Before the polite thread was closed due to lack of politeness, CP posted an interesting excerpt from LawCornell.edu, where the point was made that legal scholars and jurists are of the opinion that, in certain respects, the establisment clause of the First Amendment prohibits what the free expression clause following it requires. That there can be clear conflicts here.
The argument was made that, as a matter of secular law, anti-discrimination laws trump religious expression. And this was certainly true during the civil rights conflict, where free expression of religion was indeed used as an argument to support refusing to sell to negroes.
The problem with that, in the cases of our poster child baker, florist, and photographer, is that none of these people was refusing to serve gays! In fact, in the case of the florist, the gay man had been a long-time steady customer whose sexual orientation was known and not a problem. As far as I can tell, none of the discrimination in these cases was against any people at all. Instead, these merchants refused to serve the event of same-sex marriage, on the grounds of religious expression.
So the question is, does the free expression clause cover refusal to serve ONLY specific events, by someone freely willing to serve these people in any other respect (and presumably, to continue to serve them after the marriage, for example for a birthday party)? This is distinctly NOT discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation. Should that make a difference?
The argument was made that, as a matter of secular law, anti-discrimination laws trump religious expression. And this was certainly true during the civil rights conflict, where free expression of religion was indeed used as an argument to support refusing to sell to negroes.
The problem with that, in the cases of our poster child baker, florist, and photographer, is that none of these people was refusing to serve gays! In fact, in the case of the florist, the gay man had been a long-time steady customer whose sexual orientation was known and not a problem. As far as I can tell, none of the discrimination in these cases was against any people at all. Instead, these merchants refused to serve the event of same-sex marriage, on the grounds of religious expression.
So the question is, does the free expression clause cover refusal to serve ONLY specific events, by someone freely willing to serve these people in any other respect (and presumably, to continue to serve them after the marriage, for example for a birthday party)? This is distinctly NOT discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation. Should that make a difference?
Comment