Some readers may appreciate this introduction to the complex and subtle case against scientism (the author's definition).
To begin with, part of the central tenet of empiricism-positivism (also called Popperianism and logic positivism) is that statements can be classified into three categories: 1) empirical, 2) analytical, and 3) nonsense or emotive. An emotive statement is merely emotion-provoking ("Wow!" "Grrr!") Consider the sentence, "Leprechauns are not real." Let's assume "leprechaun" is understood to be a particular kind of being. The statement could be true or false and hence is to be classified as empirical (this point will be disputed later). Analytical statements are in essence definitions. For example, someone may point to a deer on his front lawn and say, "deer!" His listeners are supposed to associate the word "deer" with that tan-colored animal presently cavorting on the lawn.
The second part of the tenet is that only empirical statements can be true or false. Analytical statements are meaningful only to the extent that they help people or lead them to understand what every part of any particular empirical statements mean.
Note that that tenet is a strong version of the author's version of scientism. In this post I will attempt to show that empiricism is self-contradictory. But even if I succeed in convincing a reader that it is, that does not disprove scientism. This post is just introductory.
Now consider the central tenet of empiricism (the tenet above) itself. Is it empirical? No--what experiments or observations have been made that would support or disprove it? None as far as I know. So, is it analytical? But even if the answer is yes, that would not show the tenet is true. Is it nonsense, then? Not emotive, clearly, but it could be nonsense. Possibly!
Knowledge is possible that is not in the form of empirical statements, but to establish that point would take many pages of close and subtle reasoning, so may I be allowed to end the post here?
To begin with, part of the central tenet of empiricism-positivism (also called Popperianism and logic positivism) is that statements can be classified into three categories: 1) empirical, 2) analytical, and 3) nonsense or emotive. An emotive statement is merely emotion-provoking ("Wow!" "Grrr!") Consider the sentence, "Leprechauns are not real." Let's assume "leprechaun" is understood to be a particular kind of being. The statement could be true or false and hence is to be classified as empirical (this point will be disputed later). Analytical statements are in essence definitions. For example, someone may point to a deer on his front lawn and say, "deer!" His listeners are supposed to associate the word "deer" with that tan-colored animal presently cavorting on the lawn.
The second part of the tenet is that only empirical statements can be true or false. Analytical statements are meaningful only to the extent that they help people or lead them to understand what every part of any particular empirical statements mean.
Note that that tenet is a strong version of the author's version of scientism. In this post I will attempt to show that empiricism is self-contradictory. But even if I succeed in convincing a reader that it is, that does not disprove scientism. This post is just introductory.
Now consider the central tenet of empiricism (the tenet above) itself. Is it empirical? No--what experiments or observations have been made that would support or disprove it? None as far as I know. So, is it analytical? But even if the answer is yes, that would not show the tenet is true. Is it nonsense, then? Not emotive, clearly, but it could be nonsense. Possibly!
Knowledge is possible that is not in the form of empirical statements, but to establish that point would take many pages of close and subtle reasoning, so may I be allowed to end the post here?
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