Need Help With Reading Comprehension

[phank]

Epistemology can be heavy going. I was interested in reading the "modern" view that something qualifies as knowledge if:
1) It is believed to be true.
2) It is actually true in the objective universe.
3) The belief that it's true is sufficiently justified.

The post-modernists omit qualifier #2, on the grounds (as I understand it) that objective truth is forever inaccessible. For them, Zeus was a true god in ancient Greece as surely as the Christian god is a true god today (and Vishnu is a true god in parts of India).

But both schools of thought concentrate on #3, the justification for the belief that something is correct. CAN biology be reduced to chemistry? The claim that there are aspects to biology that can NOT be reduced to chemistry requires, as justification, the identification of some biologcal phenomena which is not composed of, and does not derive from, atoms and molecules. So the question becomes, should we go with the post-modernists and say that a sufficient majority of biolgists believing yes or no, determines our knowledge? Or with the modernists, who take the nominative position that there IS an objective reality, and we evaulate our justifications based on how well our investigations converge on it?

[Adrift]

Which scientism are they defending or attacking; AIG's, Shook's, or that described by Jeroen de Ridder?

As far as I can see they're all referring to exactly the same thing. The view that sees science as the only access to the truth. Every single one of these people/articles are saying that. I don't know how you've come to any other conclusion.

Who are the martyrs of 'scientism' that claim the mantle of rationality?

I don't know what you mean by martyr, but if you're referring to the last quote by Austin Hughes I posted, presumably he's referring to people like James Laydman, Don Ross, David Spurret, Alex Rosenberg, Jason Rosenhouse, and maybe even John Shook.

[Adrift]

Maybe you can convince him to use only your preferred terminology. His way of dealing with this is to speak of scientistic epistemology and notes those who distinguish between epistemological claims and ontological claims of scientism. Thus, for him, epistemological scientism and ontological scientism would correspond roughly (not exactly, of course) to your use of methodological naturalism and metaphysical naturalism. Shook and I have already noted that some philosophers are less comfortable with the term metaphysical naturalism.

I'm increasingly beginning to believe that shunya has it in his head that if one is a metaphysical naturalist, they cannot also be a methodological naturalist, but I don't see anything in the definitions of the two that would prevent one from being both. Perhaps not all methodological naturalists are metaphysical naturalists, but surely all metaphysical naturalists are methodological naturalists. I believe his insistence in keeping each type of naturalism separate is a part of the reason why he doesn't accept the views of people like Shook.

[phank]

I'm increasingly beginning to believe that shunya has it in his head that if one is a metaphysical naturalist, they cannot also be a methodological naturalist, but I don't see anything in the definitions of the two that would prevent one from being both. Perhaps not all methodological naturalists are metaphysical naturalists, but surely all metaphysical naturalists are methodological naturalists. I believe his insistence in keeping each type of naturalism separate is a part of the reason why he doesn't accept the views of people like Shook.

I get the impression that metaphysical naturalism is the theoretical base, and methodological naturalism is nothing but applied metaphysical naturalism. I know there are working scientists who also believe in a variety of gods (science being pursued worldwide), but this may be simple compartmentalization. They simply take metaphysical naturalism for granted as they work, much as a swimmer takes hydrodynamics for granted. Even religiously devout scientists do not even think of including anything supernatural in their hypotheses, research, or conclusions.

[robrecht]

I'm increasingly beginning to believe that shunya has it in his head that if one is a metaphysical naturalist, they cannot also be a methodological naturalist, but I don't see anything in the definitions of the two that would prevent one from being both. Perhaps not all methodological naturalists are metaphysical naturalists, but surely all metaphysical naturalists are methodological naturalists. I believe his insistence in keeping each type of naturalism separate is a part of the reason why he doesn't accept the views of people like Shook.

Certainly (not just perhaps) all methodological naturalists are not metaphysical naturalists. But there are valid reasons why someone who is what Shuny (and others) would call a metaphysical naturalist would not want to use this label for themselves. Why he cannot accept this, I do not know, and do not really want to speculate here. Whenever anyone studies philosophy, one must be attentive to the various nuances of terminology as it is used by different philosophers and it is futile and comical to insist, or even prefer, that everyone use exactly the same terminology in exactly the same way. A philosopher who prefers to have a consistent and holistic naturalist philosophy, including both naturalist ontological and naturalist epistemological positions may object to his view being defined as metaphysical when he very well might object to even the validity of metaphysics. According to them, there is nothing above and beyond or after physics, ie, nature, in Greek. This is what Shook meant about the sometimes contentious relationship between naturalists with metaphysics and what I meant previously about 'metaphysical naturalism' being a little bit oxymoronic from some perspectives. It is almost as if one were to say, 'from my metaphysical perspective, I do not believe there is a metaphysical perspective.' Others, of course, will have no difficulty defining themselves from the perspective of others, but the term 'ontology/ontological' is perfectly adequate and is accepted by all as having the same sense. A consistent naturalist philosophy should indeed consist of a coherent naturalist ontology and a naturalist epistemology. I do not see why this should be objectionable to anyone.

[Adrift]

I get the impression that metaphysical naturalism is the theoretical base, and methodological naturalism is nothing but applied metaphysical naturalism. I know there are working scientists who also believe in a variety of gods (science being pursued worldwide), but this may be simple compartmentalization. They simply take metaphysical naturalism for granted as they work, much as a swimmer takes hydrodynamics for granted. Even religiously devout scientists do not even think of including anything supernatural in their hypotheses, research, or conclusions.

Hmm. Maybe you have the words switched around? Because it seems to me that a scientist who believes in some sort of divinity would not be called a metaphysical naturalist, but rather a methodological naturalist.

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naturalism_(philosophy)#Metaphysical_naturalism

Metaphysical naturalism
Metaphysical naturalism, also called "ontological naturalism" and "philosophical naturalism", is a philosophical worldview and belief system that holds that there is nothing but natural elements, principles, and relations of the kind studied by the natural sciences, i.e., those required to understand our physical environment by mathematical modeling. Methodological naturalism, on the other hand, refers exclusively to the methodology of science, for which metaphysical naturalism provides only one possible ontological foundation.

Metaphysical naturalism holds that all properties related to consciousness and the mind are reducible to, or supervene upon, nature. Broadly, the corresponding theological perspective is religious naturalism or spiritual naturalism. More specifically, metaphysical naturalism rejects the supernatural concepts and explanations that are part of many religions.

Methodological naturalism
Methodological naturalism concerns itself not with claims about what exists but with methods of learning what nature is. It is strictly the idea that all scientific endeavors—all hypotheses and events—are to be explained and tested by reference to natural causes and events. The genesis of nature (for example, by an act of God) is not addressed. This second sense of naturalism seeks only to provide a framework within which to conduct the scientific study of the laws of nature. Methodological naturalism is a way of acquiring knowledge. It is a distinct system of thought concerned with a cognitive approach to reality, and is thus a philosophy of knowledge. Studies by sociologist Elaine Ecklund suggest that religious scientists in practice apply methodological naturalism. They report that their religious beliefs affect the way they think about the implications - often moral - of their work, but not the way they practice science.

© Copyright Original Source

[phank]

Hmm. Maybe you have the words switched around? Because it seems to me that a scientist who believes in some sort of divinity would not be called a metaphysical naturalist, but rather a methodological naturalist.

I guess I didn't explain clearly enough. I cannot see a person's beiefs directly -- I must listen to what he says and watch what he does. Consider the scientist who believes in anything supernatural. He SAYS this is what he believes, but there is not the slightest trace of that belief in anything he does as a scientist. Ever. Worse yet, as I tried to say, methodological naturalism is actually applied metaphysical naturalism - it is metaphysical naturism put into practice. At best, he is obliged by the very nature of the scientific enterprise to pretend to metaphysical beliefs he does not hold. At worst, he knows better.

As somewhat of an analogy, I have known a good many people in my life who CLAIM to be devout Christians, but who in practice lie, cheat and steal, who are unfaithful and untrustworthy, who radiate bigotry, etc. So is it possible to be a metaphysical Christian, but a methodological knave? Or is the claimed faith just another untruth? Or (I think likely) is it possible for someone to THINK they are a Christian because they want to, but behave in ways that have Christ doing facepalms?

Looking at the quotes you thoughtfully provided, I see that religious scientists ACT like metaphysical naturalists in every professional respect. They are walking examples of Mark Twain's quip that "faith is believing what you know ain't so."

(Once again, I observe that where scientists disagree, they isolate the details of their disagreement and construct differentiating tests. Soon enough, these matters are sufficiently well studied so that one or both admits error. Science always eventually dovetails into agreement, because the arbitrator is reality, and there's only one of them. Religions, on the other hand, have no such objective authority to appeal to. They experience schisms, irresolvable forever. Religious "knowledge" is not testable. The best a religious scientist can really do, is pay lip service to a faith that plays no role in his search for knowledge. Religious truth claims are not knowledge.)

[shunyadragon]

Maybe you can convince him to use only your preferred terminology. His way of dealing with this is to speak of scientistic epistemology and notes those who distinguish between epistemological claims and ontological claims of scientism. Thus, for him, epistemological scientism and ontological scientism would correspond roughly (not exactly, of course) to your use of methodological naturalism and metaphysical naturalism. Shook and I have already noted that some philosophers are less comfortable with the term metaphysical naturalism.

Then use ontological naturalism for metaphysical naturalism. I do not believe epistemological scientism translates well to anything that I can find. Can you provide a reference here on how this is used. They should not be that uncomfortable with terminology like Methodological Naturalism to need to invent 'scientisms' with inconsistent meanings.

Regardless of discomfort, scientism is too lossey goosey translate consistently to anything since it is used differently by different people.

[robrecht]

Then use ontological naturalism for metaphysical naturalism. I do not believe epistemological scientism translates well to anything that I can find. Can you provide a reference here on how this is used. They should not be that uncomfortable with terminology like Methodological Naturalism to need to invent 'scientisms' with inconsistent meanings.

Regardless of discomfort, scientism is too lossey goosey translate consistently to anything since it is used differently by different people.

Just look at the way de Ridder uses it; he also gives a few references. But isn't it rather self-explanatory? Also keep in mind that scientism as used here by de Ridder is a pejorative. He is not necessarily critiquing methodological naturalism here but rather an overreaching form of epistemological scientism. I'm sorry you are not feeling comfortable with the thoughts and expressions of others in all their variety.

[shunyadragon]

Not quite. Shook takes the same position as John Dewey, thus he holds that 'a thing can’t have any reality unless it can be theoretically confirmed by one of the biological or natural sciences'. But he rejects the position that might claim 'a thing has no reality at all unless its existence is required by a theory of a single natural science enjoying the widest universality (physics)'. The latter position, which I think may be that of physicists such as Stephen Hawking, does not reject biology but does believe that all laws determining biological phenomena are ultimately reducible to the physical sciences. Shook, on the other hand, believes that 'some kinds of biological matters will never be reducible without remainder to chemistry/physics'. He gives two reasons why one might take a reductive view of biology, either the 'lack of a bridging law' or the use of 'teleological explanation'. Even the maximalist physicists do not reject biology, only such suspicious elements in it or any foundational view that biological science cannot ultimately be reduced to physical laws.

Not clear you need to cite Shook directly if you feel his definition of 'scientism' includes anything else besides 'just the physical sciences.'

What is not clear to you about teleology not being a properly inductive element in biology?

Teleology would be a separate consideration from the inductive element whether one believes something has design and purpose.

[shunyadragon]

I'm increasingly beginning to believe that shunya has it in his head that if one is a metaphysical naturalist, they cannot also be a methodological naturalist, but I don't see anything in the definitions of the two that would prevent one from being both. Perhaps not all methodological naturalists are metaphysical naturalists, but surely all metaphysical naturalists are methodological naturalists. I believe his insistence in keeping each type of naturalism separate is a part of the reason why he doesn't accept the views of people like Shook.

Scientists who support the methods of methodological naturalism as the epistemology of our physical existence, which in and of itself is neutral to any ontological (metaphysical) assumptions, may believe in other sources of knowledge such as a theistic source. Those that believe in ontological naturalism use the same methodological naturalism methodology, but believe that science is capable of explaining all possible knowledge of our existence, and rejects other possible sources of knowledge.

[robrecht]

Not clear you need to cite Shook directly if you feel his definition of 'scientism' includes anything else besides 'just the physical sciences.'

I just gave you four word-for-word quotations from Shook to try to make this clear to you, 'though I used single quotation marks in order to abbreviate slightly. Just the physical sciences means everything, including the legitimate parts of the the life sciences, is ultimately understood as reducible to the physical sciences. What exactly is still so unclear to you?

Teleology would be a separate consideration from the inductive element whether one believes something has design and purpose.

Exactly, which is why it cannot be reducible to the physical sciences.

[shunyadragon]

Just look at the way de Ridder uses it; he also gives a few references. But isn't it rather self-explanatory?

No it is not.

Also keep in mind that scientism as used here by de Ridder is a pejorative. He is not necessarily critiquing methodological naturalism here but rather an overreaching form of epistemological scientism. I'm sorry you are not feeling comfortable with the thoughts and expressions of others in all their variety.

Can you provide a clear definition for epistemological scientism. What do you mean by form of? You described epistemological scientism as some how roughly equivalent to methodological naturalism.

[robrecht]

Scientists who support the methods of methodological naturalism as the epistemology of our physical existence, which in and of itself is neutral to any ontological (metaphysical) assumptions, may believe in other sources of knowledge such as a theistic source. Those that believe in ontological naturalism use the same methodological naturalism methodology, but believe that science is capable of explaining all possible knowledge of our existence, and rejects other possible sources of knowledge.

Doesn't "methodological naturalism methodology" sound a little redundant to you? Why not just say they use the same naturalist methodology? More concise. No need to burden a description of scientific method with a disclaimer relating to the possibility of God, the divine, spiritual, the source some call God. Flexible. Smooth. Concise. Peaceful. Think happy thoughts.

[shunyadragon]

I just gave you four word-for-word quotations from Shook to try to make this clear to you, 'though I used single quotation marks in order to abbreviate slightly. Just the physical sciences means everything, including the legitimate parts of the the life sciences, is ultimately understood as reducible to the physical sciences. What exactly is still so unclear to you?

Exactly, which is why it cannot be reducible to the physical sciences.

Physical Sciences DOES NOT mean everything, by any possible recognized science definition. Please cite Shook fully and completely if you believe he refers to a different definition then 'just physical sciences. Physical Sciences + Life Sciences = Natural Sciences by science definitions.

Do not abbreviate slightly. Cite him clearly and completely as to how and where he defines scientism differently.