of the individual.

What is crucial morally is the being of a person, not his or her functioning. A human person does not come into existence when human function arises, but rather, a human person is an entity who has the natural inherent capacity to give rise to human functions, whether or not those functions are ever attained. …A human person who lacks the ability to think rationally (either because she is too young or she suffers from a disability) is still a human person because of her nature. Consequently, it makes sense to speak of a human being’s lack if and only if she is an actual person.
—[9]

Philosopher J. P. Moreland clarifies this point:

It is because an entity has an essence and falls within a natural kind that it can possess a unity of dispositions, capacities, parts and properties at a given time and can maintain identity through change.
—[10]

Harry G. Frankfurt writes that, "What philosophers have lately come to accept as analysis of the concept of a person is not actually analysis of that concept at all." He suggests that the concept of a person is intimately connected to free will, and describes the structure of human volition according to first- and second-order desires:

Besides wanting and choosing and being moved to do this or that, [humans] may also want to have (or not to have) certain desires and motives. They are capable of wanting to be different, in their preferences and purposes, from what they are. Many animals appear to have the capacity for what I shall call "first-order desires" or "desires of the first order," which are simply desires to do or not to do one thing or another. No animal other than man, however, appears to have the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in the formation of second-order desires.
—[11]

[12]

The criteria for being a person... are designed to capture those attributes which are the subject of our most humane concern with ourselves and the source of what we regard as most important and most problematical in our lives.
—Harry G. Frankfurt



According to Nikolas Kompridis, there might also be an intersubjective, or interpersonal, basis to personhood:

What if personal identity is constituted in, and sustained through, our relations with others, such that were we to erase our relations with our significant others we would also erase the conditions of our self-intelligibility? As it turns out, this erasure... is precisely what is experimentally dramatized in the “science fiction” film, Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind, a far more philosophically sophisticated meditation on personal identity than is found in most of the contemporary literature on the topic.
—[13]

Other philosophers have defined persons in different ways. Boethius gives the definition of "person" as "an individual substance of a rational nature" ("Naturæ rationalis individua substantia").[14] Peter Singer defines a “person” as being a conscious, thinking being, which knows that it is a person (self-awareness).[15]

Philosopher Thomas I. White argues that the criteria for a person are as follows: (1) is alive, (2) is aware, (3) feels positive and negative sensations, (4) has emotions, (5) has a sense of self, (6) controls its own behaviour, (7) recognises other persons and treats them appropriately, and (8) has a variety of sophisticated cognitive abilities. While many of White's criteria are somewhat anthropocentric, some animals such as dolphins would still be considered persons.[16] Some animal rights groups have also championed recognition for animals as "persons".[17]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Personhood

[fm93]

No, one can't.

Sure one can. The fact that there is even a serious debate over it clearly shows that. I don't agree with the case, but a case can certainly be made.

What would be an example of an extreme case?

If carrying the fetus to term would severely threaten the mother's life, then I believe it would be morally permissible to abort, for instance.

[Bill the Cat]

Sure one can. The fact that there is even a serious debate over it clearly shows that. I don't agree with the case, but a case can certainly be made.

The problem is that it ISN'T a serious debate. Biologically ignorant masses have simply yelled so loud that it LOOKS like there is a conversation going on.

[Sam]

I didn't suggest that it was so arbitrary that it could include rocks. Sine we are defining human beings, or attempting to define human beings, that is where the argument lies.

No, I don't agree at all. Look at the quote - who is correct? Which definition is correct? How do we know which definition is correct? So don't tell me this is not arbitrary - it clearly is.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Personhood

We are not defining "human beings." We are defining "persons." If you agree that a definition of personhood cannot include rocks, you are agreeing that the definition is not arbitrary. If the definition is not arbitrary then it is based on rational criteria. If it is based on rational criteria then it is worthwhile to discuss what those criteria are and whether a human fetus meets that criteria.

Just because you cannot parse competing definitions of personhood or disagree with others' criteria does not mean the definition is arbitrary. Welcome to the world of philosophy: it's complicated.

[Zymologist]

We are not defining "human beings." We are defining "persons." If you agree that a definition of personhood cannot include rocks, you are agreeing that the definition is not arbitrary. If the definition is not arbitrary then it is based on rational criteria. If it is based on rational criteria then it is worthwhile to discuss what those criteria are and whether a human fetus meets that criteria.

Just because you cannot parse competing definitions of personhood or disagree with others' criteria does not mean the definition is arbitrary. Welcome to the world of philosophy: it's complicated.

Why does the abortion debate have to be about the definition of "personhood"? AFAICT, any pro-abortion definitions of "personhood" also seem to exclude newborns, as well (though most abortion advocates, understandably, won't even come close to saying that themselves.)

[seer]

We are not defining "human beings." We are defining "persons." If you agree that a definition of personhood cannot include rocks, you are agreeing that the definition is not arbitrary. If the definition is not arbitrary then it is based on rational criteria. If it is based on rational criteria then it is worthwhile to discuss what those criteria are and whether a human fetus meets that criteria

Just because you cannot parse competing definitions of personhood or disagree with others' criteria does not mean the definition is arbitrary. Welcome to the world of philosophy: it's complicated.

Listen Sam, believe it or not, I have been around this discussion enough to know that there is no "rational criteria" that will be acceptable to all or most. It is a completely subjective endeavor. If you think otherwise, of the number of different definitions I listed, tells us all which one is correct and why. And that is why when deciding who should live or die the definition of person hood should not even enter the debate.

[Sam]

Why does the abortion debate have to be about the definition of "personhood"? AFAICT, any pro-abortion definitions of "personhood" also seem to exclude newborns, as well (though most abortion advocates, understandably, won't even come close to saying that themselves.)

That's pretty clearly untrue: many pro-choice definitions of "personhood" include viable human fetuses and therefore necessarily include neonates as persons.

The abortion debate has to include the definition of "person" as a fundamental premise because we're talking about the legal rights afforded to fetuses. If a human fetus is a "person," it has the legal rights afforded to all persons. If a human fetus is not a "person" then it does not necessarily have the legal rights afforded to all persons. One could argue that human fetuses are not persons before a given gestational age but still argue that they should be afforded certain protections (similar to how we protect domesticated animals in certain situations) — but one could not argue that such protections are pursuant to the constitutionally-protected rights of a fetus.

[Zymologist]

That's pretty clearly untrue: many pro-choice definitions of "personhood" include viable human fetuses and therefore necessarily include neonates as persons.

The abortion debate has to include the definition of "person" as a fundamental premise because we're talking about the legal rights afforded to fetuses. If a human fetus is a "person," it has the legal rights afforded to all persons. If a human fetus is not a "person" then it does not necessarily have the legal rights afforded to all persons. One could argue that human fetuses are not persons before a given gestational age but still argue that they should be afforded certain protections (similar to how we protect domesticated animals in certain situations) — but one could not argue that such protections are pursuant to the constitutionally-protected rights of a fetus.

I suppose my question is, why isn't "human" enough as a classification?