A question for Materialists/Atheist/ Humanists and their allies

[Jichard]

First of all Jichard I'm not speaking of how we got where we are but our present brain states. And those brain states are chemical, and nothing more.

They are neurobiological, functional, physical, and so on.

Once again: brain states have non-chemical properties, since not every property is a chemical property (that is: not every property occurs at the level discussed in chemistry). I've explained that no less that 4 times. It's standard philosophy of science. Is there something unclear about it?

Of course you are free to invent whatever analogy you wish, but that fact does not change. So I will ask again, show me, scientifically one psychologically-relevant event that is not chemically driven, where there is something more, physically, than chemistry. I will be waiting.

Repeating the same mistaken question, will get you the same response:

Can you just read and understand what I actually wrote, as opposed to bringing up red herrings?

"And of course there are things other than chemical reactions involved in the thinking process, since no informed naturalists thinks all psychologically-relevant processes occur at the level of chemical reactions. I already discussed this in my reply to the OP, in the context of levels of scientific explanation."

Nowhere in there did I claim that brain processes are not chemically driven. So your question is a red herring based on a strawman you erected. Instead I said that no informed naturalists thinks all psychologically-relevant processes occur at the level of chemical reactions. And that's straightforwardly true, since there are processes that occur at levels other than chemistry, such as the processes discussed by functionalists. Not every process is a chemical process, since not every process occurs at the level discussed by chemistry.

If you still don't know what I mean by "level", then actually read the post I linked to above.

[Jichard]

I have been reading about this and you are incorrect, there are informed naturalists who do not, on any level, buy into functionalism. Some Physicalists and Behaviorists don't buy it in the least. I was reading some stuff by men like Ned Block, Hilary Putnam and John Searle who argue directly against functionalism - are these men not informed?

You're badly misrepresenting what I wrote. I did not claim that all informed naturalists buy into functionalism. What I wrote was:

"no informed naturalists thinks all psychologically-relevant processes occur at the level of chemical reactions"

I repeated this for you no less that 4 times.

And I don't think you know what functionalism is. Saying this:

"no informed naturalists thinks all psychologically-relevant processes occur at the level of chemical reactions"

does not commit one to functionalism. For example, one can argue for it on grounds that have nothing to do with functionalism, such as by pointing out non-chemical properties (that is: properties that don't occur at the level of chemistry). I did that already. Multiple times.

Anyway, I'm familiar with Block, Putnam, and Searle. None of them think that all psychologically-relevant processes occur at the level of chemical reactions. None. For example, Putnam is one of the originators of the multiple realizability argument I gave in my reply to the OP, the very sort of argument one would use to show that psychologically-relevant processes don't occur at the level of chemical reactions, since psychologically-relevant processes are multiply realizable with respect to chemical reactions.

[Jichard]

Getting ready for a trip so I don't have much time ... let me be very brief:

Fine, substitute "chemistry / chemical" with "physical" (which includes chemistry/chemical, mechanical, all of the four basic forces, etc.). The question that I posed remains the same: how did ANY physical process, or combinations of physical processes, become self-aware?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rAugfzh6Y2g
Now apply that to attention in the context of mirror self-recognition.

Feel free to take your religiously-motivated position, while serious people do serious scientific work.

At what stage, at what moment, did that happen?

Don't need to tell you the precise moment. Please stop wasting my time with Sorites paradoxes.

Show that the 'right combination of matter (mass-energy)' -- "right" in terms of space-time position -- implies or leads to or produces self-awareness.

That's easy to show: there's the brain of a self-aware human. Me. So that's an example of the right combination of matter to be self-aware.

That is, after all, what Materialists like yourself believe, isn't it?

And given your Young Earth creationism, I don't expect you to engage with any of the scientific evidence. You've tipped your hand.

[Jichard]

Perhaps it might help to remember there are levels of explanation in science. Fundamentally, the laws of physics are responsible for everything, but it would be ludicrous to try to explain psychology in terms of basic physics. [...]

But to frame the question as 'How does a chemical reaction become self aware?' is much the same as asking 'What is the physics behind social psychology?'

Exactly.

"[...] putative explanations of the behavior of complex or “higher level” systems—explanations that do not explicitly cite spatio-temporally continuous causal processes involving transfer of energy and momentum, even though we may think that such processes are at work at a more “underlying” level. Most explanations in disciplines like biology, psychology and economics fall under this description, as do a number of straightforwardly physical explanations (section 4.3)."

I've expanded on this point in response to the OP.

[seer]

Nowhere in there did I claim that brain processes are not chemically driven. So your question is a red herring based on a strawman you erected. Instead I said that no informed naturalists thinks all psychologically-relevant processes occur at the level of chemical reactions. And that's straightforwardly true, since there are processes that occur at levels other than chemistry, such as the processes discussed by functionalists. Not every process is a chemical process, since not every process occurs at the level discussed by chemistry.

If you still don't know what I mean by "level", then actually read the post I linked to above.[/INDENT]

This is utter nonsense Jichard and useless verbage. First you agree that brain processes are chemically driven, then you say that all not all psychologically-relevant processes occur at the level of chemical reactions. OK, but put up - what physically causes these other psychologically-relevant events? If chemistry is not the cause at these levels then what is the physical cause? See, since we started this little discussion I have been to a number of scientific sites concerning the function of the brain. And pretty much all I found was electrochemical interactions.

[seer]

Anyway, I'm familiar with Block, Putnam, and Searle. None of them think that all psychologically-relevant processes occur at the level of chemical reactions. None. For example, Putnam is one of the originators of the multiple realizability argument I gave in my reply to the OP, the very sort of argument one would use to show that psychologically-relevant processes don't occur at the level of chemical reactions, since psychologically-relevant processes are multiply realizable with respect to chemical reactions.

You mean there are not reductionists that deny or reject multiple realizability? And that they are not informed naturalists?

[Jichard]

You mean there are not reductionists that deny or reject multiple realizability?

That was not at all what I said. What I said was: you were wrong when you claimed they disagree with what I said, since none of them think all psychologically-relevant processes occur at the level of chemical reactions.
Please stop trying to strawman what I wrote.

Specify what you mean by "reductionists". There are multiple forms of reductionism, including conceptual reduction, reduction via identity, and reduction via constitution. The third is compatible with multiple realizability and token-token identity.

And that they are not informed naturalists?

Again, not at all what I said. Please stop strawmanning. Once again, what I said was: you were wrong when you claimed they disagree with what I said, since none of them think all psychologically-relevant processes occur at the level of chemical reactions.

[Jichard]

This is utter nonsense Jichard and useless verbage.

No, its intro philosophy of science, and reveals the mistakes that people like you and Jorge make. What you and Jorge want to do is pretend that naturalists need to account for psychological processes (like awareness) in chemical terms and in reference to chemical reactions. That's silly, as I explained in my response to the OP, since it runs afoul how levels of scientific explanation work (not to mention falling afoul of the multiple realizability of the psychological processes relative to chemical processes).

People other than me have pointed this out to you. For example:

Perhaps it might help to remember there are levels of explanation in science. Fundamentally, the laws of physics are responsible for everything, but it would be ludicrous to try to explain psychology in terms of basic physics.

[...]

But to frame the question as 'How does a chemical reaction become self aware?' is much the same as asking 'What is the physics behind social psychology?'

I've even cited a source for you on this:

"[...] putative explanations of the behavior of complex or “higher level” systems—explanations that do not explicitly cite spatio-temporally continuous causal processes involving transfer of energy and momentum, even though we may think that such processes are at work at a more “underlying” level. Most explanations in disciplines like biology, psychology and economics fall under this description, as do a number of straightforwardly physical explanations (section 4.3)."

So, once again:

Can you just read and understand what I actually wrote, as opposed to bringing up red herrings?

"And of course there are things other than chemical reactions involved in the thinking process, since no informed naturalists thinks all psychologically-relevant processes occur at the level of chemical reactions. I already discussed this in my reply to the OP, in the context of levels of scientific explanation."

Nowhere in there did I claim that brain processes are not chemically driven. So your question is a red herring based on a strawman you erected. Instead I said that no informed naturalists thinks all psychologically-relevant processes occur at the level of chemical reactions. And that's straightforwardly true, since there are processes that occur at levels other than chemistry, such as the processes discussed by functionalists. Not every process is a chemical process, since not every process occurs at the level discussed by chemistry.

If you still don't know what I mean by "level", then actually read the post I linked to above.

It's not "verbage". I'm simply pointing out a mistake you're making in philosophy of science.

First you agree that brain processes are chemically driven, then you say that all not all psychologically-relevant processes occur at the level of chemical reactions. OK, but put up - what physically causes these other psychologically-relevant events?

Prior natural states.

If chemistry is not the cause at these levels then what is the physical cause?

Already explained this to you:

If you still think deny that there are processes that are not chemical reactions, then open up any basic textbook on cognitive science. That will introduce you to processes that don't occur at the level of chemistry. Or open about a biology textbook. Or an astronomy textbook. Or an..

And at this point, I don't think you understand Chalmers work at all. You've basically just quote-mined (as many Christians tend to do, especially creationists) his work, without reading it. I think this because Chalmers spends page after page discussing non-chemical processes involved in psychologically-relevant events (that is: processes that don't occur at the level of chemistry), and yet you seem utterly unaware of this. For example, Chalmers focuses on processes discussed by functionalists, as I told you

There are levels of explanation other than chemistry, seer. These include computational levels of explanation discussed by people like Marr. If you seriously don't know this, then feel free to enroll in a science course that is not a chemistry course, such as a cognitive science course or one in neuroanatomy.

See, since we started this little discussion I have been to a number of scientific sites concerning the function of the brain. And pretty much all I found was electrochemical interactions.

And I have been reading papers (and listening to lectures) in cognitive science, experimental psychology, etc. for years, and they almost always discuss processes that are not electrochemical interactions (that is: processes that don't occur at an electrochemical level). So I'm not impressed that you visited a few websites to support a religiously-motivated argument you have against naturalism.

In any event, Marr's work on vision is one of the standard, touchstone examples of explaining psychological processes at levels other than chemistry. It's discussed extensively in the literature by scientists and philosophers, including by people like Daniel Dennett. Here's a basic introduction to Marr: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_M...euroscientist)
I am surprised you haven't run into his work on these sites you've been frequenting.

[seer]

That was not at all what I said. What I said was: you were wrong when you claimed they disagree with what I said, since none of them think all psychologically-relevant processes occur at the level of chemical reactions.
Please stop trying to strawman what I wrote.

Specify what you mean by "reductionists". There are multiple forms of reductionism, including conceptual reduction, reduction via identity, and reduction via constitution. The third is compatible with multiple realizability and token-token identity.

Really so there are no reductionists that reject multiple realizability? Like Jaegwon Kim, Churchland or Bechtel and Mundale. To name a few I found this afternoon.

[seer]

No, its intro philosophy of science, and reveals the mistakes that people like you and Jorge make. What you and Jorge want to do is pretend that naturalists need to account for psychological processes (like awareness) in chemical terms and in reference to chemical reactions. That's silly, as I explained in my response to the OP, since it runs afoul how levels of scientific explanation work (not to mention falling afoul of the multiple realizability of the psychological processes relative to chemical processes).

People other than me have pointed this out to you. For example:
I've even cited a source for you on this:

"[...] putative explanations of the behavior of complex or “higher level” systems—explanations that do not explicitly cite spatio-temporally continuous causal processes involving transfer of energy and momentum, even though we may think that such processes are at work at a more “underlying” level. Most explanations in disciplines like biology, psychology and economics fall under this description, as do a number of straightforwardly physical explanations (section 4.3)."

So, once again:

Can you just read and understand what I actually wrote, as opposed to bringing up red herrings?

"And of course there are things other than chemical reactions involved in the thinking process, since no informed naturalists thinks all psychologically-relevant processes occur at the level of chemical reactions. I already discussed this in my reply to the OP, in the context of levels of scientific explanation."

Nowhere in there did I claim that brain processes are not chemically driven. So your question is a red herring based on a strawman you erected. Instead I said that no informed naturalists thinks all psychologically-relevant processes occur at the level of chemical reactions. And that's straightforwardly true, since there are processes that occur at levels other than chemistry, such as the processes discussed by functionalists. Not every process is a chemical process, since not every process occurs at the level discussed by chemistry.

If you still don't know what I mean by "level", then actually read the post I linked to above.

It's not "verbage". I'm simply pointing out a mistake you're making in philosophy of science.



Prior natural states.



Already explained this to you:
There are levels of explanation other than chemistry, seer. These include computational levels of explanation discussed by people like Marr. If you seriously don't know this, then feel free to enroll in a science course that is not a chemistry course, such as a cognitive science course or one in neuroanatomy.



And I have been reading papers (and listening to lectures) in cognitive science, experimental psychology, etc. for years, and they almost always discuss processes that are not electrochemical interactions (that is: processes that don't occur at an electrochemical level). So I'm not impressed that you visited a few websites to support a religiously-motivated argument you have against naturalism.

In any event, Marr's work on vision is one of the standard, touchstone examples of explaining psychological processes at levels other than chemistry. It's discussed extensively in the literature by scientists and philosophers, including by people like Daniel Dennett. Here's a basic introduction to Marr: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_M...euroscientist)
I am surprised you haven't run into his work on these sites you've been frequenting.

Stop referencing other sites Jichard and just tell me. What exactly, physically causes these other psychological processes?

[Jichard]

Stop referencing other sites Jichard and just tell me.

Funny, since you have no problem mentioning other sites when it's convenient for you, or patting people on the bag for citing other sources.

What exactly, physically causes these other psychological processes?

Already answered your question.

It's not my fault that (in your apologetic zeal to criticize naturalism) you're either unable or unwilling to deal with the science on this in any depth. Some of us actually read sources, beyond just quote-mining passages from Harris and Chalmers, when without understanding those passages. So you're getting the same response from me:

I've even cited a source for you on this:

"[...] putative explanations of the behavior of complex or “higher level” systems—explanations that do not explicitly cite spatio-temporally continuous causal processes involving transfer of energy and momentum, even though we may think that such processes are at work at a more “underlying” level. Most explanations in disciplines like biology, psychology and economics fall under this description, as do a number of straightforwardly physical explanations (section 4.3)."

So, once again:

Can you just read and understand what I actually wrote, as opposed to bringing up red herrings?

"And of course there are things other than chemical reactions involved in the thinking process, since no informed naturalists thinks all psychologically-relevant processes occur at the level of chemical reactions. I already discussed this in my reply to the OP, in the context of levels of scientific explanation."

Nowhere in there did I claim that brain processes are not chemically driven. So your question is a red herring based on a strawman you erected. Instead I said that no informed naturalists thinks all psychologically-relevant processes occur at the level of chemical reactions. And that's straightforwardly true, since there are processes that occur at levels other than chemistry, such as the processes discussed by functionalists. Not every process is a chemical process, since not every process occurs at the level discussed by chemistry.

If you still don't know what I mean by "level", then actually read the post I linked to above.

There are levels of explanation other than chemistry, seer. These include computational levels of explanation discussed by people like Marr. If you seriously don't know this, then feel free to enroll in a science course that is not a chemistry course, such as a cognitive science course or one in neuroanatomy.



And I have been reading papers (and listening to lectures) in cognitive science, experimental psychology, etc. for years, and they almost always discuss processes that are not electrochemical interactions (that is: processes that don't occur at an electrochemical level).

In any event, Marr's work on vision is one of the standard, touchstone examples of explaining psychological processes at levels other than chemistry. It's discussed extensively in the literature by scientists and philosophers, including by people like Daniel Dennett. Here's a basic introduction to Marr: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_M...euroscientist)
I am surprised you haven't run into his work on these sites you've been frequenting.

[Jichard]

Really so there are no reductionists that reject multiple realizability? Like Jaegwon Kim, Churchland or Bechtel and Mundale. To name a few I found this afternoon.

It's like you intentionally misrepresent people, when it suits your apologetic purposes. This is sad.

I never said that "there are no reductionists that reject multiple realizability". Stop strawmanning.

What I said was: you were wrong when you claimed they disagree with what I said, since none of them think all psychologically-relevant processes occur at the level of chemical reactions. I've repeated this for you no less than 6 times, and even did so twice in the very post you were responding to, with bolding and underlining for emphasis. Yet you still misrepresent it. Seriously, seer, are you capable of fairly representing what people write? This has gone beyond just an honest misunderstanding. You're literally changing what I say in order to suit your purposes.

And I know full well that you have idea about the nuances in the views of people like Kim and the Churchlands. You're just doing what you did for Harris and Chalmers: quote-mining/misrepresenting work you are not familiar with, because you think it fits you apologetic goals, much as Young Earth creationists quote-mine Darwin. Sorry, seer, but you can't actually bluff me. I've read work from Kim and the Churchlands. They do not think all psychologically-relevant processes occur at the level of chemical reactions.

[seer]

There are levels of explanation other than chemistry, seer. These include computational levels of explanation discussed by people like Marr. If you seriously don't know this, then feel free to enroll in a science course that is not a chemistry course, such as a cognitive science course or one in neuroanatomy.

Good, so what physically causes these computational events if not chemistry?

[Jichard]

Good, so what physically causes these computational events if not chemistry?

So I guess you're not going to own up to your strawmen and misrepresentations? Figures.

Anyway, you're just doing the apologist's tactic of moving the goalposts. I said:

no informed naturalists thinks all psychologically-relevant processes occur at the level of chemical reactions

You've still yet to address that, without strawmanning it.

And you're still misled on this. Events are caused by previous events (normally specific constituents of previous events). Those events (and their constituents) have various properties, including computational properties, chemical properties, biological properties, and so on. The various sciences discuss these properties (and the relevant processes) at various levels of description. Now, you erroneously seem to think there is some computational event utterly divorced form the chemical event that occurs at the same time. That's a confusion on your part. Given what I just said, there is instead an event, where that event has a computational description that describes its computational properties, a chemical description that discusses it's chemical properties, a biological description that discusses it's biological properties, and so on. This is philosophy of science 101.

So your "what physically causes these computational events if not chemistry?" is based on a confusion on your part. One natural event causes another natural event, where each of those events have different properties under different descriptions. You would have caught on to this if you bothered to ever fairly address the above bright red claim you've been dodging for awhile now.

[seer]

So I guess you're not going to own up to your strawmen and misrepresentations? Figures.

Anyway, you're just doing the apologist's tactic of moving the goalposts. I said:

no informed naturalists thinks all psychologically-relevant processes occur at the level of chemical reactions

You've still yet to address that, without strawmanning it.

And you're still misled on this. Events are caused by previous events (normally specific constituents of previous events). Those events (and their constituents) have various properties, including computational properties, chemical properties, biological properties, and so on. The various sciences discuss these properties (and the relevant processes) at various levels of description. Now, you erroneously seem to think there is some computational event utterly divorced form the chemical event that occurs at the same time. That's a confusion on your part. Given what I just said, there is instead an event, where that event has a computational description that describes its computational properties, a chemical description that discusses it's chemical properties, a biological description that discusses it's biological properties, and so on. This is philosophy of science 101.

So your "what physically causes these computational events if not chemistry?" is based on a confusion on your part. One natural event causes another natural event, where each of those events have different properties under different descriptions. You would have caught on to this if you bothered to ever fairly address the above bright red claim you've been dodging for awhile now.

All you are really doing is labeling certain chemical events as something else. A computational event is no less chemical than any other brain state. You, or others, can call it something else - but in reality it is a chemical reaction.