This video is lengthy (25 February), and I started making notes as to what is being said, but it appears to be an actual bipartisan "look back" at what happened. It seems to come down to "the foot soldiers did great" but the leadership screwed up bigtime.
They KNEW there would be major trouble, but there were also major failures of command and control - no clear rules of engagement, and officers felt abandoned by leadership as things quickly fell apart.
Some claim they had no actionable intelligence on January 5, but the same department had issued dire warnings on January 3.
Several of the witnesses complain that they had actionable intelligence that warned of major trouble, but also assured that this would be more like the "million man march" - even though armed militia and white supremacist's would be involved, and they were monitoring social media that encouraged protesters to bring arms.
Apparently, a claim was made that helmets were issued to officers in preparation of the anticipated riot, but very few of the officers were wearing helmets.
Several are throwing (unintentionally, perhaps) the Sgt at Arms under the bus for not disseminating the information they had.
Chief Pittman had claimed that the size of dignitary protection was increased --- when asked, she admits the increase was from 4 people to 6 people.
Chief Pittman had boasted of deploying counter-intelligence agents, but admits the increase was minimal.
Chief Sun had pressed the Sgt at Arms for more protection, but was denied.
Chief Sun had asked for National Guard assistance, also asked Senate Sgt at Arms - and was denied prior to the 6th.
Ranking member of Appropriations member was "in the fray" and was near "boots on the ground" and said there was absolutely no way they were getting command and control direction.
She also refers to the shooting incident by Lt Michael Byrd, and says he had no way of knowing there was a tactical response team on the other side of the door, because there was zero communication over command radio headsets or radios. No real time coordination at all.
Senate was evacuated, but House was not - appeared to be no plan for House to evacuate.
Chief Pittman - "Incident Command Protocols" developed after 9-11 were "not adhered to". Because "command" failed, officers "on the ground" had to become "command and control", but they were busy trying to manage their own areas of defense.
Capitol Police Union "no confidence" vote of Pittman was 92% not confident --- Pittman was supposedly incompetent, and is trying to "fix the problem".
Chief Pittman - Incident Command Structure failed, but she (Pittman) claims reforms are still being implemented.
Pittman disputes the "no confidence" vote because "not all sworn officers" voted.
Still working on "communications", because there apparently was no communication avenue between Metro Police, Capitol Police, Sgts at Arms (both House and Senate) and there were way too few "hard turtle gear" (the tactical police) units.
Admits there was no training for the anticipated January 6 riot.
Don't have time to get further into this, but it sounds like pretty much everybody agrees "boots on the ground" performed admirably, but "command and control" screwed up really badly, and was mostly totally absent.
They KNEW there would be major trouble, but there were also major failures of command and control - no clear rules of engagement, and officers felt abandoned by leadership as things quickly fell apart.
Some claim they had no actionable intelligence on January 5, but the same department had issued dire warnings on January 3.
Several of the witnesses complain that they had actionable intelligence that warned of major trouble, but also assured that this would be more like the "million man march" - even though armed militia and white supremacist's would be involved, and they were monitoring social media that encouraged protesters to bring arms.
Apparently, a claim was made that helmets were issued to officers in preparation of the anticipated riot, but very few of the officers were wearing helmets.
Several are throwing (unintentionally, perhaps) the Sgt at Arms under the bus for not disseminating the information they had.
Chief Pittman had claimed that the size of dignitary protection was increased --- when asked, she admits the increase was from 4 people to 6 people.
Chief Pittman had boasted of deploying counter-intelligence agents, but admits the increase was minimal.
Chief Sun had pressed the Sgt at Arms for more protection, but was denied.
Chief Sun had asked for National Guard assistance, also asked Senate Sgt at Arms - and was denied prior to the 6th.
Ranking member of Appropriations member was "in the fray" and was near "boots on the ground" and said there was absolutely no way they were getting command and control direction.
She also refers to the shooting incident by Lt Michael Byrd, and says he had no way of knowing there was a tactical response team on the other side of the door, because there was zero communication over command radio headsets or radios. No real time coordination at all.
Senate was evacuated, but House was not - appeared to be no plan for House to evacuate.
Chief Pittman - "Incident Command Protocols" developed after 9-11 were "not adhered to". Because "command" failed, officers "on the ground" had to become "command and control", but they were busy trying to manage their own areas of defense.
Capitol Police Union "no confidence" vote of Pittman was 92% not confident --- Pittman was supposedly incompetent, and is trying to "fix the problem".
Chief Pittman - Incident Command Structure failed, but she (Pittman) claims reforms are still being implemented.
Pittman disputes the "no confidence" vote because "not all sworn officers" voted.
Still working on "communications", because there apparently was no communication avenue between Metro Police, Capitol Police, Sgts at Arms (both House and Senate) and there were way too few "hard turtle gear" (the tactical police) units.
Admits there was no training for the anticipated January 6 riot.
Don't have time to get further into this, but it sounds like pretty much everybody agrees "boots on the ground" performed admirably, but "command and control" screwed up really badly, and was mostly totally absent.
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