A question for Materialists/Atheist/ Humanists and their allies

[JimL]

A natural evolution of life, including a natural development of the brain, is not mutually exclusive with a supernatural origin of consciousness. Of course, the scientific method doesn't accept the line "we don't know how it could have happened, so God must have done it". Until we can identify and study any supernatural methods that could be involved, we will keep looking for natural answers. Science is a tool, and anyone can use it, whether religious or not.

A natural evolution is mutually exclusive to any of the religious based assertions, a.k.a. revelation, for the origins of consciousness, and without those religious based assertions there is no reason to assume anything other than a natural evolution. Religions claim to have the answer, and their answer is not evolution.

[seer]

I don't buy that for one second. I explained it to you over and over and over. Roy explained it to you. I explained the difference between "physical" and "non-physical" to you. I explained what a "property" was. I explained to you how you were confusing descriptions with the properties to which those descriptions refer, as per your use/mention mistake And instead of making an honest attempt at understanding, you repeated the falsehoods, while pretending not to understand what was written. At this point, I accept that the other people on this forum were right about you. Honest discourse with you is impossible.

Bull crap. When I asked about non-physical properties you said:

Non-physical properties exist in the natural world. These include properties like biological properties, chemical properties, astronomical properties, and so on.

A feature particular (or collections of particulars) can have.

What the hell does that mean...

seer, please don't lie to me. You don't understand those links at all. For example, you have no clue whether Prinz is giving an account of say, access consciousness, or instead the phenomenal consciousness that Chalmers focuses on. Chalmers would accept a naturalistic account of access consciousness. I do know what sort of account Prinz is offering, since I'm familiar with Prinz's work and have heard him discuss it. You are not familiar with it, given your track-record. Your track-record shows that you will misrepresent what people say (going so far as to lie about their work), if you think it suits your apologetic ends. For example, you lied about what reductivie physicalists were committed to; you committed this lie by omission when you quote-mined the link on reductive physicalism.

So, seer, stop please pretending you understanding things. What makes your tactic even more ridiculous is that Chalmers and Harris agree with what I'm saying. They both, for example, accept that there are non-physical properties discusses at levels of description other than that used by the science of physics, and that these non-physical properties are instantiated by natural things. So when you claim that you understand what they're saying but you don't understand what I'm saying, you're lying. Pure and simple. You're lying.

No you are lying. I understand perfectly what both Chalmers and Harris are saying in the links, And I will again quote Harris:

The problem, however, is that no evidence for consciousness exists in the physical world.[6] Physical events are simply mute as to whether it is “like something” to be what they are. The only thing in this universe that attests to the existence of consciousness is consciousness itself; the only clue to subjectivity, as such, is subjectivity. Absolutely nothing about a brain, when surveyed as a physical system, suggests that it is a locus of experience. Were we not already brimming with consciousness ourselves, we would find no evidence of it in the physical universe—nor would we have any notion of the many experiential states that it gives rise to. The painfulness of pain, for instance, puts in an appearance only in consciousness. And no description of C-fibers or pain-avoiding behavior will bring the subjective reality into view.

If we look for consciousness in the physical world, all we find are increasingly complex systems giving rise to increasingly complex behavior—which may or may not be attended by consciousness. The fact that the behavior of our fellow human beings persuades us that they are (more or less) conscious does not get us any closer to linking consciousness to physical events. Is a starfish conscious? A scientific account of the emergence of consciousness would answer this question. And it seems clear that we will not make any progress by drawing analogies between starfish behavior and our own. It is only in the presence of animals sufficiently like ourselves that our intuitions about (and attributions of) consciousness begin to crystallize. Is there “something that it is like” to be a cocker spaniel? Does it feel its pains and pleasures? Surely it must. How do we know? Behavior, analogy, parsimony.[7]

Most scientists are confident that consciousness emerges from unconscious complexity. We have compelling reasons for believing this, because the only signs of consciousness we see in the universe are found in evolved organisms like ourselves. Nevertheless, this notion of emergence strikes me as nothing more than a restatement of a miracle. To say that consciousness emerged at some point in the evolution of life doesn’t give us an inkling of how it could emerge from unconscious processes, even in principle.

http://www.samharris.org/blog/item/t...-consciousness

See Jichard, that is not hard to understand. So do you disagree with Harris?

[Jichard]

Actually I have no idea what your point is anymore. Other than descriptions of physical events.

I don't buy that for one second. I explained it to you over and over and over. Roy explained it to you. I explained the difference between "physical" and "non-physical" to you. I explained what a "property" was. I explained to you how you were confusing descriptions with the properties to which those descriptions refer, as per your use/mention mistake And instead of making an honest attempt at understanding, you repeated the falsehoods, while pretending not to understand what was written. At this point, I accept that the other people on this forum were right about you. Honest discourse with you is impossible.

Actually I understand both links, and I also understand that both men would disagree Prinz if he is claiming a naturalistic account of consciousness. I can understand Harris and Chamlers quite easily in these links - unlike trying to understand you.

seer, please don't lie to me. You don't understand those links at all. For example, you have no clue whether Prinz is giving an account of say, access consciousness, or instead the phenomenal consciousness that Chalmers focuses on. Chalmers would accept a naturalistic account of access consciousness. I do know what sort of account Prinz is offering, since I'm familiar with Prinz's work and have heard him discuss it. You are not familiar with it, given your track-record. Your track-record shows that you will misrepresent what people say (going so far as to lie about their work), if you think it suits your apologetic ends. For example, you lied about what reductivie physicalists were committed to; you committed this lie by omission when you quote-mined the link on reductive physicalism.

So, seer, stop please pretending you understanding things. What makes your tactic even more ridiculous is that Chalmers and Harris agree with what I'm saying. They both, for example, accept that there are non-physical properties discusses at levels of description other than that used by the science of physics, and that these non-physical properties are instantiated by natural things. So when you claim that you understand what they're saying but you don't understand what I'm saying, you're lying. Pure and simple. You're lying.

[seer]

Seriously, you make no honest effort to understand to what people say. Cats aren't physical things [or more precisely, the property referred to by "is a cat" is non-physical], and you'd know that if you ever bother to actually read what I wrote. The property referred to by "is a cat" is biological property, not a physical one, since it occurs at a level of description other than than discussed in the science of physics. This is not a problem for physicalism, given the supervenience of these non-physical properties on the physical, as even acknowledged by the source you misrepresented in your quote-mine:

Actually I have no idea what your point is anymore. Other than descriptions of physical events.

Please don't reference stuff you don't understand, and have no honest interest in understanding.

Actually I understand both links, and I also understand that both men would disagree Prinz if he is claiming a naturalistic account of consciousness. I can understand Harris and Chamlers quite easily in these links - unlike trying to understand you.

[Jichard]

But a cat as well quantum mechanics are physical things.

Seriously, you make no honest effort to understand to what people say. Cats aren't physical things [or more precisely, the property referred to by "is a cat" is non-physical], and you'd know that if you ever bother to actually read what I wrote. The property referred to by "is a cat" is biological property, not a physical one, since it occurs at a level of description other than than discussed in the science of physics. This is not a problem for physicalism, given the supervenience of these non-physical properties on the physical, as even acknowledged by the source you misrepresented in your quote-mine:

"The physicalist slogan is that 'there is nothing over and above the physical.' The previous section addresses the issue of how 'the physical' is to be understood. This section is concerned with how physicalists unpack their claim that there is 'nothing over and above' the physical. Most physicalists understand 'nothing over and above' in terms of 'metaphysical supervenience' (emphasis added). Supervenience is generally thought of as a 'determination' relation which entails that if 'A' properties supervene upon 'B' properties, then there cannot be a change or difference in A properties without a change or difference in B properties.[13] 'Metaphysical' supervenience entails that if A properties metaphysically supervene upon B properties, then at every possible world in which A properties and B properties are instantiated, there cannot be a difference in A properties without a difference in B properties.[14] If physicalism is understood in terms of metaphysical supervenience, then the thesis at issue is that all non-physical properties in the actual world metaphysically supervene upon the physical. So understood, physicalism does not entail that all properties in the actual world are type identical to physical properties. It is, therefore, compatible with multiple realizability (emphasis added)."

As are the psychological processes.

Once again, those are non-physical processes, since they occur at a level of description discussed in sciences other than physics, such as psychology.

And as far as a naturalistic explanation, who should I believe - Prinz? David Chamlers? http://www.ted.com/talks/david_chalm..._consciousness Or neuroscientist Sam Harris? http://www.samharris.org/blog/item/t...-consciousness

Please don't reference stuff you don't understand, and have no honest interest in understanding. You've already been caught quote-mining something you admit you did not take the time to understand, to the point where you grossly misrepresented your source.

[seer]

[INDENT]"[URL="http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/showthread.php?6236-A-question-for-Materialists-Atheist-Humanists-and-their-allies&p=181865#post181865"]

This is one issue you're trying to take advantage of. You're trying to act as if people need to explain a psychological process ("aware[ness]") at one level, by using a chemical explanation from a much different level (a "set" of chemical reactions). I'm sorry, but that's ridiculous. It's as ridiculous as asking me to use quantum mechanics to explain what a "cat" is. If you want an actual explanation of psychological processes, then please choose a science that operates at the right level of description. The obvious choice would be a psychological science (such as experimental psychology). Or you could opt for a science that deals with processes that occur at a level very close to that of psychological processes. For example: neuroscience or cognitive science. If you do that, then you'll find various naturalistic accounts of "aware[ness]" (ex: Jesse Prinz's).

But a cat as well quantum mechanics are physical things. As are the psychological processes. And as far as a naturalistic explanation, who should I believe - Prinz? David Chamlers? http://www.ted.com/talks/david_chalm..._consciousness Or neuroscientist Sam Harris? http://www.samharris.org/blog/item/t...-consciousness

[Jichard]

OK, this is confusing. Let's go back to the OP.

I'm not surprised that you claim to find it confusing. You're not being intellectually honest. No matter what people tell you, you'll find some way to move the goalposts for the sake of your apologetic goals. I'm not surprised.

You have electro-chemical interactions in the brain, these interactions create thinking/thought - I assume that you would call thinking/thought a mental property. But isn't that just a description of what the electro-chemical interactions are producing?

You're making the same exact mistake that's been pointed out to you no less that 10 times. It's so dishonest of you to keep making that mistake, while pretending not to notice when it's pointed out. You've even resorted to removing my mention of the mistake from your quote of my post. After all, your mistake was pointed out in the very post you're responding to:

"You committed the use-mention mistake again. You're confusing a concept / term with what the term / concept refers to. You're conflating labels with the properties to which those labels refer. It's like confusing the term is a cat with the property to which it refers, by saying that cats are made up of 4 letters."

So, please stop confusing descriptions/labels with the properties to which those descriptions/labels refer.


Anyway, you still seem to be assuming that mental properties occur at the level discussed in organic chemistry; that is: terms that refer to mental properties instead just refer to electrochemical interactions. I already explained the problem with that in my first response to the OP:

"The main problem here has to with levels of scientific explanation. There are various levels of scientific explanation. To help illustrate the point, imagine using a microscope or telescope. Depending on your level of magnification, you'll observe different processes, phenomena, and so on. We deal with the different levels by using have different sciences for different levels. For example, sub-atomic physics deals with lower-level phenomena than does astronomy.

Now, if you want to address a given phenomena, you need to select the science that addresses the level at which that phenomena emerges (or a science which addresses a level close to that phenomena's level). For example, it would be foolish to try and use sub-atomic physics to explain the motion of planets. Sub-atomic physics operates at way too low a level, the scientific tools of sub-atomic physics won't be of much help to you in dealing with large-scale planetary motion, etc. You instead need the tools of astronomy, especially in terms of discussing gravitational effects of large bodies. Now, does that show that there's some dualism between atoms and planets, that planets are made out of non-material substance, etc. No. It simply shows that it's often hard to explain a phenomenon that occurs at one level (ex: a planet's orbit around a star) with a phenomenon that occurs at a very different level (ex: a planet's sub-atomic constituents), even if you already know that (in some sense) the features/processes occurring at one level are constituted by (or emerge from) the features/processes occurring at another level.

This is one issue you're trying to take advantage of. You're trying to act as if people need to explain a psychological process ("aware[ness]") at one level, by using a chemical explanation from a much different level (a "set" of chemical reactions). I'm sorry, but that's ridiculous. It's as ridiculous as asking me to use quantum mechanics to explain what a "cat" is. If you want an actual explanation of psychological processes, then please choose a science that operates at the right level of description. The obvious choice would be a psychological science (such as experimental psychology). Or you could opt for a science that deals with processes that occur at a level very close to that of psychological processes. For example: neuroscience or cognitive science. If you do that, then you'll find various naturalistic accounts of "aware[ness]" (ex: Jesse Prinz's).


On to the other problem: multiple realizibility. Roughly, X is multiply realizable with respect to Y, if there are many configurations of Y such that those configurations constitute X. For example, "houses" is multiply realizable is respect to "arranged building material", since houses can be made out of different configurations of building material. So all the following could count as a house: a skyscraper made out of steel, a cabin made out of wood, a hut made out of mud, etc. It would therefore be absurd to ask me:

What building material is it that allows an arrangement to become a house that it is a chemical reaction?

as if there was only one building material or set of building materials that explains the presence of houses. Instead, the feature referred to by "being a house", can be realized in multiple material arrangements.

So how does that apply to your OP? Well, psychological states like "aware[ness]" are typically taken to be multiply realizable with respect to their material constituents / reactions. So two organisms can have different chemical reactions going on in their heads, even if both organisms are aware. Which means the question you asked is just as absurd as the above question regarding houses and chemical reactions."

[seer]

Which they are, since they aren't properties that occur at the level of description discussed in physics.



They're in the natural world, seer, just like every other existent property.



Non-physical properties exist in the natural world. These include properties like biological properties, chemical properties, astronomical properties, and so on.



A feature particular (or collections of particulars) can have.

OK, this is confusing. Let's go back to the OP. You have electro-chemical interactions in the brain, these interactions create thinking/thought - I assume that you would call thinking/thought a mental property. But isn't that just a description of what the electro-chemical interactions are producing?

[Jichard]

The fact is "mental properties" are no more than descriptions of physical events. When I concluded that mental properties were just ideas that didn't exist anywhere he took exception to that. So I'm not lying, just confused.

You committed the use-mention mistake again. You're confusing a concept / term with what the term / concept refers to. You're conflating labels with the properties to which those labels refer. It's like confusing the term is a cat with the property to which it refers, by saying that cats are made up of 4 letters.

When will you stop committing the "use/mention" mistake?

[Jichard]

Again Jichard - you are the one claiming that mental properties exist and that they are not physical.

Which they are, since they aren't properties that occur at the level of description discussed in physics.

So what the heck are they.

They're in the natural world, seer, just like every other existent property.

And you are implying that they actually exist. Where do these non-physical things exist?

Non-physical properties exist in the natural world. These include properties like biological properties, chemical properties, astronomical properties, and so on.

What exactly is a "property?"

A feature particular (or collections of particulars) can have.

All you are doing is labeling a physical event as something else.

You committed the use-mention mistake again. You're confusing a concept / term with what the term / concept refers to. You're conflating labels with the properties to which those labels refer. It's like confusing the term is a cat with the property to which it refers, by saying that cats are made up of 4 letters.

Non-physical properties exist, seer, unless you take the insane position that the stuff discussed in sciences other than physics (such as biology, chemistry, psychology, astronomy, etc.) doesn't exist.

You could say that a computer has a computational event but in reality it only a physical event that computes.

That's a ridiculous claim to make, since you'd be saying that the only existent features are those that occur at the level discussed by physics. Which is an insane form of eliminativism. That would mean there are no biological properties (so no living organisms), no chemical properties (so no organic reactions), no astronomical properties (so no planets), and so on. No sane naturalist thinks that, seer. To say otherwise is a strawman of naturalism, a strawman you've been caught resorting to time and time again. Instead, most naturalists admit that there are non-physical properties (that is [for the 50th time]: properties that occur at a level of description other than that focused on by the science of physics) and these non-physical properties are instantiated by particulars in the natural world.

[seer]

There isn't anything I don't "get".

"Physical" has several meanings. Jichard made it clear that his intended usage was "relating to physics". Yet you persist in insisting he meant something else, despite repeated correction.

Either you are being deliberately obtuse or you are incredibly stupid. Pick one.*

Roy

*I suspect the former based on previous encounters and since I've already caught you in one lie.

The fact is "mental properties" are no more than descriptions of physical events. When I concluded that mental properties were just ideas that didn't exist anywhere he took exception to that. So I'm not lying, just confused.

[Roy]

What don't you get? My question remains, if these "mental properties are non-physical" as he claimed, then where do they actually exist? I have trying to get a straight answer

There isn't anything I don't "get".

"Physical" has several meanings. Jichard made it clear that his intended usage was "relating to physics". Yet you persist in insisting he meant something else, despite repeated correction.

Either you are being deliberately obtuse or you are incredibly stupid. Pick one.*

Roy

*I suspect the former based on previous encounters and since I've already caught you in one lie.

[seer]

No, he didn't reject that. You only said that a couple of posts ago, and he hasn't responded since then. You are lying.

What he rejected was your mischaracterisation of his views as "So mental properties are non-physical. So they don't actually exist anywhere", and he rejected that because it's a blatant misrepresentation of what he actually said, as is obvious to anyone who bothers to read what he actually wrote, which you've just quoted again without bothering to.

Not that I'd expect anything else from you.

Roy

What don't you get? My question remains, if these "mental properties are non-physical" as he claimed, then where do they actually exist? I have trying to get a straight answer

[Roy]

No he said: "mental properties are non-physical, since they aren't the properties discussed in the science of physics. They don't occur at a physical level of explanation, just as biological properties are non-physics since they don't occur at the level of explanation biology focuses on."

I said then that these were just ideas that described physical events. Which he seemed to reject.

No, he didn't reject that. You only said that a couple of posts ago, and he hasn't responded since then. You are lying.

What he rejected was your mischaracterisation of his views as "So mental properties are non-physical. So they don't actually exist anywhere", and he rejected that because it's a blatant misrepresentation of what he actually said, as is obvious to anyone who bothers to read what he actually wrote, which you've just quoted again without bothering to.

Not that I'd expect anything else from you.

Roy

[seer]

No he isn't. He's claiming that mental properties are not describable in terms of physics.

You would know that if you'd bothered to read what he has repeatedly stated.

Roy

No he said: "mental properties are non-physical, since they aren't the properties discussed in the science of physics. They don't occur at a physical level of explanation, just as biological properties are non-physics since they don't occur at the level of explanation biology focuses on."

I said then that these were just ideas that described physical events. Which he seemed to reject.